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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Research Design 
 
1.1 Background and Objectives 
The fall of Soeharto from his throne as the president the Republic of Indonesia for 
more than 30 years has brought about the inspiration to make a study on political 
communication.  What is going to find out here is the relationship between the political 
transition and freedom of the press. The reason behind is that in other countries, such a 
change in the media system has also influenced the transition.  A free media system will 
be much better in overthrowing an authoritarian regime in East Europe than if such a 
system was previously defended (O’Neil, 1998).  In Taiwan, the media plays an 
important role in the political transition (Randall, 1998).  The global process has further 
transformed such a political communication through the liberalization, deregulation, and 
distribution of new media technology (Axford and Huggins, 2001). 
It is quite rare to find a review on political communication in Indonesia, 
particularly the published one. After the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, however, there 
have been many books which discuss how media has played an important role in the new 
political system, which was called a democratic system. The television media which had 
been following the “free and responsible press” system without any capability to criticize 
Soeharto and his cronies suddenly reported the reality of protests against Soeharto.  
Moreover, a former minister in Soeharto’s cabinet in a television interview said the best 
thing for Soeharto was to resign. Just like a person suffering from a toothache, he had to 
pull the troubled tooth out (Hidayat et al., 2000).  It was impossible to express such a 
statement openly in media when the old political system existed.  
The question is whether such a political change is the result of changes in freedom 
of the press. The next question is how the structures of the new political system 
influenced freedom of the press. For example, how press freedom in Indonesia has 
dramatically changed after the fall of Soeharto. Referring to Gabriel Almond’s view that 
political communication is a function in a political system (1960), how did legislators set 
up new rules on freedom of the press?  
The fact shows that after Soeharto, mass media was more or even so free to play 
its role as a channel for political communication. However, another fact was that such 
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freedom could not be easily understood by the government and the society.  Besides, the 
media itself was not ready to work professionally.  As a consequence, a large number of 
tensions between the government and media came to surface; there were a number of 
anarchic actions by community groups which felt to have been harmed by media reports.  
But the interesting fact which has been the focus of this study is how the 
structures in such immature democratic political system played their role in the process of 
political communication by releasing the new press law, which adopted the principles of 
liberal press freedom. So, the objective of this book is to explore political communication 
in the transitional period in Indonesia, to see the attitudes and efforts of political 
structures which gave birth to the legal arrangements for the press.  
 
1.2 Methodology, Research Design and Methods 
As a research to understand certain social situations such as the events, roles, 
groups or interactions (Creswell, 1994), this research is more an interpretative, 
constructive, and theoretical proposition (paradigm) in nature. It is a coherent method of 
communication study. In German intellectual tradition, interpretism is included in the 
hermeneutic or Verstehen tradition of sociology; a phenomenon from Alfred Schultz and 
criticism over scientism and positivism in social sciences which were influenced by 
empirical logic. In the eye of Schwandt (in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), interpretism 
discusses the uniqueness of human curiosity. It creates some objections against 
naturalistic interpretation in social sciences. It proposes that a mental science or 
Geisteswissenschaften or a cultural science or Kulturwissenschaften is different from a 
natural science or Naturwissenschaften.  The objective of a natural science is a scientific 
explanation (Erklaren), whereas the objective of a social science is to achieve or 
understand (Verstehen) ”the meaning” of a social phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994: 119). 
From an anthropological philosophy perspective, it is a study based on the 
division to describe and explain human beings and human behaviors. Intepretism states 
that a human behavior is purposive in nature. An interpretist leaves a mechanistical 
explanation, while a neo-behaviorist, an associationist leaves the explanation of human 
behavior.  Social agents are considered as being autonomous, intentional, active, goal 
directed; they estimate, construct, interpret their own and their agents’ behaviors (Denzin 
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and Lincoln, 1994: 120). The primary focus of an interpretist is to understand 
(Verstehen); that is why he / she considers a social reality condition in a quite different 
way from those who advocate the social science frameworks of an empiricist.  In this 
paradigm, an actor’s point of view is used to understand what happens. Understanding is 
also its major topic and methodological source (Lindlof, 1995).  Next, Lindlof says, 
ontological realities are understood in multiple forms, for instance, a mental construction 
which cannot be expressed clearly (intangibly), social and experimental base, local and 
special condition. Their shapes and contents are dependent on the individual person or 
group holding the construction. From an epistemological point of view, the research and 
its research object are assumed to be interactively related so that “the results” are literally 
created when investigation is still going on. From a methodological point of view, the 
variables and personal conditions of a social construction requires that an individual 
construction be elicited and filtered through the interactions between and within the 
research and respondents. These construction variations are interpreted with conventional 
hermeneutical techniques and are compared and contrasted through dialectical exchanges. 
The final objective is to filter a construction which is more informed and more 
sophisticated than the previous one (Lindlof, 1995:109). 
  An important question in applying an interpretive paradigm is related to the 
method.  Madison explains that a scientific method is characterized as an abstract one 
which means that it method is based on the elimination of personal and subjective 
judgments; while the criteria of the implementation is the correctness or in other words, 
the implementation which is directed by the method itself. Then, an interpretation or 
decision which was made by someone cannot be considered verifiable or testable without 
applying the norms or criteria which are appropriate to the respective condition to 
interpret it. The criteria include  thoroughness, coherence, comprehensiveness and so on, 
and also a question whether the interpretation is useful, valuable, etc., or not (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994: 122).  
This research will study how the discussion upon the draft of the 1999 Press Law 
in Indonesia was in fact a social situation reflecting the dynamics of political 
communication, and which described the relationship among the government, media, and 
society. It will also study how the discussion in the legislative body (House of 
Representatives) reflects the debates or competitions among political interests involving 
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the government, House of Representatives, and other components namely media and the 
society. This research will cover informants who were  involved in the discussion to 
prepare the laws, especially  some legislators from political parties, and some people 
from the media and civil society.  In order to reveal and to give a meaning to the social 
situation, two approaches are employed. First is to interview, and the second is to collect 
data or information from texts.  Interview is the most common and the most powerful 
method used to understand human beings (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  In a qualitative 
research, an interview has some objectives, for example to learn about things which 
cannot be directly observed with other methods or to understand a social actor 
perspective (Lindlof, 1995:166). In this research, the interview approach is applied to a 
number of informants (informant interviews) having a close relationship with the three 
former  presidents in the transitional period of Indonesia, namely Dewi Fortuna Anwar as 
“the spokesperson” of President BJ Habibie, Cornelis Lay as a political advisor to 
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Adhi M.Massardi, speaker to Presiden Abdurrahman 
Wahid. Their opinions can be considered as ‘representing’ those of the three former 
presidents.  Meanwhile, two persons would represent the media, namely the Vice Editor-
in-Chief of Kompas daily St.Sularto and senior journalist Trias Kuncahyono; the  Head of 
Research and Development Division of Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) Iskandar Siahaan 
and  a news producer Erdy  Taufik.  The society would be represented by four activists of 
the Press and Broadcasting Society, like Leo Batubara, Zainal Suryokusumo, also Chair 
of Press Council Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, a member of the Council, Amir Effendi 
Siregar, and RH Siregar of Indonesian Jurnalis Union (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia-
PWI).  Another person from a political party we can interview comes from Indonesian 
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-PDI), YB Wijanjono and Paulus 
Widiyanto. Interviews with informants are made with those who are of greater mobility 
in an organization than the rest, and those who have more experiences in certain matters. 
They are well respected by their organization, superiors, and or subordinates. An 
informant will typically be interviewed several times to get any special information, 
usually with well prepared questions in the best suitable time and place for the interview 
(Lindlof, 1995:170-171). A guide for the interview will organize the topics covered in 
this research.  Topics of questions are derived from theories applied in this research 
particularly those on democracy, press freedom, and relationship between the government 
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and media.  
Other information which is expected to reveal the meaning in such a social 
situation when the Press Regulation was discussed comes from the official texts 
published by the Center for Documentation Service and the Secretariat General of the 
House of Representatives. Two bundles of the texts, Book 2A, 2B and 2C, could be 
obtained. Book 2A contains a Work Treatise coming from the discussion on August 26, 
27, 30, and September 9, 1999. Book 2B is about the meetings on August 31 August, and 
September 1, 2, and 3, 1999, while Book 2C lists the issues in the Press Law draft. A set 
of complete tapes of the discussions on the drafting of the Press Law, including the 
opinions suggested by the Government (Information Minister), chiefs and members of 
legislative (House of Representatives) from political parties, mass media and civil society 
representatives especially  Indonesian Society on Press and Broadcasting (Masyarakat 
Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia-MPPI)  which currently served as an advisor to the 
government could be made available.  Other materials could be made available from 
mass media reports especially from Kompas daily which had provided a good and smooth 
online system for easy access. The reports from Kompas on the discussions would also be 
complementary to the interviews and information from the Indonesian House of 
Representative.  A content analysis on Kompas texts was made by applying the 
effectiveness dimension of the informants and multi-access dimension as stated by 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996). Through an effectiveness dimension, it can be seen how 
informants get the fundamental effects on the content of Kompas while through a multi-
access dimension, it can be seen how the news objectivity level was fulfilled.  An 
informant may not only an individual but can also be an organization, which in this case 
such an informant can also be called an actor (Dijk, 1988).   
Huberman and Miles define a data analysis from three sub processes, namely data 
reduction, data display and conclusion (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 428-429).  This 
process runs before the collection of data, during the preparation of plan and design, 
during the collection of data, and after the data are collected. In the sub process of data 
reduction, all data potentials are reduced in a research anticipative method by choosing 
the relevant concept frameworks, research questions, cases, and instruments.  These 
include all actual field notes, records, and other available data, data compilations, coding, 
finding, clustering, and writings.  The sub process of data display is how to organize the 
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information and to summarize the results in a conclusion as a part of the analysis. The 
process of data reduction is the basis to think about the meaning. A conclusion inference 
and verification involve the researcher in the process of interpretation: to draw the 
meaning of a data presentation.  The strategy includes, among others, to compare / 
contrast, to write down the patterns and themes, to group and to use metaphors, for 
instance by applying a triangulation, to draw negative cases, to follow a surprise, and to 
check the results with the respondents.    
 
 
Table 1.1: Research Method 
Units of analysis Locus of data Analysis Method 
1. Political Communication  
1.1.How was the media tendency in 
reporting the process to draw the 
Press Law?   
1.2.Who were the actors or 
communicators present in the 
reports?   
 
 
1.1.1. Media texts  
 
 
1.1.2. Media texts  
 
 
 
 
1.1.1. Content analysis 
 
 
1.1.2. Content analysis 
 
 
 
2. Press Freedom 
2.1.What were the important issues 
appearing in the discussion to 
draw the Press Law in the 
Parliament?   
2.2.How was the relationship 
between the media and politics in 
transitional period? 
 
2.1.1. Meeting Treatise of 
Special Committee of the 
House of Representative 
on Press Law 1999 
2.1.2. Interview transcripts  
 
 
 
2.1.1. Text analysis  
 
 
 
2.1.2. Transcript analysis  
 
 
 
 
In the research, the data will be read literally, interpretively or reflectively 
(Mason, 2002). In a literal reading, the researcher is interested in the forms such as: the 
contents, structures, styles and layouts. In reading the interview transcript, the things 
worth noting are the words and language in use, also the sequence of interactions, the 
forms and structures of the dialogues and literal contents. In reading the document, what 
to search for is”what is there” (Mason, 2002: 149).  An interpretative and reflective 
reading is to read the parts of interview transcripts which tell about the implicit norms or 
rules existing in the interviews. It can be a matter of discourse where they were involved, 
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or how the discourse was done, or how it indicates a kind of mechanism in social 
behavior.  The researcher is in particular aware about what is considered an interpretation 
in understanding the interviewees, or in how an emphasis is more on the side of the 
researcher’s interpretation. A reflective reading puts the research as a part of the data in 
his disposal and it will find out the roles and perspectives of the researcher in the process 
of collecting and interpreting the data.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Book 
The introduction is followed by Chapter 2 which contains the theoretical 
frameworks.  
A number of key theories include the theories of unconsolidated democracy, relationships 
between democracy and press freedom and media, and relationships between the 
government and media.  Also included here is the theory of political communication 
which is completed with the first parts of political communication development and a 
variety of its dimensions.  
Chapter 3 is a comparison analysis of political communication in a number of 
countries, particularly certain industrialized and transitional countries.  To represent the 
group of developed ones, some countries have been taken including Germany, England 
and the United States; while the countries in transition chosen here include the 
Philippines, Russia, and Hungary. The substance of this comparison was then made the 
theoretical base to view the political communication in Indonesia, including how press 
freedom has become an important factor in the government.  
Chapter 4 discusses the politics and media in Indonesia before the fall of 
Soeharto.  Started with the discussion on Indonesia and the Independence, it then 
discusses the political culture, political structure, and it is ended with the discussion on 
the media system in former era.  If it is in a weak position, it is difficult for the media to 
play its role as a channel of information, moreover as the fourth pillar of the governance.  
The discussion on political communication in the transitional era of Indonesia is 
the main part of Chapter 5.  It is started with a political communication analysis, and then 
it is followed with an explanation on Indonesia as a transitional society where it includes, 
among others, the causes of such a transition, the roles of press, and the transitional 
situation  condition in Indonesia from 1998 to 2004.  Another important part in this 
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chapter is the discussion on press freedom.  
Chapter 6 studies the research findings on press freedom in the era of President BJ 
Habibie.  It is started with the discussion on the relationship between media and the 
government in this era, and then on the factors which surrounded Habibie and which 
affected his governance.  Though in fact, this era has opened the door for the birth of the 
Press Law, but certain pressures on the media could still be found. A case study on the 
birth of the Press Law is also presented here. Some important findings include, for 
example, how Kompas framed the reports on this process, how politicians and activists 
viewed this draft, and also the crucial issues emerging in the discussion of this draft.  
In Chapter 7, press freedom still plays the key topic of discussion. The traits of 
both presidents, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, have influenced the 
dynamics of their governance, for example how the relationship between the government 
and media was.  Although Wahid was well known for his democratic personality his 
governance, he also applied some pressures to the media.  Meanwhile, in the 
administration of Soekarnoputri, the tension between the government and media could be 
bridged by the performance of the Press Council.  
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions and it summarizes all previous chapters (2-7). 
This chapter is concluded with the reflection on press freedom in transitional period of 
Indonesia.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
  
Communication is the basis for all social and political activities (Fagen, 1966). 
Through communication media, a government can convey its messages to the public, 
political parties to disseminate its programs, and the people can give responses to the 
messages they receive. A change in the government in the form of a political transition 
also changes the politics.  In an authoritarian political system, a media cannot play its 
major role to channel information freely due to censorship applied by the government. 
Media even serves as an instrument for the authority to defend itself and to control the 
people. When an authoritarian government is down replaced by the new, democratic one, 
the media gets a greater opportunity. In an unstable democracy, as it was the case in post 
1998 Indonesia, there were conflicts of interest among the government, media, and the 
community to grip the dominance over the press like the one before the birth of the press 
freedom. The lesson from Taiwan shows that an efficient, independent, and diverse 
media system is vital to the success of democracy consolidation and to prevent the system 
from decomposing (Randal, 1998: 119). 
This research will take the view from macro and micro perspectives. In a micro-
perspective approach, the question is how and with what a media would change or 
strengthen a political attitude; while a macro approach would focus on the media system 
which influences the politics, for example by testing a government regulation pattern, 
media ownership, program content, public and viewership structures (Gunther and 
Mughan, 2000). 
 
2.1 Unstable Democracy  
In a classical tradition, democracy is a form of government (Sartori, 1962; 
Pennock, 1979), and it is the best government (Diamond, 2003). This refers to the traits 
of a liberal democracy for instance in the control over the state, decree, and allocation of 
resources which in fact or in a theoretical point of view are mandated to the appointed 
public officials.  In a transitional society, the democracy has not been in a stable nature 
that a consolidation is deemed necessary.  In the process of consolidating the democracy, 
there exists a strong social and political consensus. There is a certain level of government 
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decentralization; there exists a government which complies with the media law, there 
exists a group of private media, and there also exist the citizens with the access to various 
information sources including the printed to the electronic media, in addition to the 
existence of journalist associations (Price et al., 2002:60). Dunkwart Rustow also views 
democracy from a transitional point of view with a focus on the political processes and 
the behavior of the leaders and elites (Mas’oed, 1994). This focus implies the 
encouragement of political processes which allow interested leaders to initiate the 
transformation and establishment of policy choices which promote democracy.  
Referring to Larry Diamond, a consolidation of democracy is about how to keep a 
democracy consistent so that it will really meet the requirements (Dwipayana et al., 
2003). Diamond describes some approaches for the consolidation of democracy. In the 
first place, it includes the elite (actor) approach, where a mutual commitment among the 
elite circles through a constitutional mechanism of coordination among the related 
political institutions and through the an agreement to maintain the limits of state authority 
regardless of which party is ruling the state at a certain time. In the second place, it 
includes the institutional approach which is the importance of political institutionalization 
in a consolidation process.  A consolidation of democracy has to respond the 
strengthening challenges of three political institution types: (a) the state administrative 
officials (bureaucracy), (b) the representative bodies and democratic executors (political 
parties, the parliament, and the general election system); and (c) the structures which 
ensure the horizontal accountability and the governance which is based on laws, for 
instance the justice systems and controlling institutions.  A parliament has to have the 
capacity to formulate a constitution, to aggregate public preferences, to allocate 
resources, and to weigh the petitions and aspirations of the society independently. By 
deepening and strengthening this method of democracy practice, a political 
institutionalization also heightens the normative commitment in a democratic system 
(Dwipayana et al., 2003: xxx). 
An institutional approach also highlights the performance of a regime. According 
to Diamond, a democratic regime must result in a quite positive policy to establish a 
political legitimacy or at least to avoid a crystallization of resistance against the 
legitimacy.  If a democratic legitimacy and procedural commitment should become the 
principal foundation of the regime, the regime performance will be the crucial variable 
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which influences the development and internalization of conviction between the 
legitimacy and performance. There is a reciprocal relationship between a legitimacy and 
performance.  The more successful is a regime in providing what people want the bigger 
and deeper of the tendency in its legitimacy is.  
The third one is a political cultural approach.  A political culture is related to the 
perceptions, attitudes, supports, actions and trusts in the democratic legitimacy. Aristotle 
considered a political cultural theory as focusing on the importance of moderation and 
tolerance and the dangers of political extremism and uncontrolled populism.  The 
development of a pattern and finally a culture, moderation, accommodation, cooperation, 
and bargaining among political elites seem to be the theme of theories which are oriented 
to the process of transition and the consolidation of democracy. According to Diamond, 
an empirical democracy needs a conviction in the democratic legitimacy.  The 
development of this conviction and behavioral commitment is the definition of 
consolidation process.  
Next, one of the factors which seem to increase a democratic legitimacy among 
the community is a personal experience with it.  That is why, in addition to its quality and 
orientation, participation is another central element of an ideal – typical democratic. This 
implies that a mass participation as a political life norm and a tendency to actual 
participation in politics is based on the informed interest in public affairs.  This refers to 
the “culture of political participation” which involves the role of individuals as ’activists’ 
in the policy (nation society)”. This is not only manifested through giving votes but also 
through political interests, information, knowledge, opinion formation, and organizational 
membership.  What underlie a participant’s orientation are the political efficacy, self 
confidence and sense of competence of the citizens that their political actions may result 
in policy changes or indemnification/restoration in facing the complaints.  
  The fourth one is a society-oriented approach. Diamond constructs the 
preliminary argument that the society is a widespread concept, and which is easily used 
or misused.  Without any organization, structure, and principle, the public may be 
meaningless for democracy.  A democracy also requires an organized public for 
democracy. This can be made through dissemination of norms and values, and 
commitments not only on thousands of its narrow interests but also on the goals of the 
society in general. This kind of public is made possible only with vigorous civil society.  
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According to Diamond, a civil society is a scope of social life which is organized 
in an openly and voluntarily manner, which is self-generated in nature, and –at least 
partially—self financed. It is autonomous from the state, and it is bound by legal 
arrangements on a set of communal values.  It is different from the society in general in 
the sense that it involves the community which acts collectively in a public scope to 
express their interests, desires, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information in order to 
reach collective goals, to deliver their requests to the state, to improve the structure and 
function of the state, and to urge the state officials to act accountably. (Dwipayana et al., 
2003: xxxi-xxxiii) 
Diamond’s explanation has some consequences which can serve as a reference to 
see the political transition in Indonesia.  In an elite approach, the president (executive) 
and representatives of political parties in the parliament (legislative), both have an 
important role to play in making policies through the constitution.  Besides, through an 
institutional approach, the performance of principal institutions like the president, 
parliament, and political parties must be strengthened.  A parliament must have the 
capacity to formulate a constitution and to think about the demands and aspirations of the 
people independently. In a political culture arras, how the people understand a democratic 
legitimacy is shown by a conviction that democracy is the best form of governance; and 
participation is a way to changes. And finally at a civil society level, it is deemed 
necessary an open, voluntary, and self-generated organization to express the interests, 
passions, and ideas to reach the collective objectives, to improve the structures and the 
functioning of the state.  Thus, a consolidation time is a momentum for various elements 
in both parties, the government and society, to formulate various legal stipulations, 
including press laws which give a room for democratic practices.  
In the context of democratic consolidation in post-May-1998 Indonesia, the 
practice was as the followings:  
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Table 2.1: The Practice of Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia 
In the administrations of Presidents BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
and Megawati Soekarnoputri 
Approach Consequences Practice 
Elite 1. A mutual commitment through   
the mechanism of coordination of 
the constitution  
 
 
 
 
2. To develop an agreement among 
the elite to uphold the authority 
limits of the state 
 
1. The commitment of BJ Habibie’s 
Administration to set new a Press Law; the 
commitment of Wahid to remove the 
Ministry of  Information, and the 
commitment of Soekarnoputri to set a new 
Broadcasting Law 
  
2. The agreement to limit the authority of the 
state through policies and the two laws. 
Institution 1. An institutional approach, to 
strengthen and empower the 
parliament to have capacities to 
set laws  
 
2. To bring about policies to build 
the political legitimacy.  
 
3. To independently take the 
petitions and aspiration of the 
society into consideration. 
 
1-3. The Parliament ratifies the Press Law 
which includes:   
  
1. Free-of-censorship media  
2. An Independent Press Council  
 
1-3. The Parliament ratifies the Broadcasting 
Law which includes:  
 
1. Free-of-censorship Broadcasting 
Institutions  
2. An Independent Broadcasting 
Commission  
 
Political Culture 1. The perceptions, attitudes, 
supports, actions and conviction 
on a democratic legitimacy. 
 
2. The culture, moderation, 
accommodation, cooperation, 
and bargaining among the 
political elites  
 
3. A participative political culture 
”involving” the ‘activist’ role of  
individuals in the policies  
(a civic society)”, 
1-3. The ideas and involvement of various 
Non Government Organizations in the 
discussion of Press Law draft. 
 
2. The accommodation of ideas in the 
discussion of Press Law draft in the 
parliament.  
Civil society 1. The scope of social life is 
organized in an openly, 
voluntarily, self-generating 
manner, which is at least partially 
1. The establishment of the MPPI 
(Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran 
Indonesia-Indonesian Press and 
Broadcasting Society) 
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self-financed, autonomous from 
the state and is bound to legal 
arrangement and a set of common 
values. 
  
2. To deliver requests to the state, to 
improve the structure and 
functioning of the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The MPPI proposes the draft of Press Law 
to the President through the Minister of 
Information 
 
2.1.1 Democracy and Press Freedom  
A democracy will only really work if two key elements are present, namely option 
and information (Alger, 1996:9). First, alternative options must be available for the 
public.  The key idea is that a democracy which is operational in nature is an alternative 
option for public agreements; and in principle, it is in the form of alternative candidates 
in a general election.  This can also be applied in the adoption of policies to deal with the 
problems faced by the society. An alternative competition and the effort to present an 
alternative in comparison to the others are just parts of a vital concept in democracy 
namely, “the marketplace of ideas”. This will assist citizens to be aware of their choices. 
The existence of options is the core of democracy and when such a thing does not exist, 
the democracy degrades.  The second basis for an essential democracy is that the public 
has ”in its hands” the information which is taken to make meaningful decisions – namely, 
to make choices, which are related to their own values, convictions, and awareness, in 
accordance with their mental capabilities and imaginations.  If the public is meant to be 
the basis of a democratic process and thus indicates the basic objectives for the 
government through the choices in a general election and other political participations, 
the people need the information in order to be able to make decision properly and to act 
accordingly.  In principle, an appropriate general education and perception on freedom to 
make choices are the most affective rights (Alger, 1996:9), and both are influenced by 
media and its freedom.  
Carl J.Friedrich says:”Freedom of the press is considered a cornerstone of 
constitutional democracy”.  He also concludes,”the emergence of constitutional 
government and in particular the crystallization of the system of popular representation as 
we know them are inextricably interwoven with the growth of the modern press. Without 
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a constitution, a government is unimaginable” (Alger, 1996: 10). Meanwhile, to Robert 
Dahl’s opinion:”But at a minimum…democratic theory is concerned with processes by 
which ordinary citizen exert a relatively high degree of control over leader” (Alger, 1996: 
10-11).  The question is, how the citizens can implement the ‘high degree of control” 
effectively.  According to Alger, the answer lies in the information the public must have 
and this is supported by Catlin’s opinion that:”Freedom of the press…is a civil liberty 
under law, logically justified for the specific purposes of…the development of an 
objectively informed or intellectually vigorous democracy” (Alger, 1996: 11). The role of 
mass media in providing appropriate information for the people which allows the process 
of democracy to work is a very important thing in the world today.  
The freedom of the press is the focus of relationship between media and the 
government because it is a freedom from any pressure and intervention by the 
government (Asante, 1997).  Referring to John C.Merril’s opinion, a press freedom 
means an autonomous press – namely, a freedom from external controls, a”maximum 
journalistic autonomy is the imperative of journalism”. In line with Everette E.Dennis, 
Merril then defines a press freedom as “the right to communicate ideas, opinions, and 
information through printed words without a government restraint” (Asante, 1997: 11).  
Another writer, for example David H.Weaver, formulates a press freedom in three 
different things:        
   
(1) As the relative absence of government restraints on the media; (2) 
as the relative absence of government and other restraints on the media; 
and (3) as not only the absence of restraints on the media, but also the 
presence of those conditions necessary for the dissemination of a diversity 
of ideas and opinions to a relatively large audience such as enforced right 
of access to newspapers and radio stations (Asante, 1997: 11)  
 
Here, Weaver gives a detailed formula on freedom of the press, which is not only the 
absence of government restraints or other parties on media, but also the presence of those 
conditions which are necessary for the dissemination of a diversity of ideas and opinions 
to a relatively large audience including the rights to access newspapers and radio stations.  
In fact, the creation of such a condition is not only the work of the government but also 
other parties, including the society and the press itself.  However, the government is the 
key element in creating such a condition. Paul A.V.Ansah confirms:  
  
16
 
Freedom of the press is generally taken to mean the ”freedom to disseminate 
information and ideas through the mass media without government 
restriction.” A free press system is expected to provide a factual account of 
what is happening in the society and to present, analyze and clarify the goals 
and values of the society. It should also provide a forum an exchange of 
comments on and criticism of the nation’s affairs and thus serve as a 
watchdog of the people’s rights (Asante, 1997: 12). 
 
The statement on freedom of the press should be included in any constitution, but it 
should also be admitted that the freedom level is different from a country to another 
country. However, almost any media system is a target of control which has to be made 
through various legal stipulations.  
In fact, it is quite clear that there is a positive relationship between media and the 
practice of democracy as cited by Milton.  He says that a free press will advance a 
democracy by playing the function as a watch-dog for the government, and thus to 
prevent the government from excessively abusing the citizens and the political processes 
(Tettey, 2001: 7-8).  Quoting Meiklejohn, democracy should be based on an 
understanding on the supremacy of the people; and this requires that citizens be 
sufficiently informed if they should participate in political processes and should 
effectively play their roles as the key decision makers. In his article on media and 
democracy in Africa, Tettey writes that a free and distinct press allows people to receive 
different views about rumors based on the understanding that they can make an informed 
political decision. The relationship between media and democracy is also stated in the 
opportunities that a free press works for the people to influence the political process. A 
democratic media would enable political leaders to be aware about the atmosphere among 
the people so that they can response appropriately. (Tettey, 2001: 8).  
Francis P.Kasoma (1995), who also writes about media in Africa, says that in 
modern governance, it is absolutely impossible to develop a democratic government 
without the support of a free and independent media.  Referring to the opinion of Ansah, 
it is said that in a democratic society, the actions of a government which come from 
collective desires and powers of the people are expected to be regulated by the power of 
public opinions; and the press serves as the most adequate media for the general opinion 
estimation and reflection. If there is no regular evaluation and control mechanism over 
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the government performance, there is a great possibility that the government will fall into 
the attitudes of self-satisfaction, irresponsiveness, and irresponsibility (Kasoma, 1995: 
540).  
 
2.1.2 Democracy and the Media 
O’Neil (1998) uses the term of a ”new democracy” when discussing some cases 
in European and North American countries.  According to O’Neil, the opportunities for 
an unregulated media and a political communication in a new democratic context are 
possibly more disruptive than productive in establishing a stable pattern and institution 
from any society participation (O’Neil, 1998: 196).  In observing various cases in some 
European and North American countries, there area some propositions: first, the use of a 
mediated political communication is far from being effective in precipitating a change in 
the regime than in establishing a stable institution.  Second, the good capacities of the 
former countries and authoritarian media organizations to quickly embrace the format of 
European and North American political programs can surpass the capacities of the public 
to process and to effectively use the newly received information.  Third, the variable 
which is often avoided in paralleling a media and democracy is the condition of a civil 
society.  The absence of social experiences related to new vocabularies in democracy 
would underline the public capacity to move the content into a political identification and 
a stable conviction. Thus, the role of a media in establishing democracy cannot be 
separated from the understanding of the social context where the communication is 
received (O’Neil, 1998: 198). 
More specifically, the discussion on the correlation between democracy, press 
freedom and media is presented in the following sub chapter on press systems. 
 
2.2 Relationship between the Government and Media 
So far, the discussion on press systems has never missed the work of Siebert et al. 
which was published in 1956.  The concept or model which Siebert develops can indeed 
describe how the different relationships between the government and media are in line 
with the political systems and ideology of the country. The recent criticism, however, 
says the work of Siebert et al.,  Four Press Theories,  is like Zombie, a horror film, which 
controls over the studies on media for decades, so that the time has come to burry it and 
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to develop a new model based on a comparative analysis (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).  
This research gives the emphasis to using the model of Picard as a criticism or an 
improvement to Siebert’s work but with a simplification and it does not list all models. 
The argument is that the political development after May 1998 has omitted, at least 
temporarily, the authoritarian model and the communist model as suggested by Siebert 
while other models, namely the Developmental, Social Responsibility and Libertarian 
models, are presented here to consider their applicability in Indonesia. 
 
Table 2.2: A Part of Picard’s Theory on the Press  
 Developmental Social Responsibility Libertarian 
Developed In the 20th Century 
non-industrialized; 
non-communist 
nations of the Third 
World 
In the United States in 
the 20th  Century 
Adopted in England after 1688 and in 
U.S. : influential in Western and pro-
Western states 
Out of Marxist thought 
combine with 
communication-for-
development views 
of Schramm, Lerner 
and Pye 
Writing of W.E. 
Hocking, 
Commission on 
Freedom of the Press 
and practitioners, and 
media codes 
 
Writing of Milton, Locke, Mill and 
philosophy of rationalism and natural 
rights 
Chief purpose To promote national 
integration and social 
and economic 
development 
To inform, entertain, 
sell- but chiefly to 
raise conflict to plane 
of discussion 
To inform, entertain, sell –but mostly 
to help discover truth and check 
government 
Who has the 
right to use 
media 
Government has right 
to use for programs 
for the public goods 
Everyone who has 
something to say 
Anyone with economic means to do 
so 
How are 
Media 
controlled 
Government and/or 
party control, and 
legal constraints 
Community opinion, 
consumers action, 
professional ethics 
By “self-righting process of truth” in 
free market place of ideas” and by 
courts 
What is 
forbidden 
Challenge to 
authority: 
information that 
would damage efforts 
for “progress” 
Serious invasion of 
recognize private 
rights and  vital social 
interests 
Defamation, obscenity, indecency, 
wartime sedition 
Ownership Private or state: most 
often state 
Private unless 
government has to 
take over to ensure 
public service 
 
Chiefly private 
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Essential 
different 
Information is a 
national resource to 
be use for 
development; societal 
concerns more 
important than 
individual concerns 
Media must assume 
obligation of social 
responsibility: if they 
do not, someone must 
see that they do 
Instrument for checking government 
and meeting other needs of society 
Adopted from Picard, 1985: 69 
In practice, the relationship between the government and the press in post-May 
1998 Indonesia tends to follow the third (libertarian) model. Before and after the new 
Press Law was enacted in September 1999, the media had been freed from any 
censorship handcuff and various limitations applied by the government in propagating 
information to the audience.  The key objective of the media has been to convey critical 
information to improve the performance of governmental institutions, such as the 
president, the legislative bodies, legal institutions and other governmental institutions.  In 
this period, the media used its freedom to control the government by reporting various 
bad behaviors of state officials and by propagating political news to the public. The 
media were not owned nor controlled by the government but by private or personal 
institutions even though some electronic media, namely television and radio, were still 
under control of Soeharto’s family.  After the Information Minister removed any 
stipulation including the removal of the obligation to get a publication permit, there grew 
fast new printed and electronic mass media.  But some media news also turned on some 
conflicts and anger from various elites and society groups who felt being offended or 
being harmed by the information.  This happened because the press freedom was not used 
on professionalism, accuracy, check and recheck basis, and it fell into euphoria.  As a 
consequence, the control which had been relieved by the government was now taken over 
by certain groups in the society by occupying some editor’s offices which was followed 
with a number of violence and anarchy.  Meanwhile, some political elites, especially 
those who had previously enjoyed the control on the media for such a long period during 
the New Order era now started to be uneasy and they urged the importance of controlling 
press.  Then the social and responsibility models were seen to be more appropriate to 
change the political systems and cultures.  During the administration of Soeharto, the 
term “Free but Responsible Press” was so popular too, but in a very negative connotation.  
The reason is that because the press was not free at all and it was subordinated to the 
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government.  This model was in fact ideal in nature, but some parts of the government 
were still fond of applying a control over the media by referring to the Developmental 
Model.  
In doing the research on the Indonesian press, Hanazaki (1998) uses the 
hypothesis of Godwin Chu on the correlations between the media, government and 
society.  First, a control serves as a spur to enhance the reform in which the press should 
be controlled not to let it be used by the opposition which may retard the reform. Second, 
an economy development would drive the need of the society for mass media.  The third 
hypothesis is the ideological transformation, where the development of media can 
stimulate the growth of information, including new ideas from overseas countries.  In this 
stage, a traditional society begins to undergo substantial changes on its ideological 
values.  The middle class begins to emerge and demand a political participation. Fourth, 
the mass media begins to play a new role as a forum to express political demands. 
Communication plays the key role to voice individual interests to become collective 
political demands. There occur big changes where political institutions, authority elites 
surrender to the pressure of changes; and the government gradually hands over the 
authority control (Hanazaki, 1998: 193).  
The study of Hallin and Mancini (2004: 21) suggests four dimensions to compare 
West European and North American media.  The first dimension is the market 
development of media with a strong emphasis on whether the press circulation is strong 
or weak. The second dimension is about a political parallelism, namely the level and 
intensity of the relationship between a media and political parties or whether it reflects a 
political division in the community.  The third dimension is about the development of 
journalistic professionalism; and the fourth dimension is the level and intensity of state 
intervention upon media systems. A state intervention may include, among others: libel, 
defamation, privacy, and right-of-reply laws; hate speech laws; professional secrecy laws 
for journalists (protecting the confidentiality or sources) and ”conscience laws” 
(protecting journalists when the political line of their paper changes); laws regulating 
access to government information; laws regulating media concentration, ownership, and 
competition; laws regulating political communication, particularly during election 
campaigns; and broadcast licensing laws and laws regulating broadcasting content, 
including those   dealing     with   political    pluralism,   language,   and   domestic   
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content  (2004: 43-44). 
  In the context of Indonesian political transition, the fourth dimension in such 
forms have been existing for long period in various legal stipulations especially through 
the Criminal Law including the revised draft which is being prepared by the government. 
In this research, the fourth dimension serves as a reference to look upon the formulae in 
preparing the Press Law.  
 
2.2.1 Power of the Media   
In a democratic political system, freedom of the press is a must if the media is to 
play the controlling function and to play the role of disseminating information to the 
public. On the other hand, a media has a power of its own. A media can determine the 
fate of politicians and political causes; a media can influence the government and the 
voters (Street, 2001). As Paolo Mancini and David Swanson suggest: ”a mass media is 
not merely an instrument for other subsystems such as political parties which can convey 
their own messages; a media exists in the modern politics as an autonomous power in the 
center of competition with other power centers. In a dictatorship government, the power 
is on the hands of the untouchable elite who use the power to exploit the weak. In a 
democratic government, the power is considered as being ”legitimate” because the 
executive is there to represent and to report to the people. In a dictatorship, there is a 
monopoly of control over the media, in which it is used to disseminate propaganda; while 
in a democracy, there is a distribution of control (Street, 2001: 231-2). 
Street suggests that there are three kinds of powers: discursive, access, and 
resources powers. First, a discursive power is related to the claim that “knowledge is 
power” so that a control is applied upon the dissemination of information about what the 
authority is doing. The control is also applied to make people unaware about anything, 
which opens the door to prevent political protests. A discursive power is applied upon the 
assumption that what a person does is conditioned by what he thinks about, and what he 
thinks about is the result of what a mass media brings about. This power is not directly 
translated to certain behaviors. However, so far a mass media is responsible for the 
distribution of ideas, certain imaging; and so far a media can shape the thoughts and 
actions. A mass media is considered to have the discursive or ideological power. Another 
assumption is that a mass media operates on behalf of or is shaped by the interests which 
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take the benefits from the disseminated ideology. It implies that we need to analyze the 
details and contents of a media text to open the specific part of the world which has been 
poured into it (Street, 2001: 234).  
The second one is access power. The idea that a media has a discursive role 
implies the acknowledgement of the process of discourse production. So far, when a 
media provides valuable sources for those who want to promote or to manage their 
interests, there is an opportunity that the power will work according to the decision on 
who access the sources. The power to access refers to the method how a mass media 
controls the voices or the interests. This can be done in various formats, both as a 
spectator, reader, and contributor.  It can be in the format of a conglomerate which 
controls over various sources to the access. On the other hand, it can be a step of interest 
or identity to get an expression in the media option.  
The next one is the power of resources.  This is the third form of media power. If 
a discursive power refers to a method where it is shaped, and an access power refers to 
the method where certain interests or certain identities are acknowledged or excluded, a 
resource power refers to the method where a media conglomerate can influence the 
actions of the government and state. This form of power identifies the bargaining 
between a media conglomerate and the national government or its agencies. The 
government needs a media owned by the conglomerate to deliver infrastructural services 
(provision and dissemination of information) and to share the revenues and employments 
it can create.  But this makes the government in a vulnerable position and this also limits 
the government’s capacity to regulate the media actor. If the government would apply 
constraints upon the media actor through a cross ownership system or through certain 
regulations, it would be very costly for the government itself, because this will create an 
antipathy of the media conglomerate against the government (as expressed through the 
media), or the media conglomerate may choose to move to somewhere else to a more 
‘liberal’ regime. This power is about the relationship between a media industry and the 
government (Street, 2001: 236). 
 
2.2.2 Government Regulations 
 The power of media may influence the society in general; and in a modern 
context a media should also be viewed as a global-commercial market. When other 
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markets play the domination risks of a player on the other one, the media market seems to 
be more monopolistic or oligopolistic in nature as described by Bagdikian, Herman, and 
McChesney (Feintuck, 1999). Because of its power and its centralized influence on 
democracy, a media requires a set of regulations to make sure that it will act according to 
the principles of democracy, in which a media supports the citizenship and a public space 
than to decide upon it (Feintuck, 1999: 16). 
 In the United States and Europe, 1960s is the era of television as a political 
communication media. In Indonesia it is in 1990s. In a democratic country, the 
government respects and guarantees the freedom of the press, and prevents any constraint 
for political information which is acknowledged as an integral part of the government’s 
responsibility (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 9). The government will as least as possible 
intervene the free flow of information through the print media. That is why there are two 
kinds of printed media. First, in some European countries, it is marked by the high level 
of partisan press which chooses to respect its own political party. Particularly in the 
United States, a newspaper would clearly choose to cover partisan coverage in the 
politics as shown in the ‘national news’. For the broadcasting media (radio and 
television), a democratic government has no choice but to take a deeper intervention, 
because a government is obliged to search for solutions to cope with the wavelength 
scarcity by giving a license based on the criteria formulated by the government itself. So, 
there are two models: the public service and the commercial service. The first model is 
characterized by the emphasis on news and public matters, features, documentaries, arts, 
music, and plays; and the second one is characterized by the emphasis on entertainment 
(Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 10).  
 In the New Order era of Indonesia, there was almost no difference in the 
treatment upon the printed and the broadcasting media. Both were tightly controlled by 
the government. The tight control upon a printed media made through the Press Law and 
the control over the broadcasting media (particularly the television) was made through 
the monopoly on the media as the only television media owned by the government. By 
the fall of Soeharto, some television companies owned by the family of Soeharto started 
to air which were also under the control of the government.  
 The deregulation on the broadcasting media was made in two formats. First, it 
was through a liberalization of political control, and second it was through the opening of 
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wavelength for private sectors and commercial broadcasting companies with less or no 
public obligation (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 13). Liberalization is in fact a form of 
deregulation in an authoritarian political system. In a different political system, the 
objective of liberalization is basically the same, that is for the sake of free market 
economic interests and for the interests of the political ruler, for instance to gain the 
supports of the people (see, Table 2.3). 
  
 
Table 2.3: Different objectives of deregulation based on the political system  
Political System 
(name of country) 
Liberalization Objective 
Authoritarian (Chile) 
 
 
 
 
1. Free market economies and commercial pressure to provide 
the more open and entertainment-oriented content valued by 
consumers in an essentially demand-based economy 
 
2. A part of an intentional strategy for the achievement of other, 
    more highly valued political objectives 
Openness or glasnost (Soviet Union) To mobilize public support for his assault on the bureaucratic 
ossification and entrenched self-interest that were stultifying 
society and crippling the economy 
Established democracies (EU) Opening up the established and licensed television sector to 
competition from private cable and satellite broadcaster that are 
unabashedly commercial in character and not subject to the 
same “inform and educate” strictures as their longer-established 
counterparts  
 
Established democracy (USA) 
To increased competition for audience ratings and 
advertisement revenue by downplaying their serious news 
programming 
Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 13-14 
 
 
2.3 Political Communication  
2.3.1 Early Developments 
A political communication research in a transitional community is an effort to enrich the 
researches in political communication which have still been very rare in comparison to 
other communication fields. The study on political communication is the one which 
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comes from two disciplines, namely the field of communication and the field of politics. 
And it has become a cross-disciplinary study (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981; Burgoon, 1982; 
Nimmo, 1989). The relationships between the press, politics, media, and government 
have been a curiosity for scholars for a long time even since the end of the eighteenth 
century (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981: 22). 
 Mansfield and Weaver (in Burgoon, 1982: 605-620) also mention about some 
topics like political communicators, political messages, the media of political 
communication, and methods in the study of political communication. There are at least 
four methods in this analysis including the content analysis method, survey method, 
experimental method, and qualitative method. 
 Historically, in early modern Europe, the invention of printed media and the 
distribution of stores selling printed matters all over Europe in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries are just technical opportunities to enlarge the political communication 
not just as the communication in the elite circles. But printed news and political opinions 
were still in fact the communication among the elite up to mid 1700s. The Church and 
countries watched over printed publication and tried to prevent the development of this 
new technology. In the nineteenth century, there were two big developments in the 
political communication in Europe and North America. First, political parties emerged as 
central institutions of opinion formation and articulation. Second, newspapers 
substantially emerged as central institutions of opinion formation and articulation. In the 
twentieth century, mass-based parties and newspapers became new inventions for 
political communication which was then followed by the power of electronic media in the 
same area (Barnouw, eds., 1989: 304-311). 
 The next development in political communication saw a new impact of new 
media which contributed the development and stability in the political process and 
institutions. Some historians relate the birth of printed media to such a development as an 
expansion of monarchies. It was also considered to prevent the development of electronic 
media in the big changes of political campaigns. Since 1970s, some scholars have been 
involved in the implications of new media as seen in the development of computer and 
telecommunication technologies, such as the fast growth of microelectronics, micro radio 
waves, satellites, and fiber optics. The question is about who is now controlling the 
media. (Barnouw, eds., 1989:313). 
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 To take the control is a central issue, since telecommunication technologies still 
serve the interests of those who control them. It is the key in a media system since it is 
connected to the financial, programming, audience, mechanisms, and feedback issues. 
Allan Wells ascribes these factors as other essential elements in differentiating a system 
from another. He mentions a Namurois classification, a typology which has five 
dimensions in a media system. The options for a control may include the state-operated, 
public corporation, partnership, private enterprise (with varying degrees of government 
regulations), or institutionally sponsored ones. The alternatives available for the financial 
control starts from a license fee, general taxation, advertising and taxation combined, 
advertising, or private subsidy. The purpose of a programming control can be directed to 
the commercial, education, cultural, or political purposes (Razak, 1985: 5). 
 Barnouw mentions about four control perspectives. The first one is from a 
democratic marketplace point of view. This view sees a technology as being absolutely 
controlled by public needs and choices. It is operates through a normal market process in 
a democratic institutional context. This is an optimistic perspective on the impact of a 
new media. The second one is the technocratic view as marked with a criticism to the 
media. A media can only be controlled by military and industrial application rather than 
by public needs for communication. These public choices are controlled through 
marketing techniques, and a new media would enhance the possibility that it will be 
controlled by the technological elite, namely those experts who are responsive and 
accountable to the economic elite and the society. The third one is the pluralistic 
perspective which argues that a technology is sharpened by the catchment and hauling of 
the competing elite groups. A new media can only be controlled through a pluralistic 
process of conflicts and cooperation among various actors in different sources of the 
political process. The fourth one is the political enhancement which sees a 
communication technology as a malleable source which can be controlled by the 
dominant coalition of interests in the organizations or society (Barnouw, eds., 1989: 313). 
 Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) divide the political communication system into 
three periods. The first one is after the Second World War which is called the ‘golden age 
of parties’, where the political system was called the key source of initiatives and debates 
for the social reform. The party system was articulated to grip the divisions of social 
structures, and many voters related themselves to the politics in a less strong and less 
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durable manner than a party identification. In the era of this ‘high modernism’, the 
‘consensus was accompanied by a high level of confidence in political institutions’; and 
many political communications were subordinated to the stable and strong political 
institutions and trusts. The new era started to fade out in the second period in 1960s when 
the limited television channels became the dominant media for political communications; 
and the grip of loyalty to parties on the voters started to get loosened. This resulted in 
four transformations. The first one is the reduction of frequencies from the selective 
exposure patterns to the propaganda of parties, since a media of news, discussions, and 
empty spaces for parties consistently resulted in a limited scope for the audience. The 
selection was also marked with the decreasing number of newspapers, clubs, and other 
organizations which were attached to parties particularly in the European continent. The 
second one is that a media gives a mandate to non-partisan norms such as fairness, 
impartiality, and neutrality. These choices became the main platform for a political 
communication. The third one is that the television expanded the audience for a political 
communication by penetrating the electorate sectors which had been previously hard to 
do. The fourth on is that this important channel is television. Its value and format which 
can reach a large audience resulted in the scheduling of political events, political 
languages, and personalization of its presentation. 
 The third period is the phase which was marked with the distribution of key 
features of communication, media abundance, ubiquity, reach, and celerity. In particular 
for television, once a communication outlet is concentrated only to some channels for 
politicians, it became or would become an elaborate journalistic media which became a 
host of news, inserts, bulletins, large format public matters, and 24 news services. A new 
pattern and adaptation can be available for all who are involved in the process of political 
communication. This will change how people think about politics (Blumler and 
Kavanagh, 1999: 209-213). 
  
2.3.2 Relevance of Political Communication 
A political communication study in a transitional society is very relevant in the 
sense that first, it is used to see how a media plays its role in different political systems. 
Jean K Chalaby, for instance, conducted a study on political communication in the 
presidential regimes of unconsolidated democracies and found some typologies to 
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contribute to the development of communication and journalism (Chalaby, 1998: 432). 
The first typology is about the political communication in an authoritarian regime which 
is characterized by cynicism, violence, and Machiavellianism of totalitarian elites. There 
are three components of elite Machiavellianism, namely a pessimistic vision on human 
condition, emphasis on actions; experimental and rational methods applied to the politics 
which urge the elite to use immoral, aggressive, and exclusive power. The third one is 
how the elite use or maintain the power. This analysis will contribute to the conditions 
and roles of mass media in a totalitarian regime where in such a political system and in 
such three factors mentioned above would destroy the press freedom. In a totalitarian 
regime, journalists and media organizations are the servants of a power which conquers 
the whole state and civil society institutions. They lost their autonomy and became a tool 
of mass indoctrination. 
 The second thing is the media in an authoritarian regime. Such a regime doesn’t 
necessarily need to be as repressive as the one in a totalitarian regime. The ruler of such a 
regime needs the media to publish their ideologies and to stop the rest. Though the press 
freedom is still prevented and some pressures are still applied on journalists and 
intellectuals, an authoritarian regime is less oppressive because its political leadership 
doesn’t need any propaganda. The regime doesn’t need a level of control to indoctrinate a 
new ideology like propagating a radical doctrine. 
 The third one is about the political communication in a presidential regime like 
the one in unconsolidated democracies. This system refers to the countries which adopt a 
presidential constitution during a transitional period from a totalitarian or authoritarian 
regime to a more democratic one. The examples include Lebanon and Croatia: the two 
countries which adopt a presidential constitution after the civil wars, just like Franc in 
late 1950s, and in the years after the colonial war in South Asia and Algiers. The 
communication pattern of such a presidential country has some elements to create an 
ideal political communication system which is characterized with: 
1. The state still plays the key role in media and keeps using a strong control on 
public communication. In the field of broadcasting, there is a monopoly of the 
state or at least there is a state-owned broadcasting organization. To respect the 
press, some members of the government, usually a strong president or ministers 
can control one or more newspapers. 
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2. The television in such a country is still unconsolidated and becomes a tool of 
national sovereignty. Television is a national institution, just like a national ballet 
company, so that the channels of national television are given certain privileges. 
They are given national identities, not only in political but also in cultural ones. 
Television becomes a national symbol, just like other national institutions which 
represent the countries overseas. One of its duties is to present a positive image of 
the nation to all over the country and all over the world. For a newly independent 
country, a national television is also a symbol of sovereignty just like a national 
anthem or a seat in the United Nations. A national television is also used to 
strengthen toe national unity and to promote the national language. 
3. A presidential regime in an unconsolidated democracy also takes the way to open 
or to use violence upon their journalists while keep tolerating the opposing 
newspapers. 
4. Some presidential regimes in unconsolidated democracies also support and 
provide the opportunities for the presidents and their cronies to apply personal 
controls over the television. First it is made through the power and status of being 
a good boy for the national broadcasting. Second, a president often tries to build a 
personal relationship to his/her constituents, based on the charisma and based on 
the relationship with the people through emotions and feelings. Third, the control 
over television is vital for a president because such a personal power is more 
difficult to gain legitimacy than a collegial power. In short, the president needs 
the television to run its power over the state, the charisma of his/ her political 
leadership, and legitimacy as the leader of the state (Chalaby, 1998: 437 – 438).  
The main points of Chalaby include that a totalitarian regime applies a stronger repression 
over the media and journalists than the authoritarian one. On the other hand, in a 
presidential regime, the media, particularly television, becomes a tool of power for the 
presidential government, and hence the television is utilized to build the legitimacy and 
charisma. Television is used to strengthen the national unity just like in the early regime of 
Soeharto in Indonesia. 
The studies of Nossek and Rinnawi on censorship and press freedom under the 
changing political regimes in Palestine also strengthen the relevance of political 
communication studies, particularly as comparison to this study. In 1993, Oslo Accords 
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brought about a new system and relationships between the ruling government, the 
Palestinian civil society, and media. In a simple agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the power was shifted to the Palestinian Authority 
which adopted new laws, rules, and regulations for the media which operated in its 
jurisdictions (Nossek and Rinnawi, 2003: 184). 
The studies of Nossek and Rinnawi give the picture of two principle axioms in the 
relationships between a political regime and mass communication. Though the political 
regime which rules Palestine has completely moved from a military ruling by Israel to a 
legitimacy which is completely supported by local people and international communities, 
but the media doesn’t change. The two rulers, Israel and Palestine, have found the ways 
to control the media in their respective areas, including through a set of regulations. So, 
while PA has no explicit censorship law and enjoys a relatively progressive press law, the 
relationship between the government and media gives a lot of censorship practices 
(Nossek and Rinnawi, 2003:198). The findings of Nossek and Rinnawi show that in 
principle a regime may change to another one, but the control over the media is still the 
same, both with or without a press law or media regulations. 
The second relevance is that a political communication research in the transitional 
period will see how a regime reacts to the freedom of the press. The study of Ellis will 
also support this second relevance when the political transition in the USSA also gave 
birth to some Federal states which tried to adopt various universal stipulations in their 
Press Laws. The book of Ellis, ‘From Glastnost to the Internet’ (1999), describes the 
media legislations in Russian Federation. This country applies a new press law with some 
inspirations like the one in Article 19 and about six articles of the Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR) which are relevant to Russian mass media. The preparation of 
the Russian 1990 Press Law was started with a disobedience movement or a ‘cultural 
opposition’ to fill a lot of gaps left by Soviet mass media officers. The members 
acknowledged some aspects of basic freedom which were protected and applied by the 
law, as the best guarantee for human rights and civil rights. The idea to prepare a new 
Press Law was among the editorial chief of the main Soviet publishing organization of 
the Ideological Commission and Central Committee of CPSU, and which was approved 
by the Politbureau (Ellis, 1999: 68). 
 On the other hand, in the transitional process of Nigeria, the press enjoyed 
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its freedom as related to the environment and development of a democratic country. A 
free, active, and responsible mass media is the main vehicle to disseminate values which 
enliven the political awareness of the people and which guide to the development of a 
healthy nation (Oyovbaire and Olagunju, 1996: 26). 
 The study of Rawnsley and Rawnsley (Randal, 1998) on the transition of 
regime and media in Taiwan concludes that there is a strong correlation between the 
promotion of freedom and diversity of media and the level of political changes. The 
government of Taiwan agreed that a diverse and free media was the essential component 
the democratic changes. The former director general of Government Information Office 
(GIO), Jason C. Hu describes that the ‘unfettered flow of information’ is a ‘prerequisite 
for democratic development’ (Randal, 1998: 106-107). 
 The democratization process in South Korea since mid 1987 and the 
experiences of democratic practices were accompanied by the increasing level of 
liberalization in media activities. The country saw an increasing number of newspapers to 
almost three fourth from 30 to 100 in 1987 – 1993. Five commercial television stations 
were licensed to operate regionally. Cable news services were started in 1995 with 24 
channels and 50 regional operators. Two communication satellites were launched in 1995 
to open the satellite era. This is the golden era of Korean press. But on the other hand, the 
control of media mechanism and news production has only little shifted. For instance, 
Media Today, a weekly magazine published by the Korean Federation of Press Union 
(KPFU) reported that the old control mechanism is still applied even in the era which was 
called as a democratic government. Security agents of the government individually 
supervise various newspapers and television stations to monitor the activities of 
journalists (Jay-kyoung Lee, 1997: 135-136). 
 The above researches depict how a transitional situation in a country is 
always related to the relationships between the state, government, media, and civil 
society. In the cases of Palestine and Russia, a political change may lead to the 
preparation of a legal regulation on the press and to provide the freedom. On the other 
hand, in the transitional process of Nigeria, the press enjoys the freedom in relation to the 
environment or development of a democratic country. In Asia, particularly in Taiwan and 
Korea, a transitional period is always related to the changes in media.  
 A political communication research in the transitional period of Indonesia, 
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and in particular in the effort to see the relationships between the government and media, 
is also closely related and thus has a strong relevance. From an academic point of view, 
this research will see how the relational process between the government and media has a 
strong dynamics in line with the unstable transitional situation. Is in such an unstable 
situation the relationship among the parties also unstable or stable in nature? The 
researches on this matter (see Chapter IV) in general state that there is an adversarial 
rather than mutually symbiotic relationship. This research will also contribute to the 
political communication pattern in a transitional community in Indonesia or Asia. Then, a 
changing relationship between the government and media as manifested in the ratification 
of a liberal Press law will not automatically build a liberal press.  
 
2.3.3 Dimensions of Political Communication 
Various formulations on political communication by some experts imply the 
existence of some dimensions. Smith views it in the dimension of process in which the 
social, economic, and political situations become the background of messages delivered 
by political parties, interest groups, and candidates (Denton and Woodward, 1998). While 
McNair sees it as a relationship of various elements (Brian McNair, 1999). 
 
2.3.3.1 Process of Negotiation  
Craig Allen Smith defines political communication as ‘the process of negotiating 
a community orientation through the interpretation and characterization of interest, of 
power relationships, and of the community’s role in the world’ (Denton and Woodward, 
1998:10). This definition explains how a negotiation process of a community on an 
interest in the power relationship is happening. In this process, there is a process of 
pulling and drawing on the orientation through a process of interest interpretation. This 
negotiation process can happen very fast but can it can also happen very slowly 
depending on the roles played by the actors in the community in addition to their 
capabilities to translate the interests in their power relationship. In addition to a process 
of negotiation, political communication is also defined as an interaction process of 
migrating information among the politicians, news media, and the public (Smelser and 
Baltes, 2000). 
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According to Smelser and Baltes, the process system model of political 
communication can be described as the following: 
 
Figure 2.1: Process of Political Communication 
   
Smelser and Baltes, 2001. 
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of messages conveyed by political parties, groups, or candidates. Through the direct 
channels, the messages of newspaper, radio, television, and internet are transmitted to 
individuals as well as the public that will be influential to their political knowledge, 
political attitude, and political behavior. 
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forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the 
purpose of achieving specific objectives; (2) communication addressed to these actors by 
non-politicians such as voters and newspaper columnist, and (3) communication about 
these actors and their activities, as contained in news reports, editorials, and other forms 
of media discussion of politics. McNair also includes political discourses, so that political 
communication is not only a verbal or written statement but also visual ways to signify 
other things such as uniform, make-up, hairstyle, and logos, all of which are 
communication elements that can be used to shape an ‘image’ or a political identity. But 
he does not include interpersonal political communication. He gives the emphasis on the 
political discussion among the people in a public bar or a public dinner, in negotiations 
by the government behind closed doors, and in information gathered by journalists from a 
face-to-face communication with high profile sources, as the things that are very 
significant for the political process. The three political communication elements can be 
depicted as the following: 
 
Figure 2.2: Relation of Three Elements (McNair, 1999: 5) 
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          From the first element, namely political organization, he calls political actors as the 
important ones. They are people with strong ambitions, through organizational and 
institutional ways, who try to influence the process of decision making. They do this by 
getting institutionalized political powers, in the government or in the groups of 
constituents, through which the selected policies can be implemented. The second 
element is the organization of a media which in a political system functions as the 
transmitter of political communication coming from outside the media organization itself 
and also as a transmitter of political messages constructed by journalists. The role of the 
media is not less important and it is clearly used by political actors to communicate their 
messages to the intended audience. Political programs, political statements, political 
invitations, campaign by pressure groups, terrorist’s actions, all of which may have 
political existence and all has the potential for the effectiveness of communication only if 
they are covered and received as messages by the media. As a consequence, all political 
communicators have to have an access to the media through various ways, whether 
through the legislative body, or by appreciating the works of the media so that the 
message can be distributed. The third element is the people or the citizens. For political 
communication, in its widest meaning it can be an institution with a purpose to persuade 
all voters in a country. But it can also be meant in a narrow sense as when an influential 
newspaper editor asks a political party to change the leader. The audience can be widely 
meant or narrowly meant as in the case of a supermarket bombing (McNair, 1999: 12). 
 
2.3.3.3 Cultural Dimension   
There are a number of researches showing how cultural factors influence the political 
communication as stated by Heisy (in Gonzalez and Tanno, 1997), including, first,  the 
book edited by Gundykunst and Kim, ‘Methods for Intercultural Communication 
Research’ where Strarosta describes the usage of Burke’s symbolic analysis technique in 
some selected UN speeches to unveil the motifs (‘factors’) of a communicator.  It is said 
that ‘the tenets of a given culture could be disclosed through an analysis of cultural 
materials. One subjective culture should permeate one’s pronouncements’ (Gonzalez and 
Tanno, eds., 1997: 9). 
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 The conclusion of Starosta on a public speech which opens the teachings of a 
culture is anticipated by Olivier in ‘Communication and Culture in Ancient India and 
China’. Olivier says that the premise of his study is ‘rhetoric is culturally based’ and that 
‘rhetoric inheres in the philosophy and way of life of its practitioners’, including personal 
and public speeches. 
 Second, in ‘New Directions in Political Communications: A Resource Book’, 
Swanson and Nimmo have a more advanced understanding on how a culture affects and 
expresses itself in the political communication in two ways. First, it identifies the second 
area of political communication research such as ‘neo-Marxist cultural studies’ which is 
beyond ‘the voters’ persuasion paradigm’, and this incites questions on the mainstream of 
this research. The editors claim that there is an increasing divergence in this study and 
that ‘rhetorical critics and theorists who represent the oldest tradition in the main research 
give more attention to the understanding of a political dimension rather than popular 
cultures’. 
 Also in this book, Johnston reviews the ‘political rhetoric’ research in 1980s, 
outlines some analytical categories such as the themes and messages of a speaker or a 
certain group, a special type of an event in which the response is given, and how a special 
historical metaphor is applied to create a vision for the public. Johnston concludes that by 
identifying one of the main tendencies as ‘an attempt to understand how through single 
speeches, multifold media messages, and whole campaigns, political realities are 
constructed, negotiated, and renegotiated by and for their participants, politicians, media 
professionals, and the public’. This tendency is included in an interest to test the power 
that the cultural components are playing in the construction and negotiation of these 
political realities (Gonzales and Tanno, eds., 1997:10). 
 Referring to the book, New Direction, Aaron Wildavsky argues that a cultural 
theory means that a culture plays the role as a ‘social filter’, and it enables ‘people to 
construct a political preference’. This perspective is very important understanding how a 
cultural factor affects the political communication in and in between the different 
systems. In Europe, the political communication has been analyzed for its cultural values. 
Heisy in the research on the Prime Minister, Olaf Palme of Sweden says that an 
examination on a political rhetoric shows two characters of Swedish traditional cultural 
values: namely to campaign for the cause of justice and to work for peace. Palme has 
  
37
been recorded in Sweden and other places in the world where he brought the causes as 
the causes for his country, and this is clear in the interest he gives for the development of 
conscience in the world. He was against the colonial position and he supported the 
movement of national liberation in many countries in the world (Gonzales and Tanno, 
eds., 1997: 11). 
 Palme has become very famous for his assistance on social equality, peaceful 
conflict resolutions, disarmament, and non-aligned politics in the world. These all are the 
positions of Sweden, which are based on their own history and on their international 
behavior. His expressed opposition against the involvement of the United States in South 
East Asia is one of his personal labels. From this position, Palme wants to show that ‘for 
the world audience, there was an alternative to the direction the superpowers were 
taking’. That is why, in the funeral for Palme in 1986, his successor called him as the 
‘champion of justice and peace’ and Heisy called him as a ‘conscience to the world’ 
(Gonzales and Tanno, eds., 1997:11). 
 Third, the study of McPhail believes that racism in the United States has to be 
rejected as a cultural phenomenon in any of its forms and manifestations. He sees that the 
opinion of Cornel West and Patricia Williams as a hope for the ‘perspective that 
challenge essential notions of race, gender, and language’, including a ‘dialog as a viable 
strategy for human symbolic actions and interaction’. He wants to move from ‘the 
rhetoric of racism’ and ‘complicity’ to a ‘dialog discourse of coherence’ which replaces 
the expository and argumentative discourse with ‘the unities of coherent dialog’. Such an 
advanced movement in the United States will be marginalized, whether it is about ethnic 
groups or female groups. Racism is not a ‘white problem, nor a black problem, but a 
moral problem which covers the political discourse in the United States’ (Gonzales and 
Tanno, eds., 1997: 13). 
 Apart from racism, the analysis on the Gulf War is also another example on how 
scholars view how a culture plays its role in the construction of political communication. 
Hallin and Gitlin examine the media coverage and political reports on the Gulf War and 
they found that the war was seen as a ‘high drama’, ‘a personalized contest between 
Saddam Hussein and George Bush’, and also as a’ ritual of a civil religion’ which 
identifies the ‘community’. It is a ‘story above all of American prowess: a story of the 
firmness of American leaders, the potency of American technology, and the bravery, 
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determination, and skills of American soldiers’. This dramatic story helps to shift the 
political focus ‘from debate to a consensus’ and from ‘protests to demonstrations behind 
the troops’ (Gonzales and Tanno, eds., 1997: 13). 
 So, it is deemed necessary to know the third tradition in political communication, 
namely the perspective of cultural influences. 
 
2.3.3.4 Ethical Dimension 
Political communication is about a constitutional authority, public morality, and politics 
(Denton, 2000: 241). It is also said that the meaning of an authority is that it is a central 
concept in the political and social thoughts. There are many kinds of authorities: 
bureaucratic, technical, and professional ones. But all those kinds of authorities are based 
on the structure of social relationships between an individual and the state. Such a 
relation can start from a coercion based on oppression, obedience which is not based on 
reflection but on habits, based on the purpose to enlighten the differences of the 
meanings. The roles of an authority in a governance is to respect not only morals, ethics, 
and intellectual standards but also to guarantee the social and political freedom which 
function as the limits for centralization and despotic power. We use an authority to 
protect our rights, to run a government and security, to manage a conflict, and to 
distribute profits and liabilities to the people. 
 The authority of a government: structures, rules, and laws – come from the 
constitution. The moral authority of a government comes from the collective trust, 
attitudes, and values of the citizens. A moral authority can probably be defined as 
perceived obligations, duties, values, or ideas which are derived from the community. 
From a democratic point of view, a conditional authority is defined as the capability to 
enliven voluntariness. 
 From the four dimensions, the second dimension which considers political 
communication as a relation among various elements particularly political organizations, 
media, and the citizens becomes the cornerstone of this research. This important element 
in this section is about how political communication becomes a political process of policy 
making which involves various elements such as the government, parliament, 
community, and media. 
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2.4  Conclusions 
The political transition happened from an authoritarian to a democratic one through an 
unstable democratic process. The transitional approach is focused on the political process 
and behaviors of the elite which boost the leaders to transform and to take policies which 
are consistent to democracy, for instance by approving a media law (Price et al. 2002). 
Democracy itself requires that there should be alternatives for the public and there should 
be information to make the choice. In this case, a free media can provide information for 
citizens so that they can make the alternatives. But it is still required a civil society which 
has the knowledge of democracy; and a democratic system, it is still unstable in nature, 
needs the freedom of the press. The question is what kind of press freedom it should be. 
 For a transitional society, the combination of social obligation, libertarian, and 
development models can be the foundation of the press freedom. The purpose is to 
promote the national unity, economic, and social aspects but also to provide information 
which empowers the society and which enables the society to take the use of the 
information to apply a control over the government. A press freedom with a control 
function over the government can play its role, not just for to voice the interests of the 
ruler like the one in an authoritarian system. A strong media, and in particular if the 
media falls into a commercial market, will tend to focus on an ownership dominance. On 
the other hand, a media should always support the citizenship and the availability of 
public spaces. So, this is the essence of political communication, namely the availability 
of a relationship among the three elements: political organizations, media, and the 
citizens (McNair, 1999). 
 At first, political communication is elitist in nature, where a political organization 
(political party) is the central institution for opinion creation through newspapers, and 
then through electronic media, particularly through television. Technological 
developments then finally open the door for citizens to access information as well as to 
pass it through openly. A study in political communication of transitional society has two 
kinds of relevance. First, it is to see how a media plays it role in different political 
systems; for instance the study of Jean K. Chalaby in unconsolidated democratic 
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countries. Chalaby finds three typologies which are meant to contribute for the 
development of communication and journalism. The first typology is about political 
communication in a totalitarian regime which is characterized with cynicism, violence, 
and Machiavellianism of totalitarian elites. Second, it is about the media an authoritarian 
regime. The leader of such a regime still needs the media which can help to publish its 
ideologies and stops the other ones. The third one is about political communication in a 
presidential regime. This system refers to the countries which adopt a presidential 
constitution in their transition periods from a totalitarian or authoritarian to a more 
democratic one (Chalaby, 1998: 432). The second relevance is to see how a new regime 
behaves to freedom of the press. The study of Ellis sees how the political transition in the 
Soviet Union has given birth to a Federal country and tried to adopt various universal 
stipulations in their Press Law. Ellis (1999) describes how this country tried to apply a 
new press law with some inspirations from Article 19 and about six other articles of the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) which were relevant to Russian 
mass media.  
 A political communication has some dimensions, namely the dimensions of 
process, relations, culture, and ethics. In the process dimension, the social, economic, and 
political situations become the background of messages delivered by political parties, 
interest groups, and candidates (Denton and Woodward, 1998). A process of negotiation 
can move fast or slowly, depending on the roles played by the actors in the community or 
depending on their capabilities to translate the interests in the power relations (Smelser 
and Baltes, 2000). On the other hand, McNair sees it as a relationship of various 
elements, namely the political organizations, media, and citizens. Referring to Swanson 
and Nimmo, a culture may also influence and express itself in the political 
communication. While Aaron Wildavsky considers that an action culture as a ‘social 
filter’ enables ‘people to construct a political preference’. This perspective is also 
important in understanding how a cultural factor affects the political communication in 
and among the different systems. In an ethical dimension, a political communication is a 
constitutional authority and a public and political morality (Denton, 2000: 241). An 
authority plays its role in the governance to respect morals, ethics, and intellectual 
standards, but also to ensure the social and political freedom and it plays as the limits for 
a centralization and despotism. An authority is used to protect the rights of the citizens, to 
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run an order and security, to manage a conflict, and to distribute the profit and liabilities 
among people. The authority of a government which includes the structure, rules, and 
laws which come from a constitution cannot be used arbitrarily because it comes from a 
collective trust, attitude, and values of the citizens. A moral authority is a perceived 
obligation and duty which is derived from community values such as ideas and ideals of 
the society. It is used to raise the voluntariness. So, the establishment of a legal law for 
the media by the government which is entering a democratic system is to protect the 
rights of the citizens, to enforce the authority which defends the public morality. 
To mention some, first, in a book edited by Gundykunst and Kim, Methods for 
Intercultural Communication Research, Starosta explained the use of “Burke’s symbolic 
analysis technique” to selected speakers of the UNO to disclose the motivations 
(‘factors’)  of the communicator”.   It was said, ”that the tenets of a given culture could 
be disclosed through the analysis of cultural materials. One subjective culture should 
permeate one’s pronouncements” (Gonzalez and Tanno, eds.1997:9). Starosta’ 
conclusion about public speech opening the culture learning was anticipated by Oliver in 
Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China. Oliver said that the premise of 
his study was “rhetoric is culturally based” and that “rhetoric inheres in the philosophy 
and way of life of its practitioners,” including personal and public speech. 
      Second, in New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book, 
Swanson and Nimmo had more advanced understanding how culture influenced and 
expressed itself in political communication in two ways. The first method, in identifying 
the second area of political communication research such as “neo-Marxist cultural 
studies, ” beyond ”the voter’s persuasion paradigm,” invited a question about the 
mainstream of this research.  Its editors claimed the existence of the increasing 
divergence in this review and that “rhetorical critics and theorist, who represented the 
oldest tradition of the main research, gave greater attention to wider understanding of 
political dimension than popular cultural forms”. 
       It was in this book as well that Johnston reviewed the research of “political 
rhetoric” in 1980s, making outline of some analysis categories like the themes and 
messages from the readers or special group, special type of an event where response was 
given, and how special historical metaphor was used to create a vision for public. 
Johnston concluded in his review by identifying a big tendency as “an attempt to 
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understand how, through single speeches, multifold media messages, and whole 
campaigns, political realities are constructed, negotiated, and renegotiated by and for 
their participants-politicians, media professionals, and the public”.  This tendency is 
included in the interest in testing the strength that cultural component plays in the 
construction and negotiation of these political realities. (Gonzales and Tanno, 1997:10). 
      Still referring to New Direction book, Aaron Wildavsky suggested that a cultural 
theory means that culture, acting as a “social filter”, enabled “people to construct political 
preference”.  This perspective is important in understanding how cultural factor 
influenced political communication in and between different systems. In European 
regions, political communication had been analyzed for cultural values.  In a research on 
Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, Heisy said that an examination of political 
rhetoric showed two characters of Sweden traditional culture: campaigning the cause of 
fairness and worked for peace.  Palme was noted in Swede and other places in the world 
where he brought the causes as the cause of his country was clear in the interest he gave 
to the development of conscience in the world.  He opposed to colonial attitude and 
supported national liberation movement in many places in the world (Gonzales and 
Tanno, 1997: 11). 
  Palme became famous due to his contribution to social equality, peaceful conflict 
resolution, disarmament, and nonalignment politics in the world – all are Sweden 
positions, based on their own history and international behavior. His open opposition to 
the involvement of the United States of America in South East Asia was of his personal 
stamps.  From this position, Palme wanted “to show the world audience that there was an 
alternative to the direction the superpowers were taking”.  That was the reason that in 
Palme burial in 1986, his successor called him as “champion of justice and peace” and 
Heisy called “as a conscience to the world” (Gonzales and Tanno, 1997: 11). 
   Third, McPhail study believed that racism in America must be rejected as a 
cultural phenomenon in all of its forms and manifestations.  He saw the ideas of Cornel 
West and Patricia Williams as a sign of an expectation for an offer of “perspective that 
challenge essential notions of race, gender and language”, including “dialogue as a viable 
strategy for human symbolic action and interaction”.  He wanted to switch from “the 
rhetoric of racism” and “complicity” to “a dialogue discourse of coherence” that replaced 
expository and argumentative realm with “the unities of coherent dialogue”.  Such a 
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forward movement in America would be put aside, either ethnical group or female group.  
Racism is not ”a white problem, nor a black problem, but a moral problem covering 
political discourse in America (Gonzales and Tanno,  1997: 13). 
      In addition to racism problem, analysis on Gulf War is an example of how 
scholars see culture plays its part in the construction of political communication.   Hallin 
and Gitlin examined media coverage and political reports of the Gulf War and found out 
that war was seen as a”high drama”,”a personalized contest between Saddam Hussein” 
and George Bush, as well as “ritual” of “civil religion” confirming the “community”.  It 
was “a story above all of American prowess: a story of the firmness of American leaders, 
the potency of American technology, and the bravery, determination, and skill of 
American soldiers.”  This dramatic story helped shift political focus “from debate to 
consensus” and from protest to demonstration behind the troop. (Gonzales and Tanno, 
1997: 13). 
      Thus, the third tradition in political communication has to be understood, namely 
the perspective of cultural influence.  
 
2.3.3.4 Ethical Dimension 
      Political communication is about constitutional right, public morality and politics 
(Denton, 2000: 241).  It is then said, the understanding of authority is a central concept in 
political and social mind.  There are many forms of authority: bureaucratic, technical, or 
professional. However, all forms of authority are based on the structure of social 
relationship between an individual and the state.  Such a relation moves from the 
coercion based on pressure, to obedience without reflection based on habit, to enlighten 
difference based on value understanding.  The role of the authority and government is not 
only respecting moral, ethics, and intellectual standard but also ensuring social and 
political independence and acting as the limit of centralization and arbitrariness and 
despotic authority.  We use authority to protect our rights, to do the order and safety, to 
manage conflict, and to distribute benefits and burden of the society.  
      Government authority: structure, rules, and law – originating from the 
constitution. Moral authority of the government comes from collective trust, attitude and 
value of the citizens.  Moral authority may be defined as the sensed obligation and the 
task is taken from shared community values, ideas and ideals. From the perspective of 
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democracy, the authority condition is defined as the ability to awaken voluntary attitude.   
Out of the four dimensions, it was the second dimension thinking about pol 
Chapter 3 
Comparative Analysis of Political Communication in other Countries 
 
Started with a short description on the situation of media in respective countries, 
this chapter will describe the dynamics of political communication in some industrialized 
countries as well as developing countries or transitional countries. The United States, 
UK, and Germany are three representatives of industrialized countries with important 
media developing that may affect other countries. Russia, Hungary, and the Philippines 
are three representatives of transitional countries in Europe and Asia. The important 
lessons to take from the six countries are focused on the relationship between the 
government and the media as depicted through legal regulations, principles of press 
freedom and in some recent cases. In the relationship, formal obstacles can be seen in the 
laws an regulations made by the state, and the informal ones can be found in other 
mechanism such as ethical, social, economic, and cultural matters where the two 
institutions are forming the media content (Grossberg et al., 2006). 
 
3.1 Political Communication in Industrialized Countries 
3.1.1 United States of America 
Similarities between Indonesia and the United States can be found among others 
in the number of their populations. Both are included in the five largest populations in the 
world as compared to other countries. The dissimilarities can be found among others in 
the fact that from the total 278,058,881 American people, 97% are literate in addition to 
having a high income per capita. The two factors make American people capable to 
access all kinds of media in their various forms such as newspapers, magazines, radio, 
television, documentary movies, and internet, while Indonesians are just entering the era 
of television after newspapers and radio. 
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3.1.1.1 Media System  
The general tendency of US press in the 20th century includes consolidation, 
corporation or chain ownership, and monopoly in many towns and cities (Quick, 2003). 
For instance, in 2001, good newspapers could only be found in 49 cities of which 16 of 
them were owned by a single owner. Though the levels of population, prosperity, and 
literacy have been tremendously increasing, but the number of papers has been 
continuously decreasing. In the last 30 years, the number of papers has decreased from 
1,748 to 1,480. The largest papers in America include The Wall Street Journal with 
1,763,000 in print, USA Today (1,693,000), New York Times (1,097,000), Los Angeles 
Time (1,033,000), The Washington Post (762,000) (Quick, 2003). Papers were on their 
peak in the US between 1890 and 1920 where the population was tripled between 1850 
and 1900 to reach almost 76 million. On the other hand, the circulation of papers 
increased twenty times to reach 15.1 million in 1900 (McKearns in Straubhaar and La 
Rose, 2004: 100). 
 The most important issue in US press is the quality of journalism. The unique 
aspect of a newspaper is its attachment to news particularly political news. But when the 
number and the level of competition among papers started to decrease, they also started 
to decrease their support to a particular political party or ideology. Journalists are trained 
to grab the objectiveness in their coverage and they are warned to keep a distance with an 
issue, sources, and events covered. However, there are also criticisms that most American 
papers are basically biased in their coverage, like supporting capitalism, free market, and 
based on the two-party system. Corporate consolidation in 2002 made journalists 
concerned about the opportunities to give an influence as the result of a centralized 
ownership in a very lithe number of people (Quick, 2003: 1022-1023). 
 The golden age of radio was much brighter after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by 
the Japanese in 1941 and the US was forced to join the Second World War. Radio was 
used to sell war ties and most of its content was intended to strengthen the morale of the 
nation. When the war ended and radio license was provided, the number of radio stations 
jumped to 2,000. Annual advertising revenue reached $454 million in 1950. With the 
advent of television, the number of affiliated networks dropped from 97% in 1945 to 
reach 50% in mid 1950s. Radio stations became more localized in the face of national 
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television domination and the advertising revenue for radio dropped to reach $35 million 
in 1960, while 90% of American households owned a television set (Baran, 2004: 205).  
In early 1980, a boom of financial speculation showed up in radio stations because their 
values were considered sharply increasing. A few years of revenue made the speculator 
out. Changes in ownership as dictated by the telecommunication law of 1996 permitted 
the groups of radio stations to get more additional stations just to speed up the number. 
The largest groups of owners started to join the Clear Channel Communication with more 
than 1200 stations. But in 1996 to 1997, more than 4400 stations changed hands. The 
largest format of stations in the US included country, classic, and new to reach 2,218 
programs, followed by news / talks/ sports (1,838), religious / gospel/ Christian (1,803), 
standard adult (1,290), oldies, 70s – 80s, rhythmic oldies (1,006), rock, classic rock, AOR 
(812), Spanish (all including news talk) ( 600), contemporary hit (CHR), rhytmic (551), 
alternative, adult alternative (429), urban, urban oldies, urban AC (321), classical, fine 
arts (276), new adult contemporary, smooth jazz (148) (Straubhaar and LaRose, 
2004:134-135).  
 Radio industry became the model for television industry in the US. Local 
television served their communities but they were also affiliated to their networks. In 
1950s there were four TV networks, namely CBS, NBC, ABC, and DuMont, and in 1980s 
and 1990s the competition among television industries got more severe (Dominick, 
2007). In 2005, CBS and ABS started to decline to make more people change to cable TV 
news. Cable TV has formed the new modern television and 69.4% of home televisions 
(73.2 million households) are wired (Baran, 2004: 251). Pre-cable television audience 
had only fewer choices, namely three commercial networks, public television, and an 
independent television station, but they have more than 100 channels to choose. The new 
outlet provides a channel for innovative series, like the launching of the first series like 
Oz of the HBO and Soul Food of Showtime. Through the expansion of optical fiber 
cables using signals channeled through light beam on fiber glass, 500 cable systems can 
be technologically made.  
 The US enjoyed internet booming between 1998 and mid 2000 and started to 
declined in 2001. In this year it was predicted that the internet service providers lost more 
than $1.7 billion (Dominick, 2007: 272). There are 6,000 internet service providers (ISP) 
in the US including the famous ones like America Online, Prodigy, and the wireless 
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Ricochet. In 1996, 63% internet users were males, in 2000 female users became the 
largest users for the first time. But the profile of internet users in the US in 2002 was like 
the followings: 90% in the 5 -17 years of age brackets, followed by college students 81%, 
married couples with income more than $75,000 (79%), females (54%), married couples, 
(50.5%), males and female single parents (46% respectively), and married couples with 
income less than $15,000 (Baran, 2004: 310). 
 
3.1.1.2 Government-Media-Relations   
The first amendment of the US constitution is one of the political system 
elements. It also provides enough freedom for media to determine how media are going 
to cover and report news. But at the same time, the first amendment also protects paid 
political speeches, controversial issues, as long as the actions by political committees 
paying the candidate campaign are made independently (Perloff, 1998: 11). 
 According to Croteau and Hoynes, it is not enough just to refer on the first 
amendment. Indeed, in the first amendment, the state guarantees freedom of the press. 
The complete statement is: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.” We don’t have to look deeper to find other dimensions of the 
relationship between the government and media except for the US constitution (Croteau 
and Hoynes, 1997:67). Article 8 of section I says: “Power of Congress,” is among others 
a power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times 
to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
Croteau and Hoynes say that the constitution explicitly gives the Congress the right to 
intervene communication market to protect the interest of creator through copy rights 
(1997: 67). Through this case it wants to be shown that the government does make 
interventions and these are important for the functioning of media industry. Without copy 
right enforcement by the government, the profit of media industry would not last. And in 
the end, the discussion wants to mention that the relationship between the government 
and media is more complicated than the slogan of ‘freedom of the press’. Other important 
issues are about communication systems which are related to regulations dictated by the 
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government. In the context of the first amendment, this refers to the media of the age, 
namely print media, while in Europe the government limited the right to print through 
various ways such as printing taxes and aggressively punished defamations (Eisenstein in 
Croteau and Hoynes, 1997: 68). 
 Press freedom in a liberal democratic system has its own reality, not only for print 
media but also for television. Press freedom is defined as a medium in which a diversity 
of ideas and opinions is allowable, not as a single opinion agent of state propaganda 
(Street, 2001: 253). The media is ‘free’ in the sense that it is not subject to a centralized 
control. Any control on its content is a violation of the freedom. The meaning of press 
freedom is attached to the free market. This puts media at the basis of a free market in the 
sense that there is an opportunity to assure the media independence from the government.  
 In broadcasting there is a different regulation by establishing the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) in 1934.  Now the responsibility of FCC includes the 
regulation of communication among states and US international Communication through 
radio, television, cables, satellites, and wired transmission. FCC is also responsible to 
issue the license, charges, and enforcement of communication laws. 
 The relationship between media and politicians in US government is a mixture of 
conflicts, cooperation, support, and denial (Silverblatt, 1995: 229). There are two 
differences to discuss the subject: first, media coverage on politics and media usage by 
politicians. The competing functions are depicting the aspects of political 
communication. 
 According to Silverblatt, there are some reasons why media covers politics 
including (1) media informs the public on political life of the state by educating the 
public on issues related to politics, for instance when American media strengthens the 
political agenda for the whole nation, (2) media provides public exposure for politicians. 
In American context, politicians are very much dependent on media when media 
coverage lends its legitimacy to politician’s aspirations, (3) media influences public 
attitudes on politics and other issues which is the result of  media influence and that is 
why politicians are trying to show their good will to media, and (4) media works as the 
enemy for the government. In this case, media plays the role as a watchdog for the 
government; even media makes the government more accountable in the eyes of the 
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people. For instance, investigative reports on Vietnam wars, Watergate, and Iran-gate 
have contributed to the assignments of officials to improve policies, and to reform the 
governance (Silverblatt, 1995: 230). 
On the other hand, politicians can monitor messages delivered to the public to 
media, for instance through political advertisements. Politicians can manipulate media 
coverage by holding press conference, speeches, meetings that will be covered by media. 
According to Silverblatt (1995: 231-2), media usage by politicians can be categorized 
into: (1) media sees politicians as important sources of news and fortunes; (2) politicians 
use media to monitor; (3) to manage information flow; (4) to limit the access for 
reporters; (5) to speak in unison; (6) to facilitate media in providing various sources; (7) 
to exploit media, and (8) to bind media anytime it is required. On the other side, media 
also supports the agenda of the government my expanding the destination edge of the 
coverage by collaborating with the government. The two sides of the roles meet together 
to make public confused because of the fact that the difference between a news item and 
a political advertisement is very vague, for instance election news item as an 
advertisement.  
In 1970, the most important cases included the Pentagon Papers and Watergate 
scandal. Pentagon Papers proved the illegal US bombing in the neutral Cambodia in the 
Vietnam wars and it placed the media in a conflicting situation with the government. In 
the case of Watergate, two Washington Post journalists revealed the Watergate scandal to 
make the president Richard Nixon resign (Braestrup in Straubhaar and La Rose, 2004). 
The era also asserted that the US press was no more a watch dog but an attack dog based 
on the practice of investigative journalism. 
The most recent case in relation to press freedom is about the case of a basketball 
player Kobe Bryant in 2004. The court reporter mistakenly delivered secret report to 
some media. After realizing the mistake, the judge ordered that all copies be destroyed 
and warned anybody holding the copy as a contempt of the court. The judge said that the 
policy to hold the report was for the sake of national interest. But what the judge did then 
was eventually stopped when the judge revealed the information in the copy and in 2005 
the court said that a judge could not be prevented of publicizing the name of juries 
identified in the open session of the court (Dominick, 2007: 347). 
  
50
 
3.1.2 Germany  
The history of Germany is very interesting to be made a comparison in looking at 
the dynamics of its political communication. As an industrialized country, the public 
access to media is very much different from those in transitional or developing countries. 
The unification of Germany in 1989-1990 was a different nuance as compared to France, 
UK, or Sweden because Germany today is in the process of integrating 16 million new 
citizens into its economy, social and political situations (Hancock, et al., 2000). In 1989, 
the Federal Republic of Germany included 248,621 square kilometers with 62.7 million 
of people including those most densely populated areas (ca 250 people per square 
kilometer) in the world (Ostergaard, 1997). It can be said that in fact Germany has not 
been long in a ‘transitional’ situation. 
 
3.1.2.1 Media System  
As compared to other European countries, Germany is considered as one of the 
most densely populated countries with 82,160,000 people. Just like in the US, the 
development of media in the country drops. In 1997 there were 403 newspapers and only 
381 in 2001 (WAN, 2002). According to the association, the growth level of national 
newspapers dropped from less than 7 in 1997 to 10 in 2001. But the number of papers at 
regional level and local level dropped from 396 in 1997 to 371 in 2001. The total 
circulation also dropped from 25,260,000 in 1997 to only 23,838,000 in 2001. The big 
five of newspapers in Germany included Bild with 4,396,000 in circulation followed by 
Zeitungsgruppe WAZ (1,090,000), Zeitungsgruppe Thuringen (458,000), Suddeutsche 
Zeitung (436,000) and Rheinische Post (418,000). The general profile of German press, 
according to Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail (2004) included (1) there are a lot of titles, 
(2) strong local papers, and sometimes monopoly, (3) only small number of national 
papers, and (4) many magazines.  
 Following Ostergaard, as compared to other industrialized countries in Western 
Europe, German press dated back to the seventeenth century and closely related to the 
emergence of a capitalist state and its industrial economy. Up to the dawn of the 
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twentieth century, in the era of the Weimar Republic, the press grow with a commercial 
character and concentrated in the hands of some publishers like Rudolf Mosse, Leopold 
Ullstein, and August Scherl. There also grew some party presses like those published by 
the Social Democratic Party. In the mean time, in the World War I, Alfred Hugenberg, an 
ultra conservative industrialist, started to establish his ‘media empire’ to support the 
rightist political extreme and to help Hitler to reach the throne of power (Ostergaard, 
1997: 76). 
 Television transmission was started in 1954 through TV channels. This was the 
cooperation among all Lander organizations to establish the Arbeitgemeinschaft der 
Rundfungkanstalten Deutschlands (ARD), a federal effort to introduce the second 
channel which was cancelled by the federal constitutional court in 1961. All national 
broadcasting activities were taken at the Lander level than the federal one. The ARD then 
opened the third channel (ARD-3). The first two channels offered public programs, the 
third channel started to air regional and cultural programs. The public service 
broadcasting is a strong factor to support regional identity (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and 
McQuail, 2004: 82). 
 In 1970, the public monopoly started to be broken by the introduction of 
commercial broadcasting. The main actor was paper industries, namely the successful 
ones in 1984 / 1985 when the dual system was established. After a few years of 
inactivity, public broadcasting started to react against the challenge and started to offer 
entertainment while developing some special channels in cooperation with Austria and 
Switzerland in German language, a German chanel (ARTE), a documentary channel 
(Phoenix), and a channel for kids (Kika). The ARD-3 program was then channeled 
through the satellites to make N-24 viewed at homes. This made most German citizens 
have more than ten or more public service channels. The main competitor for public 
broadcasting was RTL, which was originally aired from Luxembourg as RTL-plus to 
cross the borders. Then it was introduced Pro-7, followed by Vox, RTL-2, Kabel 1, and 
special channels like Viva 1 + 2, DSF for sport, ntv and N-24 for news (Kelly, Mazzoleni, 
and McQuail, 2004: 82-83). 
 Almost all radios in Germany are regional or local in nature. In addition to the 
two programs distributed nationally (Deutschland Radio) as the remains of the unification 
process, all other programs are limited for local and regional distances. The monopoly on 
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radio public service remained up to 1985 when the first commercial radio station was 
licensed. Since the license issuance was handled by the broadcasting authority in Lander, 
the situation changed, and a different policy was made. 
 Based on a study by ARD-online in 2001, the number of German citizens using 
Internet was 38.8 percent, including 48.3 percent of all males and 30.1 percent of all 
females. The main provider was T-online, a sister company of Deutsch Telekom and 
AOL-online. The majority of broadcasting media used the online service and the most 
successful one included rtl.de (1.48 hits in February 2002), sat1.de (800,000), sport1.de 
(510,000), and wdr.de (500,000). WDR is a public service of North Rhine Westphalia. A 
public broadcasting services often invests its capital in online service and almost all of 
them build portals centered in news (tageschau.de), regional matters, and materials to 
support their programs. In the mean time, their business competitors give the emphasis on 
entertainment, games, and interactive chatting. Most papers are also active in online 
service, among others include FAZ (faz.de) which starts to collect money for larger 
usage.  
 
3.1.2.2 Government-Media-Relations  
The end of a propaganda media system by the Nazi dictatorship started the new 
license structure for papers and magazines, where broadcasting stations were under the 
control of the allies, and only some of them which were placed under German authority. 
This is the end of the old regime until the establishment of the Federal Republic based on 
the new basic law as its constitution (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004). In section 5 
article 1 it can be seen:  
Everybody has the right to free expression and publication of his 
opinion in word, writting and picture and the right to obtain 
information without hindrance from sources generally accessible. The 
freedom of the press and of reporting by broadcasting and film is 
guaranteed. There must be no censorship. 
 
While in the Federal Constitutional Court it is stated: “a free press, independent of the 
State and not subject to censorship, is one of the fundamental elements of the democratic 
state; in particular, a free, regular political press is indispensable for modern democracy. 
In a representative democracy, the press is both a constant link and a instrument of 
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supervision between the people and is elected representatives in parliament and 
government” (Bergmann, 2000: 3). 
 But in addition to the general guidelines as the part of human rights in the 
constitution, there are not many references of media which can be found. Section 70 
states that a law making for the press is in the hand of the Lander, but the federal 
government can specify a general framework of rules which it never does. All Lander 
make their own press laws consisting of similar regulations on publisher’s information, 
the rights of journalists, and other materials. This emphasizes the fact that a newspaper 
business is treated in the same way anywhere. In addition to this law, the self-regulation 
system is also applied. A press council (Deutscher Presserat), which includes the 
representatives of publishers and journalists, handles all complaints and issues open 
warning. An advertisement council does the same thing. 
A special regulation for the press was included in the federal cartel law in 1976. 
The most important definition of a free market was more specifically defined for the 
press in comparison to other institutions. But the implementation of this regulation was 
not so strict and the publishers tried to revoke this regulation (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and 
McQuail, 2004: 85). Klaus Bergmann, a media law expert says that the media law in 
Germany can be assumed as a rule in a soccer match. There are certain rules to follow by 
all players, and the rules are needed just to make the game not ended in a chaos and 
boring for the viewers. But on the other hand, the game will also be boring and 
meaningless if there are too many rules where the referee always interferes and stops the 
game (Bergmann, 2000: 2). 
 The basic law says that the sole responsibility in broadcasting is on the hands of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a part of its cultural sovereignty. But there is 
also an exception for radio and television companies of which main function is to provide 
information for foreign countries based on the federal legislation, namely for Deutsche 
Welle (DW). Just like the one mentioned previously, another actor in broadcasting policy 
is the Federal Constitutional Court which said its opinions in some important decisions in 
1961, 1971, 1981, 1986, and 1992. The court maintained the public service system 
decided in 1961 when it banned commercial television companies, and in 1986 it said 
that a commercial broadcasting was protected by the constitution, some basic principles 
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were protected for instance for financial security, and that a public service was allowed to 
take basic programs (Ostergaard, 1997: 84). 
 The first decision on broadcasting in 1961 for instance said that the court 
supported and institutionalized the opinion of the Allies on democratic pluralism and its 
implications on public opinions as imbedded in the basic law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in section 5 on the guarantee of freedom of opinion. And the court recorded that 
in section 5 of the basic law it was dictated the position that organized broadcasting 
providers to give effective participation of all relevant powers in their organs, to give 
them an opportunity to air their opinions in all scheduled programs. The position 
contained the guidelines of mandatory contents which guaranteed the minimum balance, 
objectivity, and the principles of mutual respect (Dahlgreen and Sparks, 1997: 98). In its 
verdict in 1981, the court agreed the principles of commercial private broadcasting which 
became the foundation of conservative Lander to start introducing the legislation on 
private broadcasting in 1984. The decision in 1986 basically was to restructure German 
broadcasting to a dual system which combined the structure of public service and the 
public service itself. 
 The public service system has three structural layers which consist of a 
supervising body or broadcasting council, an administrative body, and a director general 
or Intendant. The third structure, Intendant, is mainly responsible for the structure and 
content of programs and for budget preparation. The broadcasting council represents the 
‘general public interests’ (Dahlgreen and Sparks, 1997: 102). 
 With the dawn of new electronic technologies, namely cable and satellite 
technologies,  a new legislation is deemed necessary. All states prepared a media law in 
1980s particularly to control electronic media outside conventional public companies by 
distributing commercial radio and television licenses and to determine what program 
should be included in the cable system. For this matter, a new supervising body was 
established namely the Landesmedienanstalten (Ostergaard, 1997: 85). 
German media industry also follows the policy of horizontal and vertical 
centralization. A television broadcasting organization can control any number of 
television channels up to combined maximum of 30 percent of public shares. The owner 
of a print media in a German state has a dominant position in the market but it cannot 
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apply its dominant power on a broadcasting program in the same area (McQuail and 
Siune,  2001: 193 – 194). 
After the unification and political liberalization, the control of German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) on the press was paralyzed and the journalists reached their 
highest freedom (Ostergaard, 1997: 84). Following Ostergaard, soon after the fall of the 
Berlin wall, Western publication flooded East Germany and competed with old 
publications. Western magazines and tabloids got their huge fortune and a publisher like 
BILD started to publish its regional edition for East Germany, while a lot of old 
publishers came to an end. On the days of ‘non-violence revolution’, some new 
publishers came with an ‘alternative’ concept but not many could survive. But some 
communist publishers at district levels survived and proved to be stable even after the 
unification. They were taken over by Treuhand, the commissioner for East German 
companies for West German publishers sometimes to reach 100% of shares. In other 
cases, joint ownerships were established, for instance Springer which acquired a 
prominent publication of Leipzig (50%) and Rostock (75%), Bertelsmann acquired a 
Berlin publication in addition to Dresden (60%). 
But in the matter of policies for press and broadcasting, the main actor is the 
political parties, in particular the two largest parties, namely CDU (Christian Democratic 
Party) and SPD (Social Democratic Party) at the Lander level. In 1980 they issued a new 
regulation for the commercial sector by giving themselves a central position in the newly 
established supervising institution. The federal government was not much exercising its 
power, for instance on Deutsche Telekom. But in the peak months of unification, the 
situation was so unclear to determine the integration of broadcasting (Ostergaard, 1997: 
91). The most influential business actor is the giant media companies such as 
Bertelsmann and Springer which dominated the publication for a long period with a 
success and they started to demand new licenses for commercial broadcasting. They were 
now in the main position in radio, television, and print media industries which created 
new problems of the concentrated media. Most of them (Springer, Bauer, Burda) are 
inclined to CDU and they find the party as a ready fleet to be more commercial. 
Bertelsmann behaves more independently and sometimes it is inclined to SPD. Foreign 
actors also come in such as RTL and Berlusconi, but their influence is limited. 
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3.1.3 Great Britain  
As compared to the United States and Germany, Britain is a much smaller country 
in terms of its area and population. Out of 59,647,790 British citizens the literacy level 
reaches 99.0%. They live in 24 million households. Around 90% of the population lives 
in urban areas particularly in London and Manchester. At least 95% of the population 
speaks English as the first language. Other people speak Urdu and Welsh. England with 
its centralized governance changed its direction in 1997, followed by Scotland and Wales 
and Northern Ireland to lead a federal tendency (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 
262). However, the international community never moves its eyes on political affairs in 
UK including the relationship between the government and media. Though well known 
as a very liberal country, the British government  also limits the freedom of the press. 
 
3.1.3.1 Media System  
There are three influential papers in the country namely The Times with 711,628 
in circulation, followed by The Daily Telegraph with 1,006,561 in circulation, and The 
Guardian with 403,009 in circulation (Quick, 2003). From the circulation’s point of 
view, it is only The Daily Telegraph is included in the big five. The largest circulations 
include The Sun (3,388,703), The Daily Mail (2,429,906), The Daily Mirror (2,116,710), 
and The Daily Express (927,785). 
 Very contrast to US papers, in fact there are many national papers in UK which 
openly and emphatically are partisan papers (Alger, 1996: 408). According to Alger, as 
the result of the ownership and editorial orientation to Conservative party and ideology, 
and tendency to ownership concentration for two decades, the press has intensively 
tended to the Conservative party. In fact, Labor party and the new alliance party, Social 
Democratic – Liberal party, have been are not favored by the press. Out of eleven dailies 
in 1992, seven favored the Conservative party; even some of them were so empathic by 
showing the position in their head line news coverage. There were only two papers with 
orientation to Labor party and the other two were independent in nature (Alger, 1996: 
408). The problem of British press includes commercialization, effect of advertisement, 
tendency to sensationalism, ownership centralization, and less political coverage 
(Negrine, 1994: 39). 
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 The contrast between the British and American media system can be seen in 
broadcasting. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a really a legend in 
broadcasting world. Britain took a different path in the development and control upon 
broadcasting. The position of the company (BBC) is independent in its day-to-day 
business, and the primary control comes from the government. In terms of the 
demarcation between the government and BBC it was said: ”Where the interest of the 
State appear to be at all closely involved, it is open to the Corporation to consult a 
Minister or Department informally and of its own accord. This method leaves decision 
and discretion in the hands of the Corporation and is consistent with the independent 
status which was formulated” (Alger, 1996: 409). 
 In UK there are four dominant groups in commercial radio namely Capital, GWR, 
EMAP, and Scottish Radio. Along with six other groups, these radios are owned by the 
British commercial radio. BBC takes 53% share and commercial radio takes 45% (Kelly, 
Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 265). 
 All groups of major papers and television stations, in particular the BBC, actively 
compete in internet business. The proportion of household users to the Internet sharply 
increased from 29 percent by the end of 2000 to around 45 percent by the end of 2001. 
The BBC site, www.bbc.co.uk, was claimed as the Europe’s leading content site which 
was combined by the BBC World Service with its 614 page tracks in March 2002 (Kelly, 
Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 266). 
 
3.1.3.2. Government-Media-Relations  
Tracing its history, Britain in the 17th century applied a tight control on the press. 
The control on regulation and censorship was made on the basis that press freedom was 
considered a threat for the national security and stability (Negrine, 1994: 20-21). Britain 
was a unique country because its long tradition of press freedom did not oblige it to have 
a written law even in its constitution. However, this situation is also a weakness because 
there is no basic written protection for press freedom. In daily reality, British press is one 
of the freest one in the world except in emergency situation like in the First and Second 
World Wars. The unavailability of written law gives a chance for the government to 
threaten any media which is considered as not being in the same opinion with the 
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government. A criticism on a calumny, sexual abuse, and law violation shows that there 
is an option on possible censorship (Quick, 2003: 1008). 
The advent of the National Secrecy and Calumny Laws are just barriers in the 
democratic system of Britain (Alger, 1996). The National Secrecy Laws bans the 
broadcasting of publication on any information in which the government has considered 
it as a secret. This is quite similar to the law in the US, but this regulation is officially 
intended to protect national security and defense, particularly in covering a subject of 
‘draconian width’ with the ‘application of military secrecy even to the most innocuous 
civil information’. This law is really limiting and it is applied by the government by an 
imprisonment for the failure to communicate the information. The regulation gives the 
rights to the police to search an editorial office and to take away any letter or anything 
which is considered a proof of rule violation, if there is a reasonable reason for the 
implementation of both violations (Alger, 1996: 414). 
Officially, British press is free from the government. Censorship is seldom 
implemented and there is a limited regulation on the press. The relationship between the 
state and the press is symbiotically as well as hostile in nature. Based on investigative 
reports, British media practice a watch dog journalism which is long so that it can protect 
the public from corruption and power abuse by government officials (Quick, 2003: 1008). 
In 1991, there was established the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), an independent 
regulation agency as a mechanism to reestablish the press council which was developed 
in 1947 by the Royal Commission on the press. PCC was a reaction against the belief that 
press standards have been eroded and that there is a monopoly tendency in the press. In 
late 1980s, it was believed that the press council was no longer effective when its 
members were involved in various cases which were not professionally related to the 
press and to financial sources which were not independent in nature. In addition, in fact 
the editors did not consider it as a serious one (Quick, 2003: 1009). In many cases, 
British media is quite different from its counterparts in the US where national papers are 
open and emphatically partisan. The ownership and editorial orientation is to the 
Conservative party and also to an ideology. 
  National papers dominate British media policy. And the power of national papers 
on media policy has been increasing for two reasons. First, media communication and 
media have been more important since the end of broadcasting and communication 
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monopoly. Second, papers have been changing since the last decades to be different, 
more aggressive, and active in searching for political and commercial agenda. British 
politicians are scared of the press for some reasons; when the national press starts 
smelling the blood of politics, the press will give no mercy. All politicians see how other 
politicians’ career was torn apart by papers. British prime minister is so sensitive to the 
potential dislike of the press. Tony Blair in 1997 and on has permitted anti European 
papers to veto British membership in Euro finance (Kelly, Mazzoleni, McQuail, 2004: 
266). 
Out of eight newspaper owners, Murdoch is the most important one. He has a 
long career in seducing politicians. He owns The Times, Sunday Times, and two tabloids, 
Sun, and News of the World. The other three are perhaps more potential politically than 
Murdoch, including The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph, and The Daily Mirror. The 
prime minister often intervenes media policy, and many of these interventions take the 
form of face-to-face meeting between the prime minister and newspaper owners (Kelly, 
Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 267). 
The relationship between the press and the government significantly changed in 
the period of 1980-2000. In addition to the level of partisanship than US papers, British 
papers in the 20th century were more independent from political parties, so that a paper 
that was perhaps so friendly in the eyes of a politician could sophistically ‘manage’ news. 
Barnet and Gaber, as quoted by Quick, depicted how a political leader tried to control 
media coverage by the so-called ‘spin-doctor’ (Quick, 2003: 1008). 
British press industry also underwent structural changes. Before 1850, the market 
system functioned to promote social access to the public domain where cheap papers 
could be started and still got profit even without an advertisement. But in the second half 
of the 19th century, the dependence on advertisement increased and brought to the ad-
hunger of radical papers, while the increasing publishing costs brought a strong change in 
control power of popular press to capitalist businesspersons. Then it was followed by a 
consolidation of newspaper chain in the 20th century which was most controlled by the 
right wing. The death of labor press, a bureaucratic voice through which labor interests 
were channeled was represented in 1920s (Dahlgreen and Sparks, 1997: 39-40).  This 
change strengthens the press flow to the right. In 1987, the Conservative papers owned 
72% of national circulation though in fact the Conservative party only won 43% of votes 
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in the election. Even non Conservative party press was closed for political centers and 
joined the stigma of dissidents, leftist union, radical council, militant students, and gay 
proponents (Dahlgreen and Sparks, 1997: 40). 
In Britain, TV and radio help democratizing the relationship between the 
government and the governed. A TV studio weakened the parliament as a national debate 
forum, with a consequence of politics becoming a public activity rather than a closed 
business among professional politicians followed by elite politicization in general 
election. The emergence of broadcasting just like the press proves itself as an 
emancipative power to empower the people (Dahlgreen and Sparks, 1997: 44).  
An emergency situation happened when the Independent Television Commission 
(ITC) was always chaired by a scholar or a business person not a person from the media. 
Sir John Biggam, the person named to chair the ITC in 1996, said to the journalist of 
Broadcast that his television was prevented for news and the documentary program: 
‘After that I fall asleep’. That is also the case when a politician doesn’t have knowledge 
about the media or previous experience before handling the policy on national media 
(Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 266). In 2002, there was designed a 
Communication Bill which planned the complex structure of Office of Communication 
(OFCOM) as a ‘softer’ regulating body. Most of its contents were focused on the issues 
of telecommunication regulation. 
 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
Political communication in such industrial countries as the United States of 
America, Germany and England is influenced by social-political and technological 
development as well as its media system.  The relationship between the government and 
media is based on the supporting law.  
In USA, consolidation, corporation and ownership become the tendency of press 
development in the twentieth century.  Radio industry becomes the model for the 
development of television industry, and Internet increased in the year 1998 to 2000, then 
decreased in the year 2001.  The number of newspapers tended to decrease, but the most 
important issue was about journalism quality.   Criticism said, American newspapers 
were basically bias in its reports that supported capitalism, free market and are bases on 
bi-party system.  The relationship between the government and media was based on 
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democratic political system that was manifested in the Constitution, the First 
Amendment.  It was confirmed there that media had freedom and the state guaranteed not 
to establish laws prohibiting the freedom of religion, the freedom to express opinions, the 
freedom to gather peacefully and the right to submit petitions to the government. The 
relationship between the government and media is combination of conflict, cooperation, 
support and refusal (Silverblatt, 1995: 229).   
Germany was actually experiencing transition time after the unification in 1989.  
Just like in the United States of America, there was decrease of the number of 
newspapers in this country, especially since the year 1997 to the year 2001.  Germany 
media industry develops following horizontal and vertical centralization pattern.  A 
television broadcasting organization may control any combined number of television 
channels up to 30 percent of the public share.  Media development seemed to return to 
the seventeen century and was closed to the existence of capitalism country and its 
industry economy. Commercial broadcasting started to cut public broadcasting monopoly 
even though there were more than ten public television channels.  Its first competitor was 
RTL that actually broadcasted from Luxembourg as RTL-plus crossing country border.  
As the result of the unification process, all radio programs were limited for local and 
regional distance.  The result of the research in 2001 showed 38.8 percent Internet users 
where the principal T-online, a sister company of the Deutsch Telekom and AOL-online.  
The new Basic Law as a constitution gives guarantee for the press to express and 
publicize opinions in oral, written and pictorial forms, and the right to get information 
without obstacles from the available sources.  Press freedom was guaranteed.  However, 
the main actors in the policies for press and broadcasting were political parties, especially 
two big parties, namely Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party 
(SPD). 
Almost all of British citizens totaling more than 59 millions are literate and the 
country is famous for following liberal press freedom.  As a result of ownership tendency 
and the editorial orientation that gave sympathy to Conservative party, it had been two 
decades that British press also tended to Conservative parties.  Labor party and the 
alliance of Liberal and Social Democratic parties did not interest press.  If in Germany, 
public media monopoly was cut by the presence of commercial broadcasting industry, the 
position of British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in England as an independent 
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institution did not seem to be shaken with shares ownership of 53% by BBC and 45% by 
commercial radios (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 265).  All were competing in 
Internet business with the increase of users by 29 percent in the year 2000 and 45 percent 
by the end of 2001.  
British media served its function as a watchdog and protected the public from 
corruption and misuse of rights by government officials. Complaint against press was 
handled by a kind of Press Council that was called Press Complaint Commission (PCC), 
an independent regulation institution that was established since the year 1947.  However, 
in the end of the year 1980s this institution was not effective anymore because some of its 
members were involved in a number of cases that professionally were unrelated to press. 
Political leaders tried to control media reports by using ’spin-doctor’ model.  However, 
television and radio in England helped democratize the relationship between the 
government and the citizens.  
 
3.2 Political Communication in Transitional Countries  
There are around one hundred countries which can be considered as being in a 
transitional situation and they are spread around Europe, Latin America, Africa, Middle 
East, and Asia (Carothers, 2002). In Asia, there are such countries like the Philippines, 
Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. This section will briefly discuss media 
and politics in transitional countries particularly in three countries namely the 
Philippines, Russia, and Hungary. They are chosen for their similarities. The Philippines 
has a lot of similarities to Indonesia in some aspects. First, from a political point of view, 
the Philippines were once under dictatorial governance for more than two decades under 
Marcos’ regime while Indonesia was once under the authoritarian regime of Soeharto for 
more than three decades. The similarities of the two Asian nations also include their 
cultural heritage. The dissimilarities of the two include the facts that Catholicism is very 
dominant in the Philippines while Islam is dominant in Indonesia. 
The similarities between Indonesia and Russia and Hungary include the facts that 
the three of them are struggling to get rid of an old political system which was 
authoritarian or totalitarian in nature. In a totalitarian or authoritarian political system, the 
three countries placed media as a horn of power and easily put a control on it. The control 
  
63
on media was widely distributed through an ‘unlimited and easily distributed’ effort in 
the media system (Gunther and Mughan, 2000:4). The Philippines, Russia, and Hungary 
are the countries in a transitional process where the relationship between the government 
and media is a factor which needs a close attention. 
 
3.2.1 Philippines  
The Philippines is a neighboring country to Indonesia with various similarities 
including in their cultures and archipelagic territories. The country is considered among 
the first to starts the transitional era from an authoritarian political system to a democratic 
political system as compared to other Asian countries. Spanish and American 
colonization has left the legacy a cultural tradition and political system which are 
influential on the development and democratic values. What Corazon Aquino achieved 
after beating Ferdinand Marcos was a moderate way rather than what was suggested in 
the ‘transition from authoritarianism to democracy’ (Kerkvliet and Mojares, 1991). 
 
3.2.1.1 Media System  
Newspapers were first published in the voyage of American ships when entering 
the bay of Manila in 1898. The Bounding Billow was published from the Dewey, an 
American fleet including the American Soldier, Freedom, and the American (Quick, 
2003: 733). Just like the Indonesian press system which is very much affected by the 
colonizer, the Dutch, the Filipino press system is modeled after the American and it was 
even made a campaign tool for the colonization. The Manila Times was the first English 
newspaper launched in October 1898. Other papers which were full of a colonization 
smell included La Democracia and Consolidacion Nacional. While El Renacimiento, 
Muling Pagsilang, El Debate, La Opinion, and Los Obreros were papers supporting 
freedom. In 1917, Manuel Quezon bought the Manila Times and owned it for four years. 
The ownership changed few times until the Times was acquired by Alejandro Roses Sr. 
who also owned other papers such as Taliba, the Tribune, and La Vanguardia. Though 
they were published under the principles of press freedom, Filipino papers were the target 
of censorship by the American military authority and then by the American civilian 
administrator. 
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After the independence, Filipino papers started to write again on the corrupt high 
level and the motif was genuine, but they tended to apply one source coverage or 
unsubstantiated coverage system. In the course of time, the political elite started to own 
newspapers (Quick, 2003: 734). There were around one dozen of papers with a 
circulation between 100,000 and 300,000, and around a dozen of circulation between 
50,000 and 100,000;  between 25,000 and 50,000; one paper with a circulation between 
10,000 and 25,000, and two with a circulation below 10,000. In the Philippines, the 
publication is in English, Filipino, Taglish (Tagalog and English), and Chinese 
languages. Three popular English papers include the Manila Bulletin with a circulation of 
320,000, the Philippine Star (229,900), and the Philippines Inquirer (148,800). In 
Filipino languages there are the People’s Tonight (320,900), Pilipino Ngayon (272,000), 
and Taliba (226,800). In the mixed English and Tagalog (Filipino) or Taglish there are 
the big three including the People’s Journal (372,500), Headline Manila (105,100), and 
News Today (75,000). The Chinese papers include the World News (36,000), United 
Daily News (32,000), and China Times (30,000) (Quick, 2003: 734 -735). 
 In the transitional era, media played an important role in boosting people’s 
elements to control abuses by the government. The role of Radio Veritas which was 
always on air on February 22 – 25, 1986 when the mob was concentrated which was well 
known as the people’s power is just one example. At the time, Veritas was airing the 
speech of Cardinal Sin suggesting the people to demand the military back to the barracks. 
On the other hand, General Ramos and Enrile used the radio not only for publication 
purposes and to strengthen their own positions but also to separate them from Marcos by 
stating that  Marcos was cheating the general election and that was why Marcos had to 
resign (Casper, 1995: 124). According to the Worldwide Press Review (Quick, 2003: 
737), radio was a more popular media because of its coverage and because of the wide 
spread of poverty. There were around 600 radio stations where 273 of which used the 
AM wave. 
 Television cut the popularity of papers particularly in urban areas. Most television 
stations included ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., Radio 
Philippine Network, Allied Broadcasting Corp, Interisland Broadcasting Corp, and the 
People’s Television Network Inc. 
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 Internet started to show its role in Filipino journalism when a lot of print 
publications offered their online versions including the Philippine Journalism Review ( 
http://www.cmfr.com.ph/pjr ) published by the Center for Media Freedom and 
Responsibility. Some lists of online publications include Balita News 
(http://www.balita.org); Bankaw News (http://www.geoocities.com/bankaw); Business 
World (http://www.bworld.com.ph/current/today.html); Chinese Online Newspaper 
(http://www.singpo.com), the Philippine’s first Chinese online newspaper, Diaryo 
Pilipino (http://www.diaryopilipinon.com); Malaya (http://www.malaya.com.ph); 
Philippines Today (http://www.philippinestoday.net) (Quick, 2003: 738). 
 
3.2.1.2 Government-Media-Relations 
The Filipino media system is considered as being liberal in nature. The Filipino 
Constitution of 1935 clearly stated in its section IV article 9: ‘no law shall be passed 
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press’. Some amendments in 1973, 1976, 
1981, and early 1984 never changed the section. Press freedom is defined as a right to 
express and distribute information and opinions in writings (Pineda-Ofreno, 1986). The 
press plays an important role in controlling the government through its criticism and 
coverage. However, since the political elite is dominated by landlords both in the 
parliament and the executive bodies, the role of the press and civil society sometimes are 
not capable to touch the power. Democracy in the Philippines is often called an elitist 
democracy. Eric Gutierez for instance wrote the ‘Rich Dominate the House’ telling the 
domination of landlords, real estate, logging, construction, transportation, financial, and 
capital tycoons in the parliament (Coronel, 2000: 107 – 9). 
 After the fall of Marcos through the people’s power, the Philippines was 
consecutively led by President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), 
Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2006). Arroyo initially 
just continued the presidency of Estrada who was impeached for a corruption scandal, but 
then she won the presidential election though there was a criticism on cheating. 
 As a matter of fact, in the period of 1920s – 1930s, the Filipino press was called 
as having a ‘high degree of professionalism’ as quoted in the Philippine Journalism 
Review (Quick, 2003: 735). Journalists analyzed public issues and supported open 
debates. But the free press of the Philippines was also marked with the publication of 
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porn tabloids exposing naked female bodies. There were a lot of debates on free press and 
free economy which could live side by side with the economic growth. In the recent 
years, business owners blamed the press freedom and democratic growth as the reason of 
slow economic growth. A famous businessperson said that the press had to be controlled 
‘for the sake of the economy’ but this opinion was challenged by president Arroyo by 
saying that ‘the cure might be worse than the sickness’ (Quick, 2003: 736). 
 President Marcos applied intimidation on media. The official censorship ended 
under the martial law, but in his palace, Marcos and his cronies took over almost all 
publications. Those that were not under direct control were forced to apply self-
censorship if they wanted to have their licenses extended. And after the revocation of the 
martial law in 1981, Marcos started to shut down critical media such as We Forum, 
Malaya, and the Philippines Times and arrested the publishers and their staff by the end 
of 1982 (Timberman, 1991: 100). 
 Though the democratic system has been back to base the Filipino media life, but 
some presidents still cannot hide their uneasiness on the press. President Estrada, for 
instance, once asked his lawyers to sue the Daily Inquirer for publishing the interview 
with a soldier who related him with Senator Panfilo Lacson, a national police leader, on 
the scandal of money laundering (Quick, 2003: 736). President Arroyo once banned a 
media to publish the violent conflict between the military and Abu Syayaf revolts in 
southern Philippines. She dropped a troop in secrecy and asked to keep the policy secret. 
Arroyo even accused journalist who interviewed the rebels as an ‘anti-patriotic’ action 
though there was no ban to enter the area (Quick, 2003: 756).  
 Some people say that Filipino media is perhaps the freest one in Asia but it has 
abused its freedom. Critics say that Filipino media is ‘noisy but vulnerable, powerful but 
irresponsible’ just like other Filipino institutions. Media is also weak and prevented by 
the same systemic and contextual problems which threaten the democracy today (Gloria, 
2000: 192). 
 Filipino media is also owned by tycoons. The businesspersons acquired 
newspapers even if they see it as an unprofitable business. The explanation is quite 
simple, namely they buy a paper because the purpose is not profit but influence and 
power (Gloria, 2000: 194). Some owners even have used their papers to attack their 
enemies even just to seek for political legitimacy by making the authority happy. The 
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situation of media ownership in the last two decades has influenced the profit of large 
businesses. The two largest Filipino papers such as (1) the Philippine Daily Inquirer is 
owned by the Prieto / Rufino families who are also tycoons in food, real estate, paper 
mill, and other businesses, and (2) the Manila Bulletin is owned by Emilio Yap who is 
also the owner of Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corp, Manila Prince Hotel, US 
Automotive Corp. In., and Manila International Post Terminal; (3) the Philippine Star is 
owned by Feliciano Belmonte Jr, a member of the Parliament and the leader of Lakas-
NUCD party, (4) the top radio DZRH is owned by Elizalde, (5) the TV station ABS – 
CBN was handed over to the previous owner Lopez who also has businesses in 
telecommunication, power, water, and infrastructures, and he also owns DZMM the 
second largest radio station in the country.  
 Following Gloria (2000: 195), the government also started the business in media 
in three television stations, RPN – 9, IBC-13, and PTV-4, but RPN-9 and IBC-13 were 
privatized because of their great loss in the last decade. The government still owns a 
group of journal publications. Now it publishes two tabloids, one in English and the other 
in Filipino. The pressure by the government seems very obvious by the murder of 33 
journalists since 1983. The Philippines has been inaugurated by the Committee to Protect 
Journalist (CPJ) as the most dangerous country for journalists. Out of 44 murders on 
journalists since 1984, almost half of them were in Mindanao to indicate how dangerous 
the situation is of being a journalist in the press community. Cawicaan and Marcale, in 
‘Culture of Impunity in the Philippines: Silencing Journalist’ (Journalism Asia, May 3, 
2004) said that the attacks and murders on journalists were the result of weak law 
enforcement and because of the fact that the government didn’t protect its citizens. On 
the other hand, the law on calumny in the Philippines was a copy of the one in the US and 
it is not as limiting as the ones in other places. In the Philippines, a calumny is considered 
a civil and criminal attack. Officers or other citizens who feel being attacked by a 
criticism have suggested law suits against journalists. Fortunately, the Filipino court 
tended to manage it for the sake of freedom for the journalists to write and comment. 
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3.2.2 Russia  
Under the USSR, Russia was known by the international community for its 
political rivalry against the United States. In the pattern of its political communication, 
the two countries were uneasy one another where the Russians were stunned by the 
sensationalism and commercialism of Western press. On the other hand, Americans were 
scared by the massive efforts to convince the citizens to see the world as the power who 
also wanted them too. Americans confront the citizens with a free choice among a lot of 
facts and interpretations which are often contradictory in nature, while the Soviet system 
bombarded them with deceiving messages to re-form them and just to strengthen the truth 
according to the version of the authority (Almond and Powell, 1988). 
 After the fall of the USSR, there were 145 million  people in Russia and the Great 
Russia was 82% of the total population. As a country with a literacy tradition, Russia 
always enjoys literature, while modern press and journalism was only left behind. Russia 
celebrated her 300th anniversary of newspaper publication in 2003. The press life was not 
as smooth as it is imagined, though there is a freedom. When the Commonwealth of 
Independent Countries was established, all legal regulations were deemed to be invalid 
including the provision on the press (d’Haenens and Saeys, 1998: 307). 
 
3.2.2.1. Media System  
Russia is interesting to learn and in particularly to be compared to Indonesia 
because both countries are in a transitional situation. As the result of the post-Soviet 
transformation, the papers lost their central position in the media system, but still play an 
important role in the regional and local markets (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 
192). Around 80% of Russians read at least one paper per day. The total number of titles 
sharply increased from 4,863 in 1991 to 5,758 in 2000. However, the total circulation of 
papers sharply dropped from 160.2 million in 1990 to 108.8 in 2000 or a drop of 32%. 
The daily, Moskovsky Komsomolets has a circulation of 1,400,000, Komsomolskaya 
Pravda (756,000), Izvestiya (234,500). Argumenty i Facty (3,000,000), 
Komsomolskayapravda (2,800,000), Trud (1,580.000), Itogy (85,000), Expert (75,000), 
and Kommersant Vlast’ (73,000). 
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 In recent years, Russian television started to take the central position in the media 
system. As the most powerful media, 94% of Russians watched the TV everyday. The 
average time to watch television is almost three and a half hours per day. Almost 99% of 
Russian households have at least one television set and a half of households have two or 
more TV sets; 45% still have black and white TV sets. According to the data of the 
Ministry of Press and Broadcasting, the total number of broadcasting licenses issued in 
2002 was 1,276 for television and 1,002 for radio. But the number does not indicate the 
number of stations in operation. There are 9 national television stations, namely three 
national federal stations with different ownership such as Obshestvennoye Rossiskoye 
Televidenie (ORT), Rossiiskoye Televidenie (RTR), and a private television NTV. Four 
others are reginal stations with national coverage namely Culture owned by the state, and 
Moscow municipal TVC (TV Centre) (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 194). 
 In 1999, 83% of Russians listened to the radio because in their opinion, the radio 
was suitable for the public demand better than television. Around 76.9% of Russians 
were satisfied by radio programs while 65% had the same opinion on television (Kelly, 
Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 197). Meanwhile, Runet, a Russian language sector of 
the Internet, becomes the indicator of latest media changes. The level of internet usage 
sharply increased between 1993 and 1997, when the number of internet users doubled in 
every year. Now the maximum number of users reached 12.8 million (8.8%). Most users 
are the educated people, urban males with good income, including government officials, 
politicians, businesspersons, journalists, college and school students (Kelly, Mazzoleni, 
and McQuail, 2004: 198). 
 Internet has become the ideal communication medium in Russia because of the 
difficulties in her communication tradition, long distances which are spread in eleven 
time differences, and scarcity of written sources (Quick, 2003: 788). The three main 
functions of internet in Russia include, first to give access to world information sources, 
some of them from national and local sources which may be tightly controlled; second, to 
be a marketplace for local production and open services for national and international 
markets; and third to serve as a source of information for overseas Russians, Jews, 
Armenians, Georgians, Chachens, and many others, to know about what happens in their 
land of birth when most local and Russian sources keep silent about them. For the 
moment, Ru-net seems to guarantee the freedom of speech and distribution of ideas. In 
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the beginning and mid 1990s, the number of Russian internet users doubled every two 
year period. But in 2001, the total number of internet users was less than 10 million 
(Quick, 2003: 789). 
 
3.2.2.2 Government-Media-Relations  
Russian independence cannot be separated from the new period of Soviet Union 
in 1985 when Gorbachev, the youngest Secretary General since Stalin launched 
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness to information) which had been 
previously started from above then continued from the bottom (Haenens and Saeys, 
1998). Since then, the Soviet Union changed to join the freedom in media. After the 
liquidation on December 25, 1991, the communist dictatorship for 74 years was ended 
and Boris Yeltsin became the president of the new Russian Federation. Various changes 
happened in Russia such as in her economic, social, political, spiritual, and international 
relationship sectors. The result of those changes made the old social structure in a critical 
condition (Williams, et al. 1996). Changes in political communication also contributed to 
the democratization process where since December 12, 1993, a new Russian constitution 
was agreed including freedom of the press and ban for censorship (Quick, 2003: 791). 
Russia was called a partial democratic country (Robinson, 2003). The reason is that the 
country has failed to reach a fully democratic consolidation in the last decade. One of the 
reasons is that the capacity of the state to handle public interests in which the presidential 
system was a potential failure for democracy because of anti-consensual system, political 
changes to a zero - sum game, and patronage politics. Russia is an example of a semi-
presidential system or a ‘president-parliamentary’ political system since the existence of 
a president in 1991. 
 In the era of Soviet Union, the media system was well known because it was one 
of the four categories introduced by Siebert et al., namely the communist system. The 
theoretical perspective of the media was also differentiated from the liberal perspective, 
in which in the communist system, the media was subordinated to the revolutionary 
purposes (Wheeler, 1997: 2). Press and media were under the control of the Communist 
Party. Censorship was a long and violent history in Russia, at least since the 19th century 
and the fall of czar. The Czarist Law applied censorship, which was forced in 1917, to 
put a series of bans on what would be published, and gave a discretionary power, in an 
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emergency period, to prevent all newspapers (Herbert, 2001: 182). The first Soviet 
leader, Lenin, placed the press as the main tool in organizing and ruling the mass. The 
growth of communist mass media ideology which spreads to all Soviet blocs in Europe 
came from Lenin’s belief that the press had to play the role as a propagandist, agitator, 
and collective organizer (Aumente, 1999: 50). Then in the period of Khruschev in 1950s 
and early 1960s, it was accompanied by a live example of plain speaking media on the 
failures of the system. The growing press freedom by the end of Soviet’s period depicted 
the invaluable transformation with newspapers and magazines, including the legalized 
samizdat publication, which grew very fast. 
The period between 1988 and 1992 was seen as a breakthrough period for Russian 
press. Various scandals were exposed and dictatorship was unveiled. The rebel in August 
1991 was badly designed and sadly ended. The press freedom and military apathy played 
an important role in preventing the revolution. In the same time, the television aired Boris 
Yeltsin standing on a tank suggesting that Russian people launch a coup, which threw the 
Soviet Union and made Yeltsin an icon. Two years later, the press and other media in 
Russia saw themselves as the savior of the country and the determining instrument of 
democracy (Quick, 2003: 784). 
The support of media in 1996 election made Yeltsin as the winner and it was 
partly because of financial interests of some tycoons and media bosses and political 
parties which was afraid that the Communist would come back to censor and collect 
retribution. Media, in particular television, played an important role in the re-election of 
Yeltsin against the old cracks and economic problems. But after Yeltsin’s victory, there 
was a much bitter fracture between the state and the press and electronic media. Some of 
them were a clear result of disappointment which were not well managed and disputes on 
share in the electronic media failure (Quick, 2003: 784). 
 The relationship between the government and media was very conspicuous during 
the presidential election. On February 15, 1996, or two months after the parliamentary 
election and only a few hours after Yeltsin announced his candidacy for the second term, 
he dismissed the director of RTR, Oleg Poptsov. He accused that RTR was lying by 
focusing in the violence in Chechnya and exaggerating the economic problems. This 
situation shows government intervention even the president himself on the media owned 
by the government and put it under the hands of the ruler (McCormack, 1999: 208). 
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 In 1992, the total circulation of newspapers was trembling and all customer 
systems found difficulties as the result of inflation (Murray, 1994: 54). The government 
then offered a loan to some newspapers through a regulation. Pravda, an anti government 
newspaper, for instance, was offered 21 million rubbles to get out of its death. Officially 
the application of a subsidy tax system did not give any difference between the media 
owned by the government and the private sectors (McCormack, 1999). To get a loan, a 
newspaper had to be included in the ownership of a selected institution at the local level, 
editor, or other judicial agency. If a newspaper is not managed by a selected local 
institution, it had to have a recommendation from a public association at the district level. 
The government loan was seen as an effort to include political influence to the press so 
that the minister of information, Mikhail Poltoranin, said to a Tuld journalist that there is 
‘no kind of pressure on the publication or any infringement of their freedom and 
independence’ (Murray, 1994: 55).  
The government issued the rule no. 511 / 1998 on changes in media electronic 
activities, and rule no. 844/ 1998 on the establishment of a complex media technology 
and production unit. According to this rule, the company would consist of 83 regional 
radio and broadcasting centers, 16 radio centers as the branches of all government 
television and broadcasting stations (VGTRK) and 92 regional government television 
stations subsidized radio companies (RSTVRC) (McCormack, 1999: 210). 
 
3.2.3 Hungary  
Hungary is one of the transitional countries. The country has been successful in 
developing democracy and it enjoys a positive democratization like Poland, Czech 
Republic, and Slovenia (Carothers, 2002: 9). Hungary is not so populated with only 10 
million people and a literacy level of 99.0%. Around 1.8 million people live in the 
capital, Budapest. Other big cities include Debrecen (204,000), Miskole (172,000), 
Szeged (158,000), Pecs (157,000), and Gyor (124,000). The transitional process is still on 
the way, and this also applies to the relationship between the government and media. 
Media played a more important role in the transitional period, since the new democratic 
political power and journalists knew better western ideas and democratic institutions 
(Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 103). 
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3.2.3.1 Media System  
There are 40 newspapers with a total circulation of 1,625,000 copies; 35 
television stations, 77 radio stations, and 1,480,000 internet users. The most famous 
paper in Hungary up to 2000 was Nepzabadsag with a daily circulation of 210,000 
copies. The tabloid Metro had a higher level of circulation, 235,000 copies, in 2002. 
Newspapers are always in a struggle position between the drop of readership in the midst 
of publication excess and increase in yellow journalism which tries to get a better share 
(Quick, 2003: 429). Newspapers in Hungary are in general biased to the left as an 
accusation if they are not in line with the ruling political party. But this accusation seems 
to be real in Budapest when the people and political interests are deeply involved in 
Hungarian political seasons. In some papers there can be found anti-Semitism sentiments, 
but the government quickly represses the rightist extremists. 
 For a geographical reason, there a four terrestrial television frequencies. One of it 
is only owned by the military, and the remaining three can be distributed among the 
broadcasting owners. One is used by the first channel of public television (m1), the two 
others by the market leader TV-2, which its majority shares are owned by Scandinavian 
Broadcasting and the third is owned by RTL Klub, a Hungarian affiliate of the German 
group RTL. The remaining two are owned by commercial companies and the third 
channel is for public interests (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 105). 
 In the meantime, out of five national radio broadcasting channels, three of them 
are owned by a public radio (Magyar Radio); the remaining two are privately owned by 
Danubius and Slager. Two other companies, Juventus and Radio 1, reach a half of 
Hungarian territory through a radio station network with a consequence that they are in a 
fierce competition with their forerunners, which makes them in a lot of troubles to get an 
advertisement.  
 The level of internet development and related media is relatively low. According 
to the data by the end of 2001, there were only 17% of the people with an age more than 
14 years to have an internet access and 66% of them used this media more than five hours 
per month. The intensive usage of this media is from home. Internet shops were very 
popular. In Budapest, one can find fifty internet shops with a reasonable price (Kelly, 
Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 107). 
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3.2.3.2 Government-Media-Relations  
When the country was still in the hands of the Soviet Union since 1945, Hungary 
only had little tradition of media freedom. Every step of press freedom history before the 
Second World War disappeared under the communist government for 45 years (Quick, 
2003: 429). The 1949 Hungarian constitution was amended in 1989 when the country got 
her independence to guarantee press freedom under the clause XX of Chapter 61 which 
says that in Hungary everyone has the right for freely expressing his opinion and has the 
access to distribute data to the public (section one). The republic of Hungary 
acknowledges and protests freedom of the press (section two). An amendment on the 
clause on public data publication and press freedom requires a two third majority of the 
parliament (section three) (Quick, 2003: 432). 
 In 1994, there was introduced the right of citizens and journalists to criticize 
public officials. This rule got a lot of internal and external protests from media observers. 
In 1996, the law on media related to commercial broadcasting media was agreed by 89% 
of parliamentary majority. This is the most problematic provision in Hungary. For 
instance, Hungary is the only associate country of the European Union that has not closed 
negotiations with the European Union on the so-called ’audiovisual chapter’. The result is 
that Hungarian film industry lost the access to most European Union financial aids. The 
opposition group (the former government) said that the current government was 
consistently banning legal changes on media law and did not prove a space for 
negotiation (Quick, 2003: 433). 
 In general, censorship is a difficult issue. For instance, there is no official 
censorship in the country but independent observers clearly recorded how the 
government had influenced the media since the independence in 1998. The clearest 
example was the general election in Hungary in May 2002. When the media played a 
major role in making the political transitional relatively simple, to convince politicians, 
particularly the newcomers, the media should not be let alone, but it should be under a 
control (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 103). In 1998 and 1999, media reported 
an embarrassing story about the Hungarian government so that the editors of a weekly 
magazine and a TV program were sued as unveiling state secrecy. Some of the publicly 
financed media staff of MTV-1 were dismissed after airing the program which involved 
10 members of the ruling party in a corruption scandal (Herbert, 2001: 187). 
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 One of the most questionable regulations is the so-called Principle of Objective 
Responsibility (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 108). According to the principle, 
as applied by the court, a journalist has a total responsibility on the value of truth of his 
report even if he only presents an opinion of another person. If someone else tells a lie or 
something that is proven to be untrue and a journalist puts it in his paper or in an 
electronic media program, the journalist will be blamed by the court, even if it is because 
of a strong belief. Another questionable case is in the relationship between state secrecy 
and personal life. There are some legal cases in which journalists were punished because 
they published documents containing state secrets. In other cases, media was accused of 
violating privacy and dignity of certain people most of them were politicians of other 
public figures. 
 There is a problem of a subtle problem in the freedom of speech and it seems to 
be unsolvable by any legislation, namely the so-called ‘hate speech’. The issue is about a 
protection on publication and communication which attacks the dignity of a social group. 
This is the case of right extreme books which show their doubt on the Holocaust and 
distribute the anti-Semitic propaganda. So far the legislation has proved that there is no 
reconciliation between freedom of speech and freedom of the press and protection on 
human dignity. Though regulation and censorship are not solely the problems of the press 
but the media in general, most cases which could be rejected in the court were related to 
the press, particularly in book publication, because there are two special institutions 
related with the regulation on electronic media (Kelly, Mazzoleni, and McQuail, 2004: 
109). 
 
3.2.4  Conclusions  
Three transitional countries, the Philippines, Russia and Hungary had similar 
characters with Indonesia as a transitional country.  In different periods, the three 
countries experienced political system from authoritarian or totalitarian to democratic.  
The political system change influenced political communication where each country 
established new press law that was more appropriate with democracy character.  
The Philippines experienced earlier change of political system compared to other 
two countries in Europe.  Through people power revolution in February 1986, President 
Ferdinand Marcos who had been in power for 21 years was thrown.  In that crisis time, 
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media played its role as the opposition of Marcos’ dictatorship.  Veritas radio broadcasted 
the speech of Cardinal Sin that required the people to ask the army to return to the 
barrack.  General Ramos and Enrile also made use of the radio to support people’s 
revolution by stating that Marcos had commit a fraud in the general election and 
requiring him to withdraw.   The elected president, Corazon Aquino, returned democracy 
through the new Constitution that guaranteed political rights and democratic government 
atmosphere.  Mass media functioned again as the controller of the authority as it was 
guaranteed by Constitution. In the Philippines, radio is a popular communication channel 
for the people, while television had cut the popularity of newspapers in rural areas. Then, 
printed media started online version as it was done by the Philippine Journalism Review, 
Balita News, and also Malaya newspaper. 
The Philippines Constitution actually guarantees the freedom to speak and press 
freedom. Press freedom was interpreted as the right to express and share written 
information and opinions.  Except in Marcos time, press played important role in 
controlling the government through its criticisms and reports.  However, as it happens in 
industrial countries, Philippines media were also owned by conglomerates.  They bought 
newspaper industry not to get economical profits but more to get influence and authority 
(Gloria, 2000: 194).  The government was even involved in media business at leath 
through three television stations namely RPN-9, IBC-13, and PTV-4. 
Russia was a transitional country in Europe that was interesting to review, 
especially after it became independent as an ex-Soviet colony country.  Newspapers lost 
its central role in media system although it still played an important role in regional and 
local markets. Around 80 % of the people read one newspaper each day and the number 
of newspapers even increased since the year 2000.  However, total circulation dropped 
from 160.2 millions in the year 1990 to 108.8 millions in 2000.  In the last years, 
television started to take over important role in media system, where almost 94% of the 
people watched television every day.   However, in 1999 around 83% of the people 
listened to the radio because it was considered more appropriate than television.  The 
development of communication technology also spread to Russia with the presence of 
Internet.  It served as an ideal communication instrument due to difficulties in 
communication, distant coverage, and rareness of written sources (Quick, 2003: 788).  
Internet contributed to present global information, as marketing place for local products 
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and open service for national and international markets, in addition to serving as source 
of information for Russian people abroad.  
In 1993 a new Russian Constitution including press freedom and censorship 
prohibition was agreed.  Russia was often called as a partly democratic country because it 
failed to achieve full democratic consolidation.  This was due to the failure of the country 
capacity to guarantee public interests in presidential system because of anti-consensus 
system, political shift to zero-sum game, and patronage politics.  However, press and 
other media in Russia had been the savior of the country and served as the instrument for 
democracy (Quick, 2003: 784).  During the president election, the government accused 
media to lie and exaggerate economy problems and violence.  President Yeltsin made an 
intervension to the media.  
Hungary was called a country that was successful in showing democracy 
compared to Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovenia (Carothers, 2002:9),  different from 
Russia or Indonesia.  During transition period, media played an important role since the 
new democracy system where journalists understood western ideas, including the idea on 
democracy. In media system, newspapers kept on struggling not to lack of readers amidst 
the presence of yellow journalism.  Newspapers in Hungary tended to deviate leftward as 
an accusation that they were not in line with the regulating party.  One television station 
was owned by the army and the other threes were shared among such owners as TV-2, 
most of which shares were owned by Scandinavian Broadcasting, one station was owned 
by RTL Club, a Hungarian affiliation from Germany RTL group and the rests were 
owned by commercial enterprises.  Out of five radio channels, some were owned by 
public radio (Magyar Radio), the rests were owned by Danubius and Slager.  Internet 
growth was categorized as slow; by the end of 2001 there were only 17% of the citizen 
by the age of over 14 years could accessed it and 66% of them used it for more than 5 
hours per month. After the independence from Russia, Hungarian Constitution was 
amended in 1989, containing, among others, guarantee of press freedom.  Everyone had 
free rights to express ideas and to have access to disseminate information to public.  It 
was introduced in 1994 the rights of civilians and journalists to criticize public officials. 
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Chapter 4 
Politics and Media in Indonesia before the Downfall of the Soeharto-Regime 
 
 
This chapter outlines the political dynamics and the media in Indonesia in the two 
periods of administrations, namely Soekarno (1945 -1966) and Soeharto (1966 – 1998). 
The description is started with the short history of Indonesia then followed by the two 
main sections of this chapter, namely Political Development and Media. The topic of the 
political development section refers more heavily on the political culture and political 
structure, as the main ingredients of politics. The political culture helps tracing the route 
differences in the political development because it seriously treats nuances in the 
behavioral pattern which seems very unimportant but in fact it is very important in 
differentiating success from failure (Pye, 1985). On the other hand, the development of 
media refers more heavily on the media system which is more colored by legal 
regulations coming from the government affecting the degree of press freedom. 
 
4.1  Indonesia and Independence 
‘Kemerdekaan’ or  ‘Independence’ is a magic word for a colonized nation like 
Indonesia. Indonesian historians depict the development of Indonesia starting from the 
kingdom of Sriwijaya in 7th to 13th centuries, the kingdom of Majapahit in 13th to 15th 
centuries, and the period between 1500 and 1900 in which there flourished various 
Indonesian kingdoms both in Java and outside Java, but which one by one was gone to 
the hands of the Netherlands – Indian government (Moedjanto, 1988: 15 – 16). Then 
there was created the unification of Indonesia under the Dutch colonization known as Pax 
Neerlandica or Unification and Pacification; and so it becomes true the statement that the 
independence of Indonesian came into a real dream after 350 years of colonization by the 
Dutch. 1 From an economic point of view, quoting Wallerstein, Indonesia is a marginal 
                                                
1 The youth of 1990s who had been raised in a dramatic, post – colonial, post revolution period of history 
became very touched. Indonesia had been independent but always felt without power because they did have 
any contribution in her making (Aswab Mahasin in Syamsuddin Harris, ‘Demokrasi di Indonesia Gagasan 
dan Pengalaman, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1995. p. xi). 
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country of which natural resources should be tapped to make the nuclear countries alive. 
The people of Indonesia have to be workers in plantations with suffering living 
conditions just to make the life of the colonizing country possible. As such, with the 
existing capabilities available, Indonesian leaders such as Soekarno, Hatta, and Syahrir 
urged the people to launch diplomatic and military efforts against the colonizers. Prior to 
1900, the reactions and the efforts of Indonesian people were local, negative, irrational, 
and without any follow up in nature, but after 1900, the nature of the efforts turned to be 
national, positive, organized, and with future follow-ups such as governmental, 
economic, and educational structures (Moedjanto, 1988: 25). When Indonesia was 
colonized by the Japanese for around three and a half years since March 9, 1942, 
Indonesia eventually was successful to proclaim her independence. 
 With the independence, the social and economic conditions of Indonesia started to 
change and the nation is governed by her own people, namely President Soekarno (1945 
– 1966) and Soeharto (1966 – 1998). In the administration of Soekarno, the spirit of anti 
colonialism was reflected through diplomacy and international relations. The nationalism 
of Soekarno was so strong to impress some Asian and African countries to name him to 
lead the Asian African Conference. At the domestic level, the nationalism was shown 
through the development of political parties such as Indonesian National Party (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia-PNI). But in the administration of Soekarno, the economic and 
education developments were not good enough. Through a silent coup, Soehartogunan 
Lima Tahun came to power and he launched the five-year-national-development plans 
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun-Repelita) to adopt the theory of WW Rostow. In the 
administration of Soeharto, Indonesians enjoyed economic, social, and political 
developments. 2 In 1976, there were around 54.2 million people (40.1 per cent) in the 
status of poverty, but in 1993 the number dropped to 25.9 million people (13.7 per cent) 
of the total population of 189.2 million people (Sairin, 2002: 8). Soeharto practiced the 
development  model    that tended    to be repressive in nature just to    create the people’s  
 
                                                
2 Daniel Lev called the year of 1965 as the irreversible turning point of the momentum of structural 
changes in economic, social, and political fields by the emergence of the middle class. They grew up 
quickly in the economic climate of the New Order which was in favor for them but they only enjoyed little 
political power (Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Monash 
Univsersity, Clayton, Victoria, 1990, p. 45) 
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dream of the meaning of independence. The dream came true after 30 years of Soeharto’s 
administration and Indonesia was back into a political transition, but this time from the 
authoritarian to the democratic governance. 
 In 2000 the population grew to 205.8 million people and in 2004 it was 217 
million people. In the 2000 census there were a lot of constraints particularly as the result 
of riots and amok in some parts of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Central Celebes, 
Moluccan islands, North Moluccan islands, and Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2005: 49). The riots in some other places such as Papua were related to the idea of 
independence that kept growing up. 
 
4.2  Political Culture in Indonesia 
Following Wiseman, a political system involves a political structure, political 
roles showed by actors or agents, interaction patterns among actors, both individually and 
collectively, and a political process. So, a political system is a kind of interactions among 
roles and role structures understood as interaction patterns. But Wiseman also warns that 
a political system works in one (or more) political culture (Wiseman, 1967: 101). 
 Indonesia is a multi – ethnicity, multi – religion country, with a population around 
220 million people living in thousands of islands. Javanese is the biggest ethnicity 
(around 50.5%) and the most influential one in all living facets such as in politics, 
economy, culture, and government. The first two presidents, Soekarno and Soeharto, 
were Javanese. The island of Java is the most densely populated one, inhabited by more 
than 65% of the population, and it is the center of government.  
 After the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia entered a ‘democratic’ 
governance system to make politicians call Indonesia the largest Moslem country 
following democracy. Indeed, Islam is the largest religion in Indonesia with almost 90% 
of the population in addition to other faiths and beliefs. But inside Islam itself there are 
various groups which Geertz differentiated the syncretic group (‘abangan’) and the 
puritan group (santri). The two groups in Islam are Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah.  
 Dwight Y. King, who studied authoritarianism in Asia, depicted Indonesia as a 
country practicing an ‘authoritarian bureaucratic’ model (Bakti et al., 2001: 35) as the  
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opposite of democracy. This is a system practiced by a regime in which the power and 
the political processes are centered in one person or in one group, including the military. 
In this model, there is no chance for the people to take control on the power because the 
chance has been structurally used to discipline the political order. 
 Starting form the above description, the discussion in this chapter will focus on 
the Indonesian political culture and political structure which certainly observe the 
political roles played by actors or agents, including the president, political parties, and 
interaction patterns among them. 
 
4.2.1 Political Culture 
It is Gabriel Almond who has the idea of a political culture that is linked to the 
political system. According to Almond, a political system is linked to the interaction 
pattern based on the political action, namely in the political culture (Wiseman, 1967: 24). 
Almond and Powel then differentiate the political cultures into: parochial political 
culture, ordinary people political culture, participant’s political culture, and civic political 
culture. The parochial political culture can be found in a parochial community, which is 
limited in a certain area or a small scope, and in which there is no specific and 
independent political roles because of its limited differentiation. In such a culture, the 
community tends not to pay attention to the political objects in the wide sense except for 
the areas where it is closely related. The more conspicuous is the awareness of the 
community on the center of political power (Kantaprawira, 1988 and Wiseman, 1967: 
34). 
 In the political culture of the ordinary people, the community shows the attention, 
interest, and possibly awareness on the system as a whole, particularly on the output. The 
attention on the input and the role as a political actor are still at the zero level. Their real 
orientation on the real political object can be seen from their statement of pride, their 
attitude to support or to deny a system particularly the output. The position as ordinary 
people is a passive position, considering themselves as powerless in influencing or 
changing the system, and as such they surrender to all policies and decisions made by the 
authority holder in the community. Moreover, all decisions (output) are something that 
cannot be changed, corrected or denied, just to make them take anything, faithful,  
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obedient, and follow any instruction and suggestion of their political leaders. According 
to this political culture, the community has a vertical (hierarchical) structure in which 
individuals or groups have been destined to take anything as it is and to be satisfied with 
its ‘nature’. Their obedience level in such a political culture is very intense where the 
members only play the role as the ‘ordinary one’. The attitude of silence when they do 
not like the system or outputs is only deeply stored because there is in fact no vehicle or 
capacity available to change or to deny it. It is very much colored with the influence of an 
ex -colony, and the characteristics of dictatorship and authoritarianism in such a political 
culture (Kantaprawira, 1988: 34).  
 In the participative political culture, one considers himself or other people as 
being active in the political life. He is aware on every right and responsibility and he can 
realize and use his rights and responsibilities. It is expected that one should not blindly 
accept his situations, with a dead discipline, being obedient to the situation because of his 
active role in the political process. In such a culture, one is with full of awareness can 
judge the political system as a totality, input and output, and his own position. It means 
that he is actively involved the system. On the other hand, the civic political culture is a 
mixture of characteristics of the three political types above. 
 Palmer says that the civic culture represents the pattern how we share the public 
space, the public resources, and the public opportunities and how we manage our 
interdependence in a ‘company of strangers’ (Boulding, 1988: xvii). This is related to the 
interaction which creates the understanding on the general public interests. Though most 
of us will keep being strangers one another in our lifetime when we share the civic 
culture, but we also have the common interests in managing a public frame work where 
we can live as individuals or families. 
 An Indonesian scholar, Afan Gaffar, understands a political culture as the 
individual attitude towards the political systems and its components, and also the 
individual attitude on the roles played in a political system. He is the psychological 
orientation on the social object, namely the political system which then undergoes an 
internalization process into the orientation of form which is cognitive, affective, and 
evaluative in nature (Gaffar, 2002). According to Gaffar, the cognitive orientation is 
related to the individual understanding and belief about the political system and its  
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attributes such as the capital of the country, the symbol of the country, the leaders, and so 
on. The affective orientation is related to the emotional links of the individuals to the 
political system. This includes the feeling about the political system. The evaluative 
orientation is related to the capacity of the individuals to judge the political system in 
place and how to take a role in it. 
 In a community of which attitudes and political orientation are dominated by 
cognitive characteristics there will be created a parochial political culture. In a 
community of which attitudes and political orientation are dominated by affective 
characteristics there will be created a subjective political culture. And in a community of 
which attitudes and political orientation are dominated by a high political competence 
where its members are capable to evaluate the political process in place, there will be 
created a participative political culture (Gaffar, 2002: 100). 
 
4.2.2 Major Dimensions 
The political culture of Indonesia is very much influenced by some variables 
(Kantaprawira, 1988: 37). First, the subculture configuration is dominated by a 
vulnerable diversity of languages, religions, classes, castes. Second, Indonesia is 
basically included in an ordinary people – parochial political culture in one side and a 
participative political culture on the other side. Third, the primordial ties are still very 
strongly rooted in the indicators of ‘regional, tribal, and religious sentiments, difference 
in religious approach: Puritanism and non – Puritanism. The other indicators include the 
strong regionalism such as the vertical structure of the community in which the efforts of 
the elite to exploit and to touch the social substructure for raising support. Fourth, the 
tendency of political culture is still to follow the paternalistic attitude and patrimonial 
nature through the strong indicator of ‘bapak-ism’ (‘father-ism’), just to make the leader 
happy. In one hand, the community is still left behind in applying the rights and in taking 
the political responsibility, as the result of isolation from outer cultures, influence of 
colonization, feudalism, ‘bapak-ism’, and primordial ties. On the other hand, the elite 
actively participate because of their modern (Western) education that is often secular in 
nature in its relative meaning makes them capable to differentiate disintegrating factors 
such as religions, tribalism, and so on. Based on these reasons, Kantaprawira argues that 
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the political culture of Indonesia is a mixed culture influenced by the magnitude of 
parochial – ordinary people political culture (Kantaprawira, 1988: 37). 
 Gaffar argues that it is quite difficult to identify the Indonesian political culture 
because its attributes are not quite clear. As a starting point, there is a dominant political 
cultural pattern coming from the dominant ethnicity, namely Javanese (Gaffar, 2002: 
106). Javanese community, like most other Indonesian communities, is hierarchical in 
nature. Social stratification is not based on the social – materialistic attributes but more 
on the access to power. There is a distinct difference between those who are in power, the 
‘priyayi’ (noblemen), and the ordinary people. This is expressed through the language. 
The stratification in Javanese, such as delicate, medium delicate, and harsh, shows the 
differentiation between the authority and the people. 
 The implication of such a differentiation among the bureaucrats often shows itself 
through a benevolent self image such as by the statement that the authority protects the 
people and plays the role as the teachers for the people. The authority should show 
themselves as the benevolent people, the good guys, patron of the whole people. On the 
other hand, the power circles have the perception to humiliate the ordinary one. Since the 
authority people have been good, generous, and being the patrons, the ordinary people 
should be obedient, observant, and faithful to the authority people. The negative 
implication in the public policy is that a public policy is in the domain or competence of a 
small elite group in Jakarta or in the provincial capital. The agenda and formulation of a 
public policy belongs to the government then it will be adjusted and ratified by the House 
of Representatives, while the common people are alienated or even marginalized from the 
political processes. So there is no public discussion on why such a policy is taken but the 
common people have to be involved in the implementation. 
 Following James Scott, one of the most conspicuous political cultures in 
Indonesia according to Gaffar is the tendency to the establishment of a patronage 
relationship among the authority as well as the community. The patronage tendency can 
be widely found among the bureaucracy and the community. The president can be the 
patron for some ministers. The minister functions him as the broker or middleman for 
other ministers and it is the ministers who become the real clients. A minister can be a 
middleman or broker and to create his own clientele with the director generals, the  
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secretary general, inspector general, and so on up to the lowest bureaucratic levels or 
echelons.  
 The political culture of Indonesia can also be represented by Golongan Karya 
(Golkar). As the largest political power in the New Order era, even it became the state 
party, Golkar was not only an election machine, Golkar was the manifestation of 
Indonesian dominant political culture (Suryadinata, 1999: 141). Golkar is the 
manifestation of Pancasila culture, namely a culture that was meant to be developed by 
Soeharto’s administration through Golkar. 
 An Indonesian scholar, Ignas Kleden, argues that the term of political culture 
sometimes creates a cynicism, because a political culture is considered not more than an 
argument or a scientific reasoning to justify the existing political practice (Kleden, 2001). 
The cynicism is the result of some reasons behind and one of which is that the political 
culture is not more than a set of values and habits developed among the political elite, 
and it becomes a subculture in the circles. Because those values and habits are followed 
by a group of people who are relatively in power and who are politically influential, the 
values, views, habits, and behaviors of the social group can easily be spread out, 
followed, and accepted by the wider community. A political culture becomes a kind of 
‘life style’ in the political life and it is so contiguous to common citizens who are not a 
part of the political elite, though such a behavior is not fully being realized. 
 Kleden sees the problem when a common person tries to imitate a political 
attitude by relying on the eyes than the ears. What is seen by eyes is much more 
believable and easily to imitate than what is heard through teachings and official training. 
The problem for the authority people is the belief that the common people can be assured 
by noble words and sayings, while in fact what is heard will always be tested by the eyes 
of the common people. If it is proven to be true that the difference between what is heard 
and what is seen, then the common people will imitate what is seen and will forget what 
is heard (Kleden, 2001: 30). 
 The other difficulty is that a political culture is face to face with the common 
dilemma in a culture. There is a belief, and partly supported by social theories, that a 
political culture is a set of values, norms, and habits that become the basis of behavior of 
the elite. Then, it is assumed that such a political culture is based on the existing  
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dominant political culture. That is why there develops an assumption that the political 
behavior of Indonesia should be based on the Indonesian cultural values such as manners, 
willingness to apply means that is not hurtful to other feelings in delivering a different 
opinion, a willingness to sacrifice for the sake of wider interest, and a respect to the 
power and to those who are in power. 
 The forgetfulness to talk about a political culture, according to Kleden, is that a 
culture is not only about values and norms, but it also provides an equal possibility that 
such values and norms are abused for certain economic and power interests where the 
abuse can be easily made under the name of the same cultural values. So, from a 
theoretical point of view, a political culture is not only a foundation for the political 
behavior but is also created and manifested by the real political behavior. The 
relationship between a political culture and the political behavior is not that the first 
affects the second but that the political behavior affects the manifestation and the nature 
of the political culture. That is why a clean political behavior will result in a political 
culture that respects honesty, while a corrupt political behavior will end in a forgetful 
political culture that will eventually justify any abuse (Kleden, 2001: 31). 
 Just like Gaffar, Kantaprawira, and Pye, Kleden also argues that a political culture 
is an important matter in a community which is very paternalistic in nature like most 
Indonesian communities which is based on the patron – client relationship. In such a 
pattern, the behavior of a commoner will follow what is shown by those who are 
considered as the models without arguing whether what is shown by the models is wrong 
or right. But can such a political behavior be made a model? 
 There are two possibilities. First, the political behavior is based on what is called 
a political propriety. Second, the political behavior is based on a political correctness. 
The first consideration is more esthetical in nature and what is given an emphasis there is 
the propriety, beauty, and appropriateness of a behavior. The second consideration is 
more ethical in nature where the emphasis is on the political behavior that can be justified 
or declined based on the norms in prevailing legal and political sensibilities. But such an 
esthetical consideration is subjective in nature, like one’s taste in listening to music or to 
watching a picture. On the other hand, the ethical consideration can be made through a  
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discourse to find out what criteria can be commonly used on the basis of the reasons 
being discussed.  
 So, according to Kleden, if a political culture is meant as giving an emphasis on 
the political esthetics, it is quite difficult to review the habits and tendencies in a political 
behavior, because in a political culture, a behavior is accepted because it has been 
accepted. On the other hand, if the political morality is given the emphasis, there is a 
possibility to find out weaknesses in a political culture based on the agreed criteria. Here, 
a political behavior is not automatically accepted because it has been accepted in a group 
of community but it is accepted because of the justifying reasons. A political reform in 
Indonesian is only possible if there is a real shift based on the political culture than on the 
consideration based on a political morality. So, a set of values is not accepted because it 
is considered as having values but it is accepted because there are reasons and discourses 
to justify the acceptance. If this is not made, then it is not impossible that the whole 
political thought will be taken to an odd logic that a political value is considered good 
just because it is considered as an Indonesian culture, and the other set of values   is    
considered     bad     because    it   is   not    an     Indonesian     culture (Kleden, 2001: 
35). 
 
4.2.3 The ‘Bapak-ism’ of Soekarno and Soeharto 
Gaffar also mentions about the neo-patrimonialistic political culture as the one 
mentioned by Harold Crouch (1979). It is called neo-patrimonialistic because the state 
has the modern and rationalistic attributes such as bureaucracy, but it also shows 
patrimonialistic attributes. The concept developed by Max Weber is very relevant to the 
administration of New Order where the governance and the military power were under 
the direct control of the leader of the state, who perceived everything as being 
personalized (Gaffar, 2002: 115). The political tendency is still in favor for paternalism 
and patrimonialism with the indicators of ‘father-ism’ and ‘just to make the father happy’ 
(Kantaprawira, 1988: 37). Pye argues, “The bapak (father) has to assume extensive 
responsibilities for his anak buah (followers), and they turn owe him the incalculable debt 
of hutang budi, a form of indebtedness which they can strive ceaselessly to repay but 
which continues to endure, sometimes even into the next generation” (Pye, 1985: 117). It  
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was also argued that Soeharto is clearly a master of the patron-client game, has frequently 
violated this rule and banished from his inner court anak buahs who grown too powerful 
by becoming major bapaks in their own right. 
 According to Pye, there are differences and similarities between the two figures: 
Certain key distinctions (as well as similarities) between Sukarno’s and Suharto’s  ruling 
style can be understood only in the context of the subtle dynamics of these Indonesia 
forms of patron-client relationship. Indonesians, nurtured in the tradition of Javanese 
etiquette, are not so taken in by the abjectly servile posturing of subordinates as to believe 
that masters can be carefree and have no restraints. (Pye,  1985:117) 
Next,  Sukarno’s method in handling patron-client power was to act as the bold 
“father” of the whole country who was fearlessly confronting the “outside” dangerous 
world. He sought to give psychic rewards to all of his “children.” They could feel that 
they could “stand tall,” that they were bigger and stronger than before, while it was he 
who had assumed the risk. But in the end he was the loser, for the world saw him as 
buffoon, a conceited dictator, while his own people with smiles remembered him as 
something of a show-off, having forgotten the brief emotional charge he had given 
them.Soeharto’s conduct has been equally tied to the patron-client ideal, but he has 
adhered more closely to the Javanese ethos that values modesty and reticence. Rather 
than dealing at a symbolic level, Soeharto has specific clients, and rather than pretending 
that as master he can do anything and everything, he has acknowledged than in most 
practical matters it is the servants who should  be burdened with decisions. Thus, in 
contrast to Sukarno with his flamboyant all-knowing manner, Soeharto has exploited the 
traditional patron-client model to legitimize divisions of authority based on technical 
specialization. Thus in a strange way Soeharto, who is more traditionalist than Sukarno 
was, has been  more successful in bringing to Indonesian public life the seemingly 
modern notion that the top political authority should not intervene in technical matters 
that call for special knowledge and skills. Thus Soeharto has given scope to Western-
trained technocrats who, as his clients, carefully treat him as their deserving patron. 
(Pye,1985: 118-119). 
 As patrons, Soekarno and Soeharto have shown their important roles in 
manifesting themselves as the power holders who can make their own history. Any of 
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them in their own period agreed their views on how far a change could be made since it is 
the duty of a client to maintain the continuity. It is more important that the two leaders 
have shown of being generous with the existing resources for the country. In his daily 
life, Soekarno plays the various but also profligate roles, a kind of Javanese ruler who 
easily spends the wealth of the country for symbolic monuments. 
 Again Pye argues, all key elements in politics can find the expectations 
distributed in the period of austerity when the inflation was under control. The belief of 
Indonesians that any well off thing is ready to distribute the fortune has made him 
difficult to draw a clear line between socialistic redistribution and corruption. This spirit 
of sharing has made easy for Indonesians to arrange their key patron in the first hierarchy 
because it creates a relatively stable bureaucracy. 
 The existence of a stable national power structure does not necessarily mean that 
policies are well and efficiently implemented. On the contrary, the main essence of power 
concept in Indonesia is too noble to be mixed with purposeful activities. Power is 
something to have not to use. Power is a status; this is about above anybody else and 
being treated differently. This is not a utilitarian means. One wants power just to have it, 
just to enjoy it. On the other hand, in Western practice, the search for the power is made 
by following the ethics which limits the power of those with worthy purpose and so 
makes the power holder responsible for the causes they support. The Indonesian way is to 
find out the bad effect of the power and to develop the idea that power should not be 
totally applied. One should be satisfied to accept psychic differences they have, and they 
should have, both materially, and they should show their unlimited generosity to their 
clients.  
 According to Pye, such a practice has taken Indonesia to a stable power structure 
with little capacity for coherent and integrated national policies except for some flaws in 
the bureaucracy. Pertamina (The National Oil Company), for instance, is a small state in 
the state which brings prosperity by controlling the oil, inordinately using the share of 
this business to expand its own activities, and creating jealousy on other people because 
they agree the legitimacy of the domains (Pye, 1985: 120). 
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4.3  Political Structure and Institution 
A structure is the institutionalization of the organizational relationships among the 
components that create the building. In politics, a structure is always related to the 
allocation of authoritative values and is affected by power distribution and utilization. As 
such, this is related to capacity, capability, and competence to influence, to assure, to 
control, and to direct other people. This is certainly related to the authority, right, and the 
physical force or naked power (Kantaprawira, 1988: 41). 
 A political structure is also related to informal factors which in practice also 
influence the way of the apparatus and the community to express, channel, convert 
demands and supports on public interests. But this is also related to the formal or official 
political institutions which legally identify all problems, determine, and implement all 
decisions which bind all of the community to reach the public interests. 
 
4.3.1  Informal Political Institutions 
Political institution affects the way the apparatus do. Included here are those 
institutions such as political parties, interest groups, pressure groups, political figures or 
opinion leaders, mass communication means which is called the conveyor belt (Suwandi 
in Kantaprawira, 1988: 42). Then, in the structure there can be found some functions such 
as interest articulation and interest aggregation. There are also interactions among the 
political culture and political structure. 
 Kantaprawira applies some approaches in viewing the unofficial reality in 
Indonesia including first, the community groupings based on social and economic 
similarities to study the real community power as forces of revolution (1988: 45). 
Farmers, workers, middle class, and intellectuals are included in these groupings. 
Farmers are those who earn their living from cultivating the soil in a wide sense. Farmers 
apply traditional ways of cultivating the land which have been passed from generation to 
generation. They are included in the 87% of ‘silent majority’ who most dwell in villages. 
The rest are the ‘vocal majority’ who most dwell in urban areas. Workers are the group of 
the community who earn their living form contributing their labor service in the 
production process. Most of them live in industrial cities and they enjoy various facilities 
provided in cities such as electricity, transportation means, and entertainment. The middle 
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class is the group of community who earn the living from doing things outside land 
cultivation and labor service directly. They include doctors, lawyers, civil servants, and 
business persons. The middle class tends to be a small elite noble group (petit 
bourgeoisie). The intelligentsia includes those who have extra capabilities in knowledge 
as compared to the ordinary people, having ideas, idealisms, and concept about how a 
community should be created. They enjoy formal and informal education, and they are 
challenged to apply their knowledge. They consist not more than 5%. 
 Second, the community grouping is based on the difference of the methods and 
grouping based on the awareness on the same type of purpose. They are categorized as 
the political association group. Third, the grouping is based on the political factual life. 
Included here are political parties and interest groups, pressure groups, political figures, 
and mass media (Kantaprawira, 1988: 50 – 51). 
 
4.3.2 Political Parties and “Golongan Karya” 
In the period of Soekarno, political parties flourished along with the growing 
spirit to counter the colonizers. The political parties were established by religious and 
ethnical groups and intellectuals. In 1955 general election, there were more than 30 
political parties but there were only four to reach the most votes. They included the 
National Indonesian Party (PNI) with 22.3%, Masyumi (20.9%), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
(18.4%), and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia-PKI) (16.4%). 
The influential intellectual party included the Socialist Indonesian Party (Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia-PSI) with only 2%.  
 In the era of Soeharto there were only three political parties namely the Unity 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-PPP,), Golongan Karya, and the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-PDI). PPP was the fusion of 
Islamic parties and PDI was the fusion of nationalist and Christian parties. From the 
dozens of parties in the era of Soekarno and three in the era of Soeharto, it is only 
Golongan Karya that survives up to the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
 The functional groups as the embryo of Golkar have been in existence long before 
since the colonial era. Since the kingdoms of Nusantara, there have been members of 
seven different functional groups participating in the governance system as the advisors  
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for the kings (Boileau, 1983: 23). In the Dutch colonial parliament, there were the 
representatives of functional groups, named Volksraad, established in 1918. The same 
thing can be found in the Chuo-Sangi-In, an institution established in the Japanese 
colonial era in the Second World War. The Central Indonesian National Committee 
(Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat-KNIP) or parliament, in 1945 – 1949, there were also 
such representatives (Boileau, 1983: 25). 
 According to Boileau, President Soekarno was known to support the interest 
groups in the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawartan Rakyat-MPR) 
since his travel around the world in 1956 particularly to socialist countries to see the 
interest groups in playing their roles in the political system. The years of 1957 – 1964 
was the first period of Golkar’s life as the political embryo of which process was started 
when there was a pragmatic coalition between Soekarno and the military (Fatah in 
Stanley, 1999). Soekarno was disappointed by the experiment of parliamentary 
democracy which placed the president in the symbolic – ceremonial role, and the Army 
was also disappointed because it was placed as the ‘fire fighter’ by the civil government. 
Golkar was the tool to develop the political basis for military empowerment vis-à-vis 
other political powers, particularly the communist. For the military, Golkar was not a 
political party but it was just a working group to respond the reactions of political parties 
which in the past were seen as the sources of political chaos and state economic 
bankruptcy (Suryadinata, 1992: 8). 
 In the era of Soeharto, Golongan Karya got much greater position and it became 
the only political party3 in power for the period of more than 30 years. Two other parties, 
the Unity Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 
practice did not have any significant power. The organizational structure of Golkar was 
closely superimposed with the cabinet structure of Soeharto and all of its power. Golkar 
penetrated all official community living facets. One of the key position of Golkar as the 
ruling party was to take the position of the Minister of Information to make it capable to  
                                                
3 The characteristics of Golkar as a political party included its activeness and effectiveness in the fight for 
political position. This is in line with the definition of a political party as suggested by Plano, namely a 
group with the agreed ideology to organize itself to win the general election, to run the governance, to 
determine public policies, and to win political positions (Boileau, Golkar, Functional Group Politics in 
Indonesia, Jakarta, CSIS, 1983, p. 111). 
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control the communication and mass media in Indonesia in the period of the New Order 
(1966 – 1998). Through various regulations, the Minister of Information was capable to 
control the only journalistic organization, namely the Indonesian Journalist Association 
(Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia-PWI) and that was the way taken by the government to 
‘Golkar-ize’ the PWI (Simanjuntak, 1998: 10). 
 
4.3.3 Government as a Formal Political Institution 
Based on the 1945 Constitution, the governance system of the Republic of 
Indonesia includes: (1) the state is based on the law, not on power, (2) the governance is 
based on the constitutional system not absolutism, (3) the supreme state power is on the 
hand of the People’s Consultative  Assembly (MPR), (4) the president is the supreme 
executive power under the MPR in running the governance with its power and 
responsibility, (5) the president reports to the House of Representatives, in which the 
president has to get the approval of the House to issue a law and to determine the state 
budget, (6) the state power is not limitless (Salam, 2002: 130 – 131).  
 Following Montesquieu, the government is the state institution know as “Trias 
Politica” in which there are the legislative power (law maker), the executive power (law 
execution), and the judicative power (law implementation overseer). The purpose of the 
concept is to divide the power to avoid absoluteness of power but in its development it 
has become the distribution of power. The three powers or institutions are to make 
official, binding, and legitimate decisions. The government political structure also 
includes the governance system namely the type of relationship and functional 
relationship among the state institutions which are usually determined by the constitution.  
 In the classification there are two governance systems namely the parliamentary 
executive or the cabinet government system and the presidential system (non-
parliamentary executive or fixed executive, presidential system, or chief executive 
system). The 1945 Indonesian constitution dictates the combined governance system. In 
the beginning of Indonesian government (August 18 – November 14, 1945), Indonesia 
applied the presidential system based on the article IV of the transitional clause which is 
often called the absolutely centralized government (Sanusi and Kantaprawira, 1988: 142). 
Through the government announcement on November 14, 1945, there was established the 
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parliamentary cabinet and since then presidential system moved to the parliamentary 
system. Since the system was not known in the 1945 Constitution, this change was 
considered unconstitutional or against the 1945 Constitution (Kantaprawira, 1988: 144). 
In this system, the House has the power to make the president accountable for the 
administration. The government can also be impeached by the House (Thoha, 2003). The 
Republic of Indonesia was once under the united system through the United Indonesian 
Republic (Republik Indonesia Serikat-RIS) through the RIS constitution (December 27, 
1949 – August 17, 1950) and the application of the parliamentary system. On December 
17, 1950, the RI applied the parliamentary governance system with some gradual 
differences namely (1) no duplication in offices between being the member of the House 
and the minister of the cabinet (2) an active member of the armed forces had to be 
inactive if the person accepted the membership of the House, and (3) the prerogative right 
of the president as the state leader to dismiss the House with a condition of an election for 
the House in 30 days.  
 In short, Indonesia has undergone three periods of governance systems namely (1) 
the parliamentary and presidential governance system (1945 – 1950) (2) the liberal 
parliamentary cabinet system (1950 – 1959), the led-democratic presidential cabinet 
system (1959 – 1966), and (4) the new order cabinet governance system (1966 – 1999) 
(Thoha, 2003: xiv). 
 
4.3.3.1 Executive Institution: President and Ministers 
The executive power is dictated in the 1945 Constitution in Chapter II articles 4 – 
15. The government of Indonesia consists of the central government apparatus, the local 
government apparatus, and the state businesses. The central government apparatus 
consists of the presidency and the cabinet including the departments. The presidency 
along with the main apparatus includes the president as the head of the state who is also 
the executive head, the vice president, the state / non –departmental ministers, the general 
attorney, the secretary of the state, national councils, and non – departmental institution 
(Salam, 2002: 138). 
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 In the presidential cabinet system, the accountability on governmental policies is 
on the hand of the president. In addition, the president also plays as the prime minister 
and the ministers do not directly report to the House but to the president. The positions of 
the ministers are just the assistants to the president and the president is responsible of 
establishing the departments to apply the executive power. The main duty of the 
department is to determine the government policy based on the general policies made by 
the president and the prevailing laws and regulations (Salam, 2002: 146). 
 The ministry of information is an important formal political institution in the 
Indonesian political system particularly in the administration of Soeharto. In the 
administration of Soekarno, the ministry of information had the State Film Company 
(Perusahaan Film Negara), the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI), and the 
Television of the Republic of Indonesia (Televisi Republik Indonesia-TVRI). The 
ministry also held the Information Academi (Akademi Penerangan-AP) and the National 
News Office (Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional-LKBN) Antara as the educational means 
in information matters (Hardjowirogo, 1984). In the administration of Soeharto, the 
ministry of information was once led by army generals such as Ali Murtopo and R. 
Hartono but then it was led by a former journalist, Harmoko. In the era of Harmoko, the 
ministry of information was successful in applying the new order development politics 
through the concept of development press. 
 
4.3.3.2 Legislative Institution: House of Representatives 
According to article 5 sub-article (1), articles 20 and 21 of the 1945 constitution, 
the president and the House are the institutions which have the power in legislative 
matters by passing the laws. In addition, the decision of the MPR no III/MPR/1978 
dictates the working relationship between the House and the president in article 8. The 
second sub-article says that the president along with the House passes the laws including 
the budget law. The fifth sub-article says that the president does not report to the House, 
and article 6 says that the president cannot dismiss the House (Boboy, 1994). 
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4.3.3.3. Judicial Institution: Supreme Court and Constitutional Court 
Following the 3rd Amandment of the 1945 Constitution on 2001, the Indonesian 
judicial system comprises several types of courts under the oversight of the Supreme 
Court (Mahkamah Agung-MA). However, Indonesian courts do not apply the principle of 
precedent .The Supreme Court does not have the power to review the constitutionality of 
laws passed by the national assembly. This function is taken by the Constitutional Court 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi-MK). The Constitutional Court  also takes original jurisdiction in 
deciding disputes, for example about the results of a general election and about the action 
of dismissing the President from office.  
 
4.4 Media System in the “Law and Power”-Eras 
Entering the 1990s, the view that the press was the fourth estate of the state life 
with an equal position was considered a myth (Siregar, 1997). Not even the fourth estate, 
the other three pillars, namely the judicative, legislative, and executive powers were not 
in an equal position. This view is in line with the opinion of McQuail in describing the 
relationship between the media and the state and the people. One of the relationship 
models is the control of the state versus the independence where there is a tendency of 
external authority to limit or to control the media (McQuail, 1991: 25). The practice of 
limitation and controlling the media by state power has been in existence since the 
Soekarno era and the Soeharto era. 
 An opinion says that the press system of a developing country is in general 
following or continuing its former colonial system with some appropriate adjustments 
(Saefuddin, 2004). Some of the characteristics of the press system in a developing 
country include: (1) the press system tends to follow the former ex- colonizer, (2) the 
press in a developing country has still been in its transition form up to now, it is still 
looking for a suitable form or to find its own identity, just to make it less stable; (3) the 
press in a developing country is demanded to be an ‘agent of social change’ in which the 
press along with the government has the responsibility on the success of development, (4) 
in general, press freedom is acknowledged in its existence but in practice there are a lot 
of limitations, and in general it follows the system of a social responsibility, (5) the 
matters of inequality in information, monopoly, and excessive centralization of resources 
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and communication channels just create the domination of the state over the developing 
country, (6) the system and the relationship pattern between the press and the government 
has the tendency of combination between the existing systems (libertarian, authoritarian, 
and social responsibility) (Rahmadi, 1990).  
The broadcasting system of Indonesia is related with national interest (Wahid in 
Swastoyo, 1997). If you broadcasts something that is considered by the government as 
being against the national interest then you will have to automatically limit yourself 
because the national interest is very strong here. Moreover, public broadcasting is 
controlled by a self –censorship, the government, or the fear of license revocation. In 
addition to political issues, or other sensitive issues such as ethnicity, religious, and 
cultural issues are also jus examples of how media is controlled by the authority.[Center 
of Statistical Data in 1995 recorded that there were 43.2% of the total 45,653,084 
households in Indonesia owned a television set, or equal to 19,709,480 units. It means 
that one television set was for five family members or there were 98,547,400 viewers 
(Panjaitan and Tabing, 2000: 15)]. 
 
4.4.1 Media System in the Era of Soekarno:Free Press, Caged Press 
The media system in the era of Soekarno was closely related to the media systems 
developed by the Dutch and the Japanese (Surjomihardjo, 1980). The Dutch government 
was in favor for Dutch audience, but the government did not govern through a 
representative body like in the Netherlands. The Dutch colony officials controlled the 
Netherlands Indies in an authoritarian manner by maintaining the caste system as the 
characteristics of a colonized community. A mass media that might open the possibility 
to voice a public opinion on the government policy would not be let published until the 
first experiment with an official mass media in the administration of the governor general 
van Imhoff who published the Bataaviasche Novelles in 1744 (Surjomihardjo, 1980). 
 In a treatise on the Indonesian press in 1909, EFE Douwes Dekker, the editor of 
the Bataviassche Nieuwsblad considered that the position of the press in Malay language 
was more important than the Dutch press (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 65). In the Dutch 
colonial era, the first regulation on press was passed in 1856 in the Reglement op de 
Drukwerken in Nederlandsch Indie which was more preventive and it was improved in  
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1906 to adjust to the demand of the situation, among others by the democratic pressures. 
The regulation was more a repressive supervision in nature (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 145).  
 In the Japanese colonial era, the authority of Java – Madura controlled the 
publication and communication means through the law no. 16. Some articles of it were 
about the implementation of a publication license system and preventive censorship. 
Article 1 says that all kinds of printed material have to have a publication license. Article 
2 says that all publishers that were previously against the Japanese should continue their 
business (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 148). 
 In the era of Indonesian republic, the government has changed its policy on press 
because there were some changes in the governance system. Article 28 of the 1945 
Constitution implicitly mentions about press freedom: ‘the freedom of assembly, 
expressing opinions orally or in written matters as dictated by the law’. Referring to 
Hardjowirogo (1984: 34), when the 1945 constitution was still in the making, there was 
no general statement on human rights by the UN and it was only issued on December 10, 
1948. In the constitution of RIS in 1951, press freedom was explicitly stated in article 19: 
‘everybody reserves the right of having and expressing opinions’. According to 
Hardjowirogo, this text is quite similar to the text of article 19 of the UN general 
statement. Article 19 of the RIS constitution was made the legal basis for press freedom 
in the period between 1951 and 1959 (Hardjowirogo, 1984: 35). 
 Persbreidel Ordonantie of 1931, a legacy of the Dutch colonial was only changed 
when the independent government entered 1954, particularly on August 2. The act no. 23 
of the year 1954 says that the revocation of the ordonantie was made on the reason that 
the ordonantie was against article 19 jo. 33 of the RIS constitution saying: ‘everybody 
reserves the right of having and expressing opinions’ (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 150). 
Hanazaki calls the press situation of the period of 1945–1957 as the partisan press 
and the following period (1957–1965) as the guided press or pers terpimpin (Hanazaki, 
1998: 6). He says that after the independence, Indonesian press was caught in euphoria of 
freedom which was affected by tight competition among political parties. The press was 
also caught in the situation and it just became a means of political propaganda. There 
were three newspapers namely the republican press, the press financed by the Dutch, and 
the press  financed by  the Chinese    and all of them    were involved in the    propaganda  
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(Hanazaki, 1998: 12). Some newspapers owned by Indonesians included Berita 
Indonesia, which had an anti – Japanese spirit, with a list of 5,000 subscribers. There 
were also Merdeka daily established by BM Diah and Soeara Merdeka daily in Bandung, 
Soeara Asia which was then changed to Soeara Rakjat in Surabaya. In Jakarta there was 
Ra’jat and English daily, Independent.  
 To counter the attack of republican papers, the Dutch published some papers in 
Indonesian language, including Fadjar in Jakarta, Soeloeh Rakjat in Semarang, Pelita 
Rakjat in Surabaya, Padjajaran and Persatoean in Bandung (Hanazaki, 1998: 12 – 13). 
The Chinese people also came back to newspaper business through Sumatera Bin Po, 
New China Times, Democratic Daily News in Medan, and Sin Po and Keng Po in 
Jakarta, and Sin Min in Surabaya. According to Tribuana Said, the Chinese papers tended 
to be in favor for the Dutch (Hanazaki, 1998: 13). 
 According to the World Communication record published by the UNESCO in 
1951, in December 1948 there were 124 papers in Indonesia with a total of 405,000 in 
print, but in April 1959 there were only 81 papers with a total of 283,000 in print as the 
result of the Dutch aggression (Hanazaki, 1998: 13). Along the period, Indonesian press 
was strengthening the spirit of nationality, sharpening the techniques of polemic, and 
starting to show the increasing partisan spirit. 
 Indonesian press enjoyed the liberal era and found its tremendous growth in the 
number of impressions. In 1950 there were 67 Indonesian dailies with a total of 338,300 
in print, and in 1957 there were 96 dailies with a total of 888,950 in print. Getting close 
to the first election in 1955, in Jakarta only there were 27 papers with a total of 320,000 
in print. The four largest papers were Harian Rakyat (owned by the Indonesian 
communist party) with a total of 55,000 in print, Pedoman owned by the Indonesian 
socialist party (48,000), Suluh Indonesia owned by the Indonesian nationalist party 
(40,000), and Abadi owned by Masyumi (34,000) (Said quoted in Hanazaki, 1998: 13). 
Other papers which affiliated to political parties included Merdeka (PNI), Duta 
Masyarakat (Nahdlatul Ulama), and Sin Po (PKI). 
 According to Herbert Feith, the partisan position of the press was accelerated by 
the discrimination made by any ruling party its own paper by providing credit for press 
financing and administration, while opposition papers were often bridled (Hanazaki,  
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1998: 14). More than thirty political parties were involved in the election campaign and 
they used the press support. In the era of constitutional democracy, the press was not 
striving for unity but instead trying to fight one another just to make chaos and unrest 
among the people.  
 One of the most influential papers was Indonesia Raya established by Mochtar 
Lubis. The paper investigated the corruption made by the authority. Indonesia Raya also 
criticized the existence of a mutual security act with the United States in 1951 – 1952. In 
the history of Indonesian press, Indonesia Raya was in a unique position because it lived 
in two different periods for around ten years (Haryanto, 2006: 49). The press situation of 
the constitutional democratic era according to an official of the Ministry of Information 
was considered as disturbing the national unity but in the eyes of a western observer, E 
Schumacher, it was considered as the real ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘unattainable even by 
western countries’ (Oey in Hanazaki, 1998: 15). 
 The government issued some regulations which were considered as pressing the 
journalists, for instance the one issued by the Army chief as the military ruler dated 
September 14, 1965. Article 1 of the regulation banned the printing, publication, and 
distribution of writings, pictures, clichés, or paintings which contained any protest, 
suspicion, or insult to the president or vice president, an institution or general assembly, 
or ‘a civil servant who was doing his legal duty’ (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 151). 
 This ban also applied to various writings which were considered as ‘containing a 
statement of hatred or insult on any group of people’. This also applied to the ban on 
‘writings which contained news or information that might create chaos among the 
people’. 
 According to the Indonesian association of journalists (PWI), the regulation 
signed by the army chief, Maj. Gen. AH Nasution, was quite similar to the Haatzaai 
Artikelen. After stating the state of war on March 14, 1957, the ban on the press was 
much bitterer. The regulations of Peperti no. 10/ 1960 and Penpres no. 6 / 1963 were the 
main pillars of government policy on press after 1959 until the issuance of Act no. 11 / 
1966 on the principles of press. Article 6 of Penpres 6 / 1963 mentioned the need for a 
publication license for a daily or magazine. A printer violating the regulation can be 
sentenced for one year or a maximum damage of fifty thousand rupiahs (article 10), and  
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the printing equipment can be confiscated or destroyed (article 12). Then the control on 
the press was transferred to the Minister of Information assisted by the chief of the armed 
forces, the chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and police who had the position equal to a 
minister (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 156). The controlling duty of the minister of information 
included: (a) to control the functioning of the press in the guided democracy; (b) to play 
the role as connector between the revolution leader and press organizations in press 
matters in the led democracy; and (c) to listen to the voices of the general public or 
suggestions from press representatives in the context of general policy on the press from 
the revolution leader. Article 4 says that in implementing the duties, the minister of 
information reports to the president as the general leader of revolution (Surjomihardjo, 
1980: 156). The issue of SIT is then regulated in the decision of the minister of 
information no. 03/  Per/ Menpen/ 1969, dated May 27, 1969. One of the regulation says 
that the SIT should be accompanied by a ‘statement that the press publication should 
prioritize the ideal traits by describing the mission in the service for the nation and the 
country’ (Surjomihardjo, 1980: 157). 
 Prior to the general principles of the press no. 11 of the year 1966 dated 
December 12, the administration of Soekarno issued the printing license (Surat Izin 
Cetak-SIC) through the special executive command of the local security and order 
recovery (Laksus Kopkamtibda). Through the SIC, the military reserved the full right to 
summon journalists who were considered as making mistakes or considered as 
questionable. This regulation also dictates the obligation to include the printing license 
number for every press publication, just like the publication license (Surjomihardjo, 
1980: 157). As such, the media system in the administration of Soekarno is very much 
dependent on the regulations for the press, and most of them really jailed the press 
freedom. 
 What about the radio? The radio of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI) was aired for 
the first time on September 19, 1945, a month after the independence. Its embryo can be 
found when Indonesia was still under the Dutch colonization by the establishment of the 
Nederlands Indische Radio Omroep (NIROM), Bataviaasche Radio Vereniging (BRV), 
Solosche Radio Vereniging (SRV) in Solo, and Siaran Radio Indonesia (SRI) 
(Hardjowirogo, 1984: 28). In the Japanese colonization era, there was established the  
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propaganda force (Sendenbu) and censorship office (Hodohan) with the duty to censor 
any kind of publication and broadcasting. After the independence on August 17, 1945, 
from the Japanese there was inherited the Hosokyoku, or the radio agency which was 
then transformed to be the radio of the Republic of Indonesia on September 19, 1945 
(Hardjowirogo, 1984: 31). Radio played a great role in transmitting information 
concerning the power, conflicts, and integration of Indonesia. For instance, the coup-
d’etat and counter coup’ in 1965, the public buildings seized by the communist forces 
under Colonel Untung included the RRI station in Jln. Merdeka, Jakarta. Through the 
RRI, Col. Untung announced the coup plan of the ‘General’s Council’. This was also the 
practice of Let. Col. Soeharto after attacking the movement (Masduki, 2003: 13). 
 But in the situation of struggle which overwhelmed the people after the 
independence, the press and particularly the radio as a government institution was 
considered as the extended hand of the government. This is also included in the Act no. 
11 of the year 1966 in article 1 (1) saying that ‘the press is a community institution as a 
revolution tool’ and in article 2 (1) saying that ‘the national press is a revolution tool’ 
(Hardjowirogo, 1984: 33). 
 In the administration of Soekarno, print media got its freedom when the 
government applied the liberal political system and the press took a greater role as a 
propaganda tool for political parties. When the political system was changed to the 
repressive one such as in the guided democracy or demokrasi terpimpin system, the press 
was once again cuffed with a lot of limiting regulations. Radio had been more 
functioning as a tool for the government since the early beginning. 
 
4.4.2 Media System in the Era of Soeharto 
If it is compared to the era of Soekarno, the administration of Soeharto was so 
much powerful to place the media in a position almost powerless. It was only in certain 
years that the mass media got the space to play its function to channel information more 
freely. But almost all of the time in his era, the media was always in his hands. Though 
not politically capable, the role of the media in the era of Soeharto grew as an industry. 
Nearing to his fall, alternative media, particularly the Internet, provided a space for a  
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transition process. In addition to regulations, the political structure and culture was also 
the determining tool for the media system in the era of Soeharto. 
 
4.4.2.1 Key Principles of the Press 
For the administration of Soeharto, the law no. 11 / 1966 on the key principles of 
the press was the really effective weapon to circumcise the press freedom. In the 
administration of Soekarno, the press system was influenced by the ever changing 
governance system such as the parliamentary system, the system following the RIS 
constitution, and the guided democracy system. Included in it was the rule issued to 
regulate the press following the September 30, 1965 movement. 
 It can be said that the press system in the era of Soeharto inherited the press 
control by the state implemented in the era of Soekarno. The considerations of the act of 
press key principles at the point (c) clearly stated ‘in accordance with the principles of 
Pancasila democracy, the control over the press is in the hands of the government along 
with the press representatives’. 
 In addition to the act of 1966, the administration of Soeharto also applied the act 
no. 4 of the year 1967 and the law no. 21 of the year 1982. In addition, some other 
regulations to control the press were also issued by the press council, namely the decision 
of the press council no. 79 / XIV/ 1974 on the guidelines of controlling the press ideals. It 
was stated that the guidelines was binding for the press in implementing the duties and it 
was also binding to the government in controlling the press (Gandhi, 1985). The 
guidelines stated that ‘the freedom of the people to express their opinions or thoughts 
through oral and written materials is regulated by an act’ such as article 28 of the 1945 
constitution and the decision of the MPR no IV/ 1973 on the basic guidelines of the state 
and the act no. 11 of the year 1966 on the key principles of the press. But there were lot 
of difficulties to translate the meaning of ‘freedom’ in daily journalistic practice; that is 
way it was suggested to submit a review on the essence of the ‘responsible press 
freedom’ (Gandhi, 1985: 147). 
 The philosophy of press freedom according to Pancasila is not free from the 
obligation of press mass media as a civil institution to support the national consensus in 
their writings. In applying the function, the press has to highly respect the prevailing  
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values in the community. It means that the press has to support the national development 
as the one outlined in the guidelines of the state as the national consensus. ‘In line with 
our national consensus, the existence of such freedom brings about the responsibility to 
apply the freedom in a balanced harmonious way to apply the function for the sake of 
progress and development of the community’ (Gandhi, 1985: 150).  
 The relationship between the press and the government is intertwined in a form 
that is inspired by the spirit of partnership in realizing the just and prosperous community 
based on Pancasila. In the era of development, political, economic, and social stability is 
the prerequisite for the successful development efforts. The press should be inspired to 
help the government in applying the power of the government to support the dynamic 
stability, without minimizing its rights to provide healthy and constructive criticism in an 
atmosphere of responsible – free press (Gandhi, 1985: 155). 
 Such a controlled relationship is based on some regulations to limit the media. 
Some of them was the decision of the minister of information no 24/Kep/ Menpen/1978 
on the support of the PWI and Serikat Pekerja Suratkabar (Labor Press Union) as the only 
organizations for Indonesian journalists and publishing companies. The control in the 
hands of the organizations was also controlled by the government through the decision of 
the minister of information no 184/Kep/Menpen/1978 on the support that the press 
graphic society (Serikat Pers dan Grafika-SPG) as the only organization for Indonesian 
press printing companies. The most severe control could be found in the decision of the 
minister of information no 01/Per/Menpen/1984 on the regulations of press business 
license (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers-SIUPP) and in the decision of the minister of 
information no 214 A/Kep/ Menpen/1984 on the procedure and conditions to get a press 
business license. Both decisions were directly to circumcise the press freedom as dictated 
in 1945 constitution and other legal regulations. This all was the practice of the state in 
controlling the press in various forms. Some other examples show the pattern of 
relationship between the state and the press particularly with the association of interest 
such as Indonesian association of journalist. There were cases, for instance when the 
chief editor of Monitor magazines confiscated, the PWI even dismissed its member in 
dishonor without providing the right to answer and without waiting for the legal process. 
When the magazines Tempo, Editor, and Detik were bridled by the authority, the PWI  
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even issued the statement that it was ‘quite understandable’ to the decision. When some 
journalists agreed in a Sirnagalih declaration to be against the bridle and the abuse by the 
government over the press, the PWI instructed the chief editors of the dailies and 
magazines to fire their journalists who signed the declaration (Surbakti in Akhmadi, 
1977). 
 Why the PWI should be tightly controlled by the government? In the policy of the 
New Order which emphasized the political stability and economic growth, any public 
organization with a high score which was popular to make it capable to influence millions 
of people in various cities with certain issues to question the credibility of the authority, it 
will certainly be the target of control by the authority (Akhmadi, 1997: 48). In addition to 
PWI, the state was also represented by the technical control institution, namely the 
ministry of information and the political control directorate (Social and Political 
Directorate and the Indonesian Armed Forces) which directly controlled the press. Some 
modes of control included direct summoning the chief editors for a consultation, to give a 
pressure over the telephone, and to give oral and written warning. The intensity of control 
by the state was strengthening the mechanism of self –censorship by the media 
(Akhmadi, 1997: 49). Hidayat called it a preventive and corrective control, control on 
individuals, control on the text, control on the sources, and control on the access (Hidayat 
et al., 2000: 6). Since 1974 up to 1994, some print media were banned by the government 
of Soeharto including Harian Nusantara, Harian Kami, The Jakarta Times, Abadi, 
Indonesia Raya, Pedoman, Suluh Berita Surabaya, and some weeklies and magazines 
such as Pemuda and Mahasiswa Indonesia (1974), Sinar Harapan daily (1986),  Monitor 
magazine(1990), Tempo, Editor, and Detik magazines (1994) (Wahyuni, 1995: 67). 
 
4.4.2.2 Regulations for Broadcasting 
In the beginning of Soeharto’s administration, television media was relatively 
new but it had shown a strong coverage. That is because of its capability that the state 
wanted to make use the existence of television broadcasting industry (Wahyuni, 2000 : 
2). Different from the control on print media which had been using the legal means, 
television media was more controlled by using ministerial policies that were more 
versatile in nature. This was closely related to the power character of the new order which  
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used patrimonial political structure and culture to control any kind of policy. In her 
research on television and state intervention, Wahyuni mentioned one framework 
analysis named patrimonial cluster (Wahyuni, 2000: 22). This is a pyramid marked with a 
relationship between groups with different status, between a dependent client and a 
patron as the source of influence. This model was marked by a political condition which 
does not recognize a conflict in its policy but instead a competition among the clients to 
get the closest position to the patron. The closest elite to the king is the best one, but the 
outer mass will always be pressed. According to Wahyuni, those who have the television 
industry are those who are close to the president such as the children, nephews, and 
surrounding cronies. Moreover, the state television, TVRI (Televisi Republik Indonesia) 
was positioned as the patron while the private television was only a client. 
 On October 20, 1987, TVRI assigned Rajawali Citra Televisi (RCTI) as the 
financier for the first commercial television service in Indonesia aired through decoder up 
to 1989. Then on January 17, 1990, TVRI signed an agreement with Surya Citra Televisi 
(SCTV) to run a limited television service in Surabaya. The policy was not in accordance 
with the decision of the minister of information no 190 A of 1987 saying that a 
commercial television should only be in Jakarta, but then the ministry of information 
revised the policy through the decision no 111 of 1990. 
 Then followed the license for television was issued to five private television 
companies in Jakarta in Soeharto’s era through the decision of the minister of information 
no 04/A/Kep/Menpen / 1993 which also showed the high degree of centralization 
(Wahyuni, 2000: 82). While in fact, the decision of the minister of information no 84 of 
1992 said that there was only one commercial television in Jakarta. Again, on January 18, 
1993, the policy of the minister of information provided different basis for the 
commercial television structure. The decision no 04A/Kep/Menpen/1993 dictated two 
categories: first, a private television company SPTS located in Jakarta was allowed to air 
national broadcasting with only one broadcast; second, a SPTS located in a province or a 
level I area was allowed to air local broadcasting. There were only allowed not more than 
five SPTSs in Jakarta (Wahyuni, 2000: 83). 
 The policy of the new order particularly the ministry of information was always 
changing or inconsistent. This shows the strong intervention of power but it was only  
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oriented to businesspersons with close ties to Soeharto such as his family, relatives, and 
cronies. The electronic media system in the era of Soeharto was finally substantiated 
through the broadcasting act no. 24 of 1997. Previously, the television business was only 
controlled through the decision of the minister of information no. 190A/1987 which 
opened the opportunity for private companies to provide ‘limited broadcasting of TVRI’ 
and then through the decision of the minister of information no 111/1990 on deregulation 
of television in Indonesia to make it possible for 3 broadcasting groups, namely the TVRI 
owned by the government, the education television or TPI (Televisi Pendidikan 
Indonesia) and public television to exist. TVRI was clearly owned by the government, the 
TPI was owned by the daughter of Soeharto and the other television company was owned 
by the son, close relatives, and cronies of Soeharto. 
 The deregulation of private television through the SK Menpen no 
111/Kep/Menpen /1990 did not allow private television to air their own news. In fact, 
they aired news programs or just ‘information’ (Soemandoyo, 1999: 40). In such a 
situation, news program of private television proved to grow tremendously. The role of 
television media as an information channel was started through the presence of ‘Seputar 
Jakarta’ aired by RCTI though it was only information like criminal news in Jakarta. This 
program then was changed to ‘Seputar Indonesia’ with information coming from all over 
Indonesia concerning various issues in politics, economy, and socio-culture. This 
program was then followed by SCTV through ‘Liputan 6 SCTV’ which was initially 
aired weekly but then daily. Then followed the news programs at TPI, AN-Teve, 
Indosiar, and even breaking news (Soemandoyo, 1999: 41-42). The angle was quite 
different from the TVRI because TVRI was more about the social reality of bureaucratic 
behavior and development while those private companies aired social realities with 
social, economic, and political dimensions (Soemandoyo, 1999: 43). 
 If the TVRI was more the propaganda tool for the government, private television 
did the almost the same function but they also functioned as industrial businesses. But the 
western oriented television programs of private television companies resulted in their less 
contribution to the distribution of local culture (Soemandoyo, 1999: 20). According to 
Soemandoyo’s research, two programs which were considered as local were ‘sinetron’ 
(electronic cinema), quiz and talk shows. Referring to the broadcasting act of 1997, the  
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number of local programs agreed was 70% and the rest came from outside. Prior to the 
crises in 1997, television stations were difficult to find a portion of local programs as the 
one dictated by the law because the price was too high. For instance, in September 1998, 
Indosiar used 10 broadcasting hours from its total 11.5 hours for local programs. If an 
overseas program was only around $ 4,000 per hour or with a rate of Rp. 10,000 per 
dollar, the total was only Rp. 40 – 60 millions, while a local program cost Rp. 70 – 90 
millions before the crises and after the crises it rose to Rp. 120 – 140 millions per hour. In 
addition to ‘sinetron’ television then chose news program as its main alternative because 
of its cheap operational cost (Soemandoyo, 1992: 21). 
 
4.4.2.3 Broadcasting Law  
The policy of the Broadcasting Law no. 24 of 1997 opens the freedom for radio 
because it allows radio to make and to air its own news such as dictated in article 40 of 
the act. However, article 35 still obliged a private broadcasting company to relay aired by 
the government broadcasting stations through a centralized broadcasting. The 
broadcasting law no 24 of 1997 was in fact expected to release the freedom of electronic 
media but in practice the control by the authority was still implemented. Long before, 
chapter II article 2 of the government regulation no. 50 of 1970 on non governmental 
radio broadcasting says in its explanation: ‘a radio broadcasting has the social function as 
an education, information, and entertainment tool, and so to support the success of 
government programs, and it can be privately provided but it is not allowed to be used for 
purposes other than the policy of the government as a political tool, to undermine and to 
attack Pancasila and 1945 constitution’. In article 7 of the decision of the minister of 
information no 39/Kep/Menpen/1971, it was obliged that a radio broadcasting to relay the 
news program and other government programs aired by the RRI, and a radio broadcasting 
was not allowed to relay overseas programs. This regulation was supported by article 7 of 
the decision of the minister of information no 24/Kep/Menpen/1978 and SK Menpen no 
226/Kep/Menpen/ 1984 (Mirza, 2000; AJI, 1999). 
 For more than 32 years, the new order regime only allowed two models of radio, 
namely government radio and commercial radio (Masduki, 2003). According to Masduki, 
both were allowed to air programs but not for democratization purpose, just only for  
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social mobilization. The RRI was designed as a media of doctrinal mobilization to 
preserve political power, while a commercial radio did the practice of mobilization to 
preserve and to develop the capital assets which were dominated by certain authority 
groups particularly those who were close to the palace. In this era, the government took 
the politics of mono – loyalty by only acknowledging one single broadcasting 
organization, Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Indonesia (PRSSNI). 
 Masduki also says that the history of radio in Indonesia is full of anomalies. In its 
industrial growth, radio is left behind print media. RRI, as the organic media is not 
autonomous and the commercial radio keeps being in the model of a ‘family business’ 
The ban for commercial radios to air factual information in 1994 proved the anomaly. 
The huge influence of RRI on information made radio de-politicized and not more than 
just an entertainment media (Masduki, 2003: 17). The function of radio was not more 
than psychological in nature, not the social – political one. On the other hand, the 
regulation of Soeharto’s administration also made radio broadcasting marginalized from 
its social function as a ‘mass media’ (Masduki, 2003: 17). 
 The intervention of political interest of the new order, namely Soeharto and his 
cronies on radio for the period of 1966 – 1998 was made through the control of human 
resources and tight news programs. According to Masduki, there were three key pillars of 
intervention. First, the behavior of Cendana family and their cronies were very aggressive 
in radio ownership as compared to other media businesspersons. For instance, Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana or Tutut (Soeharto’s daughter)  who owned PT Radio Citra Dharma 
Bali Setya (CDBS) in cooperation with Radio Trijaya owned by Bambang Trihatmodjo 
bought a radio station in Denpasar, Bali. This process opened the way for Tutut to lead 
the largest radio organization (PRSSNI). At the time Tutut was also a chairperson of 
Golkar. Second, the control on PRSSNI (which was declared by the minister of 
information, Harmoko, as the only radio organization acknowledged by the government) 
as a control on the organizational and financial aspects of radio. Third, there was a 
monopoly on information through the RRI because non-RRI radios were obliged go relay 
140 minutes per day of news program (Masduki, 2003: 18 – 19).  
 In the period of 1974 to 1998, the intervention of the state on private radio was 
made through three ways. First, the ownership of radios was dominated by the Cendana  
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family, second it was through mono-loyalty to PRSSNI, and third it was through a 
monopoly on news programs and relay obligation to RRI. Such a pressure just made 
‘unsympathetic or pro status quo’ broadcasting programs (Masduki, 2003: 19). 
 
4.3.2.4 The Internet and the Fall of Soeharto 
In a situation where it was always pressed, the mass media then finally went 
through alternative ways to move underground by delivering information to the public. 
Particularly after the bridle over three magazines, Tempo, Editor, and Detik in 1994, 
there was a revival of fight against the authority among the press community. The spirit 
found its appropriate way when the communication technology gave birth to the Internet. 
Through emails which were distributed from overseas or inside Indonesia, various 
information on the corruptness in the administration of Soeharto were the menu for the 
middle class in Indonesia. 
 Data showed the growth of internet users in Indonesia and Asia since July 1997 to 
June 1999. According to AC Nielsen, in the period of July 1997 to June 1998, in Jakarta 
and 10 other cities there were only 1% of users, but one year later it was 3%. As a 
comparison, in the same period in Manila, the Philippines, there were 2% which grew to 
8% (Winters in Hidayat et al., 2000: 263). But the important fact related to the media 
system of Soeharto’s era was the coming of the website ‘Apakabar’ in Indonesian 
language and English pioneered by John A. MacDougall. Other pioneers included Indo-
News created in August 1994 which distributed 50 – 120 news postings and comments on 
Indonesia per day. This news service can only be found at www.indo-news.com where all 
postings are available and can be searched for. There are also interactive segments in it so 
subscribers can send their comments and show up in the site and to discuss with other 
subscribers. 
 Winters illustrated the political contribution of the Internet and global information 
flow to Indonesia through the case of detik.com in Indonesian language and Joyo news 
service in English. Joyo news service was created in summer of 1996 by ‘someone who 
has been for 30 years related to Indonesia’. After Joyo was created, there showed up 
various networks of people from inside and outside Indonesia who wanted to make the 
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new order fall, and information was one of the most important means for the purpose 
(Winters in Hidayat et al., 2000: 270). A source at Joyo said: 
 
 Joyo news service seemed to be the main source of news for activists in 
Indonesia to know various events in the country and how the reaction of 
various parties in Indonesia was. Students once ‘ruled’ the DPR / MPR 
building and the walls of the building were attached with Joyo articles 
which were always updated. In Bandung, Surabaya, and Jakarta, news 
articles from Joyo were duplicated and  distributed. Some people were 
even caught in buses or bus stops when they  distributed the articles 
(Winters in Hidayat et al., 2000: 271 – 2). 
 
In addition to the information distributed through the internet as facilitated by 
Joyo news service, in fact there was also Kabar dari Pijar (KdP) which was initially an 
underground print media from the center for information and network of reformation 
action (PIJAR) with its activist Tri Agus Susanto Siswowihardjo. After the bridel on the 
three magazines Tempo, Editor, and Detik, which were considered as the benchmark of 
criticism against the government, the bulletin of PIJAR which had previously issued 
monthly it was now published daily. According to Stewart, Smith, and Denton, Kabar 
dari Pijar for the print edition and the internet edition showed up as a political pamphlet 
with a confronting rhetorical strategy and its main purpose was to make the power or 
social order less legitimate than social movements (Hidayat et al., 2000: 293). 
 The new order regime was successful in controlling the media, both print media 
and electronic media through some regulations, but it was not surprised by the advent of 
internet. In addition, it was proved that the strength of Soeharto’s power was getting 
weaker because of various pressures from inside and outside the country.  
 From the discussion here, it can be concluded that the political development in the 
eras of Soekarno and Soeharto show the strong position of the government before the 
people. The political culture of the authority was to use the paternalistic culture of a 
feudalistic community by placing the authority at the patron position. As such, the 
common people would follow any policy taken by the author. The government controlled 
mass media, both in Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s eras through some regulations, laws on 
press, and other rules or decisions of the minister of information. In the era of Soeharto, 
the overlapping of power or the president, the minister of information and Golongan 
Karya gave heavier pressure on press freedom. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
As a big kingdom in Asia around the 7th to 13th centuries even until the 15th 
century with its Sriwijaya and Majapahit, Indonesia finally fell into the hand of 
Netherlands colonialist for 350 years.  Under the Netherlands colonialism, the Indonesia 
Unification was known as Pax Neerlandica or Unification and Pacification.  With only 
strength as it was, Indonesian leaders such as Soekarno, Hatta, and Syahrir invited the 
people to fight both diplomatically and military to get the independence.  When Indonesia 
was under the Japanese colonialist for three and a half years since March 1942, Indonesia 
succeeded in declaring its independence. The Indonesian political system was influenced 
by its political culture.  Each political system was attached in the interaction pattern 
against political action, namely in the political culture (Wiseman, 1967:24). The 
Indonesian political culture, borrowing Gabriel Almond’s term, falls into parochial 
political culture.  The culture that exists in a parochial society, limited to small territory 
or coverage, and due to differentiation limitedness there was no special and independent 
political role.  Four variables influence Indonesian political culture, namely subculture 
configuration, political culture, primordial bind rooting in sentiments of locality, race, 
religion, different approach against certain puritan and non-puritan religion, and political 
culture tendency that still follows paternalism attitude and patrimonial character with the 
indicator of bossism, as long the boss is happy (Kantaprawira, 1988:37).  This last 
tendency can be seen in, for example, the characters of two Indonesian presidents namely 
Soekarno and Soeharto in controlling the government based on patron-client model (Pye, 
1985). 
The Indonesian political system consists of a structure in the form of organization 
relationship institutionalization in which there is authoritative value allocation, influenced 
by distribution of power utilization.  Political structure also relates to informal factors but 
it influences the way the society officials to express, channel, converse claim and support 
related to public interest.  Besides, the system also relates to formal political institution 
that legally identifies problems, decides and executes decisions binding all members of 
the society to achieve public interest.  In the general election in 1955 during Soekarno 
era, the Indonesian National Party of PNI got 22.3% votes, Masyumi (20.9%), Nahdlatul 
Ulama or NU (18.4%), and Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (16.4%).   In Soeharto 
era, there were only three political parties namely The United Development Party (PPP), 
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The Functional Group (Golkar), and Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Golkar that 
never wanted to be called a party always won the general election due to support from 
bureaucracy and military. Those three political structures serve the main foundation of 
Soeharto government for more than thirty years. Based on the Constitution of 1945, the 
government system of the Republic of Indonesia is a country based on law, the highest 
power in on the hand of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR); president is the 
executor of the government, under the MPR; president is responsible to the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Pwerwakilan Rakyat-DPR), and he has to get approval from the 
DPR to establish Constitution and to determine the state income and expenditure budget 
(Salam, 2002: 130-131). 
In such culture and structure, the media system in Indonesia was in a weak 
position.  The system of Indonesian media did not give room for media and its journalists 
to execute their basic function, moreover as the fourth pillar to control the government.  
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Chapter 5 
Political Communication in Indonesia in the Era of Transition 
 
  
As Chapter 2 to 4 did, this chapter still discusses a number of theories and 
political communication development.  As the continuation of the discussion on Politics 
and Media in Indonesia before transition, chapter 5 briefly accounts for political 
communication in the transition period.  The development of political communication 
study during the transition period is discussed here, followed by explanation on the 
transition causes in Indonesia.  The last part discusses the press freedom.  
 
5.1 The Analysis of Political Communication 
      Political communication study in Indonesia had just started to be  since political 
change in 1998 followed by the general election in 1999 and 2004 started with Press in  
“May Revolution” the Fall of a Hegemony (2000), a book of a number of cycles both 
academists or media practitioners, published by Gramedia, Jakarta.  Then, there existed 
various researches taking the transition period momentum as it was also done by a 
foreign researcher Angela Romano (2003) and a book was published, namely ”Politics 
and the Press in Indonesia Understanding an evolving political culture”.  In the same 
year, there existed also ”The Media in A Society in Transition A Case Study of 
Indonesia”, a thesis for  Master of Arts title at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 
written by Pit Chen Low. In Indonesia, in addition to the book  “May Revolution” that 
seemed to be inspired by February Revolution in February in the Philippines or known as 
people power in 1986, there were several studies, for example the Master thesis in 
Politics Program of Gadjah Mada University entitled ”State, Press and Interaction 
Political Transition between the State and the Press in Political transition period in 
Indonesia years 1998-1999” written by Wisnu Martha Adiputra, and Pawito’s  
dissertation in 2002 entitled “Mass Media and Democracy: a study of the roles of the 
mass media in the Indonesian transition period 1997-1999” from School of Design, 
Communication and Information Technology The University of Newcastle, Australia. 
However, the research for thesis and dissertation written by Indonesian people both 
  
115
abroad and domestic were generally not published, except the thesis by Hermin Indah 
Wahyuni at Gajah Mada University entitled “Television and State Intervention in 
Political Context of Television Broadcast Industry Public Policy”, published by Media 
Pressindo Yogyakarta,  in 2000, and the thesis by Hasrullah at the University of 
Indonesia entitled “Megawati in Press Capture”, published by LKiS Yogyakarta in 2001.  
      In addition to the studies done by academists, there were studies done by  
practitioners, for example journalists and media analysts.  In 2001 there were at least two 
books published, one entitled ”Media Politics and Discourse Analysis” by Agus Sudibyo, 
a media analyst in Jakarta, published by LKiS Yogyakarta, in 2001.  Second, the book 
”The Confused Press, a Study of East Timor Referendum” written by a number of press 
practitioners and academists namely Hotman M.Siahaan, Tjahjo Purnomo W, Teguh 
Imawan, and M.Jacky (LPPS, ISAI, USAID-Jakarta, 2001).  Another book entitled 
”Media and General Election of 2004” by Lukas Luwarso, Samsuri and Tri Agus 
S.Siswowiharjo was published as well (SEAPA-Jakarta, 2004). 
       Previously, there was hardly research on political communication. This gives a 
description that political communication study in Indonesia was experiencing growth and 
got the attention at the same time with political changes.  This condition shows how 
academician were also influenced much by some political pressures done during the 
authoritarian government of Soeharto so that they did not have space to express their 
intellectuality before the public even though campus has been a world that is autonomous 
from politics.  
        One of the interesting findings from Luwarso and his friends’ study on Media and 
General Election of  2004 was the use of service advertisement featuring Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) as the Coordinator Minister of Politics and Security in the cabinet of 
President Megawati Soekarnoputri that was broadcasted in eight television stations. This 
advertisement was considered a hidden campaign to increase SBY popularity so that 
various polling always placed him in the first rank of the president candidates.  The 
increase of SBY popularity ”Made Megawati Center Nervous”; that was a title of a report 
in Rakyat Merdeka newspaper.  The study also stated that the General Election of 2004 
was not field of competition program and a political policy but it was like a contest of 
candidates as “celebrities” (Luwarso,  2004: 14).  
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Suwardi’s study looked at the difference of the language use of the New Order 
press and the press in transition period.  One of the conclusions, language euphemism has 
destroyed the function of political communication function and its credibility (Hidayat et 
al., 2000).  In the New Order government, the language had been “the representative” of 
the Functional Group or Golkar authority.  Although it did not relate itself to dominant 
culture of Soeharto regime with his Javanese culture introducing and maintaining 
euphemism practice, however, being part of the cabinet member, people’s representative 
in the People’s Representative Council, member of political parties, member of regional 
government, and other parties including media that do not come from this culture, finally 
it “let itself” to dissolve in the practice of euphemism.  Nonetheless, as language is also 
product of a period, it is also seen as a paradigm. It is not human being that use the 
language but the language does use human beings; it covers and decides human beings. 
There had been continuous interplay between structure and individual (agent), where at 
the beginning there might be certain structure or culture introducing euphemism 
tendency, but in the long run there was a kind of accumulation where individuals 
supported and diffused in such a practice (Hidayat et al., 2000: 330). 
      Indonesian press uses euphemism such as the addresses of “crab press”, “press of 
a blind person with his stick”, “Pancasila Press”, ”Independent and Responsible Press”. If 
the first address described the press as wild yet it had to run quickly to its hiding place 
when they were bluffed, the other three press described groping movement and if it 
stumbled on something then it would know that there were obstacles (Suwardi in Hidayat 
et al., 2000: 331).  The press credibility fell down with the birth of informal press or 
alternative press, underground press in transition era.  Informal press was able to explain 
the so called ”between the lines” in a bare sentence, without euphemism, which was just 
”between the lies”. 
      The loose of formal press happened due to lack of integrity, impartiality, editorial 
independent and editorial courage. Compared to critical and direct language in the 
internet and campus leaflet or other activist network, the formal press turned to be people 
who were shy, frightened, pro authority, or occupied by the existing regime.  However, 
there was extraordinary weird change in the formal mass media several days after the riot 
on 14 May 1998 until the fall of Soeharto on 21 May 1998, namely the change of 
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orientation to support people movement and students and several media did not seem to 
show editor authority that by that time was so frightened of the New Order and concerned 
a lot with euphemism.  The practice of euphemism depends a lot on interaction of the 
language use resulted from individual and structural perceptions at various levels, either 
in political party level, People’s Representative Assembly, regional government, press 
organization, experts, to the level of political system and formal language system 
(Hidayat et al., 2000: 336). 
      In Manzella view (2000), during the crisis years 1997-1998, Indonesian 
journalists created intensive pressure against the government, of which value system and 
its belief vis-a-vis with press role in the society was strange with much understanding 
from the reporters.  Logically, it was followed by the weak government and the 
increasing press freedom.  However, after Soeharto, the press still had to be satisfied with 
a complex political system including, among others, differences of faction and economy 
social interests. Moreover, the growth of news media in Indonesia was challenged by 
disorganization level of news space and inexperience of many journalists.  Nonetheless, 
tentative independent press era had come to Jakarta ( Manzella, 2000:324).  
       From these researches, I see that political communication in Indonesia centered 
on the state, government and media, both printed and electronic.  
 
5.2 Indonesia as a Transitional Society 
      The beginning of transition period was the period where the society got more 
rights to communicate than the previous period.   This was resulted from the changing 
political atmosphere after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998.  The communication right as 
part of human rights was then stipulated in the Decree of People’s Consultative Assembly 
Number XVII/MPR/1998 regulating firmly that everyone had the right to communicate 
and to get information to improve personality and his social environment. Everyone had 
the right to find, get, keep, process and disseminate the information by means of any 
available channels. This stipulation was then strengthened with Regulations Number 39 
year 1999 on Human Rights and finally was made chapter 28F of UUD 1945 that was 
amended in the year 2000.  All of these stipulations were used as the basis for 
considerations in Press Law no. 40 year 1999.  
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During the period of President Habibie governance of the Habibie’s ’Reformation 
Era’, bureaucracy only interpreted legislation in a liberal style, and this interpretation 
could easily be tightened in an important change in the future (Romano, 2003: 49). In this 
atmosphere, politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and industry representatives, activists and 
non-government organizations joined in some coalition each of them wrote and presented 
six different suggestions to legislation that would strengthen journalists’ autonomy.  To 
Romano’s opinion, the debate in parliament and society concerning this Press 
Regulations reflected the remaining strength of the New Order culture and the intensity 
of the organization of the institutions that expected to cement a legislative shell that 
would the basis for more liberal press culture (Romano, 2003: 50).  The supporters of 
status quo in the Army and other political parties argued that in the Army and other 
political institutions argued that the replacement of the old restriction to the press would 
cause the civil society to oppose and even led to national destruction.  Finally, the 
Minister of Information, Yunus Yosfiah, agreed the reform of media regulations by using 
the same perception supported by UNDP, World Bank and IMF, for example press 
independence was the estate of democracy, which could help eliminate collusion, 
corruption and nepotism (Kolusi, Korupsi dan Nepotisme-KKN), promoting a 
responsible government and decreasing social conflict and the chaos that were often 
resulted from rumors (Romano, 2003: 50). 
 
5.2.1 Transitional Society  
The study on transition society was increasingly renewed since the publication of 
Samuel Huntington’s book (1991) “The Third Wave Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century”.  In his study he noted that in the year 1922 there were 29 democratic 
countries and 35 non-democratic countries out of 64 countries, while in the year 1990 
there were 59 democratic countries compared to 71 non democratic countries out of 130 
countries (Huntington, 1991: 26).   The interesting thing, in the years 1942, 1962, and 
1973 the percentage increase of the number of democratic countries was not as much as 
that in the years 1922 and 1990.  Carothers (2002) also held a study on transition society 
and he found that around 100 countries throughout the world such as Latin America, 
Southern Europe, formerly Soviet Union colonized countries, Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia 
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and Middle East experience the transition. Indonesia together with Nigeria, Croatia, and 
Serbia fell into a transition country even though its course was still unclear (Carothers, 
2002). 
Price et al. (2002) presented a number of political dimensions of democratic 
transition, as follows: 
 
Table 5.1: Political dimension of democratic transition 
Pre-transition                                         Mature transition 
Executive appointed                                 Executive elected and has effective power to 
rule 
 
Legislature appointed                               Legislature elected and has effective power 
to rule  
 
No judiciary or judiciary politically          Full judicial autonomy controlled  
Bureaucratic points allocated by       Bureaucratic points allocated by 
Association     merit 
 
No changeover of power between  Changeover of power between  
Government and opposition                       government and opposition 
 
Restrictions placed on travel                     No restriction placed on travel 
 
No freedom of expression                         Freedom of expression 
 
Certain ethnic groups banned from           All ethnic  groups legally and political 
participation     effectively granted full political participation 
 
Military domination over state                  Complete civilian control over military 
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Constant threat to citizen of state              No threat to citizen of state violence 
violence 
 
Right to assembly prohibited                    Right to assembly legally and effectively 
granted 
 
No election take place                               Election take place regularly 
 
No former democratic experience             Minimum of 10 years of democratic rule 
 
Rule by decree                                           Rule of law 
 
State control over information                   No state control over information 
 
Class of ruling elite                                    Change of ruling elite classes 
 
No party competition (anti-regime             No limits placed on party competition 
Parties banned)              (no parties banned) 
                                  
No civilian liberties                                     Full civilian liberties 
 
Political participation organized                 High levels of spontaneous political 
by state                                                        participation 
 
No freedom of religious expression            Freedom of religious expression 
Price et al, 2002: 4 
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Those three authors divided transition countries into three stages:  pre-transition 
stage, for example China and Uzbekistan that experienced different types of regime. 
China was said to be the main example of a “totalitarian” regime while Uzbekistan was 
categorized as post-totalitarian.  The second stage is primary transition, like Indonesia, 
which was said to experience the transition from “sultanistic” regime.  It included 
Bosnia-Herzegovina undergoing “transformation under the supervision of an 
international authority”, and Jordan representing former “authoritarian” regime. The next 
step is secondary state such as Ukraine, an example of a country that was also under a 
“post-totalitarian” regime like Uganda, which made political transition from an 
“authoritarian” regime.  And the countries categorized as late or mature transition was 
Poland that went through a “mature post-totalitarian” system, also Uruguay that existed 
from an “authoritarian” system and then India representing the original “post-colonial” 
transition (Price et al., 2002: 3-5). 
 
5.2.2 Causes of Transition 
      Giuseppe Di Palma (Sahdan, 2004) revealed 3 main factors causing transition 
movement to democracy that occurred in South Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa: 
First, economic prosperity and equality; second, a modern and diversified social structure 
in nondependent middle classes occupying center stage; third, a national culture that, by 
tolerating diversity and preferring accommodation, is already implicitly democratic. Di 
Palma’s argument was not far from Huntington’s idea in “The Third Wave, 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”.  First, the regime lost its legitimacy 
starting from the image of the regime in the eyes of the society.  The fall was influenced 
by the level of society sensitiveness toward various values entering into state atmosphere 
such as global communication, industrialization, modernization, and democratization.  
Second, it was triggered by very bad global economy crisis starting from the oil price 
shock, the influence of global economy growth. Third, the policy change among Catholic 
Church officials in Vatican influencing the other church officials in other countries. 
Fourth, diplomatic action of the USA promoting democratization and human rights that 
was able to awaken the leaders of non-democratic countries. Fifth, the effect of economy 
growth of some non-democratic countries so that it increased society participation in the 
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development, including extension of middle class, bourgeois class, and extension of 
autonomous institutions opposing the government.   Sixth, the fall of authoritarian regime 
resulted from decrease of legitimacy basis, global communication, military fall, economy 
crisis, declining oil price, the fall of Marxism-Leninism ideology, cross supporting and 
opposing coalition in an authoritarian regime, extension of political participation.  
Seventh, the huge demonstration (Sahdan, 2004: 41-44).  
 
5.2.3 The Role of the Press 
      Indonesian press had played its role in facilitating the transition time to 
democracy, contributing to the resign of Soeharto from the authority (Pit Chen Low, 
2003: 25). His role was disseminating information and giving his voice for the people, 
helping distribute pro-democracy movement in the end of Soeharto regime. During the 
hot days in May 1998, private televisions and newspapers opposed to the order from the 
owners and the government that tried to control information through media censorship in 
the form of pooling, and covered the riot and student demonstration causing the fall of 
Soeharto and the birth of independence press (Pit Chen Low, 2003: 26).However, during 
the general election of the year 1999, media had biased the report where all television 
stations, especially TVRI that cut an interview when the interviewee was critical to 
Golkar.  Meanwhile, Merdeka and Rakyat Merdeka magazine that had relations with 
Megawati’s father openly supported Megawati. 
During the government of Abdurrahman Wahid since September 1999, media 
stated closed war against Wahid until his fall in August 2001.  However, Wahid enjoyed 
the honey moon with media until the early of 2000, until the establishment of hard 
relations with them (Pit Chen Low, 2003: 29).  Negative portrait of the media about 
Wahid contributed to significant decrease of society’s trust to the government in solving 
economy and political crisis of the state.  A senior journalist told that press was the 
responsible part that brought Wahid stepped down in 2001.  All media industries 
explicitly opposed Wahid, and this can be seen from their agenda between the years 
1999-2001.  Weekly magazines investigated and revealed many scandals, corruption 
case, and political intrigue, such as Baligate touching President Habibie and Bologgate 
with regards to Wahid.  While Panji magazine hold personal attack to Wahid, it accused  
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him of committing an adultery, while Kompas revealed the Bulog scandal sponsored by 
the Baywatch and was impeached in August 2001. 
 
5.2.4 Transition in Indonesia from 1998 until 2004 
      An expert on Indonesia, Anders Uhlin (1997) said that transitional stage is the 
phase when social, economy, and political structures change in spite of some obstructions 
to improve democracy expectations (Uhlin, 1997: 155).  The most fundamental change is 
the class structure as the product of relatively quick but unbalanced development during 
the New Order government.  The middle class and worker class increase, while at the 
same time the working class and some parts of progressive middle class had some 
interests in democratization such as the ability to catch up in favor of democracy. This 
social class, even though is weaker than its counterpart in other countries, has grown and 
there was no indication that their interests in democracy will decrease in the future. 
Nonetheless, Uhlin’ study was not supported by the fact in Indonesian transitional stage 
after May 1998 where middle class and worker class had not been able to run faster and 
more appropriate democratization process. Their efforts were beaten by powerful elites in 
three branches of authority, legislative and executive as well as judicative.  
      The transition path in Indonesia did not go through military coup or fight for 
authority but through shift of power from Soeharto (President) to Habibie (Vice 
President) because of huge demonstration to get Soeharto down.  The handover did not 
think thoroughly the next and possible implications.  The opponents of Soeharto expected 
the authority handover was not given to Habibie as Soeharto’s golden son but to form a 
coalition government of various existing components. However, Soeharto’s keenness had 
changed everything and  Habibie appeared as the channel inheriting some agenda of 
Soeharto (Sahdan, 2004: 93) 
      Following Sahdan,  transition in Indonesia did not go through transformation 
because Soeharto as the controller of the authority did not sponsor the change of the 
regime or had the initiative to end the regime and changed in into a democratic system.  
The transition also did not last in the form of transplacement where democratization was 
the product of compromise and collective agreement among Soeharto opponents and his 
proponents because of several reasons.  First, Soeharto’s proponents were not able to  
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establish the characteristic of political system that they construct for the future. Second,  
Soeharto and his proponents was not able to run political dialectics with his opponents.  
Third, Soeharto’s proponents believed that they were able to overthrow Soeharto in a 
relatively short time.  Fourth, it was hardly possible to hold a negotiation between the 
opponents and proponents of Soeharto.  Fifth, the only component uniting them was 
agreeing the agreement of change as a common product of the students, non government 
organization (NGO), academists, social organizations, but it did not happen in Indonesia 
either.  
      The proper transition type for Indonesia was replacement with the characteristics: 
first, Soeharto’s opponent group was in a strong position and was able to organize itself 
freely; second, dominant element in Soeharto government was conservative group that 
did not expect changes; third, democratization was created through alliance between the 
opponents so that Soeharto got weaker and automatically fell down (was overthrown); 
fourth the group of Soeharto’s proponents did not take over the authority, because the 
initiative of authority handover appeared Soeharto’s own mind to keep political stability 
and mass anarchy;  fifth, the existence of conflict in Habibie’s government especially 
how to institutionalize transition into democracy, leaving the golden time with Soeharto 
and eradicating all of Soeharto’s inheritances.  The three phases to go through were first, 
the existence of struggle to overthrow Soeharto, second, the fall of Soeharto, third, the 
struggle after the fall of Soeharto. Replacement occurred because Soeharto was not able 
to overcome economy crisis, to recover legitimacy and to lessen the huge wave of 
democratization of his opponents (Sahdan, 2004: 94-95). 
      Next, after Soeharto stepped down from presidency throne and handed the 
authority to his assistant, BJ Habibie, the euphoria was everywhere, especially in the 
society and student activists.  However, the transition path to democracy was unclear at 
all with a number of reasons.  First, the authority system that had been established for 
years had been the new culture in a society that was difficult to be destroyed.  Second, the 
fall of Soeharto was not accompanied by total destruction of its supporting machines, for 
example the coercive apparatus (the army) did not fall, just like bureaucracy and Golkar 
starting to make a consolidation. Third, the leaders at Soeharto’s opponents did not unite 
and did not have reform agenda focus.  Fourth, democratization was not Soeharto’s 
expectation because he did not withdraw all of his interests.  Fifth, Habibie who replaced  
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Soeharto did not have complete expectation to run liberalization or democratization. 
Sixth, legislative body as the heritance of Soeharto did not agree to end the New Order 
regime but even tried to remain above it.  Seventh, political reform was not in a national 
referendum so that it gave birth to various conflicts between the reform proponents and 
conservative groups that were pro status quo. Eighth, political parties were not organized 
to run liberalization but was patterned for their own interest. (Sahdan, 2004:96-97) 
      The existence of Habibie’s authority getting government constitutional right after  
”Soeharto was permanently obstructed” brought Indonesia to the next phase namely 
preliminary political liberalization. It was the phase confirming the end of the pre-
transition, but transition did not start yet.  This phase was marked by redefinition of 
people’s political rights, the occurrence of ungovernability or disorder of the government, 
instability, and uncertainty.  It was in this phase that freedom euphoria and political 
participation explosion happened, at it happened during Habibie government.(Fatah, 
2000: 431).  It was the phase”of the beginning of transition from authoritarianism to 
unclear direction” as it was stated by Guilermo O’Donnel and Philippe Schmitter (1993: 
21 ). 
Liberalization phase can be said the “corridor” from authoritarian regime to 
transition phase. The end of this corridor was general election and the establishment of 
new regime through more democratic regime and had better legitimacy compared to the 
old regime, such as the carrying out of general election in June 1999 in Indonesia that 
was far more democratic than the elections in Soeharto period.  Also, the election of the 
new government under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri as the president and vice president. 
      However, the reform had not finished. The reform that fundamentally was 
rearrangement of political, economical, social and cultural systems to a new community 
that was more open, prosperous, fair and democratic, had just started.  The period 
between February 1998 to October 1999 was a reform process in the form of demolition 
of the past.  This period had to be continued with the reconstruction of the demolished 
hardware such as human beings, institution, rules, mechanism or software such as way of 
viewing, paradigm, behavior pattern, character, culture in order to implement the 
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democratization.  Thus, the new transition had started especially with the implementation 
of the hardware in the hope that it would be in line with the need of democratic system 
that it was expected to be completed in the years 1999 to 2004. (Fatah, 2000: 434-435).    
 
5.3 Press Freedom in Transition Periods 
Some opinions say that press freedom in Indonesia experiences significant 
changes after President Soeharto stepped down in May 1998. Freedom House, for 
example, reported that in 1998 the government annulled press prohibition, followed with 
the growth of new and old publications reporting the first democratic general election 
since 45 years ago (www.freedomhouse.org).   What phenomenal was the ratification of 
the new Press Regulations by the government and the People’s Representative Assembly 
after a marathon discussion from August-September 1999 (see Chapter VI).  These 
stipulations were ratified on 23 September 1999 in the State Paper of the Republic of 
Indonesia Year 1999 Number 166 and Additional State Paper of the Republic of 
Indonesia number 3887.  Some reasons function as considerations the birth of Press 
Regulations 1999. First, the press is one of the instruments to express ideas and opinions.  
Second, the press is important to improve public prosperity. Third, the press must be 
“free from” and “free to” implement its journalistic activities. Fourth, the press functions 
to keep world peace. Fifth, the old press regulations are not appropriate anymore. Sixth, 
press was born as constitution mandate (Panjaitan and Siregar, 2004:2-3).  In other 
words, referring to the interviews with some informants of this research, there was 
expectation from press cycles not to experience the trauma of state repression anymore, 
and it was followed with the initiative to pass  the draft of Press Law that tended to be 
liberal through civil society group and debate in parliament.  The law were made as a 
kind of “revenge” in the sense that anything made by the New Order government had to 
be reversed and eliminated.4 
      
 
 
                                                
4 RH Siregar, former staff of the Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI), the member of Press Council 
Technical Commission composing Press Regulations Year 1982, the director of Sinar Harapan daily, the 
member of Press Council 2000-2003 in an interview on 8 December 2005.  
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 Compared to the Press Law year 1982 as the revision of Press Law year 1967 and 
1966, the new Press Law support press independence as it can be seen in the following 
table.  
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Press Law no. 21 year 1982 to  
Press Law no. 40 year 1999 
Subject Press Law no. 21 year 1982 Press Law no. 40 year 1999 
 
Base of 
Consideration  
 
1. Implement the Decree of MPR 
No IV/MPR/1978 on The 
Guidelines of State Direction in 
Information and Press sectons  
 
1. Press freedom is one form of 
people sovereignty  
 
2. Freedom to express ideas and 
opinions in accordance with 
conscience and the right to get 
information are human rights  
 
3. Professional Press, getting legal 
protection, free of intervention 
and pressures from anywhere  
 
 
General Rule 
 
Chapter I Article I 
 
1. The press is a society 
institution, a national means 
of struggle (article 1) 
 
2.P Press enterprise are daily 
newspaper, temporary 
publication, news station, 
bulletin, and so on (article 2) 
 
 
 
3. Journalist is a worker who does 
his journalistic work continually 
(article 4) 
 
Chapter I Article I 
 
1. The press is a social institution 
and a means for mass 
communication  
 
2. Press enterprise is a legal body in 
Indonesia that operates press 
business including printed media 
company, electronic media, and 
news station, and other media 
companies  
 
3. Journalist is someone who 
continually does journalistic 
activities  
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Basis, 
Function, 
Right, 
Obligation 
and Role of 
the Press 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II Article 2 
 
1. National Press is a national 
means of struggling and an 
active, dynamic, creative, 
educative, informative mass 
media, and it has social function 
to support and fertilize critical 
way of thinking and progressive 
construction including all 
realization of life and living of 
Indonesian society  
 
2. National Press has the tasks and 
obligations to: 
 
a. Preserve and socialize Pancasila 
as accommodated in the 
opening of UUD 1945 with 
Guidelines of Understanding 
and Implementing Pancasila 
 
b. Struggle for the implementation 
of the mandate of  the people’s 
suffer based on Pancasila 
Democracy  
 
c. struggle for truth and fairness 
based of responsible press 
independence  
 
3.  To improve the role in 
development, press functioned 
as an objective information 
disseminator disseminating 
people’s aspiration, extending 
communication and community 
participation and to implement 
constructive social control. 
Here, positive interaction 
between the government, he 
press, and society must be 
developed.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter II Article 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
 
1. Press independence is the form 
of people sovereignty based of 
principles of democracy, fairness, 
and law supremacy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. National Press has its functions 
as media of information, 
education, entertainment, and 
social control  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. National Press functions as 
economy institution  
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4. The press has the rights to 
control, criticize and correct 
constructively  
 
5. No censor and bridle to 
National Press  
 
 
4. Press freedom is guaranteed as 
the rights of the citizens  
 
5. National press is not censored, 
bridled or prohibited to broadcast 
 
Press Council 
 
Chapter III Article 6 
 
1. Established to accompany the 
government in guiding the 
growth and development of 
national press  
 
2. The members consist of 
representatives of press 
organization, government 
representatives and society 
representatives.  In this matter, 
they are experts in press and 
experts in this field  
 
3. The position, task, function, and 
rights, number and the order of 
membership, requirements for 
membership, and appointment 
of Press Council will be 
regulated by government 
regulations  
 
 
 
 
 
4. The appointment of experts in 
press and experts of other fields 
is done by the government after 
hearing the press organizations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V Article 15 
 
1. Established in the effort of 
developing press independence 
and improving national press life  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The members consist of: 
a. Journalists selected by 
journalist association  
b. Director of press enterprise 
selected by press enterprise 
organizations  
c. Leader of the society, experts 
in press and or communication 
and other fields selected by 
journalist organizations and 
press enterprise organization  
 
4. Operating the following 
functions: 
a. Protecting press independence 
from intervention of other 
parties  
   b. Testing to develop press life  
c. Deciding and controlling the 
operation of Journalistic Ethics 
Code  
d. Giving considerations and 
trying to finish complaints of 
  
130
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Other stipulations about Press 
Council not regulated in 
government stipulations as 
stated in article 6 point (3) this 
Regulations is determined by 
the government after hearing 
consideration of the Press 
Council  
 
6. Chairperson of the Press 
Council is the Minister of 
Information; Director of Press 
Council is selected from and by 
the members of Press Council  
 
the society over cases related to 
press reports  
e.  Developing communication 
between press, society and the 
government  
f.  Facilitating press organizations 
in composing the rules in press 
and improve the quality of 
journalism profession  
g. Registering press enterprises  
 
 
 
Press 
Enterprise 
 
Chapter V 
 
1. The entire press enterprise 
capital must be national capital, 
while the founders and staff 
must all be Indonesians  
 
2. Press enterprises are obligated 
to become members of press 
enterprise organization  
 
3. Any press publication needs the 
Permit for Press Publication 
Enterprise (SIUPP) issued by 
the government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV Article 9 
 
1. Any Indonesian citizen has the 
right to establish press enterprise  
 
 
 
2. Any press enterprises must be in 
the form of Indonesian legal 
enterprise  
 
Article 11 
The addition of foreign capital to 
press enterprise must be done 
through stock market  
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Journalist 
 
 
Chapter VI Article 16  
 
1. The requirements to become a 
journalist: 
a. Indonesian citizenship  
b. Fully understand the 
position, function and 
obligation of the press as 
stated in Article 2 and Article 
3 of this Regulations  
c. Having Pancasila spirit and 
never betray the National 
Struggle  
    d. Having skills, experiences, 
education, high moral and 
responsibility  
 
2. Further stipulations for a 
journalist are determined  by 
the Government after hearing 
considerations for Press 
Council  
 
 
 
Chapter III Article 7 
 
1. Journalists are free to choose 
organization  
2. Having and submitting to 
Journalistic Ethics Code  
3. Getting legal protection in 
operating its profession  
 
Society 
Involvement  
 
None 
 
Chapter VII Article 17 
 
The society can do activities to 
develop press independence and to 
guarantee the right to get 
information needed through control 
and report of violation of law, 
ethics and technical mistakes of 
reports and suggestions to Press 
Council  
 
 
Penal 
Stipulations 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
1. Using press publication for 
personal or group advantages, 
and resulted in deviation or 
obstruction to tasks, functions, 
rights and obligations of press is 
punished with imprisonment for 
at most 4 (four) years of fine as 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
1. Obscuring or preventing the 
operation of press independence 
is imprisoned at the longest 2 
(two) years or at most 
IDR500,000,000.00 (fifty million 
Rupiah) 
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much as IDR 40,000,000,000.00 
(fourty millions Rupiah) 
 
2. Operating press publication 
without SIUPP is imprisoned at 
most 3 (three) years or fine as 
much as 10,000,000,000.00 (ten 
millions Rupiah) 
 
 
 
2. Press enterprises violating 
Article 5 point (1) and point (2), 
and article 13 is punished with 
imprisonment fine as much as 
IDR500,000,000.00 (fifty 
millions Rupiah) 
 
3. Press enterprise trespassing the 
stipulations of Article 9 point (2) 
and article 12 is punished with 
fine imprisonment at most 
IDR100,000,000.00 (one hundred 
millions)  
 
 
Journalist 
Ethics Code 
 
No mention in this Law but there 
is Journalistic Ethics Code of 
Indonesian Journalists Association 
(PWI) accommodated in 
Government Stipulations No 1 
year 1984 on Press Council  
 
 
An enclosure.  
Indonesian Journalists determined 
Indonesian Journalist Ethics Code 
year 2004 and was enclosed in this 
Law 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Political Changes  
          Political considerations seemed to serve as background of the composing of Press 
Law 1999.  The difference began to appear from the Basic Consideration where Press 
Law 1999 included three points of universal ideas compared to the Press Law 1982. In 
addition to interpreting press independence as one of forms of people’s sovereignty, two 
other considerations were the freedom to express ideas and opinions in accordance with 
the conscience and the right to get information and human rights, for example, were not 
alluded in the previous Regulations at all, even in many other legal stipulations.   In fact, 
this was strongly influenced by political situation around the construction of this 
Regulations namely political reform in the form of increasing demands from various 
components of the society to the government.  Demand for press independence also 
appeared from various groups in civil society, including the Indonesian Press and 
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Broadcast Community (Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia-MPPI), which later 
designed a draft of Press Law.5 
      The appearance of professional press ideas, legal protection for journalists, and 
the press that is free from intervention and pressures was detailed and firm formulation to 
improve press quality.  This implied changes occurring in the institution constructing the 
Regulations namely the Government and the People’s Representative Assembly.  
However, all of these were not original initiative of the two institutions but those adopted 
or appreciated pressures or inputs from the civil society.  The expectation to be free from 
intervention and pressures from any parties implied traumatic condition in press cycles 
pushed in the draft of the Regulations.  This consideration also implied inputs of liberal 
press, an independent press.  
      In the Press Law year 1982 and the previous ones, the word press independence 
did not even appear at the early part such as in the Basic Considerations or General 
Stipulations.  This term was only written in Article 2 and 5 of Cbhapter II: Functions, 
Obligations and Rights of the Press.  There is no other mention of press independence but 
in the stipulations. Meanwhile, in the new Press Regulations, the words press 
independence (kemerdekaan pers) replacing press freedom (kebebasan pers) started to 
appear in the Basic Considerations, then in Article 2 and 4 of Chapter II, in Article 15 
point (1) of Chapter V and in Article 12 point (1).  However, the number of the words 
press independence in these new Regulations does not guarantee the real implementation 
of press independence. Experience showed that good words such as  ”Press serves as 
means of revolution, social control instrument, education tool, means of channeling and 
constructing public opinion and mass motivator” written in the Considerations of Press 
Law year 1966 had very far meaning in its practice.  In daily practice, the press was just 
an instrument or channel of the authority to convey messages or its propaganda while the 
voice of the people were neglected or stifled.  The inclusion of the words ”the press as a 
means of revolution” was reconfirmed in the General Stipulations, “the press is society 
institution as a National Struggle instrument”.  In fact, these heroic terms reflected the  
                                                
5 Atmakusumah, the Chairperson of Press Council of periods 2000-2003 told the involvement of some 
figures like Riza Primadi (SCTV) who experienced pressures from the government due to the reports about 
the interview with Abdullah Syafie, the leader of Independent Aceh Movement (GAM), in struggling press 
freedom through these Law. (Interview on 29 October 2004). 
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struggle condition before the independence,  but it also reflected state domination in the 
words “national struggle”.  
      Another change was the use of simple formulae but which reflect clear meaning.  
Media function, for example, was formulates as “media of information, education, 
entertainment, and social control” (Chapter II Article 2).  In addition to referring to 
theories on media functions as cited by some experts like McQuail, this formulation is 
also easy to understand. Compare it with the formulation of Press Law year 1982, which, 
among others, written as ”preserving and socializing Pancasila as accommodated in the 
Opening of 1945 Constitution with Guidelines for Understanding and Implementing 
Pancasila”.  
      As Robert Dahl suggested, press independence is a process where the people are 
able to control the leader through information that the public have and independence as 
guaranteed by law.  
 
5.3.2 Concept of Press Freedom  
      The old Press Law formulated the concept of press freedom in Chapter II articles 
3 and 4 in two formulae.  First, press independence in line with the rights of the citizens 
had to be guaranteed.  Second, this press independence was based on national 
responsibility and the implementation of Articles 2 and 3 of these Regulations.  This first 
formulation seemed to be the same with universal meaning of press freedom because it 
was stated as part of the rights of the citizens guaranteed by the government. In its 
practice, however, the meaning and government assurance of such press independence 
were absurd.  Article 2, which was the basis for the implementation of press freedom, 
read ”National Press is a means of revolution and is an active, dynamic, creative, 
informative mass media and it had societal functions as motivator and fertilizer of critical 
and progressive way of thinking including all forms of the life and living of Indonesian 
society”.  Such a formula was very long, multi interpreted, and difficult to grasp its main 
meaning.  This formula resembles a political rhetoric where many compound sentences 
were entered to give descriptions that looked big, great, heroic. In practice, this 
formulation about national press means domination of government or state authority 
(means of revolution) rather than media dynamics, press dynamics, society creativity, or  
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education function for public. During the course of Soeharto government, press was an 
instrument for the authority and became part of an authority.  The press was really the 
subordinate of the government.   
      Such formulae were opposed with the experiences of the press enterprise 
managers and the society.  A number of press bridling along the New Order period 
showed that defending, maintaining, supporting and implementing Pancasila were limits 
for informing news to public (see Chapter 2).  It was the consequence of the formulation 
of press independence that was done and influenced by perception about authority, 
democracy genre, share of authority and system check and balance, and the role of media 
in such a s system (Oetama in Parera and Utomo, 1989: 54). Even though it was based on 
Pancasila Democracy, the meaning of democracy here is different from liberal 
democracy.  The word ”democracy” was just a label or naming, like Guided Democracy 
in Soekarno era. The democracy was the one decided or directed by the state authority, 
the head of the government, namely President.  Consequently, universal criteria that 
should have been present in a democracy, such as checks and balances through 
independence of political institutions like Legislative, Judicative and Executive did not 
work or were invalid.  Just like Pancasila Democracy that in the perception of the 
authority at that time was democracy based on discussion to achieve an agreement as it is 
accommodated in the fifth principle.  In practice, the discussion between the authority or 
government with the people had neven been done and achieved because the former 
dominated.  
      Seen from press responsibility point of view, in both Soekarno period (Old Order) 
and Soharto (New Order), the press emphasized more on responsibility than 
independence (Muis in Sularto, 2001:148).6  In other understanding, media policy by the 
government was above media regulations so that the format of press responsibility was 
political responsibility, not legal responsibility. The implementation of press 
                                                
6 “The main problem of Regulations No 40 on Press was that we asked too much obligations so that these 
Regulations released all of the rights. Although this was not wrong, there had to be orderliness and 
arrangement while in transitional democracy it was difficult to do everything.  The Government and the 
People’s Representative Council said not to have to be responsible” (Astrid S Susanto in Lukas Luwarso, 
Media: Pilar IVDemokrasi, Worskhop SEAPE-Dewan Pers-FES, Jakarta 10 Oktober 2002, p.27)  
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responsibility was not before the judge but before the officers of Information Department 
and or before the officers of Department of Defense.  
      The question, does the formulation of press independence in Press Law year 1999 
experience the same fate with the formulation in the previous Press Regulations? Is it true 
that press independence is one form of people’s sovereignty based on principles of 
democracy, justice and law supremacy?  Is it true that press freedom is guaranteed as 
citizens’ rights; no censorship, bridle or broadcast prohibition to national press?   And, is 
it true that the rights for press to find, get and disseminate information is guaranteed? 
(Article 4 Chapter II of Press Law year 1999). 
       At least, there were three different stipulations in the Press Law 1999 as the 
capital of press independence.  First, is the stipulations about the freedom of journalists to 
organize (Chapter III Article 7). It was stated in the stipulations that journalists were free 
to choose organization, obtain and submit to Journalistic Ethics Code and to get legal 
protection while doing their profession.  Second, it was about Press Council (Chapter V 
Article 15).  In terms of membership, according to these Regulations, the Press Council 
was not influenced and determined by the government since there was no government 
elements in it.  The existing elements were journalists, company directors, community 
leaders and experts in the press or communication.  Besides, determination of the 
functions was intended more to protect and or develop independence and press life.  For 
example, deciding and supervising the implementation of Journalistic Ethics Code, giving 
considerations and trying to overcome claims of the society for the cases related with 
press reports.  Third, the inclusion of the role of society (Chapter VII Article 17) where 
the society is able to execute the activity of press independence and guarantee to get 
information. The role was done through control and report of the analysis of the 
violations of law, ethics and technical errors of the reports done by press. Besides, the 
society can also express suggestions and ideas to Press Council in order to participate in 
keeping and improving press quality.  
      An activist of MPPI, the composer of the draft of Press Law year 1999, Leo 
Batubara7 suggested the concept of press independence consisted of several things. First, 
constitution prohibits the making of rules and regulations limiting press independence. 
                                                
7 Interview on 11 February 2005. 
  
137
Second, press operation: a. free from government intervention, no operating rules from 
the government, b. public and the press control the government, not the other way 
around, c. free from permit, censorship, bridle, d. based on self regulation, for example 
ethics code. Third, the state embraces press discrimination legal politics; it does not 
criminalize the press. Almost all of the concepts of press independence that Batubara 
meant are accommodated in Press Law no. 40 year 1999 except the first.  But the 
question still raises, how is the practice of these formulations?  
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Chapter 6 
The Press Freedom in the Period of BJ Habibie (1998-1999) 
 
 
This chapter explains the results of the main research on the press freedom during 
the era of President BJ Habibie in the years 1998-1999.  Although it was only 16 months 
the he held the power, President BJ Habibie made a number of important decisions in 
political communication namely eliminating the requirement for media permit and 
processing new, liberal Press Law.  For the reason, the process of this Press Law 
establishment was a case study that described political communication in the transition 
period, conflict of interest between pro-status-quo elements and those elements 
supporting the alteration.   It was also explained in this finding how Kompas daily 
newspaper reported the establishment process of the draft of this Law and how  Kompas 
also functioned as the channel for the activists to push the ratification of the new Press 
Law.  The research also found a number of important issues of debate in the discussion in 
the House of Representatives.  Those important issues were the principle themes as the 
characteristic of the press freedom.  
 
6.1 General Analysis 
      During the period of BJ Habibie, the press freedom changed drastically just 
before the establishment of the Press Law, when the government annulled the SIUPP 
stipulations through the Regulations of the Minister of Information no. 01 Year 1998.8 
According to Article 23 of these Regulations, the authority of the Minister of Information 
was limited to imposing administrative sanction, namely giving written warning, freezing 
SIUPP for a certain period and settlement through the court (Simaremare in Sularto, 
2001: 97).  Next, the elimination of SIUPP annulment sanction put national press to the 
path of free and liberated press and changed the style, method, and pattern of collecting, 
                                                
8 In fact, during the Habibie presidency, there was an issuance of Constitutional Regulations No.2 year 
1998 on freedom to express ideas in public both in written or through mass media. This constitutional 
regulation was issued suddenly and it functioned similarly to censor or shackle of mass media freedom. In 
his article in  Kompas, A. Muis suggested that DPR rejected this regulations because it was not in line with 
the reform demands (Mokh.Syaiful Bahkri, Titian Jalan Demokrasi Peranan Kebebasan Pers untuk 
Budaya Komunikasi Politik, Jakarta, The Kompas, 2000, p.101-105) 
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processing and presenting news.  Press publication started to present news containing pro 
and contra, criticism, facts revealing the behaviors of the authority holders that were not 
in line with democracy, deviations and actions contrary to the law done by government 
officers, unfairness in many sectors, denial and repression against the rights of the 
society.  The news were presented in the spirit of openness and changes that were 
oriented in the efforts of creating democratic political and social life and acceleration of 
the recovery of national economy that was in a crisis (Simaremare in Sularto, 2001: 98). 
      The consequence of this Minister of Information policy was the abundance of new 
press publications and new radio and television broadcasts.  Various sources stated 
different numbers but in the period of 30 years there were around 260 printed media 
(Luwarso in Sularto, 2001: 125) and after the issuance of the letter of the Minister of 
Information there were additional 1,398 new SIUPPs from September 1999 (Batubara in 
Sularto, 2001: 52). This growth was followed by the foundation of about 25 media watch 
organizations and some of them published their media regularly such as Sendi magazine 
and Media Watch bulletin of Lembaga Konsumen Media (LKM) in Surabaya, Kipas 
magazine in Medan, ELSIM magazine in Makasar.  In Jakarta, the following magazines 
and bulletins were published: Pantau magazine, Independen Watch magazine, bulletins 
of Media Watch and Consultative Aid Institution for Press Coverage Victim, Media 
Watch and Consumer Center magazine from Habibie Center (Atmakusumah in Sularto, 
2001: 116-117).  Besides, journalist organizations also grew to tens in 1999 but those 
who took part in signing the Journalistic Ethics Code were only 26 organizations 
(Luwarso, 2006: 262).  
      Bridling to printed media also happened in such local areas as South East 
Sulawesi, namely  Kendari Ekspres daily published on 23 April 1999; in Aceh, after 
1998, there appeared Atjeh Ekspress, Tabloida Azasi, Aceh Kronika tabloid and Kontras 
tabloid; in Palu there was Banggai Pos in Luwuk city since 20 May 1999; in Manado  
Telegraf tabloid was published since 22 June 1999; in Palembang there appeared the 
Sriwijaya Pos since 1998 then this newspaper published Demo Plus and Nira Pos tabloid 
since 19 March 1999; in Yogyakarta there were 10 new publications, all of which were 
not lasting long (Haryanto in Suprapto et al, 2001). 
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Radio stations also grew fast in provinces like Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, South 
Sumatra, Lampung, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and 
Maluku (Haryanto in Suprapto et al., 2001: 23-24). 
     Cyber world was started by the end of Soeharto governance, but online media 
related to printed media industry was pioneered by Republika and Kompas, while special 
online media was started by the presence of Tempo Interaktif and Detik.com (Suprapto et 
al., 2001:20). 
     The above data implied the space of freedom being interpreted as an opportunity 
to express various messages that by far was not channeled through many and varied 
channels. The best opportunity for media by that time was in searching, processing and 
disseminating information around the general election in June 1999.  By that time, the 
new Press Regulations had not been finished to be discussed, but the freedom of mass 
media had been probated to cover the general election in multi party system after the 
New Order.9  Multi party system certainly opened an opportunity for conflict both 
vertically and horizontally. Moreover, the press world map had changed with varied 
orientations namely the press functioned as an organ or channel for the parties of certain 
political power (Hasibuan, 1999: 4). 
      The essential thing was that the information could be collected, processed and 
disseminated freely by free channels without or with control of the government.  The 
press had the autonomy to decide which news or information to collect, and then to be 
disseminated to public.  In addition, the information from the media was a power to 
control the leaders.  
 
6.1.1 Government-Media-Relations 
      In the political euphoria as well as the press freedom euphoria, how was the 
relation between the government and the media? Dewi Fortuna Anwar, spokesperson of 
President BJ Habibie said that the government had opened the press freedom as a strong  
                                                
9 Along the years 1998-1999, 140 parties appeared after the ratification of the new Regulations of the 
General Election; 48 parties were decided to be qualified for the general election.  For the reason, the year 
1998 was said to be the year of political parties resurrection marked with the foundation of many political 
parties with different ideological orientations (Valina S.Subekti in Bersikap Independen: Pedoman Meliput 
Pemilu di Masa Demokrasi Transisi, Jakarta, AJI, 1999, p.159). 
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preliminary control to the government so that the government had to self control.  She 
saw clear sidedness of the press.  It can be said that the press was independent in terms of 
no control from the government but the press was not free from primordial and sectored 
interests.  She said further: 
”Thus, we know that  Kompas, for example, would always talk this way 
and whatever the president did, the good things, but because it ( 
Kompas) did not favor Habibie, then it would report anything like half-
empty glass, never from the half-full glass point of view and it always 
stepped on the government to raise other figure; Kompas was pro 
Megawati, wasn’t it?  Other newspapers were the same.  Meanwhile, 
Republika was the newspaper of Habibie.  So, when it had to criticize 
him, it failed to do that because it had to show its sidedness” (Interview, 
30 August 2005) 
 
Dewi, as Habibie usually called Dewi Fortuna Anwar, saw pluses and minuses of 
it and in a pluralistic, independent society, it is difficult to avoid that even though the 
newspapers were free but they were not free from economy interest, not free from 
political interest, not free from cultural, social interest of the readers, especially from the 
capital owners of each of them.  He also questioned, what the press was free from, 
because even in the global scale, the person who decides the editorial is the owner of the 
capital; the economy and ideology interests of the owner are very decisive, too.  He also 
said: 
”But, I think, it’s better in that way rather than the state that decides 
what is worth reporting and what is not. If there is sufficient freedom 
and space to compete, the society will be more critical”. (Interview, 30 
August 2005). 
 
       When BJ Habibie was in a position of the Vice President by the end of Soeharto 
time, Dewi Fortuna Anwar was the assistant to the Vice President in the Globalization 
issues.  She occupied the position until Habibie was appointed to replace President 
Soeharto on 21 May 1998.  Dewi had established close relationship with mass media both 
domestic and foreign ones far before that time, for example in her capacity as a 
researcher in LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia-Indonesian Science 
Institution).  She actually did the task as a “spokesperson” of Habibie due to many 
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requests from journalists in order for her to open access to the President, so that they 
could interview President BJ Habibie.  Due to the pressure, she had an initiative to write 
to BJ Habibie when Akbar Tanjung was the State Secretary.  She wrote: 
”I told Pak Habibie, it was important for the government (president) to 
explain various things related to public interests, directly to the people, 
and also to international world so that they understood the steps that the 
President was going to take”  (Interview, 30 August 2005) 
 
Via his spokesperson, the relationship between President Habibie and media 
could be intermediated so that he could convey his policies directly to the society.  
 
6.1.2 BJ Habibie’s Openness  
      With her experiences to interact with journalists, Dewi looked at the great 
importance of the new president (BJ Habibie) to make a relation with domestic and 
international society through media. Dewi’s initiative implied many problems to be 
explained to the public after Soeharto stepped down.10  Her position as the 
“spokesperson” did not mean to replace the task of the press bureau of the court because 
for scheduling interview with President BJ Habibie, for example, she involved the 
bureau.  The schedule and time to make an interview with the president was usually 
asked to Habibie’s adjutant. 
      Many people knew that actually Habibie was an open figure, for example when he 
was the Minister of Research and Technology.  Thanks to his appearance in various 
occasions to be broadcasted by television media; the society, also young people, were 
impressed by him, especially when he talked about technology, particularly about air 
craft.  However, Dewi acknowledged that when Habibie occupied the Vice President 
position, he could not present his real character because he honored Soeharto’s message.  
She said: 
                                                
10 In Soeharto time, the one who usually represented or functioned as a kind of “spokesperson” was the 
State Secretary or Minister of Information.  There were two phenomenal names namely Moerdiono 
(Minister of State Secretary) and Harmoko (Minister of Information).  However, Soeharto often ”made 
use” of an official who just met him to convey his ideas concerning a matter he just talked to the official.  
Press conference or media interview with the official who just left the court functioned as a medium of 
conveying president’s messages to the public.  
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 ”..We know that when Habibie was the Minister of Research and 
Technology, he was quite open to journalists but when was in the 
position as a vice president he was strongly influenced by how Soeharto 
managed that. Pak Harto was not fond of making direct contact with 
journalists because they like to twist … and during the New Order, there 
was an image that the court was terrifying, quietly closed for journalists 
and when Pak Harto talked directly to public, he did it through 
Klompencapir (Group of listeners, readers, and spectators”11 (Interview, 
30 August 2005) 
 
       Once, Dewi was in a debate with Habibie, that during Soeharto time, everyone 
who went to the president finally became the spokesperson, and they interpreted by 
themselves what they had just talked with the president without being able to be verified.  
Then, there was misunderstanding in addition to radical exchanges in matters pertaining 
to the government. She continued:  
”In leadership style of democracy era, you are your own best 
spokesman, no other spokesman is better than the president himself.  
Finally, I succeeded in confirming him so that the matter was scheduled.  
And he was pleased to give hours of interview” (Interview on 30 August 
2005)  
 
        Dewi Fortuna Anwar suggested that in addition to open characteristic that BJ 
Habibie had, he also realized the philosophy of transitional government namely from 
authoritarian to democracy. President Habibie fully realized the importance of the 
freedom of speech, the freedom of information, as the main estates of a democratic 
nation. So, when Yunus Yosfiah, the Minister of Information in Habibie era gave the 
freedom to the press, it was the policy of the president; it was cabinet’s policy.  Hence, 
there was an effort to catch the fact of being left behind in the press freedom. President 
did direct communication with media, and made the best efforts to transform the 
relationship between the government and the society.  
 
 
                                                
11 Abbreviation for Group of Listeners and Spectators namely groups of village people who were under 
consultation of the Minister of Information, Harmoko.  Every time he made a visit to a village or 
inaugurated a project, there was always someone representing the group to express ideas, usually praises, or 
gratitude for president’s donation.  
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6.1.3 BJ Habibie’s Political Burden 
      The open character of BJ Habibie’s was an important capital in his leadership as a 
temporary (transitional) president replacing Soeharto.  His educational background in 
Germany placed him as a scientist, although he was a bureaucrat during Soeharto 
government for years.  Dewi told that it was Habibie’s openness that in addition to 
understanding the importance of the freedom of the press, the freedom of information, 
which encouraged him to give the press freedom by establishing the Press Law through 
Yunus Yosfiah.  However, the openness to give free space for the press to express the 
voice of the society and to place the press in a parallel position and was not under the 
armpits of the authority, was not without obstacles. His close relationship with Soeharto 
for years also placed him in the eyes of the people as “a student” of the New Order, 
including his role as one of Golkar leaders. Habibie could not hide his expectation to 
replace Soeharto in the next period through direct presidential general election.  The 
expectation was not fully supported by Golkar.  Golkar even took the intermediary path 
proposed by the center axis led by Amien Rais to propose Abdurrahman Wahid as the 
candidate of the president after his report of accountability was rejected by the People’s 
Consultancy Assembly.  
      BJ Habibie who was the leader of Golkar, who at the same time was the chairman 
of Indonesian Moslem Scientists Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia-
ICMI), bore heavy political burden. With his spirit of openness to give the option for East 
Timor “province” that finally caused East Timor to be “separated” from Indonesia, this 
political burden placed him on unpopular position.12 Habibie was not free from the 
culture of KKN (collusion, corruption, and nepotism) because he protected close figures 
such as the Attorney General Andi Ghalib who was involved in a corruption case. This 
case made the relationship between the president and media disturbed. Dewi Fortuna 
Anwar said: 
                                                
12 The case of East Timor was just one of three issues ridiculed by the members of the People’s 
Consultancy Assembly when he presented his Accountability Report.  The policy of giving an autonomy 
option or referendum to join Indonesia or to separate (which finally was son by the option to separate from 
Indonesia) was given because since it was confirmed as the legal part of Indonesia, the international world 
(United Nations Organization) never acknowledged the existence of East Timor while much sacrifices, 
souls and materials to create peace and develop this territory. The Timorese people themselves did not give 
positive response (Hermawan, A et al, Akrobat Politik Investigasi Jurnalistik Membongkar Skenario dan 
Intrik Politik, Bandung, Rosdakarya, 2000, p.143) 
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 ”The case of tapping conversation between Habibie and Andi Ghalib 
was one of the issues he considered media reports unfair. Such cases 
sometimes became media scandal.  I do not recall the others but there 
were similar scandals that trespassed against privacy”.13 (Interview on 
30 August 2005). 
 
      Other than with printed media, Dewi said, President Habibie did not have 
problems with media television, for example with SCTV.  To his opinion, SCTV was 
popular, and different from printed media, TV could not make up reports based on 
presentation, based on quotation so that people must take responsibility.  In printed 
media, there can be opinions from unreliable sources, or from unclear sources.  Reports 
on TV might contain preference, sidedness, toward the news to be broadcasted, but 
whatever the news they broadcast, they certainly happen.  Take examples of the news 
based on the interview, based of recorded events, the interview with president, the 
interview with important figures. The freedom of television to make an opinion is rather 
difficult, because in any case they must be based on facts.  Meanwhile, newspaper may 
make analyses, personal responsibilities, and the titles that are different from the contents 
or accusation without mentioning the sources.  There are not such things in television 
broadcast, except outside Indonesia, for example CNN.  The news happened in Indonesia 
was broadcasted repeatedly although the events had been over.  The broadcasted news 
about Indonesia had always been riots. Was that deliberateness or did they have no other 
pictures? The same thing occurred when we see FOX News, every time the discussion 
was about terrorists the picture was always people praying in a mosque.  Do they 
correlate one to each other?  
      Dewi looked the relation between Habibie government and media was relatively 
good although media was very critical to Habibie government.14  On the other hand,  
                                                
13 Telephone tapping of Habibie-Andi Ghalib was written by Panji Masyarakat magazine and was then 
written by other media.  When a number of parties accused the report as ”trial by the press”, a 
communication expert from Hasanudin University, A.Muis, said that Panji Masyarakat did not violate 
journalistic ethics and they had done investigative reporting appropriately. What Panji Masyarakat did 
could be categorized as investigative reporting to a case with prominence magnitude or extraordinary event 
involving figures who are always subjects of reports (Mohk.Syaiful Bahkri, Titian Jalan Demokrasi 
Peranan Kebebasan Pers untuk Budaya Komunikasi Politik, Jakarta, The Kompas, 2000, p.xxxiv) 
14 The English-language newspaper The Jakarta Post was once stumbled by ”gravel” when on 22 May 
1997 reported the fall of CN-235 military aircraft made in PT IPTN where BJ Habibie took very important 
role, and for the report The Jakarta Post had to apologize in addition to writing the objection of PT IPTN. 
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media highly honored government openness.  In his time, the Minister of Information, 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah was a popular figure in mass media cycles.  
      President BJ Habibie’s political burden proved clearer when the factions rejected 
his accountability in the People’s Consultative Assembly.  Upon entering the assembly 
hall, the participants shouted him.  After the question and answer session had been over, 
the factions recorded 355 participants rejected and 322 accepted his report of 
accountability, even though one united faction gave positive appreciation by stating his 
success in rolling democratization, openness and press freedom for 16 months.  At the 
end of his speech, Habibie in his low voice and solemnly asked for personal apology 
(Hermawan et al., 2000: 155). 
      This explanation confirms that even though BJ Habibie was an open person but 
the difficult political situation compelled him to bear very heavy burden so that it resulted 
in bad image before the members of the People’s Consultancy Assembly as the highest 
institution in a representative system.  
      
6.1.4 Pressure against Media 
      During the era of President BJ Habibie, it did not mean that pressures against 
media were absent.  From 24 July 1998 to 18 October 1999, it was recorded that some 
printed media and televisions both national and local ones experienced a number of 
pressures in various forms, for example against Antara news station, Republika, Kompas, 
Jawa Pos, Media Indonesia, Suara Timor Timur, Bandung Pos newspapers, Forum, 
Tempo, and Jakarta-Jakarta magazines and SCTV, TVRI, Indosiar, and ANTV 
televisions (Nurudin, 2003: 93-94).  With such pressures, Nurudin concluded 4 matters. 
First, the there were neglect of press tolerance limit, minim censorship, and the 
development of trial by the press. Second, even though SIUPP was eliminated, there were 
still psychological pressures from officials, ex officials, and entrepreneurs.  Third, there 
was no realization of law enactment through the court.  Fourth, hostility between the 
government and press existed (Nurudin, 2003: 95-96).  It meant that pressures on media 
                                                                                                                                              
However, the attorney of IPTN required another rights to response and asked for dissemination of apology 
through an advertisement in both domestic and foreign media, in addition to compensation.  The format and 
content of the advertisement was even determined by IPTN.  (Mokh.Syaiful Bahkri, 2000. ibid. p. 84) 
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did not entirely come from the government so that it disturbed the relation between media 
and the government and the implementation of press freedom.  Pressures against media 
could also be caused by some other factors such as unprofessional media so that the news 
they report go beyond ethics that should have been highly honored and that emerged the 
outrage of the reader or groups of readers.  Further consequence is violence to media by 
intimidating, threatening, hitting and other acts of violence to submission of indictment.  
A hit at SCTV journalist, Iwan Taruna, in the office of the Attorney General, intimidation 
to the News Director of SCTV Riza Primadi concerning the report in ”Liputan 6” 
program on Semanggi tragedy to the kick of a Golkar guard to ANTV journalist were 
some examples presented by Nurudin.  Protest in the form of violence done to media 
reflects misunderstanding of the tasks of media or shocks against the styles of reports that 
are direct, bare, critical, but sometimes are without ethics as well.  
      In general, the indictment were done by public figure like Amien Rais (politician), 
Agus Gurlaya, the brother of the Minister of Economy and Industry Coordinator, 
Syarwan Hamid (military official), Tommy Mandala Putra the youngest son of Soeharto, 
Try Sutrisno (former Vice President) (Nurudin, 2003: 95),  Governor, Head of Intelligent 
Bureau, ex ministers (see table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Relations of the Government – Media in Several Legal Cases  
Government 
Period 
Litigant The Accused 
Media 
Accusation Settlement 
Method 
 
BJ Habibie 
(21 May 1998-
20 October 
1999) 
 
 
 
 
1.  Governor of 
South 
Sulawesi  
 
2.  ZA Maulani, 
Head of 
National 
Intelligent 
Bureau  
 
3.  General Try 
Sutrisno and 
Genderal Edi 
Sudrajat  
 
 
1. D&R 
Magazine 
 (6 June 1999) 
 
2. Sriwijawa   
Post 
Newspaper 
   (25 August 
1999) 
 
3.Warta 
Republik (25 
August 1999) 
 
 
 
1. Slander  
 
 
 
2. Slander  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Slander  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Unclear  
 
 
 
2. KUHP- 
Probationary 
Punishment   
 
 
 
3.KUHP-      
Probationary 
Punishment  
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4. AA.  Baramuli
 
 
4. Info Bisnis 
(66/Year 
IV/1999) 
 
 
4. Slander  
 
4. Unclear  
Source: Luwarso, 2002; Manan et al., 2005 
       
In a short presidency time, more or less 16 months, the governance of President 
BJ Habibie was driven among others by the Minister of Information, Mohammad Yunus 
Yosfiah, who placed an important foundation for press freedom.  However, as Weaver 
suggested, pressures on media, as it was done by the officials of ex officials during the 
government of Habibie threat the press independence.  
 
 
6.2 Case Study:The Drafting of the Press Law 
6.2.1 How Kompas Coverage on the Draft of Press Law  
The Kompas daily is selected because of its reputation for its seriousness to 
develop itself as a professional medium.  This is characterized, among others, by its 
ability to maintain its existence since 1960s with the highest number of copies that 
printed media in Indonesia ever have, namely above 500,000 copies. In its course,  
Kompas was once bridled by the authority of the New Order in January 1978 with seven 
other newspapers (Surjomihardjo, 2002: 203)15.  Kompas is also serious in recruiting its 
journalists with strict requirements and one-year training and apprenticeship system for 
the candidates before obtaining the status of a permanent journalist.  In managerial level, 
this newspaper is one of the three printed media in Indonesia having an ombudsman team 
that ”independently” controls its performance, especially in terms of the objectivity of its 
news contents.  In a recent research, Kompas is said to have very good performance with 
regards to evaluative dimension of its news (Rahayu, 2006:90-91).  This medium pays 
attention to good use of the Indonesian language amidst the bad language use of tens or 
hundreds of other printed media. Another proof of  Kompas professionalism is the use of 
on line technology and good files arrangement.  Readers can easily access  Kompas news 
through Kompas search engine or Google.  By entering the words ”Draft of Press  
                                                
15 Kompas experienced declination from the highest number of copies of 177,000 in 1974 before the ” 
January 15th Tragedy” to 169,000 in May of the same year.  The number increased again when the 
situation was back to normal and press functioned more or less as usual (Surjomihardjo, Beberapa Segi 
Perkembangan Sejarah Pers di Indonesia, Jakarta, Kompas, 2002, p.203).  
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Regulations”,  320 files are found and are narrowed down by the year 1999. Hence, as 
many as 47 articles composing of news, opinions and features from 12 January 1999 to 
11 October 1999 are obtained.  After thorough examination, we find 14 hard news, one 
opinion, and 2 features containing or discussing the draft of Press Regulations as meant 
by this research.  The analysis units are types of news, informants and message contents 
(look at table 6.2-6.8). 
This research reveals that  Kompas exposes governmental informants (executives) 
namely the Minister of Information and parliamentary (legislatives) informants including 
the Fraction members representing Political Parties: Functional Groups, United 
Development Party, and the Indonesian Army.  Other informants include the people of 
civil society, media, and intellectual spheres.  There are no informants from legal 
(judicative) environment.  
 
 
Table 6.2: The Opinions of Political Actors (Government) 
Informant Message Content Type of News 
Government   
The Minister of 
Information - 
Mohammad Yunus 
Yosfiah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   The press freedom is the 
prerequisite for the creation of the 
good quality democracy. In a 
government with no press freedom, 
its democratic life is vague.  When 
all parties require democracy to run 
well, give the press freedom to this 
country.  
 
2.   The government gives the press 
freedom for both domestic and 
foreign press to get the deepest 
information, especially during the 
coming campaign of 1999 General 
Election.  The freedom, however, is 
still limited, namely in accordance 
with the prevailing Regulations or 
rules.  
 
3.   The government through the 
Minister of Information, 
Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah, 
presents the draft of the Press 
News: Kompas, 29 
April 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News:  Kompas, 1 
May 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News: Kompas, 29 
July 1999 
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Regulations  in the final Assembly 
meeting led by the vice chairman of 
the House of Representative  - Hari 
Sabarno.  The current Press 
Regulations state that the entire 
capital of a press company must be 
national capital. This stipulation 
prevents foreign capital to enter 
press publication enterprises in 
Indonesia. For the reason, the draft 
of this new Press Regulations opens 
the opportunity for foreign capital to 
enter in national press companies. 
To promote press freedom, there is a 
mention of the draft of Press 
Regulations that press publication 
does not necessarily require SIUPP 
published by the government.  This 
draft of the regulations only requires 
the head of press companies to 
register the press publication they 
publish to Information Department.  
 
4.   To my opinion, everybody agrees 
that the press freedom is preserved 
not for government interest but for 
the justice for community.  Thus, I 
compare this press freedom to the 
rights of justice. For the reason, I 
agree to the proposal submitted by 
the United Development Party.  Via 
Usamah Hisyam the party suggested 
that chapter 3 article 2 (c) the draft 
of Press Regulations stating (2) to 
protect and ensure the press 
freedom, the national press has the 
following rights: (c) not to be 
bridled by the government, not to be 
altered.  Proposal of article 2 (c) 
being offered to become free of 
publishing bridle by the government 
via court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News: Kompas, 28 
August 1999 
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Table 6.3: The Opinions of Political Actors (Head of Parliament) 
Institution Opinion Source 
Head of Parliament    
 
The chairman of the 
House of 
Representative - Hari 
Sabarno 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vice Chairman of 
Commission I of 
House of 
Representative  -
Aminullah 
 
 
 
 
The Draft of the Regulations proposed 
by the member of the House of 
Representative  will be discussed by 
fractions.  If the fractions accept it, the 
draft of Press Regulations composed by 
proposing team will be improved and 
proposed as Draft of Regulations 
initiated by the House of  
Representative.  The draft of the 
Constitutions will be presented in the 
final Assembly meeting attended by the 
government representatives. It is 
scheduled that fractions’ response to the 
proposal of the draft will be presented 
on the coming 12 July.  
 
The House will discuss the draft of the 
Regulations that comes first.  From the 
beginning, the House will only discuss 
the draft of Press Regulations as 
proposed by the members. It is allowed 
for the government to propose three 
drafts of the Regulations, but the House 
has decided to discuss the draft of Press 
Regulations only, which we should be 
grateful for this.  
 
 
News:  Kompas, 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News:  Kompas, 17 
July 1999 
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Table 6.4: The Opinions of Political Actors (Political Party) 
Institution Opinion Source 
Political Party in 
Parliament  
  
 
Golkar-Bambang 
Sadono 
 
 
The current press freedom is just vague. 
Freedom that can be eliminated at 
anytime, since there is no legal 
foundation securing it.  The prevailing 
press law is still the old Regulations, 
which in reality had limited the press 
itself.  
This draft of Press Law is a small point 
of the House’s effort in responding the 
reform spirit, in spite its position amidst 
criticism wave with very high dynamics. 
  
 
News:  Kompas, 2 
July 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Development 
Party (FPP)-Usamah 
Hisyam 
 
Muhamad Yunus as the Minister of 
Information may tell that the press 
freedom will continue.  However, as 
long as Press Main Regulations is not 
annulled, there is no guarantee of the 
continuation of the press freedom since 
the new government will be able to 
apply the Regulations again. What is 
needed now is a Regulation that 
guarantees the press freedom.  
 
 
News:  Kompas, 5 
July 1999 
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Table 6.5: The Opinions of Political Actors (Mass Media) 
Institution Opinion Source 
Mass Media    
Kompas-Jakob 
Oetama   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANteve-Azkarmin 
Zaini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Association of 
Newspaper 
Publication -Leo 
Batubara  
 
The House of Representative  should 
have finished the draft of Press 
Regulations agreed by the government 
and the society at the latest before the 
election. ”The House of  Representative 
has the opportunity to make historical 
benchmark.  This is a challenge to be 
responded immediately since it will 
become historical. The result is the press 
freedom. At this moment, Indonesia is 
going through an important moment, 
namely the enactment of law, 
democracy, press openness and social 
justice.  This momentum will keep on 
developing so that it must be directed 
and colored through mass media.  
 
The coverage of the Vision of the draft 
of Press Regulations is broadened, not 
only printed media, but press in a 
broader sense, namely printed press and 
broadcasting press.  It must be not 
difficult to run it, since the draft of Press 
Regulations proposed by 22 members of 
the House of Representative  on the past 
16 April has appropriately contained 
such an aspiration. Thus, at least some 
parts of broadcasting media functions, 
namely information function, which is 
inseparable from the basis press 
freedom, can be secured by having legal 
basis so that it does not step on the 
vague freedom.  
 
For 54 years, the Indonesian press has 
actually been confined, since for the 
same period, Indonesia does not have 
Regulations protecting the press 
freedom. When the draft of Press 
Regulations is under struggle, the 
government suddenly issues the draft of 
nation safety Regulations in which the 
stipulation to eliminate press freedom is 
News:  Kompas, 25 
March 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion: Kompas, 
14 August 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News: Kompas, 25 
August 1999 
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contained. The press confinement by 
such draft of Regulations will clearly 
enable the Indonesian Army and Police 
to do anything freely since there is no 
control from press. Thus, it can be 
predicted that violation to Human 
Rights will get worse.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Opinions of Political Actors (Civil Society) 
Institution Opinion Source 
Civil Society   
Indonesian 
Broadcasting and 
Press Community -Leo 
Batubara  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Soetomo Press 
Institution (LPDS)-
Atmakusumah 
 
 
 
Information Flow 
Study Institute (ISAI) 
- Ulil Abshar Abdalla: 
 
1.   In the reform era, it is time to think 
together about the improvement of 
the press freedom. So many past 
authorities committed violation due 
to weak press control. It is time for 
the House of Representative to take 
initiative to make democratic 
Regulations of the press and 
broadcasting, in accordance with the 
press freedom principles. These two 
Regulations are so important 
because without the press freedom, 
an ideal democratic country will not 
come true.  
 
2.   There is no time left to cancel the 
acceptance of the Press (and 
broadcasting) Regulations. There 
won’t be other opportunities but 
now.  
 
3.   The press sphere must be alert of the 
existence of the Press Regulations 
and the articles of KUHP 
(Indonesian Penal Code) confining 
the current press freedom that the 
society is enjoying. ”We, journalists 
and press important people, must 
put our best efforts to produce new, 
democratic Press Regulations and 
the Indonesian Penal Code (KUHP) 
News:  Kompas, 27 
February 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News:  Kompas, 22 
March 1999 
 
 
 
 
News:  Kompas, 24 
May 1999 
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that protect the interests of the 
community and journalists and give 
total press freedom without limits 
and confinement anymore” 
 
4.   The situation of the current press 
freedom is like looting the land 
embezzled by the authority. The 
press freedom, however, is still 
vague, and will possibly disappear 
again. A certificate ensuring that the 
existing freedom will not be taken 
anymore is required. Namely, by 
constituting the draft of the Press 
Regulations that has been proposed 
to the government. 
 
 
 
News:  Kompas, 25 
March 1999 
 
 
Table 6.7: Opinions of Political Actors (Campus Intellectuals) 
 
Campus Intellectuals 
 
 
A.Muis, Professor at 
Communication and 
Law Departments of 
Hasanuddin University 
and Professor at 
Communication and 
Law Departments of 
University of 
Indonesia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion 
 
 
1.   Press Regulations must be 
regulative, not attributive or 
repressive.  In accordance with the 
changing time namely the free press 
era, the Press Regulations and the 
Broadcasting Regulations must 
reflect the synchronization at least 
in five needs or requirements. First, 
the requirement for information 
freedom; second, the legal assurance 
requirement; third, the 
communication 
(telecommunication) technology 
advancement requirement; fourth, 
the nature requirement; fifth, the 
requirement for the state rights or 
the authority.  Mass media freedom 
must be regulated by the state (with 
Criminal and Civil Legal 
Regulations) in order not to damage 
the freedom and the rights of the 
 
Source 
 
 
Opinion:  Kompas, 9 
February 1999 
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Lecturer of Social and 
Political Sciences at 
Airlangga University -
Hotman Siahaan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
other parties. 
 
2.   To my opinion, the change of Mass 
Media/Press must be in one package 
with the Criminal Legal 
Regulations. I have suggested that 
the press sees the Minister of Justice 
to discuss this concept.  Because, in 
its task, the journalist and press 
industries are still facing the 
Regulations with the censor 
character.  The change of Press 
Regulations must give the effects on 
the draft of the Legal Regulations. 
Now, the press gets widespread 
support from the society.  
Nonetheless, the legal instrument is 
absolute.  Therefore, we urge the 
House of Representative  to ratify 
this draft of Press Regulations 
before the General Election.  
Because, we cannot be too 
optimistic with the current press 
freedom.   
 
3.   Concerning with the Press Freedom 
Regulations, I personally do not 
consider it important, since there 
have been Regulations instruments 
such as the Penal Code (KUHP) and 
Journalistic Ethics Code.  Attention 
must be given to the fact that in the 
draft of the new Penal Code 
Regulations, the offenses 
obstructing the press freedom such 
as offenses of the hate dissemination 
are still put in effect. This fills us 
with the apprehension.   
 
4.   Although the draft of the Press Law 
has been submitted to the House of 
Representative, the press freedom is 
not yet secured since there is 
another Regulation threatening the 
press freedom.  
 
 
 
 
Feature:  Kompas, 
21 March 1999 (To 
Know Further Prof 
Dr Haji Andi Abdul 
Muis SH) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature:  Kompas, 
27 May 1999 (The 
Voice of the 
Experts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature:  Kompas, 
1999 (There is 
another Regulation 
threatening the Press 
Freedom)  
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The foreign capital and the press 
without Publication Permit (SIUPP) will 
encourage the freedom, but the freedom 
that is out of moral and ethics frames 
will become a boomerang for the growth 
of the democracy.  
 
 
Feature:  Kompas, 
31 July 1999 (There 
is another 
Regulation 
threatening the Press 
Freedom)  
 
      From the finding, we infer that the actors are those from the parliament, the 
government, the press, the community institution and campus intellectuals.  They are the 
Minister of Information - Yunus Yosfiah – who is quoted in four news, the member of 
the House of Representative  - Bambang Sadono – of Golkar, Aminullah and Hari 
Sabarno  (The Chairmen of the House), and Usamah Hisyam (PPP) each is quoted in one 
news, Jakob Oetama and Azkarmin Zaini from the press each is quoted in one news,   A 
Muis (Hasanuddin University - Makassar) whose opinions are quoted in three report 
features in  Kompas and who writes one opinion, Hotman Siahaan (Airlangga University 
- Surabaya) whose opinion is quoted in one feature,  Leo Batubara of civil society (MPPI) 
whose opinions are quoted two times representing MPPI and one time representing  SPS, 
Atmakusumah (LPDS), Ulil Absar Abdala ISAI each is quoted one time in the news.  
Most of the opinions are reported in the hard news, some in feature and one in opinion.  
Their opinions can be categorized into: 1. supporting, 2. urging the ratification of the new 
Press Regulations. 
 
Table 6.8: The Content of the Informant’s Message  
(Supporting, and/or Urging Immediate Ratification) 
Supporting Urging Immediate 
Ratification  
Argumentation 
 
Government: the Minister 
of Information (Muhammad 
Yunus Yosfiah) 
  
To protect the press 
freedom as the democracy 
prerequisite  
 
Political Party in the 
Parliament: Golkar Fraction 
(Bambang Sadono, Razian 
Agus Toniman) 
  
To response the spirit 
reform  
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United Development Party-
FPP (Usamah Hisyam) 
 
  
To ensure the press freedom 
 
The chairman of the House 
of Representative  -Hari 
Sabarno 
 
 
 
 
Draft of the Regulations 
will be presented in the 
House final meeting  
 
Vice Chairman of 
Commission I of the House 
of Representative – 
Aminullah 
  
The House decides to 
discuss the draft of the 
Press Regulations only. 
  
Kompas daily: the Head of 
Kompas Daily Newspaper 
(Jakob Oetama) 
 
 
To give direction and 
democratic colors through 
mass media. 
 
Chief Editor of ANteve (H 
Azkarmin Zaini) 
  
To extend the coverage of 
the press definition by 
including the broadcasting 
press  
 
  
A professor at Hasanuddin 
University-Makasar 
 
The press freedom has not 
been secured since there is 
still another threatening 
Regulation. 
 
 
Lecturer at the Faculty of 
Social and Political 
Sciences in Airlangga 
University -Hotman 
Siahaan 
 
  
The freedom that is out of 
moral and ethics frames will 
become a boomerang for 
the growth of the 
democracy  
 
 
  
MPPI Civil Society 
 (Leo Batubara) 
 
 
For the sake of the press 
freedom and democracy  
  
LPDS (Atmakusumah) 
 
To protect the interests of 
the community and 
journalists and to give total 
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press freedom without  
 
limitation and cuffs 
anymore” 
 
  
ISAI (Ulil Absar Abdala) 
 
Guarantee the press 
freedom in order not to be 
taken away by the authority 
 
      Kompas daily uses the hard news to inform the public how the presence of this 
draft of Press Regulations gets responses from various parties.  Reviewing their message 
contents, we find out that there is no informant who explicitly expresses opposition to the 
presence of this draft. A rather different opinion comes from a professor of the press law, 
A.Muis, who relates Press Regulations to Press Freedom Regulations. This is another 
Regulations draft that covers the Press Freedom in broader sense.  He says: ”With regards 
to Press Freedom Regulations, I personally do not consider it important, since there have 
been Regulatory instruments such as Penal Code (KUHP) and Journalistic Ethics Code 
(KEJ). Attention must be given to the fact that in the draft of the new Penal Code 
Regulations, the offenses obstructing the press freedom such as offenses of the hate 
dissemination are still put in effect.  This fills us with apprehension.” (Feature: Report of 
“Voice of the Experts”, Kompas, 27 May 1999). This means that he has an opinion that 
the Press Freedom Regulation is not required because there have been other rules namely 
the Penal Code and Journalistic Ethics Code.  In the Penal Code there is mention of some 
chapters on the Press (freedom) arrangement. This is alto true in Journalistic Ethics Code. 
For example, it is the stipulation of how to get news and to disseminate news through 
media. On the other hand, he also concerns about the draft of Penal Code Regulations, 
namely an effort to revise the Penal Code that turns to contain the chapters that even 
cause difficulties or emasculate the freedom of journalists, or threaten them to be sent to 
jail because of journalistic errors.  It is this concern that bears the suggestion of regulative 
Press Regulations: ”Press Laws must be regulative, not attributive or repressive. In 
accordance with the time change namely free press era, Press Regulations (and 
Broadcasting Regulations) must reflect the synchronization at least in five needs or 
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requirements: first, requirement of information freedom; second, legal assurance 
requirement; third, requirement for communication (telecommunication) technology  
 
advancement; fourth, nature requirement; fifth, state rights or authority requirement. 
(Opinion: Kompas, 9 February 1999). Moreover, he also suggests that: “The change of 
Press Regulations must give effect on the draft of Legal Regulations. The press gets wide 
support from the society.  However, legal instrument is absolute. Thus, we urge the 
People’s Representative Council to ratify this draft of Press Regulations before the 
General Election.  We cannot be too optimistic with the current press freedom. (Feature: 
Kompas, 21 March 1999, “To Know Further Prof Dr Haji Andi Abdul Muis SH”).  
      Out of some actors, only few of them who declare explicitly the urge to ratify the 
draft immediately, one of them is Jakob Oetama, the chief of Kompas.”  He suggests that 
the People’s Representative Assembly finish the draft of Press Regulations as had been 
approved by the government and press community, before the General Election (July 
1999) at the latest: ”The House of Representative  has the opportunity to make historical 
benchmark.  This challenge needs quick response since it will become a history. The 
result is the press freedom”. (Kompas, 25 March 1999). As a media person, this urge is so 
natural since mass media such as Kompas had repeatedly experienced the cruelty of the 
New Order hampering press freedom so much. Kompas experienced the sharpness of the 
authority censorship with their powerful authority so that it was prohibited several times 
to publish. The example is the prohibition to publish in the year 1986, when it covers 
Daud Jusuf’s analysis of Indonesian economy condition. 
      The figures from the civil society who urge the ratification of the draft of the new 
Press Regulations to replace the old Press Regulations that cuffs the press freedom other 
than Jakob Oetama are Leo Batubara (MPPI activist), Atmakusumah (LPDS) and Ulil 
Abshar Abdalla from ISAI, while from the University is Andi Muis, a professor at 
Hasanuddin University. Leo Batubara is actually someone from the press as well. Once, 
he was the manager of Suara Karya newspaper owned by Golkar and a member of the 
Press Workers Association (SPS). Batubara was once a staff in the State Intelligence 
Bureau in Soeharto era. Thus, he actually has “close” relationship with Soeharto regime.  
In Soeharto era, SPS was the only publication organization that could give 
recommendation in the process of the publication permit (SIUPP) based on Chapter 2 
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article (1 letter k) of the Decree of the Minister of Information of the Republic of 
Indonesia no 214A year 1984. (Simorangkir, 1986: 137).  At that time, SPS was also an  
 
organ supporting the policy toward the press made by Soeharto and was done by the 
Minister of Information, Indonesian Journalist Organization (PWI), Press Council, 
military officials. Suara Karya Daily Newspaper owned by Golkar clearly becomes the 
channel of the voices of the ruling government party by that time. However, the reform 
era seems to encourage Batubara to become the initiator of the press reform, together 
with some activists in MPPI, proposing the draft of the Press Regulations that is agreed 
by the House of Representative  as the governmental proposal. Kompas daily often places 
Leo Batubara as an informant with some different positions.  Most often, he is written as 
an MPPI activist, but sometimes he is said to be a press prominent figure.  
      Meanwhile, Abdalla is a young man born in Pati, Central Java, an alumnus of 
Mathali’ul Falah Islamic Boarding School, Kajen, Margoyoso, Pati.  He went to Islamic 
and Arabic Science Institution (LIPIA) and Drijarkara School of Philosophy Science in 
Jakarta.  He was an activist of student movement who actively wrote in mass media 
(Utami et al., 1994: 68). After joining with ISAI of which office is located on Utan Kayu 
No 68H, Ulil Absar Abdala actively voices the idea of ”Liberal Islam” and founds an 
organization called Liberal Islam Network or Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL). 
 
Kompas Reports Positively  
      This finding concludes that Kompas reports the issue of the draft of the Press 
Laws positively.  It means that Kompas quotes some informants who have positive views 
or who support the new Press Regulations endorsing the press freedom.  Out of ten 
informants, all support the new Press Regulations.  The figures from the government both 
in the executive (the Minister of Information) and the legislative (the representatives of 
political parties in the People’s Representative Council, including the Army ‘party’) 
stated their agreement to this Regulation with almost the same argument namely the press 
freedom.  Different emphasis was voiced by non-government figures from media, civil 
society activists and university lecturers. They did not only support but they urged that 
this Regulation should be ratified immediately. What was interesting was the publication 
of the chief of this newspaper, Jakob Oetama.  The fact can be translated as a momentum 
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for Kompas to urge the change of the press freedom in Indonesia.  Being a big press 
institution (media company), Kompas has certain restlessness considering the huge asset 
it has but it was not in a secure position if its publication was closed down.  On one hand, 
Kompas professionalism that is realized in the independence of its news contents is a 
must, but on the other hand, this endangers its survival.  For the reason,  Kompas is 
famous for practicing its “crab journalism”, a metaphor for the press institution having 
critical and sharp power like crab’s bites but then quickly withdraws backwards when 
facing obstructions from the government in the forms of suggestion, telephone calls or 
warnings.  Another strategy applied by Kompas is self-censor by using polite words, 
neatly wrapped, or euphemism.  Kompas journalism style is a colloquial style of Javanese 
people that is not straight to the point. The real objective is to criticize but it is preceded 
with praises.  
      The pressure by the civil society can be interpreted as a momentum of change 
after three decades of being in a weak position.  Those three institutions: MPPI, LPDS, 
and ISAI are non-government institutions running in press, journalism and information. 
MPPI is a new institution existing from the concern of unhealthy atmosphere for the press 
(and broadcasting) in Indonesia.  Its activists are people with long experience in press 
world like Atmakusumah, the former chief editor of Indonesia Raya, and Leo Batubara, 
the former chief editor of Suara Karya and the member of Newspaper Publication 
Organization (SPS). ISAI is a new institution that also exists from the concern about the 
information obstruction that should have been channeled to the society through media. 
One of the proponents of this institution is Gunawan Muhammad, the chief of Tempo 
magazine who also has a pile of bad experiences with the New Order. Together with 
Editor and Detik magazines, the magazine that is famous for being critical and that writes 
based on investigative method was bridled by Soeharto because it reported the sinking of 
an ex-East Germany ship that was bought by the Indonesian government.  This bridle in 
1994 even triggers solidarity among media workers to consistently oppose Soeharto 
regime16. 
                                                
16 They, a group of young journalists, were so concerned even were so offended to hear the bridle that they 
created solidarity, committed to express their stance and to formulate a ”movement” when one of their most 
fundamental possession namely writing ”freely and responsibly” was taken out arbitrarily (Utami et al, 
Bredel 1994, Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Jakarta, 1994, page.i). 
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      Kompas certainly was not without reason to choose those from the civil society as 
the informants because Kompas had the same concern, had the same “fate”.  Nonetheless,  
 
the intern people of Kompas could not express more openly like them so that it was the 
opportunity to establish the solidarity by appreciating the opinions from the press 
activists to urge the ratification of the new Press Laws.  
     It can be said that Kompas informants are people who are competent with the press 
Regulations, namely those who will and are composing the Regulations, the government 
(the executive) and the parliament (the legislative).  In accordance with the stipulations of 
the 1945 Regulations, they bear the responsibility to construct and compose the 
Regulations. The same thing is true with the informants from the civil society as figures 
or characters with high concern about the press development especially the press freedom 
in Indonesia. They, including Jakob Oetama, also have long experience as press workers. 
The entrance of ISAI represented by Ulil Absar Abdala marks Kompas commitment to 
give the space to young people, the activists of university student movements, and the 
pro-democracy activists.  
 
6.2.2 How Politicians view the Drafting of the Press Law  
It has been stated in Chapter I that political communicators play the primary 
social role, especially in the public opinion process (Nimmo, 1989).  They are politicians, 
professional communicators, and part-time professionals or activists. Those who are 
included in the politician category are executive officers such as president and ministers, 
the legislative and judicative titles such as members of the parliament or the People’s 
Representative Council and the other governmental position holders. To Nimmo’s 
opinion, this position has two principal objectives.  First, ”to influence the gift allocation 
and second, to change the existing social structure or to prevent changes”.  In its first 
authority, politicians communicate as the representatives of a group or subscribers.  In 
this position they propose and or protect the objectives of political interests so that these 
political communicators represent the interests of the groups. Thus, communicators are 
the leaders due to the position on which they seat in the social structure, in its internal as 
human beings, personality, famous figures, are symbolical leaders (Nimmo, 1989:50).  
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        The politicians that Kompas uses as its informants represent two governmental 
groups namely the executive (the Minister of Information as the President 
Representation), and the legislatives namely the figures from political parties sitting in 
Parliament.  They are Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah (the Minister of Information), 
Bambang Sadono (Golkar), Usamah Hisyam (United Development Party), Hari Sabarno 
and Aminullah (the Chairman of the Indonesian House of Representative). 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah (the Minister of Information) 
      The appointment of Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah as the Minister of Information by 
President BJ Habibie means two things. First, this is just the normality.  It means that 
Yosfiah just like BJ Habibie was a person in an elite group in the Soeharto regime 
government.  In some periods, Habibie occupies the position of cabinet minister in 
addition to some other strategic titles, including the chairman of Golkar Party.  Yosfiah is 
a Lieutenant General of the Indonesian Army, born in Rappang, South Sulawesi, 7 
August 1944, with some important positions both in military and political structures.  In 
military structure, once he occupied a position of infantry battalion commander in East 
Timor, leading the troop to Balibo, East Timor and it was that time that he was accused 
of killing 5 foreign journalists, known as ”Balibo five”.  They are Malcom Shackleton 
(27) and the cameraman Brian Peters (29), both are English citizens working for 
Australian Channel Nine. The other three victims are Greg Shackleton (27), Tony Stewart 
(21) an English citizen, and a cameraman from New Zealand, Gary Cunningham (27) 
both working for Australia Channel Seven.17 Yosfiah was in various military positions, 
for example Commander of Group 2 RPKAD (Army Special Troop Regiment) from 1966 
to 1970s, joined the training in Forth Leavenworth and got his Colonel rank and was on 
duty in Makassar in 1979.  He had also been on duty in Dili, as the Commander of 
Military Resort Command (KOREM) 164/Dili.  His “political” career becomes clearer 
when he sits on the position as the Head of Army Social and Political Affairs in 1997 
before his retirement and finally was appointed by BJ Habibie to become the Minister of 
Information. 
                                                
17 Yosfiah was also accused of killing Nicolao Lobato, a Timorese woman in 1978. 
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      Even though he did not occupy governmental position anymore and had been 
active in a political party namely United Development Party, Yosfiah was still hunted by 
the international party, including the news that give difficulty to him. The husband of 
Antonia Ricardo of East Timor origin with Portuguese blood is often called ”ghost” 
human war criminal that deserves sent to international court (Gatra, 23 February 2001).  
The tragedy on 16 October 1975 in Balibo urged Glebe Coroners court, Sydney, 
Australia to issue a command letter to arrest him.  Nonetheless, he denied all of the 
accusation toward him and explained his plea before the general assembly with 
Commission I of the House of Representative  and Alwi Shihab as the Foreign Minister.  
      In fact, in the politics of Soeharto era in Indonesia it was difficult to differentiate 
the military role from the political role since the two were parallel due to the so called 
double function of the Indonesian Army.  In the New Order politics, military is the main 
supporter of the government so that task of the military institution was not only in the 
defense but also in the politics. Many military officers occupy political positions such as 
in the legislative institution or in the parliament, in the executives such as the Minister, 
the Governor, or the Regent.  Military also occupies in the governmental party namely 
the Functional Party or Golongan Karya.  Such a political culture was still made of use by 
BJ Habibie so that he appointed Yunus Yosfiah as the Minister of Information.  Before 
that time, in Soeharto era, there were some Ministers from military sphere namely 
General Ali Murtopo and General R.Hartono. 
      Thus, both Habibie and Yosfiah acquired experiences during the New Order 
government so that they have the same understanding or “knowledge”.  This similarity is 
an important capital to cooperate for the executive officers especially between the 
President and the Ministers as his assistants. 
      The second prediction is that this appointment is a strategy for the New Order 
“people” to show the public that the political culture of the New Order has changed.  
They are not followers of closed, narrow, authoritative paradigm but an open, wide and 
democratic one with some policies categorized as being “brave”. Habibie, for example, 
released the political captives; he even proposed a referendum to decide the fate of East 
Timor.  Meanwhile, Yosfiah immediately annulled the regulations of the Minister of 
Information by the end of November 1998, which previously required press institution to 
have Publication Permit (SIUPP). 
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      However, it is clear that these political actors represent the government and 
Golkar at the same time.18  By agreeing the Press Regulations that is freer than the 
previous Regulations, it will be shown to the public that Golkar or the New Order has 
changed.  
 
Bambang Sadono (Golkar) 
      Before occupying the position in the House of Representative  in Jakarta, Sadono 
was a journalist of Suara Merdeka, Semarang (Central Java).  In the New Order political 
system, all journalists were obligated to become the members of Indonesian Journalist 
Association (PWI), while all institutions made by the government (cooptation) were 
compelled to become parts of Golongan Karya (Golkar). After moving to Jakarta, Sadono 
was not a journalist of Suara Merdeka anymore but he joined the Suara Karya daily and 
occupied the position as a Senior Editor. Even though both of the newspaper use the 
name ”suara”, they are in the different management.  Suara Merdeka is a local newspaper 
in Central Java owned by Budi Santoso; Suara Karya is owned by Golkar. The latter is 
intentionally published to become the party channel.19 
      If during the era of President Soekarno the press tended to become political 
channel, in Soeharto era there was also an effort to that tendency, for example the United 
Development Party once published Pelita. In its course, however, Pelita newspaper did 
not last long.  Military group also has newspapers that had existed for quite long namely 
Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha that were published since 1965 (Surjomihardjo, 
2002: 218).  Entering the transition time, where the life of media was getting freer, the 
media published by groups, parties, or religions were facing challenges and opportunities 
to exist.  
  
 
                                                
18 Transition time, especially preliminary time, there was internal friction and conflict in Golkar. When BJ 
HJ Habibie nominated himself for the second time for the next presidency, a statement of an objection 
came from Golkar itself.  
19 Suara Karya was published on 11 March 1971, founded by a group of Golkar cadres with the impulse to 
make a public daily newspaper with the mission of making the development a success. The mission of 
Suara Karya was to make this newspaper a reading for the decision makers in governmental sphere and 
professionals, managers of Government Owned Companies, local authorities, community leaders and 
middle up community (http://www.suarakarya-online.com/aboutus.html) 
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     Back to Bambang Sadono, as the representation of Suara Karya and Golkar, his 
side with the new Press Regulations can be interpreted as an effort to build a new image 
as an old politician who was pro changes, pro democracy.  
 
Usamah Hisyam (FPP) 
      In The Kompas coverage about the draft of the Press Regulations, the name of 
Usamah Hisyam was an informant from the United Development Party in the House of 
Representative.  We know that at that time there were only three political parties in the 
House of Representative namely the United Development Party (PPP), Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI), and Golongan Karya.  However, there was an additional party 
namely the representatives from the Indonesian Army (ABRI).  From the minute of the 
discussion of the draft, it is known that Hisyam is an actively talking person with 
advanced ideas.  He seems to support the liberal press freedom. He said that the Minister 
of Information, Muhamad Yunus, might tell that the press freedom would continue, but 
as long as the principal Press Regulations was not annulled, there was no guarantee of the 
continuation of such press freedom, what was needed by then was the Regulations that 
guarantee the press freedom (Kompas, 5 July 1999). 
        In the context of the New Order politics, the political parties other than Golkar 
were just ornaments. Their role was quite far from being maximum if not just as 
complements.  Those who succeeded in getting their position in the People’s 
Representative Council were people who went through selection or screening by the 
authority.  One of the selection methods most often talked about was ”litsus” (penelitian 
khusus) or special investigation done by the authority namely the military. The candidates 
had to answer a set of questions to find out their loyalty to UUD 1945 and Pancasila. 
Another method was through elucidation of P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila-The Guidelines of Understanding and Implementing the Pancasila) as a course 
to “deepen” or agreeing the Pancasila as the only best ideology.  
        Hence, it becomes interesting to look thoroughly at the different opinions of the 
United Development Party members in the House of Representative, including that of 
Usamah Hisyam. Is there a political strategy to create an image of the change or was 
there a process of change among politicians in this transition era?  In addition to being the  
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member of PPP, Hisyam was a Secretary General of Parmusi (Indonesian Moslems 
Brotherhood) that will be made a political party (Kompas, 2 December 2005). By the 
time of the replacement of PPP chairman, Parmusi supported Bahtiar Chamsah to replace 
Hamzah Haz who at the same time was a Vice President (Kompas, 12 May 2003). 
However, when he failed in PPP, Hisyam joined the Democratic Party, begun with 
writing the biography of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Kompas, 22 May 2004).  
 
Hari Sabarno and Aminullah (The Chair of the Parliament-Army Faction) 
       Hari Sabarno and Aminullah come from the Army Fraction. Since the New Order 
government, the military involvement in the political life was inspired by the spirit of 
“double function”. This doctrine of political and social role of the Indonesian Army 
seemed to be an integral part of the negative effect of democratization.  One of them is 
the obligation of the Indonesian Army to sit in the chairs of the House of Representative 
and the Local House of Representative  without going through general election with the 
argument of giving them an opportunity to influence the state policy planning in the 
People’s Advisory Assembly (Sugeng, 2001:36).  
       In the context of discussing the draft of the Press Law, Kompas quotes their 
opinions containing the process of proposing this draft of Regulations. Hari Sabarno, for 
instance, said that the Draft of the Law would be presented in the final meeting ( Kompas, 
2 July 1999) while Aminullah explained that the House had decided to discuss the Draft 
of the Press Law although there was another Draft of Law proposed to the People’s 
Representative Council (Kompas, 17 July 1999). The statement indirectly showed that 
they supported the existence of the draft of the Press Law.  
 
The Change of the Politician Attitude  
      The attitude of the three politicians, Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah (the Minister of 
Information), Hari Sabarno and Aminullah (the Chairmen of the House of  
Representative), Bambang Sadono (Golkar), and Usamah Hisyam (PPP) to the draft of 
the Press Law is so interesting to learn.  We see that they wanted to show up their 
existence as politicians, who were pro-changes, especially the change of the Press Law.  
It is worth noting that in 1980s, when the government decided to change the principal 
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Press Law by constructing the draft of the SIUPP Regulations there was a debate between 
the fractions in the House, namely between PDI fraction, Karya Pembangunan (FKP or 
Golkar) fraction and Persatuan Pembangunan (FPP) fraction.  At that time, FKP 
suggested that such a permit was an obligatory that the press had to have. Thus, the press 
management could not be run carelessly and there had to be the law regulating it because 
the life of the press in Indonesia was not the free press without limits, but the freedom 
accompanied by functional responsibility.  On the other hand, FPP was said to be able to 
understand the existence of SIUPP even though they still required the press no to be 
entitled to proposing such a permit (Nurudin, 2003: 24-25).  This also applies to the 
support from Golkar in the New Order government with all of its political policies, 
including the repressive policies to certain mass media that was certainly different from 
the attitude taken in the time of the existence of this new draft of the Press Law.20  
Meanwhile, military was a loyal supporter of Golkar and Soeharto government.  The 
question was, why and for what did they change? Did they really change?  Looking back 
to the early situation of that political transition, the most urgent political requirement was 
developing figure or image that they had changed and supported political reform. For the 
reason, the statement, attitude and policy to be taken, as best as it could, had to take side 
with the reform. For the government, especially BJ Habibie, the image of the change is 
important to be understood by the public because people know very well his closeness 
with President Soeharto, even he was the right hand of Soeharto. Besides, in July 1999 
there would be a general election to choose definitive president and this is an opportunity 
for Habibie to nominate himself.  Thus, again, the image of a leader as pro democracy 
was badly needed.21  
   
                                                
20 Since the time before the independence until President Soekarno’s government, there had been some 
political parties that existed and voiced various political or group interests but in Soeharto era, especially 
since 1973 there was fusion of all political parties so that there were only United Development Party, 
Functional Party and Indonesian Democratic Party.  The winning of Golkar in the general election of the 
year 1977 means the end of all other parties since Golkar could take any decisions without having to 
consider the voices of other political parties (LP3ES, Analysis on Political Strength in Indonesia, Jakarta, 
1991, pages 214-215).   
21 RH Siregar, one of MPPI members, a press worker who had been involving himself in the Indonesian 
Journalist Organization (PWI) stated in the interview with the researcher that the attitude of the government 
shownby Yosfiah as the Minister of Information was the delegation from BJ Habibie.  The target was the 
presidential election in July 1999 where Habibie nominated himself.  
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    Referring to the Nimmo theory, the intention of the politicians in communication 
was to change or to prevent the change of the existing social structure. In this research, 
we find out that politicians were involved in changing the social structure by placing the 
press as an independent institution and that was free from the control of the government 
authority. In the context of the Indonesian politics, this is a big change because it has 
been more than three decades that the Indonesian press structure is under the government 
structure that is stated by various law stipulation, rules and Regulations that cuff it.  
Further discussion on this issue will be done at the final section of this research when we 
talk about the Press Freedom.   
      Still in the context of the Nimmo political leadership, the second category was 
ideologists. Those who took the role as ideologists did not concentrate their attention to 
urge the requirements they represented.  They focused more on the wider policy 
determination, put efforts of reform, and even supported the revolutionary change. 
Ideologists communicate to divert the objective not to represent a certain group (Nimmo, 
1989:33). Based on the finding in this research, and especially referring to the informants 
selected by Kompas daily in discussing the draft of the Press Regulations, no one of them 
is called an ideologist. Politicians from the government both in the executive and in the 
parliament, tend to protect and fight for the temporary need namely to change their image 
as politicians who are pro-changes.  
       This phenomenon actually confirms political reality in Indonesia where by far 
there is few figures with a vision as an ideologist rather than a practitioner. In the history 
of the political development in Indonesia, it was during the colonization and the early 
time of the independence that some ideologists like Soekarno, Tan Malaka, and Syahrir 
existed. They developed certain ideology, especially nationalism.  
 
6.2.3 How Political Activists view the Drafting of the Press Law  
After discussing politicians as the communicators, now we will discuss the 
research finding in the form of the informants of The Kompas daily who are categorized 
as activists. They, still referring to Nimmo, are communicators as well as political 
leaders. Different from the politicians, these activists can be categorized into two, first is 
the spokesperson, and second is the opinion leader (Nimmo, 1989: 38-39). Spokesperson 
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is someone without governmental position, thus he is not a professional in the 
communication either so that he is called a political activist and semi professional in the 
political communication. He speaks for the interest of the organization, representing the 
members and does the bargaining. To Nimmo’s opinion, a spokesperson is similar to a 
journalist who reports the government decision and policy to the members of the 
organization. In describing the second communicator namely the opinion leader, Nimmo 
calls it someone from whom the direction and the information are collected who appears 
in two fields namely to influence other people’s decision, and to convey information from 
media news to the public community (1989: 40).  In this research, the opinion leader 
category is not found.  
      According to the result of this research, the informants other than politicians are 
“representatives” or “spokespersons” of each organization.  They are Leo Batubara 
(MPPI and SPS), Atmakusumah (LPDS), Ulil Abshar Abdala (ISAI), Jakob Oetama ( 
Kompas), Azkarmin Zaini (AN-teve) and Andi Muis (a lecturer in Hasanuddin 
University). Some of them like Batubara and Abdala had been discussed in the previous 
section, thus in this section we will discuss more about Atmakusumah, Azkarmin Zaini, 
Jakob Oetama, Andi Muis, Hotman Siahaan. 
 
Atmakusumah (LPDS) 
      When he was the news informant for Kompas with regards to the draft of Press 
Regulations in May 1999, Atmakusumah Astraatmadja was the Executive Director of 
Doctor Sutomo Press Institution or Lembaga Pers Dokter Sutomo (LPDS).  This is an 
educative institution in Jakarta focusing on the training of journalist candidates.  The 
chairman of LPDS is Jakob Oetama.  In his speech in the handover of the Executive 
Director from Atmakusumah to Tribuana Said in Jakarta in August 2002, Jacob said that 
the replacement of the director executive was a reform step in order to develop LPDS 
further. He emphasized the importance of the cooperation and the commitment to 
develop this institution ahead and the unification of the vision by thinking critically about 
the development of the surrounding environment (Kompas, 22 August 2002).  
Meanwhile, Atmakusumah said that the development of the journalistic training in such a 
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transition era was a challenge.  The extraordinary press freedom and the big numbers of 
mass media were advantages as well as challenges for LPDS.22 
      In fact, Atmakusumah’s involvement in journalistic has been so long namely 
since the year 1958 when he and some journalists worked in the Indonesia Raya daily and 
in the Minggu Indonesia Raya daily newspaper (Surjomihardjo, 2002: 251). Indonesia 
Raya was a newspaper published by indigenous people during the colonization, and it 
became one of the media that dared to report critical opinions to the government.  Both in 
Soekarno and Soeharto era, Indonesia Raya was the victim of the authority cruelty by 
being bridled.  The chief of Indonesia Raya, Mochtar Lubis, showed his independence by 
refusing to sign the 19 chapters of “loyalty document” obligated by the government. 
Through the Indonesian Press Institution (IPI), Lubis wrote to the International Press 
Institute while blaming his friend, Rosihan Anwar, who was submitted to the government 
control (Smith, 1986:7).  Just like Lubis, Atmakusumah who then replaced him, also had 
the independent principle in managing the Indonesia Raya.  This newspaper tried hard to 
defend its freedom with sharp, critical, and open style in facing the New Order regime, 
but finally it had to end after being bridled in 1970s (Haryanto, 2006: viii)23. 
      Together with other press activists like Leo Batubara, RH Siregar, Ridlo Eisy, 
Alamudin, Atmakusumah then joined the MPPI (Indonesian Press and Broadcasting 
Community) preparing this draft of the Press Regulations.  In addition to becoming the 
chairman of LPDS, after the ratification of this Press Regulations, Atmakusumah became 
the first Press Council chairman after the New Order.  LPDS is an independent institution 
with the task of developing the press freedom in Indonesia of which performance is far 
different from the appearance, the role, and the character of the Press Council in Soeharto 
time.  The ideas of Atmakusumah clearly support the liberal press freedom and thus it is 
not without reason if Kompas takes him as an informant in this matter of the draft of the 
Press Regulations.      
                                                
22 Once LPDS was in cooperation with George Washington University by inviting Dr.Janet Steele to teach 
in LPDS. On 20 October 2005, Dr Janet discussed the style of literature journalism in a discussion  entitled 
Literature Journalism in The Wars Within in the University of Indonesia (Kompas, 7 October 2005). 
23 The reasons for bridling the Indonesia Raya can be read in the Decree of the Minister of Information 
No.20/SK/Dirjen-PG/K/1974 stating that the Indonesia Raya had contained articles that weaken national 
life aspects, damage community trust to National Leadership, echo sensitiveness without solution, create an 
opportunity to lead the situation to rebellion (Haryanto, Indonesia Raya Dibredel!, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 
2006,  pp.314-315) 
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Leo Sabam Batubara (SPS-MPPI) 
      Almost along the political transition time especially at the early of 1999 to 2005 
and after, the name Leo Batubara seemed to become the main informant for Kompas in 
the discussion about the press and especially the press freedom. During Soeharto 
government, existed the name of Cosmas Batubara, he was the former university students 
activist in 1966 and then threw himself into Golongan Karya and finally occupied a 
position in the cabinet as the Minister of People’s Housing.  Cosmas then also became 
one of the advisors of the Suara Karya daily newspaper. Cosmas is the elder brother of 
Leo Batubara.  The existence of Sabam Leo Batubara (his complete name) seemed to fill 
the vacancy of the name Cosmas Batubara that did not occupy the important position in 
the government anymore.  
      In addition to sitting in the chief editors of newspapers owned by Golkar, Suara 
Karya, Leo was also active in the Newspaper Publication Organization (SPS) as the 
Secretary General that in the New Order which was known as the part of some press 
institutions under the control of the government through the Minister of Information.  
But, after Soeharto stepped down, he was actively initiating the new Press Regulations in 
addition to the Broadcasting Regulations through the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting 
Community or MPPI. In some discussions and also articles in mass media, he often takes 
an example of the use of an independent regulatory body that has the authority to regulate 
media.  ”In the authoritarian countries like North Korea, Myanmar, and Cuba, the 
regulating body is the government. In the democratic countries like South Korea, South 
Africa, and USA, the body regulating the broadcasting is an independent regulatory 
body” (Kompas, 12 November 2002).  For the reason, in the draft of the Press 
Regulations, the MPPI group was also very eager to suggest that the Press Council take 
its role as an independent institution.  
       
Ulil Abshar Abdala (ISAI) 
      The figure of Ulil is actually more attached to the Liberal Moslem Network (JIL) 
that was established in Jakarta in 1990s rather than to ISAI. JIL is a movement motored 
by young Moslems of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) who have different opinions from some NU  
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leaders who tightly hold qaul (statement) of the previous religious leaders as it is written 
in their yellow book.  In each discussion of religious affairs held by NU, the statement 
becomes the main reference to get the solution for community problems (Kompas, 2001). 
Ulil, for example, concerned the existence of religious polarization; for instance, the 
existence of fatwa that prohibits a woman to become a president. Such a fatwa even 
serves as social disintegrative factor (Kompas, 7 June 2004). ISAI in which Ulil was an 
active member is an institution that pays attention to the smoothness of information 
current in the society by, for example, publishing the books that used to be prohibited to 
be published by the government such as those written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 
establishing a radio station (Radio 68H), and establishing a media controlling institution 
(Kompas, 6 January 2000). When the Tempo magazine was sued by Tommy Winata 
because of an article about Tanah Abang trading center, and finally the State Court of 
East Jakarta legalized the seizure the house the senior editor of Tempo Magazine, 
Goenawan Mohammad, ISAI joined some other groups including MPPI in a 
demonstration opposing the press criminalization (Kompas, 1 October 2003). 
 
Jakob Oetama (Kompas) 
      He is identical to Kompas whereas he is “only” one of Kompas founders. Frans 
Seda, another founder, says that, in fact, the idea of the foundation cited by General Yani 
in order for the Catholic people to counter the Indonesian Communist Party was not 
followed up until they met Jakob Oetama and Auwyong, two professionals in the mass 
media (Iswara, 2001).  Then, a foundation under the name of Bentara Rakyat was 
established with its newspaper that would be named the same to counter the communist 
Harian Rakyat newspaper.  Being members of the foundation, Jakob Oetama and 
Auwyong Peng Koen got full professional autonomy as the editors of the newspaper 
(Iswara, 2001: 182). 
      In 1987, the Research, Education and Information, Economy and Social 
Institution (LP3ES) published compilation of Jakob Oetama’s articles entitled the 
Indonesian Press Perspective.  In this book, there were 6 articles about the press as a 
social institution, 5 articles about the press and social change, and 8 articles about the 
development journalism. As for the press as a social institution, Jakob Oetama said that 
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the press as an institution is always in inter relation with the main streams and the main 
structures of its community, and even though the press has an active role, it cannot 
become a single power, it always plays the role when it is with other institution, and it is 
influenced by the main stream and the structure of the community (Parera and Utomo, 
1987: 9).  Here, we can see that he expressed his idea carefully, indirectly and it is such 
an opinion that “saves” Kompas from the government pressure when repressive political 
system was still powerful.  
      With Jakob Oetama’s style of leadership, Kompas daily grows fast in The 
Kompas Gramedia Group (Kelompok Kompas Gramedia-KKG) with some publication 
and non-publication enterprises.  Based on the Annual Report of 2000-2001 ”Euphoria, 
Capital Concentration and Mass Pressure” published by the Independent Journalist 
Alliance, KKG has 57 publications, far below Jawa Pos with 107 publications (Suprapto 
et al., 2001: enclosure). 
     Being a public figure and especially in the press, Jakob has various predicates, 
such as Senior Journalist, Press Figure, Kompas Founder, President Director of KKG.  
Due to his being senior in the press, he is close to many other press figures such as 
Atmakusumah, the former chairman of the Press Council and the former Director of 
LPDS. Jakob Oetama is the Chairman of LPDS Foundation (Kompas, 22 August 2002).   
With regards to the draft of the Press Regulations, Jakob Oetama insisted the ratification 
of the Press Regulations before the general election.  The Vice Chairman of Kompas 
Editor, St.Sularto, one of his close persons in an interview with the researcher said that 
the time of President BJ Habibie was the transition time, which was still unstable (24 
August 2005). Sularto said further: 
 
”I especially see in the era after Soeharto, the press freedom appeared in 
the Habibie’s time.  There was a new Press Regulation; we did not have 
to submit the publication (SIUPP) or to get the SIUPP; we only have to 
inform that we will publish this. That was the beginning, and then there 
was no obligation anymore to inform. In terms of the freedom, out of the 
three presidents, it was during Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) era that I 
saw the most freedom.  We could criticize whatever.   During the 
Habibie presidency, in terms of the religion (one of the religions) was 
actually rather strict.  Even though it was not stated explicitly, we had to 
be careful writing this issue”   (Interview on 24 August 2005). 
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      Thus, the period of the construction and discussion of the draft of Press 
Regulations was an important moment for Kompas to insist the ratification of the 
Regulations.  
 
Azkarmin Zaini (AN-teve/IJTI) 
      He is the Chief Editor of ANteve, a private television financed by Bakrie Group, 
owned by Aburizal Bakrie. Before joining ANteve, Zaini was a journalist of Kompas 
owned by Jacob Oetama.  In addition to being the chief editor, Zaini is the honor member 
of the Television Journalist Association (IJTI), an association of television journalists 
existing in the reform time.  On 6 August 1999, together with other journalist 
associations, IJTI signed the Indonesian Journalist Ethics Code (Kode Etik Wartawan 
Indonesia-KEWI) as a common ethics code owned by the journalists in Indonesia.  
Previously, only PWI has the ethics code because PWI was the only journalist association 
that was permitted to exist in Indonesia during the Soeharto government.  After the 
existence of AJI in 1994, AJI also had its own ethics code.  
      Zaini turned to join MPPI and took part in citing changes in media life in 
Indonesia through the construction of the drafts of the Press Regulations and 
Broadcasting Regulations. In terms of the Opinion column in Kompas daily newspaper 
(14 August 1999), Zaini proposed the extension of the meaning of the press in the draft of 
Press Regulations by including broadcasting press. The Discussion Body of the People’s 
Representative Council had “inherited” the Draft of Broadcasting Regulations to the 
House of Representative resulted from the general election in 1999 because their working 
period was about to end. Zaini considered this decision a hard blow for the organizers of 
the broadcasting media and a struggle for the democracy enactment.  The consequence of 
the draft of the Broadcasting Regulations not being discussed was that the broadcasting 
media (television and radio) still had to make their fate dependent on the Regulations 
Number 24 Year 1997 on the Broadcasting that was criticized as the authoritarian 
Regulations because of placing the government as a very powerful regulator. These 
Regulations is also contrary to the rights over information freedom contained in Chapter 
VI of the People’s Advisory Assembly No XVII year 1998.  Zaini said that by including 
the broadcasting press in the Press Regulations, the People’s Representative Council had 
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“expiated the sins” since it was them that gave birth to Regulations Number 24 Year 
1997 on the Broadcasting (Kompas, 14 August 1999). 
 
Andi Muis (Hasanudin University-Makassar) 
     The name of Andi Muis, Andi Abdul Muis Andi Makksau in complete, is more 
popular as a lecturer in Hasanudin University (Unhas) in Makassar rather than a lecturer 
in the University of Indonesia.  Nonetheless, his latter position places him as an expert or 
informant for communication study and especially about the press in Indonesia.  In 
addition to teaching in Unhas, A Muis, his name when writing a column, is also a lecturer 
of communication and law at the University of Indonesia.  Before Soeharto stepped 
down, Muis was a Kompas columnist in the press and media subjects.  Muis was born in 
Kalukuang Island, a small island in Makasar Traits.  His father was a Bone nobleman and 
his mother Puang Niati was also of a noble family in Maros Regency (Bahkri, 2000: 
251). In 2000 The Kompas published articles in a book entitled ”The Path of Democracy, 
Press Freedom Role for Political Communication Culture”.   It can be said that Muis is a 
communication expert of Unhas that Kompas daily uses him as his informant.24  
      One of Muis’ articles in the book is entitled ”Understanding Globalization 
Demand in Press” that was published in Kompas on 28 June 1991. There, he suggests that 
the information globalization (mass media) cannot be separated from the economy 
globalization. The worry for the report “liberalization” in the Third World will create a 
strong reaction.  In Indonesia, the SIUPP institution will be considered to have increasing 
vital function to prevent or “tame” the globalization stream. ”Didn’t the Minister of 
Information, Harmoko, say that if SIUPP is eliminated there will be the press freedom 
anarchy because SIUPP even protects the responsible press freedom” (Bahkri, 2000: 4).  
He suggests compromise between the change of value of proximity and actuality news on 
one hand and non-judicative method of limiting reports freedom on the other hand.  
                                                
24 Muis is a Bachelor of Law from Hasanudin University, the former chapter of the University of Indonesia 
in Makasar and who wrote a thesis on journalism/publicity. In 1972 he prepared a dissertation in 
communication subject but there was no S2 and S3 programs in Indonesia so that he learned non-formally 
by making use of the writer membership in AMIC (Asian Mass Communication Research and Information 
Center) in Singapura.  Finally, he was promoted in Unhas with the promoters of Dr M.Alwi Dahlan and Dr 
Phil Astrid Sunarjo and Prof Hamijoyo (Bahkri, 2002: 252-253). 
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Otherwise, there will be more press publications “escape” to less healthy entertainment 
(features), because it is the only way of ensuring reports safety from SIUPP annulment.  
      
Hotman Siahaan (Airlangga University-Surabaya) 
       Being a lecturer in the Department of Social and Politics Science and then 
occupies the Dean position, Siahaan is popular with Non-Government Organizations 
(LSM) especially with regards to social issues in Surabaya (Kompas, 8 June 2001).  In 
fact, he is one of the lecturers in Airlangga University (Unair) who is active outside the 
campus.  He is also a member of the Social Change Study Institution (LSPS) while other 
lecturer like Prof Ramlan Surbakti is the Chairman of General Election Commission 
(KPU), and Dr Daniel Sparinga is also active in several Non-Government Organizations. 
       Although his activities do not relate much to the press, his popularity as an active 
lecturer in the society in Surabaya encouraged Kompas to take him as one of its 
informants in the discussion of the draft of the Press Law. He highlights more on the 
correlation between the foreign capital and the press.  He suggests that the foreign capital 
and the press without SIUPP will, of course, encourage freedom, but the freedom that is 
out of moral and ethics frames will even become a boomerang for the growth of the 
democracy (Kompas, 31 July 1999).  Here, he reminds that the press freedom that will be 
ratified in the Press Regulations must be accompanied by professionalism of the 
journalists.  Without the presence of the requirement the growth of the democracy will 
even be hampered.  
      Together with some popular names in the universities in Indonesia, Hotman M 
Siahaan was said to be part of Megawati Soekarnoputri as a President. ”I remain a 
spectator who will be free and fair in observing and analyzing. Besides, being a civil 
servant who wants to remain a civil servant, I am not allowed to take part in the team of a 
president candidate” (Kompas, 10 June 2004). 
      
6.2.4 How Kompas Channels the Pressure of the Press Activists  
      In Nimmo’s opinion, an activist is a communicator as well as a political leader but 
he is not a politician.  Thus, the activists being The Kompas informants are not 
politicians. Atmakusumah, Leo Batubara, Azkarmin Zaini, Andi Muis, Ulil Absar 
Abadala and Jakob Oetama are spokespersons for the interests of each organization, 
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namely LPDS, MPPI, ANteve and IJTI, Unhas, ISAI, and Kompas.  When reporting the 
draft of the Press Law by placing those five figures as informants, Kompas helps them 
disseminate their opinion about the draft of the Press Regulations. As we can see from 
this table, most of them voice louder than the politicians do; they do not merely support 
the draft of the Press Law that support the press freedom but they insist the ratification of 
it.  
      Referring to their experiences and activities, however, we see the similarity.  First, 
most activists have experiences in the press especially in the New Order era.   
Atmakusumah, and Jakob Oetama are journalists who have been active since the Old 
Order. Azkarmin Zaini and Leo Batubara are senior journalists in the New Order in this 
transition era and Andi Muis is a lecturer of communication in Hasanudin University.  
Only Ulil Absar Abdala and Hotman Siahaan do not have past experiences in the press.   
But Abdalla currently works in an institution having the commitment on the 
dissemination of the course of information (ISAI) and the press freedom and he is an 
activist of the student movement and the Liberal Islam movement. Hotman Siahaan is a 
lecturer in Unair who is active in NGO.  Thus, Abdala and Hotman are placed by The 
Kompas as representatives from the campus and they are young people who are pro to 
democracy.  
      What is not less interesting is that one of the politicians, Bambang Sadono from 
Golkar, turns to have a background as a journalist, both in the Suara Merdeka and in the 
Suara Karya. Thus, out of 14 informants of The Kompas in the report of this draft of the 
Press Regulations, most of them are press figures.   It can be concluded that Kompas 
daily newspaper gives space to the press figures to voice their concern about the 
importance of the new Press Laws that gives assurance for the press freedom. Their 
voices function as insistence to the government (the executive and the legislative) in the 
hope that by having such the freedom, the media have more or less the same position 
with the government and they are not subordinates of the government anymore.  This 
situation is badly needed for the life of democracy in Indonesia.  
 
6.2.5 Major Issues in the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
In this section, there will be an explanation of the next research finding, namely 
the main issues debated in the discussion of the draft of the Press Regulations Year 1999 
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in the parliament.  The main debated issues were the ones that also appear in some parts 
of the old Press Regulations Chapters namely the Regulations No. 11 Year 1966 
concerning the Principal Press Stipulations that later were renewed in the years 1967 and 
1982.  In the discussion of this draft of the Press Regulations year 1999, there were some 
issues strongly debated among the participants of the meeting, namely the government 
(the executive) representatives, the party or the group representatives in the legislative, 
and the media representatives. It was found in this research that those issues were closely 
related to the big concept of democracy and press freedom, starting from the use of the 
term “kemerdekaan pers” or  the “press independence” to the debate of the ”trial by the 
press”. 
 
6.2.6 The Birth of the Draft of the Press Law Year 1999 
      Before occupying the Presidency to replace Soeharto, BJ.Habibie was a Vice 
President.  As it was explained in the previous chapters, Habibie is a very close to, and 
often called as the ”right hand” of Soeharto. During the presidential time of Soeharto 
especially beginning from the period of the Development Cabinet III (March 1978- 
March 1983) Habibie had occupied an important position as the Minister of Research and 
Technology until the period of the Development Cabinet VI (March 1993-March 1998). 
For the reason, his appointment as the President disappoints some people, especially 
those expecting the end of the New Order era. Meanwhile, BJ Habibie tried his best to be 
welcomed by the people by making some ”big” decisions to show that he really did 
political reform, and was not pro-New Order.  An example of the important political 
policy is releasing the political prisoners.25  In addition to the presidential institution 
occupied by BJ Habibie, another political institution that wants to appear to be reformist 
is the House of  Representative  period 1997-2001.  The interface of the ”reformist” spirit 
of those two institutions bears the new Draft of the Press Law with totally different 
characteristic from the old Press Law made by Soeharto regime.  
                                                
25 David Bourchier from School of Asian Studies University of Western Australia, says that Habibie takes 
many parts in the previous government, but he can hold out and lead a reform time marvelously, which is 
almost like Gorbachev style (Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen, Indonesia Di Tengah Transisi Aspek-
Aspek Sosial Reformasi dan Krisis, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2000, p.17) 
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      However, the initiative to bear a new Press Regulations that is far different from 
various legal stipulations regulating press life in Indonesia was not born by BJ Habibie. 
This idea, as Leo Batubara suggests, appears from some volunteers of the society who 
call themselves the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Community (MPPI) in the 
meeting in Pacet-Cianjur, 20-23 October 1998 (Kompas, 19 September 2006).  The 
meeting did not only give birth to the draft of the Press Regulations but also the draft of 
the MPR Decree on the Information Freedom that later was accommodated in the MPR 
Decree No XVI/1998 on Human Rights. This formula then becomes the amended 
Chapter 28F of UUD 1945. 
      On 1 March 1999, as many as 22 members of the Comission I of the People’s 
Representative Council lead by Bambang Sadono (Development Functional Faction) 
proposed the Draft of the Press Regulations made by MPPI to become the Draft of the 
Press Regulations.  The proposal was then discussed in the Plenary Session in the 
People’s Representative Council on 12 July 1999.  Suddenly, President BJ Habibie sent 
the draft of the Government Press Regulations on 7 July 1999 to the People’s 
Representative Council.  This draft from the government was scheduled to become the 
main subject while the Draft of the Press Law of MPPI version would become the 
comparison (Batubara, Kompas 19 September 2006).  This draft was discussed in 
marathon from 25 August to 13 September 1999.  Four factions in the Commission I of 
the People’s Representative Council with the government that was represented by the 
Information Department finally agreed it to become the Regulations and the government 
made it into effect on 23 September 1999. Batubara, one of MPPI activists said, two 
important persons in the Information Department who contributed to the smoothness of 
the discussion of this Draft of Regulations were Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah (the Minister 
of Information) and IGK Manila (the Secretary General to the Information Department). 
Both were retired armed service officers. Yunus Yosfiah was previously Leutenant 
General who once was on duty as the Commander of Special Troop (Kopassus) in East 
Timor (Timor Leste).  In addition to being a brave commander, Yosfiah also got 
international attention with regards to the case of the killing of five Western journalists in 
Balibo. The appointment of Yosfiah as the Minister of Information disappoints some 
parties, especially those expecting the openness (O’Rourke, 2002).  
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      In the discussion, there were three persons from MPPI who were asked to become 
the government expert staff, namely Atmakusumah, Azkarmin Zaini, and Leo Batubara. 
Several names called as ”reformist stars” of the Comission I of the People’s 
Representative Council were Bambang Sadono (FKP), Soenarto (FABRI), YB 
Wiyanjono (FPDI), Amir L.Sirait (FKP), Sofyan Lubis (FKP), Ansel Da Lopez (FKP), 
Bachtiar Ali (FKP) and Usamah Hisyam (FPP) (Kompas, 19 September 2006). 
 
6.2.7  Crucial Issues  
The debate on crucial issues in the Draft of Press Regulations occurred in the third 
level discussion, on 27 and 30 August 1999 in the Workshop Meeting of the Special 
Committee and the Minister of Information of the Republic of Indonesia. The chairman 
of the meeting was Aisyiah Amini from the United Development Party (PPP).  In short, 
the debate was recorded in table 5.8 below.  This record originates from the Minute of the 
Workshop Meeting of the Special Committee on the Draft of Press Law and the 
Government, Meeting on 26 and 27 September 1999. 
 
Table 6.9: The Issues of the Debate among the Executive, the Legislative and  
Media People 
Topic The Executive (the 
Minister of 
Information) 
The Legislative 
(Members of the 
Parliament) 
Media (Editors 
or Journalists) 
 
The term ”Press 
Independence” 
 
”For the government, 
those two terms have 
the same meaning. 
We see that the 
nuance of the views 
of FPP, FKP and 
FPDI are similar, 
only one is longer, 
more detailed; as it 
was mentioned 
previously that the 
press independence is 
a very important 
element to create 
democratic life of the 
community, nation 
 
1. The Development 
Functional Faction-
FKP (Bambang 
Sadono):  In terms of 
the terminology, the 
law embraced in UUD 
1945 is independence, 
Chapter 28. The Press 
legal theories as 
suggested by Prof 
Umar Senoadji always 
quote the terms 
independent press and 
press independence. 
 
2. FKP (Amir Liven 
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and country.  In the 
government 
formulation, it was 
only mentioned as an 
important element in 
democracy life. We 
assume the 
democratic life (italic 
print from the 
researcher) covers all 
the aforementioned 
things” (Minute of 
the first Workshop 
Meeting, 26 August 
1999: 23). 
 
 
Sirait): To my opinion, 
there must be 
something to be 
corrected. We look at 
the existing theory, 
look at the 
Constitution, and 
compare it with 
countries that are 
advanced in legal 
affairs. We should not 
think too much about 
similarity, we see the 
idea of this nation 
ahead, the national 
target on this nation. 
What we emphasize 
here is independence.  
 
3.   The Army Faction-
FABRI (Isnawan): the 
press freedom is not an 
absolute matter.  
 
4. The Indonesian 
Democratic Party 
Faction-FPDI (YB 
Wiyanjono): We do 
not refuse this term.  
In fact, we prefer to 
use freedom because 
behind the screen of 
the freedom there must 
be responsibility, right, 
obligation.  
 
 
5. The Unity 
Development Party 
Faction-FPP (Usamah 
Hisyam): 
Independence is more 
substantial because 
being independent is 
the right of everyone, 
every nation. 
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Trial by the 
Press 
 
The Minister of 
Information (Moh 
Yunus Yosfiah):  If 
we are only under the 
protection of the 
journalistic ethics 
code, it does not have 
the legal implication, 
no legal sanctions.  
Of course, there is the 
penal code (KUHP) 
but it is too colonial.  
Here, chapter 4 
relates to chapter 14. 
According to the 
penal code, however, 
the legal threat is 
imprisonment.  We 
have coordinated 
with the Department 
of Justice.  We agree 
to impose journalists 
with fine, not 
imprisonment that we 
consider too 
punishing.  
 
 
 
1. The Army Faction  
(Nyoman Tamu 
Aryasa): We propose 
chapter 4 to become 
”The press publication 
is obligated to make 
public of the fair, right 
and accurate court 
process and it does not 
judge the accused or 
the suspected”. 
 
 
2. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): We propose 
some fundamental 
changes, thus the 
entire of chapter 1 is 
omitted and replaced 
so that it reads: ”The 
press publication is 
obligated to a. Report 
an event and or and 
idea accurately, b. 
honor highly 
profession ethics code 
ratified by the Press 
Council, c. Honor the 
religious norms and 
the sense of morality 
that the society 
embraces, d. Fulfill the 
rights to answer and 
the rights to make 
corrections in  
 
accordance with the 
requirement of the 
readers with regards to 
the report of the news 
that is untrue, 
slanderous, and or 
provocative” 
 
3. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): We propose 
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to eliminate chapter 4 
with the consideration 
of the substance that 
can be returned to the 
ethics code or other 
regulations.  However, 
if other factions agree 
to reformulate, FKP 
prefers the formula 
proposed by FPP. 
 
4. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam):  FPP 
considers the process 
of trial by the press 
has been included in 
the journalistic ethics 
code so that FPP 
eliminates the issue in 
order for the 
inconsistency not to 
occur.  
 
5. F-ABRI (I Nyoman 
Tamu Aryasa):  Since 
there is no ethics code 
and the council is not 
involved in the 
discussion of the 
ethics code, isn’t it 
possible just to add 
”does not judge the 
suspected or the 
accused”. 
 
6. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): One of the 
targets of the 
Regulation is the law 
supremacy. It means 
that we try to place the 
legal stipulations on its 
portion and this 
Regulation will submit 
to all of the 
stipulations. 
Meanwhile, with 
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regards to concern that 
trial by the press is not 
present in the ethics 
code, we would like to 
inform that it is 
present. The journalist 
ethics code has 
accommodated the 
issue for long time.  
 
7. Chairperson of the 
Meeting (Aisyah 
Amini-FPP):  That’s 
not the essence.  What 
was discussed was the 
ethics code composed 
by the Press Council; 
it was not there. That’s 
the problem.  We have 
to understand the trial 
by the press that is 
different from the 
contempt of court. The 
contempt of court is 
the attitude of 
underestimating the 
court while the trial by 
the press is any citizen 
of this country who is 
judged by the press, 
not by the court, while 
we have to prevent 
this. 
 
8. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam):.. In terms of 
the “trial by the press” 
where someone feels 
to be judged while he 
feels that the report is 
not true, there is a 
legal process to take, 
for example taking the 
case to the police. The 
simple example is the 
case of the “trial by 
the press” to the 
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Attorney General Andi 
Ghalib. This can be 
true that there is the 
trial by the press 
because the media 
quoted the official 
informant in a press 
conference. If Andi 
Ghalib feels to be 
judged by the press, he 
could take perfect 
steps by bringing the 
case to the police.  
 
9. F-ABRI (Isnawan): 
Now, we are talking 
about trial by the 
press, the judgment by 
the press. If we want 
to talk in details, we 
have to have the same 
perception about the 
meaning of judging.  
We call someone a 
thief; we are judging. 
Thus, when it is 
required that a report 
must be accurate, it 
must be accurate. 
Accurate means 
showing facts. The 
interest of the Army is 
the addition of clear 
statement no to do trial 
by the press.  
 
 
10. F-ABRI (Isnawan): 
We still add this issue 
of judging or trial by 
the press. 
 
11. F-PP (KH.Amin 
Bunyamin): We do 
not include trial by 
the press in this 
chapter.  We agree 
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with FKP. 
 
12.F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): We 
consider this (the trial 
by the press) not 
important because it 
relates person per 
person, that is also the 
interest of the society  
 
 
The Press 
Publication 
Registration 
 
The Minister of 
Information (Moh 
Yunus Yosfiah): The 
government is 
supposed to be 
consistent that the 
registration is needed 
for various purposes. 
It is rather weird, for 
example, if the press 
is under consultation 
of the information 
department but it gets 
information from 
other sources.  They 
have to find it in the 
Information 
Department... The 
objective of the press 
enterprise registration 
is to register the 
materials for 
information that are 
prepared well and 
become the official 
source of 
information.  
 
 
1. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): Just like the 
early position of F-KP, 
we do not agree to the 
registration of the 
press institution to the 
Department of 
Information.   
 
2. F-ABRI (Int Aryasa):  
We are badly needed 
and we agree to 
propose the 
government that any 
enterprise that is going 
to publish the press 
enterprise must report 
it to the Department of 
Information.  
 
3.  F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): We might be 
able to understand 
what FKP expresses to 
eliminate this press 
publication 
registration. One of the 
reasons might be the 
traumatic attitude.  
However, if we look at 
the past chapters that 
give assurance on the 
press independence, 
there do not seem to 
be an opportunity for 
 
1.  The chairman 
of  PWI 
(RH.Siregar): 
If the foreign 
press must 
register to the 
Department 
of 
Information, 
it becomes an 
international 
principle 
problem. 
Thus, 
reporting is 
enough.  
 
2.   Antara news 
agency (Parni 
Hadi): As far 
as I 
experience 
abroad 
(Germany), 
there is no 
Department 
of 
Information,  
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the government to 
issue the regulations.  
The Minister of 
Information model 01 
year 1984 had 
colonized this nation. 
Thus, I agree to this 
formulation.  
 
 
4.  F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): To our 
opinion, if we have to 
register, why do we 
have to do it to the 
Department of 
Information? We can 
also put this data 
collection to the Press 
Council, for example.  
 
but I have to 
report to the 
immigration 
to get my stay 
permit. 
 
Foreign Capital 
 
1. The Minister of 
Information 
(M.Yunus): 
In line with the old 
Regulations and if 
I am not mistaken, 
it is still valid, 
there is foreign 
capital entering 
press enterprise. 
As a consequence 
of the 
globalization, 
however, and 
being a member 
WTO, I consider 
this policy must be 
adapted. We 
approach the 
Department of 
Foreign Capital 
Investment to 
accommodate this 
issue in 
establishing the 
 
1. F-ABRI (I Nyoman 
Aryasa): With the 
globalization, the 
opportunity of foreign 
capital to enter cannot 
be prevented. We 
propose maximum 
foreign capital as 
much as 49%. 
 
2. F-PP (KH Amin 
Bunyamin): The 
current problem is 
unstable national 
politics. Is it already 
the time for foreign 
capital to enter the 
press enterprise?  Will 
this fund be free from 
value? For example, 
Russia that is 
communist and the 
role of press in 
forming opinions was 
so strong.  
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future Regulations. 
 
2. Officer of Trade 
and Industry 
Department (no 
name): This issue 
is in the process of 
the discussion. 
 
 
3. The Minister of 
Information 
(M.Yunus 
Yosfiah): We have 
an interest to make 
media industry 
grow well in 
Indonesia.  We 
propose that 
foreign capital to 
come in, except 
that we remain 
closed, but we 
return it to the 
members of the 
Council. 
 
 
3. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): FKP would 
like to hand this to the 
dynamics of the 
existing regulations, so 
that it is not stipulated 
in this Press 
Regulations but it is 
arranged in terms of 
capital market.  
 
Legal 
Protection for 
Journalists 
  
1. F-ABRI (Aryasa):  We 
propose this article 
(DIM no 23/32?), ”any 
action obstructing the 
implementation of the 
press functions as 
suggested in article (1) 
and article (2) are 
prohibited” is 
eliminated.  Even 
when we only talk 
about the function, I 
suppose no prohibition 
is allowed.  
 
2. F-ABRI (Fisnawan): 
The Army Faction 
expects this to be 
deleted because the 
 
Antara news 
agency (Parni 
Hadi): I agree 
with the 
protection for 
journalists.  
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words of any of this 
action are really the 
words that cannot 
predict whatever 
behind the words of 
“each action”.  We 
fear that finally this 
press independence 
seems to be something 
absolute, which no one 
can control.  
 
3. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): We agree 
that this article (3) to 
be deleted with the 
reason that without 
being controlled, what 
have been agreed in 
the Regulations must 
be done.  
 
4. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): Journalists 
must be protected.  All 
functions of the press 
must be guaranteed.  
 
5. F-KP:  Special chapter 
is needed to protect 
journalists.  
 
 
6. F-ABRI (Aryasa): 
Protecting any actions 
is too abstract.  
 
The Publication 
Prohibition 
 
The Minister of 
Information 
(Mohammad Yunus 
Yosfiah):  I suppose 
everyone agrees that 
by far the 
government is 
considered to be too 
powerful so that it 
eliminates human 
 
1. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): In addition 
to being imposed to 
printing prohibition by 
the government, the 
court is not allowed to 
kill or close the press 
publication. Thus, any 
mistake of a report 
will be imposed on the 
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rights. So, we’d 
better discuss about 
judgment further 
later.  
penal sanction to the 
persons in charge. 
 
2. The chairperson of the 
meeting (Aisyiah 
Amini -FPP): 
The logic is that the 
court cannot directly 
judge if there is no 
action. How will the 
court prohibit if there 
is no action to take?  
 
3. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono): 
We suggest that press 
should not be censored 
or bridled by anyone, 
except that the law 
allows it to be 
implemented, because 
we are submitted to 
the law supremacy.  
We look at the 
prevailing legal 
stipulation, the court.  
 
4. F-KP (Sofyan Lubis): 
Isn’t that possible if 
the publication 
prohibition does not 
come from the 
government only. We 
can still question if it 
is from the court, 
when it comes from 
the law, we have to be 
submitted to it. 
 
5. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): We propose 
to add to the sentence 
“cannot be prohibited 
by the government” 
with the words ”and 
the court”. In addition 
to not being able to be 
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prohibited by the 
government, even the 
court is not allowed to 
kill or close the press 
publication. Thus, any 
mistake of the report is 
only imposed to penal 
sanction to the persons 
in charge.  
 
6. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): Responding 
your question, madam, 
in a state situation of 
emergency, even the 
court has no rights to 
halt the press 
publication with the 
addition of the words 
”and the court”. 
 
7. F-ABRI (Isnawan): It 
is interesting, but we 
suppose that the court 
will prohibit the 
publication with a 
legal process. I have a 
description as an 
example.  In a civil 
case, there happens to 
be a case of two 
similar trademarks 
brought to the court 
and it was decided one 
to win the case.  The 
consequence is that the 
company with the 
resembling trademark 
must be banned to 
publish.  Is this 
prohibited to publish? 
Thus, we consider this 
formulation sufficient, 
“not prohibited to be 
published by the 
government”, while 
the process in the court 
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is another thing.  
 
 
8. The chairperson of the 
meeting (Aisyah 
Amini-FPP):  Thus, 
our Regulation is not 
for the press only but 
for many other 
regulations. The court 
is, of course, the 
foremost front for the 
society to get justice. 
The example is two 
press publications; 
under two names, both 
go to the court. The 
court will decide 
which one to be 
authorized to publish. 
The court for sure will 
take either one to be 
published, to be 
authorized, or the 
other to be prohibited.  
Thus, legal process 
must be followed.  In 
principle, there is no 
censor and no bridling.  
Is it acceptable? The 
Working Committee 
will discuss it later.  
 
9. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): To omit the 
word “court” we need 
a debate.  In order to 
guarantee the press 
independence, we 
have to prevent the 
society from 
demanding the closure 
of the press 
publication.  
 
10. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam): An 
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illustration, The 
Kompas daily reports 
the issues hurting the 
Moslems and there 
was mass 
demonstration to ask 
the court to bridle  
Kompas.  Will the 
court do this?  This 
happened to the 
Monitor magazine. If 
there are such 
pressures, is bridling 
allowed? The court 
legal process will 
decide to give sanction 
to the chief editor but 
it does not stop the 
press enterprise. 
 
The 
Independent 
Press Council 
 
1. The Minister of 
Information 
(M.Yunus 
Yosfiah): If the 
number of the 
management used 
to be 25 persons 
including those 
from the 
government, now I 
suppose it is less 
(15).  The Press 
Council also 
receives the fund 
from the 
Government like 
Komnasham 
(human rights 
national 
commission).  
Let’s implement 
this Press Council 
independently to 
our colleagues.  
 
2. The Minister of 
 
1. F-ABRI (Int Aryasa): 
We do not mind about 
the number, but we 
recommend the 
presence of the 
representatives from 
the Government and 
from the society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. F-ABRI (Int.Aryasa): I 
still recommend 
representatives from 
the government, even 
only one. Then, I 
recommend the 
elimination of fund 
from the government, 
because with the fund, 
the independence of 
the Press Council will 
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Information 
(M.Yunus 
Yosfiah): By far, 
there is fund for 
the Press Council 
from the 
Government; when 
there is no more 
fund, where does 
this fund come 
from?  
disappear.  
 
3. F-KP (Bahtiar Ali): 
We want to return to 
the meaning of the 
Press Council 
universally.  The Press 
Council is an 
organization 
established and 
founded by the 
society.  Thus, no 
government elements 
should be included.  
 
4. F-KP (Bambang 
Sadono):  We agreed 
that we have one 
principle that we want 
to return things related 
to the press 
community to the 
press community 
itself.  Thus, we have 
to be consequent to be 
self-financed.  If the 
procedure is to get the 
fund, it must be from 
the APBN (national 
budget). 
 
5. F-PP (Usamah 
Hisyam):  As for the 
number of the Press 
Council, we agree it at 
least 15.  In terms of 
the fund, we have to 
consider what the 
government considers.  
We do not expect that 
this Regulation is 
ratified but there is no 
fund.  
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        From marathon meetings held by the House of Representative on 26, 27, 30, 31 
August and 1, 2, and 3 September 1999, there are at least 7 issues getting much portion of 
the discussion or debate, namely: 1. Press independence, 2.Trial by the press, 3. Press 
publication registration, 4. Foreign Capital, 5. Journalist legal protection, 6. Publication 
prohibition and 7. Independent Press Council.  In the next section, there will be a 
discussion about the meaning and the context of the debate of the issues.  Resources are 
taken from the Minute of the Workshop Meeting of The People’s Representative Council 
with the Government, 1st, 2nd and 3rd meetings. 
 
6.2.7.1 Press Freedom  
      The words or term used in this draft are new words or term namely the press 
freedom.  By far, the term that is used in the press law of the previous years and in 
various Indonesian literatures as well as in public discussion is press independence.26 
Usamah Hisyam of the Development Functional Faction (FPP) suggests the importance 
of developing new paradigm in national press life namely professional press freedom and 
leaving the old paradigm of responsible press independence.27  Using the language that 
Indonesian politics elites use, this vice chairman of FPP argues: ”in order to create the 
democratic life of a society, nation and country” as a universal principle. In Indonesian 
context, its philosophy is the freedom to express ideas and opinions as it is 
accommodated in 1945 Constitution (Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, 26 August 
1999: 20-21). The context of freedom, as FPP suggests, is free from slavery and 
colonization, and is not dependent on others.  Freedom is more substantial, because 
freedom is the rights of everyone and all nations.  Although in 1945 Constitution there is 
confirmation of the presence of freedom to express ideas and opinions, in the course of 
the life of the nation especially during the New Order, there was even colonization over 
                                                
26 In Chapter I of General Stipulation of Regulations No.11 Year 1966 on Press Main Stipulations, there is 
no mention of terms or definitions about this issue, for example in the General Stipulations. There was only 
terms of press freedom as it is written in Chapter II on Function, Obligation and Rights of Press in Chapter 
2 article (2 c):  National Press is obligated ”to struggle for truth and justice based on press freedom”.  The 
term ”press freedom” then existed in Article 5 of this Chapter (look at Law no. 11 year 1966).  
27 In fact, the term “responsible press freedom” became specter for Indonesian press circles in Soeharto era, 
since the essence of this issue was the absence of freedom.  Interview with some informants who took part 
in the discussion of this Draft of Regulations, for example RH.Siregar, reveals the traumatic situation of the 
composers so that some terms or stipulations had to be omitted or added.  
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the life of the national press. The choice of the word freedom has fundamental meaning.  
The change of the word independence becomes quite important and principal as not 
merely change the word independence to freedom. 
      Bambang Sadono (Development Functional Faction-FKP) or Golkar faction takes 
juridical and theoretical reason based on legal terminology embraced in 1945 
Constitution namely freedom, which is contained in chapter 28.  Theoretically, referring 
to the idea of Seno Aji, the term is press freedom. ”When we use this term, it has 
theoretical nuance and dimension, a strong juridical dimension” (Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, 26 August 1999: 22). 
      The Indonesian Democratic Party has its own idea. YB Wiyanjono, the only 
representative of the party says that press freedom is the realization of people sovereignty 
and it constitutes a very important element in the life of the Indonesian democracy. ”In 
the context of independence, is it a release from a colonization, shackles after being 
independent? FPDI considers the word freedom is more appropriate (Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, 26 August 1999: 21). However, after the explanation from Usamah 
Hisyam (FPP) and Bambang Sadono (FKP), FPDI agrees to the use of this new 
terminology with three considerations namely philosophical, sociological and juridical. 
The source of philosophical arguments is people’s sovereignty, sociological arguments in 
the form of shackles in the past so that it needs to be freed, juridical arguments refer to  
1945 Constitution (Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, 26 August 1999: 22). 
      The government represented by the Minister, Yunus Yosfiah, did not object to the 
change of the term independence to freedom.  He said: 
”For the government, the two terms have the same meaning.  We see 
the opinions of FPP, FKP and FPDI actually have the same nuance, 
only some are longer and detailed, as it was stated that the press 
freedom is a very important element to create democratic life of 
society, nation and country.  In the government formulation, it is said 
to be a very important element in democracy life. We suppose 
democracy life to have included all the things” (Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, 26 August 1999: 23). 
 
      From a number of the opinions, especially the ones of political parties, there 
seems to be a kind of trauma of the past term namely freedom of the press that is far from 
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its real meaning. This can be represented by the opinion of YB Wiyanjono (FPDI) that 
acknowledges the presence of “shackle in the past” and Usamah Hisyam with the term 
“colonization over national press”. Other arguments seem to be true, supporting, court 
rhetorical like juridical reason based on the term used in UUD 1945 or the term used by 
the experts, namely press freedom.  
 
Table 6.10: Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of Press Law  
The Term ”Press Independence” 
Institution Speaker Reason for Supporting or 
Rejecting 
Government: The Minister 
of Information  
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah Supporting: The Press 
independence for 
democracy life  
The House: The 
Development Functional 
Faction  
Bambang Sadono Supporting: The 
Independence as 
accommodated in Chapter 
28 of 1945 Constitution 
The House: The Faction of 
Indonesian Democratic 
Party  
YB Wiyanjono Supporting: Unlike shackle 
in the past  
The House: The United 
Development Faction  
Usamah Hisyam Supporting: Unlike the past 
colonization of the national 
press  
 
      The discussion reveals that the essence of the word independence is also alluded, 
namely ”democracy”, ”the release from colonization and shackle since the independence, 
”to create the life of the society, the nation and the country”.  On one hand, the synonym 
of this term reflects the rhetorical nuance occurring in the discussion session, but on the 
other hand, it also reflects the traumatic condition of the use of the term responsible press 
freedom in the past so that the term is suggested to be renewed.  All parties, the 
government and factions agreed the use of the term press independence (table 6.10). 
 
6.2.7.2 Legal Protection for Journalists  
        The topic of the legal protection did not appear in the discussion of the Press Law 
no.11 year 1966.  In terms of the stipulations about Journalists, for example, it was only 
mentioned of the requirements to become a journalist.  In the discussion this time, a 
number of debates occurred when the Chairman of the Meeting, Aisyiah Amini, asked 
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the Faction of the Army about the form of problems identification no 23 that reads: “any 
actions resulting in obstruction or hampers the work of press function as it is meant in 
article (1) and article (2) is prohibited”.  Aryasa suggests that these articles to be deleted. 
The reason is that what is discussed in the “function” so that “prohibition” is not needed. 
His colleague of the same faction, F.Isnawan added, what behind the words ”any actions” 
are unpredictable.  He worries that finally the press freedom seems to be something 
absolute, which no one is unable to manage it (The Minute of the First Workshop, the 
Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 26). 
      Bambang Sadono (FKP) that seemed to be in the opposition with the Army 
Faction declares his agreement with the reason that even without being regulated, what is 
agreed in the Regulations had to be done.  Besides, the management of this third point is 
difficult to formulate (Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 
August 1999: 26).  Nonetheless, Usamah Hisyam from FPP did not agree. He said: 
”FPP does not see that simple that the function is difficult.  Starting from 
this chapter, FPP even sees the protection toward the implementation of 
the task and the function of journalists, as the press community expects 
by far, namely the protection for journalists” (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting , 27 August 1999: 26) 
      
”In fact, such words (any actions) are so sensitive.  For example, if 
someone is asked to talk about violations or the violations that his 
relative is doing, whereas he has the rights not to testify.  If he keeps 
silent, he can be punished with this chapter. In other words, this phrase 
(any actions) is expected to be independent but it even harms the rights 
of other people.  
I would like to explain the case of Udin, which is so different.  Here, to 
my opinion, Udin succeeded in getting the information he was searching 
and succeeded in revealing in media.  The fact that finally there was 
someone who did not like him and at last killed him is another thing, 
which is a penal action.  That the case is not or not yet uncovered, that is 
not an action impeding or obstructing the implementation of the press 
function anymore. The function of the press had worked (The Minute of 
the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 28-
29) 
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     The aforementioned Isnawan’s opinion is military or army characteristic opinion 
that sees the death of a journalist as “another case” or merely as “penal action”.28  For the 
reason, the inclusion of a chapter about the journalist protection implies reaction of 
various violations of human rights, including the violence to journalists in both the New 
Order time and reform time.  In the New Order era, violence or violations against Human 
Rights done to journalists did not appear to the surface due to the closed political system 
and it automatically closed the press freedom to report various legal violations by the 
authorities. Violent cases before and at the early of reform time such as violence to the 
supporters of Indonesian Democratic Party of Megawati, violence to university students 
in May 1998, also violence and rapes to Chinese ethnic in the turmoil in May in Jakarta 
and Solo, entailed the continuous pressures to the government.29  In specific, let us see 
the violence to a journalist in Yogyakarta in the middle of August 1996, when Soeharto 
was still very powerful. Entering the reform time, this case is not resolved and many 
parties suspect that the murderer belongs to the authority circles.  
      Such an opinion shows that military is still strongly attached to the old paradigm 
namely the repressive attitudes towards the society, media and journalists.  This happens 
because during the New Order era, Soeharto regime supported by the military used to 
repress through two ways, physical violence and hegemony violence.  The first model 
was used to get society obedience, through kidnapping, torturing, capturing arbitrarily 
without legal process, and forms of elimination of people who dare to reveal critically 
various violent army actions.  The second model was used for intellectuals who were not 
“loyal” or were opposed to the regime (Bhakti et al., 2001: 27). 
      In this discussion, the government represented by experts sees it as technical 
problem of positioning the chapter; the representative of FKP looked at the sophistication 
of the formulation, and most of the factions supported the inclusion of the protection for 
journalists. (Table 6.11). 
                                                
28 It happened that Sri Roso Sudarmo as the Regent of Bantul was a military.  By the time of the election of 
the Regent and the General Election in 1999 he did many activities showing his sympathy to Golkar.  This 
proved the fact that military is the main supporter of Golkar (Subadhi dan Margantoro,  Udin Upaya 
Menegakkan Kebenaran, Yogyakarta, Muria Baru, 1998, p. 84) 
29 The study on political violence and violent politics by the government in the New Order era was hardly 
done by Indonesian political observers due to, among other things, “politics and violence” issue in the form 
of the strength of Soeharto regime repression (Bhakti, et al. Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde 
Baru.Soeharto di Belakang Peristiwa 27 Juli?, Jakarta, LIPI and Kronik Indonesia Baru, 2001, p.27) 
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Table 6.11: The Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Regulations 
The Issue of ”The Protection for Journalists” 
Institution Speaker The Reasons for 
Supporting or Rejecting 
 
Government: The Minister 
of Information  
 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah 
asked for the opinion of an 
expert, namely Prof 
Budiatna  
 
 
Supporting: the issue of the 
protection can be positioned 
in other chapter 
 
The House : Army Faction 
 
Isnawan 
 
Rejecting:  worries that the 
press freedom as if 
constitutes an absolute thing 
 
 
The House: The 
Development Functional 
Faction (FKP)  
 
 
Bambang Sadono 
 
Rejecting: the formulation 
is difficult  
 
 
The House: The Faction of 
The Indonesian Democratic 
Party (FPDI) 
 
YB Wiyanjono 
 
Supporting: needs guarantee 
so that it is free from the 
intervention or oppression 
of any parties  
 
 
The House: The United 
Development Faction (FPP)  
 
Usamah Hisyam 
 
Supporting: by far, many 
journalists find it difficult to 
implement such a function 
since it faces obstacles and 
obstructions, for example 
the case of Udin 
 
 
Antara News Agency 
 
Parni Hadi 
 
Supporting: in principle, it 
is a protection  
 
 
6.2.7.3 The Prohibition to Publish  
      The Indonesian vocabulary makes it popular with the term “pembreidelan” or 
bridling. A book written by Edward C.Smith (1986) entitled “Pembreidelan Pers Di 
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Indonesia” as a translation work from a book entitled ”A History of the newspaper 
suppression in Indonesia, 1949-1965” tells much about this issue.30  Bridling is one of the 
actions and accusations toward the press in the form of seizure, economy sanction, 
imprisonment, permit sanction, various nationalization, paper sanction, expulsion, 
printing confiscation, interrogation/warning, travel ban, sue, delay of court session, and 
control of war leader (Smith, 1986:208). Based on a study done by Smith, there were 561 
anti-press actions for the period of 14 years from 1952 to1965 (Smith, 1986:241). 
      In the discussion of this draft, the concern whether it is allowable or not and 
whether it is important or not related to prohibiting the publication by the court became a 
subject of the debate. The Minister of Information, Mohammad Yunus, representing the 
government said:  
“Here, the role of the government will be shown.  This is not tolerable 
because I thought that we agree to consider the government to be too 
powerful so that it can eliminate human rights. Besides, I do not see the 
existence of such a prohibition. It is the person in charge who should 
bear the responsibility” (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the 
Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 38).  
        
Yosfiah’s statement actually responded to the idea existing previously, coming 
from  Usamah Hisyam (FPP), Isnawan (FABRI), Bambang Sadono (FKP), and Aisyiah 
Amini as the Chairman of the Meeting.  The trigger of the debate was the words “the 
prohibition of publication by the court”.  Hisyam said that imprisonment to a press 
company is imposed to the chief editor as the person in charge or to the Manager of the 
company as the person in charge of the enterprise only. Thus, it is not imposed to the 
enterprise. Even the court, as Hisyam suggests, is not authorized to halt or close the press 
publication, as any penal sanction resulted from the false report is imposed to the person 
in charge only (Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 
1999: 35). But Aisyiah Amini said the logic is that the court cannot directly judge if there 
is no action, so that it asks the audience for opinions. Isnawan (Army Faction) replies: 
“To suppose the court will ban the publication because of a legal 
process, for example in a civil case where there is a problem of two 
                                                
30 Smith mentioned some regulations made by the Dutch as “darkness creators” namely Press Regulations 
(Drukpersreglement) year 1856, Press Regulations year 1906, Pres Bridle Ordinance (Persbreidel 
Ordonnantie) and Pres Bridle Regulations year 1938 (Edward C.Smith, Pembreidelan Pers Di Indonesia, 
Jakarta, PT Temprint, Second Printing, 1986, p. 2) 
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similar brands, then they go to the court. The court will surely decide 
one of them to be the winner and the owner of the other brand is 
prohibited to publish. Is it prohibited?  To my opinion, the term “not 
prohibited by the government to publish” is enough; the court process is 
another case (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second 
Meeting, 27 August 1999: 37). 
 
     Bambang Sadono succinctly says: 
”FKP suggests that the press should not be imposed a censorship or 
bridle, by any parties, except the law allows to make it happens and we 
submit to the law supremacy” (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 37). 
 
       Usamah Hisyam understands that it is impossible for the court to make a decision 
if there is no prosecute.  However, he suggests that in the future there must be an 
assurance of the press independence. These requirements from the society to the court 
even seem to expect the closure of the press publication.  This must be prevented from 
occurring (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 
1999: 37).  But Aryasa (The Army Faction) still makes a problem out of it.  To his 
opinion, if there is no court institution, what other institution will there be?   The law 
supremacy pours in the court institution. The fact that there is court mafia, unfair court, 
that is another case; the court institution must be honored (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 39).  
      Unwillingness of the government to attach the publication prohibition by the court 
is also supported by the factions. Usamah Hisyam (FPP) argues, in addition to the 
absence of the publication prohibition by the government, the court is even not allowed to 
halt or close press publication.  Thus, penal sanction is only imposed to the person in 
charge.  Then, he describes: 
”There is an illustration, Kompas daily reports issues irritating Moslems 
and there was big demonstration demanding the court to bridle The 
Kompas. Will the court do this?  This happened to  Monitor magazine.  
So, when there is such a pressure, is it permitted to bridle a publication 
due to this pressure?   Legal process in the court may make a decision 
and give sanction to the chief editor or the Company Manager but it 
cannot kill the press publication” (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 40). 
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We can see here the strength of the opinion of Usamah Hisyam, a politician from 
FPP. As it has been discussed in the previous Chapter (Chapter V) the searcher looks at 
this attitude as part of a strategy to develop positive image to the public. In fact, FPP and 
all politicians actually do not have the real power to counter attack all political repression 
done by Soeharto regime.  Moreover, with the political stability concept, the government 
takes various efforts including the preparation of the general election in 1971, the serious 
management of the military, the alertness for two parties with the Marhaenism ideology 
basis (Indonesian National Party) that is considered the heir of Soekarno and for Islamic 
political parties that the government always suspects (Bhakti et al., 2001: 29).31 However, 
looking at the strong commitment to establish the free press, including the protection for 
journalists, Hisyam’s opinions can be interpreted as a release from the shackle under the 
political pressure of Soeharto regime.  The discussion of the draft of the Press 
Regulations is a canal to channel critical political opinions and to support the efforts of 
the political reform in Indonesia.  Hisyam’s opinions, for example, are different from 
those of Aisyiah Amini’s who also comes from the United Development Party (PPP).  
Why did Amini still defend closeness of a political system by limiting or shackling the 
press? 
 
Table 6.12: Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Regulations 
The Issue of the ”Publication Prohibition” 
Institution Speaker The Reason for 
Supporting or Rejecting 
Government: The Minister 
of Information 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah Rejecting: eliminating 
human rights. 
The House:The 
Development Functional 
Faction  
Bambang Sadono Rejecting:  The press is not 
imposed to censorship or 
bridle by any parties  
The House:The Army 
Faction 
Isnawan Supporting: The publication 
prohibition by the court  
The House: The United 
Development Faction  
Usamah Hisyam Rejecting: to ensure the 
press independence. 
                                                
31 The regime then combined political parties by force in 1973 from nine parties (except Golkar) into two 
parties only: The United Development Party for Islam-base parties and Indonesian Democratic Party for 
nationalism and Christian-base parties (Bhakti et al., Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru. Soeharto di 
Belakang Peristiwa 27 Juli?, Jakarta, 2001, p.29) 
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      Out of four persons who give the opinions, only the Army Faction agreed to the 
article on the publication prohibition; the rests rejected with some arguments (see table 
5.11). 
 
 
 
6.2.7.4 The Trial by the Press 
      The term the “trial by the press” often appeared in the era of Soeharto.  It 
was released concerning press reports that were considered to “harm” certain parties and 
especially the government, Soeharto’s family, military and Golkar. In the discussion of 
the draft of the Press Regulations, this term still existed and its existence implied some 
old characteristic of the New Order namely narrow dealings with mass media functions.  
The debate on this issue occurred between representatives of the Army Faction and the 
United Development Party and other factions and the government.  
      Nyoman Tamu Aryasa (F-ABRI) agreed to limit the opportunity for the “trial by 
the press” by proposing amendment of Chapter 4 that reads: ”The press publication is 
obligated to report the court process fairly and accurately without judging the accused or 
the suspected (the trial by the press)” (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the 
Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 56).  On the other hand, Usamah Hisyam (FPP) 
suggested very different idea namely replacing the entire material of article 1 with the 
sentence: ”The Press publication is obligated to: point a. ”report an event and or opinion 
accurately”, point b. “highly honor the profession ethics code applied by the Press 
Council”.  Thus, after the changes, it reads: ”The Press Publication is obligated to:  a. 
”report an event and or opinion accurately”, b. “highly honor the profession ethics code 
stipulated by Press Council”, c. “respect the religious norms and sense of morality 
embraced by the society”, d. ”fulfill the rights to answer and their rights to make 
corrections in accordance with the requirements from the readers with regards to the 
reports of the news that is not true, slanderous, or provocative” (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 56). 
      FKP represented by Bambang Sadono suggested that Chapter 4 to be eliminated 
with the consideration that its substance can be returned to ethics code or other 
  
207
regulations. If other factions agreed to the reformulation, FKP tended to the formulation 
by FPP (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 
1999: 57). Based on these views from FPP and FKP, the Army Faction asked for 
permission to the Chairman of the Meeting and said: 
”We do not see here the existence of the issue of does not judge, 
whereas the substance is not judging the accused or the suspected.  This 
must be enclosed”.  This view was confirmed by Aisyiah Amini, the 
Chairman of the Meeting: “the Army Faction sees that the substance of 
article 1 in Chapter namely the “trial by the press” is not present” (The 
Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 
1999: 58). 
      
  Responding to this question, Usamah Hisyam answered: 
“The process of the trial by the press has been included in the 
journalistic ethics code.  For the reason, FPP eliminates the issue 
because if it is accommodated, there will be inconsistency in our legal 
order in facing a report” (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, 
the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 58). 
 
 Again, the Chairman of the Meeting invited opinions from the Army Faction by saying:   
”The ethics code is not present; can we delay something that is not 
present?  Will it be present whereas we are making the regulations and 
the society certainly need this so that the society will not feel to be 
judged by the press? Please, the Army Faction.  (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 Augusts 1999: 58) 
 
        It was clear how the Chairman of the Meeting, Aisyiah Amini who also came 
from FPP provoked the Army Faction and it was clear that Amini supported the clauses 
impeding the ”trial by the press” or in other words: limiting the press.  
         Bambang Sadono (FKP) reconfirmed his support to Usamah Hisyam’s suggestion 
by holding the ideas of making this Regulation, namely the law supremacy, by placing 
legal stipulations on its portion.  With regards to the ethics code that was said not to be 
present, Bambang Sadono who was also the Secretary General of the Indonesian 
Journalist Association (PWI) said that the journalist ethics code had been present for long 
(The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 58-
59).  Nonetheless, Amini replied that it was the Ethics Code made by the Press Council 
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that was not present.  In fact, it was not there.  She also said that there was difference 
between the ”trial by the press” and the ”contempt of court”. The trial by the press is 
someone, any citizens of this country who is tried by the press, while contempt of court is 
underestimating the court.  For the reason, when she gave time to the government to 
respond, Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah responded: 
“It must be confirmed that the journalistic ethics code does not have the 
legal implication.  Thus, if we take shelter under the ethics code, there is 
not legal sanction since the journalistic ethics code is an intern matter of 
the press community.  Meanwhile, what we are talking about here is 
related to the interest of the society.  If it was said that when it has been 
regulated in the penal code (KUHP) then it is regulated here, that is true 
and what prevails is the one here.  Why is it regulated here, we have 
coordinated with the Justice Department to pose some penal threats.  
The reason is that the penal threats in KUHP tends to be colonial… it’s 
too punitive to send journalists to prison” (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 61-62). 
 
      The Minister of Information then confirmed the replacement of imprisonment 
with fine.  Thus, since the ethics code does not have the legal implication, if journalists 
accuse someone arbitrarily, the society becomes the victim, the other people suffer, or his 
good reputation is humiliated, the journalists will be fined.  Responding to the 
explanation by the government, the United Development Faction motored by Usamah 
Hisyam said: 
”To our opinion, it is the rights of any member of the society to sue any 
reports considered to have done the judging process, for example 
bringing the case to the police and the police prosecutes and so on.  The 
simplest and actual example is the process of the trial by the press 
toward the Attorney General Andi Mohamad Ghalib. It is not true that 
there is the trial by the press here because the mass media publication 
quoted the legal informant in a press conference, saying that the 
Attorney General Andi Ghalib had committed bribery.  It is not judging 
when the press quotes the source of the news.  If the Attorney General 
feels to be judged by the press, he may report to the police.  Thus, law 
functions well here.  FPP considers trial by the press is prevented in the 
profession ethics code even though it only has the moral implication, not 
punishment.  Thus, it depends on the moral responsibility of each 
publication to honor journalistic ethics that later will be determined by 
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the Press Council” (The Minute of the First Meeting, the Second 
Meeting, 27 August 1999: 63-64). 
 
       For the firm attitude of FPP, the Development Functional Faction (FKP) that was 
represented by Ariyanti Bambang S gave its support.  On the other hand, the Army 
Faction still questioned press tendency to implement trial by the press. F. Isnawan finally 
suggested: 
“When we talk about the trial by the press, we should have the same 
perception first about, for example, “has judged”.  When someone says 
“like a coolie”, that is just “like”, thus it does not judge yet.  When he 
says “coolie”, he has judged.  Thus, the essence lies on the skill of 
writing. So, reports must be accurate, very accurate.  Accurate means 
showing facts.  I will not write, for example: “Wow, he commits 
corruptions because of bribery”, instead I will say ”I saw A give some 
money to B, whereas B is investigating the case of A”.  This is accurate.  
Thus, for the sake of the Army, it is suggested to add clearly to Chapter 
4 the words ”does not do the trial by the press (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 65). 
 
         The debate did not finish yet.  Aisyiah Amini as the Chairman of the Meeting 
even asked for permission to use her rights to express her opinion:    
“To my opinion, the protection for the society is needed … in any case, 
someone may not be judged by the press.  The authorized institution for 
judging is the court.  That is what we mean by legal implication.  Thus, 
the institution having the rights to decide a corruptor as a thief or 
bastard, or whatever, is the court, not the press.  That is meant by 
judging.  The press should not judge the member of the society of being 
suspected or accused. Judge him in the sense of law, this is what this 
chapter needs” (The Minute of the First Meeting, the Second Meeting, 
27 August 1999: 66). 
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         The Minister of Information, Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah, again explained that 
KUHP especially chapter 130 (310?)32 is the legal stipulation regulating the press 
“treatment” namely ”Whoever intentionally attacks  the honor or good name of a person, 
accusing of something” will be punished, varying from 9 months, to 1 year 4 months.  
However, the Minister realized that this stipulation is colonial that tends to treat 
journalists as punishment so that he suggested that this Regulations should later be 
special (lex specialis) and omits the general (lex generalis). Chapter 14 of this Regulation 
does not impose imprisonment but fine.  This considers the Press Principal Regulations 
that once we had also treat journalists as punishment.  For example, Chapter 19 says 
”Whoever intentionally and against the law uses the press publication for personal or 
group interests and results in violation or obstruction for the task” will be imprisoned for 
at most 4 years or fined at most IDR 40 millions.  Thus, it is expected that in this 
Regulations there is no punishment or imprisonment but fine (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August1999: 68).  However, I Nyoman 
Tamu Aryasa and Isnawan (the Army Faction) remained in their belief that the 
opportunity for trial by the press had not disappeared and said: 
”.. Thus, when everyone is free to slander someone, journalists would 
only … hey, you cannot (do that) ….. No way!  Here the warnings 
function to prevent someone from harming anyone else.  Thus, he (the 
journalist) implements his rights but he trespasses others’ rights.  Thus, 
we apply the legal implication here” (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 69).  
 
Isnawan added: 
”.. We need to confirm here what we mean by judging someone is 
uttering words, giving analysis, giving consideration and finally a 
decision stating that someone is guilty...” (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 69-70).  
 
     From this discussion, we see a very clear difference between the opinion from the 
Army Faction that sometimes is supported by the Chairman of the Meeting, and the 
                                                
32 Law experts in Indonesia and a number of activists in the law call this chapter the “rubber chapter” 
because it can be imposed to any cases and especially to anyone. In Soeharto era, this chapter was also one 
of the mainstays of the authority to round up those considered to oppose, namely politicians, activists, 
including university students.  
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United Development Faction (FPP) supported by Development Functional Faction (FKP) 
and the Minister of Information as the representative from the Government (the 
executive).  The Army Faction requires a chapter that strongly prevents journalists from 
judging by their articles, and when it happens, the journalist must be punished, while the 
FPP and the FKP propose such limitation is done by the Ethics Code.  The Government, 
after consulting the Justice Department proposes that journalists who do wrong in their 
articles not to be imprisoned but to be fined.  Look at table 5.12. 
 
 
 
Table 6.13: The Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
The Issue of  the ”Trial by the Press” 
Institution Speaker The Reason for 
Supporting or Rejecting  
 
Government: The Minister 
of Information  
 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah 
 
Rejecting: when the press is 
judging, the imposed 
punishment is fine not 
imprisonment   
 
 
The House: The 
Development Functional 
Faction (FKP)  
 
Bambang Sadono 
 
Rejecting: prevented 
through the Journalistic 
Ethics Code  
 
 
The House: The Chairman 
of the Meeting 
 
Aisyiah Amini 
 
Supporting: only the court 
is authorized to judge, not 
the press  
 
 
The House: The Army 
Faction 
(FABRI) 
  
Supporting: the phrase “not 
commit the trial by the 
press” must be stated and 
the trespassers must be 
punished  
 
The House: The United 
Development Party Faction 
(FPP)  
 
Usamah Hisyam 
 
Rejecting: the limitation is 
done through the Ethics 
Code 
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      The term or to be exact the accusation of the ”trial by the press” has become a 
kind of instrument for the authority regime to press the media.  In Soekarno time, the 
Indonesia Raya newspaper became a ”good customer” of the court. Kustiniyati Mochtar 
was tried in the court in October 1957 because of her correspondence article in the South 
Sumatra concerning the suspect of the manipulation by the Resident of Palembang.  The 
article on 21 February 1956 in the Indonesia Raya newspaper was considered humiliating 
the name of an officer. Even though the attorney prosecuted three months imprisonment 
with one year of probation time, the judge released him from the trial (onstlag van 
rechtsvervolging).33 During the New Order time, the term the ”trial by the press” was an 
integral part of the government strategy to stifle the press.  This term was often stated by 
government officers both civil and military so that there was no opposition at all.  The 
case of Andi Ghalib is the example of the habit of accusing the press to implement the 
trial by the press existing in the era of President Habibie.34  
 
6.2.7.5 The Press Publication Registration  
      Referring to the Law no. 11 year 1966 on the Press Principal Stipulations, the 
press publication registration is known as SIUPP or the Permit for Press Publication 
Enterprise. This stipulation requires that all Press Enterprises in Indonesia have the 
permit certificate issued by the Minister of Information.  In fact, this is a new article of 
the Regulations no 11 year 1966.  Ironically, this addition was agreed by the Press 
Council in the Join Assembly of the General Commission and the Specific Commission 
in a meeting in Surakarta on 11-13 June 1981 (Tidar, 1986: 227).   In practice, the 
process of this SIUPP issuance served as field of business for the Minister of Information 
because the owners of the media were obligated to share some of their capital; they had to 
pay.  The Minister of Information at that period, Harmoko, as the Chairman of National 
Basket Association would hold an event and allowed The Kompas to add extra pages, 
                                                
33 See Atmakusumah, Mochtar Lubis Wartawan Jihad, Jakarta, Penerbit Kompas, 1992, pp.69-70. 
34 After ratification of this Press Regulations, a number of government officers felt to be 
harmed by media reports used their rights to report the media to Press Council as it was 
done by the State Minister for Government Owned Enterprises - Laksamana Sukardi 
(Tempo Interaktif, 7 October 2004).  
  
213
including additional advertisement, although there was regulation of limiting the pages.  
Half of the extra income was taken by Harmoko.35 
      In the discussion in the parliament, this issue became a debate between the 
representatives of political parties (the factions) and the government.  Mohammad Yunus 
Yosfiah (The Minister of Information) said the government was consistent that the 
registration was needed for various reasons. It was rather weird that the press that was 
counseled by the Information Department had to get (the information) from other 
sources, while the other people seek it to the Department of Information.  He understood 
that this would become an obstacle for the existence of the press publication in the future.  
However, he guaranteed that 15 days at the latest the permit would be issued. Another 
reason was the existence of the Regulations No 3 Year 1982 on the Enterprise Register 
Obligation and the Regulations No 1 Year 1995 on the Limited Company.  Even though 
this Regulation was for legal enterprise, not press publication, the objective of the 
registration was the presence of the records as source of information (the Minute of the 
First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August 1999: 85-86).  
      The opinion of the Government was in agreement with the idea of the Army 
Faction represented by Int. Aryasa, who stated his agreement to the government proposal 
that any enterprise publishing press should register to the Department of Information.  
Meanwhile, the FKP (Bambang Sadono) supported the opinion of the FPP by 
questioning, why the registration had to be made to the Information Department, instead 
of the Press Council. Usamah Hisyam understood the opinion of the FKP that the press 
publication registration to the government as regulated by Minister Rule No 01/1984 had 
created traumatic attitude.  
      The policy of the press publication registration of the year 1984 refers to the 
Minister of Information Regulations No 03/PER/MENPEN/1969 on the Institution of the 
Publication Permit in Transition Time for the General Press Publication by the authority 
of the New Order, which had been used as the means of censoring concerning the 
requirements it accommodates.  This Minister of Information Regulations year 1984 
require, for example, in Chapter 5 article (1) the SIUPP is given to a healthy and 
responsible press enterprise/publication fulfilling the stipulations as stated in this Chapter 
                                                
35 Interview with St Sularto, Vice General Manager of The Kompas, 24 August 2005. 
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and Chapter III to Chapter VIII in this Regulations completed with other requirements 
determined by the Minister of Information.  Besides, in Chapter VII about the Sanction it 
is stated (Chapter 32) that anyone running the press publication without the SIUPP will 
be imposed on the sanctions as meant in Chapter 19 article (2) of the Law no. 11 Year 
1966 on the Press Principal Stipulations as it is changed with the Regulations No 4 Year 
1967 and the Law no. 21 Year 1982.  Besides, it is also stated (Chapter 33), the SIUPP 
that has been given to a press enterprise/publication can be annulled by the Minister of 
Information after hearing the Press Council, if it trespasses against a number of rules.  
One of them is (chapter 33 article h): According to the judgment of the Press Council as 
meant in Chapter 9 of these Rules, the related press enterprise/publication and the press 
publication in its publication implementation does not reflect healthy press life, 
independent and responsible press (Simorangkir, 1986: 133). 
      Besides, in Chapter I on the Procedures and Requirements for Proposing SIUPP it 
is also written (article 1 k and l):  Recommendation from the Newspaper Publication 
Association (SPS), Branch and Central, concerning the press enterprise/publication for 
General Manager and Company Director of the press publication; Recommendation from 
the Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI), Branch and Central, concerning journalism 
for Chief Editor of the press publication (Simorangkir, 1986: 137). 
      Usamah Hisyam proposed if this term of registration became allergic, another 
term with the same nuance could be searched. However, FKP still questioned the reason 
for the registration. Bambang Sadono proposed another alternative by openly declaring 
the persons in charge in press.  Nonetheless, the Army Faction still required the existence 
of registration for press enterprise. FPP did not object to this clause.  
 
Table 6.14: Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
The Issue of the ”Registration of the Press Publication” 
Institution Speaker The Reason for 
Supporting or Rejecting  
 
Government: The Minister 
of Information  
 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah 
 
Supporting: the registration 
is needed for various 
purposes  
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The House :  
The Development 
Functional Faction  
Bambang Sadono Rejecting: no registration is 
needed; if any, however, 
should be to the Press 
Council, not to the 
Information Department 
  
 
 
The House:The Army 
Faction  
 
 
Aryasa 
 
 
Supporting: the registration 
is needed  
 
 
The House: The United 
Development Faction  
 
Usamah Hisyam 
 
Supporting: the registration 
to the Press Council is 
needed  
 
 
The Journalist 
Organization: The 
Indonesian Journalist 
Association  
 
 
RH.Siregar 
 
Rejecting: the foreign press 
needs to report only  
 
Antara News Agency  
 
Parni Hadi 
 
Rejecting: the foreign press 
needs to report to the 
immigration only  
 
 
      Even though the Government (The Minister of Information) explained that this 
registration is meant for preventing the copy right violation from occurring over the 
existing publication, in addition to proposing another term namely “report”, FKP remains 
objected the registration to the Department of Information and proposed the registration 
to the Press Council (table 5.13). 
      When discussion was continued to the First Workshop Meeting, the Third 
Meeting, opinions were collected from the present representatives, especially concerning 
registration for the foreign press. They were RH Siregar, Chairman of PWI, and Parni 
Hadi of the Antara News Station. Siregar said, if the foreign press had to register to the 
Department of Information, it became an international principle, thus it was sufficient to 
register only. Based on his experience in Germany, Parni Hadi told that foreign press 
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needed to report to the immigration only (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the 
Third Meeting, 30 August 1999: 42) 
      The discussion of this issue was a little bit different compared to the discussion of 
the other issues, because the majority of the speakers, both the government and the 
factions, principally agreed the registration, or another term for the report.  
 
6.2.7.6 The Foreign Capital  
      Two old press legal stipulations regulating the foreign capital clearly state the 
prohibition of such a matter.  The Press Law no. 11 Year 1966 states in Chapter V Article 
13 point (2) that the Press Enterprise Capital must entirely be national capital, while the 
founders and board of the management must all be Indonesians (Simorangkir, 1986:39).  
Meanwhile, in the Law no. 21 Year 1982 in Chapter V on Press Enterprise, Chapter 12, 
point (2) there is no change or exactly the same. In Simorangkir’s note on the press 
enterprise, it was mentioned that the obligation to have national capital had to be 
absolutely preserved, in order to prevent unexpected possibilities through the capital / 
through the national press.  The founders of the press enterprise had to be of Indonesian 
citizenship.  The past experience of the involvement of foreign parties should not happen 
anymore.  The board of the management of a press enterprise had to be Indonesian 
people.  The press enterprises were not allowed to accept services/aids/donation from 
foreign parties, except with the consent of the Government after hearing the Press 
Council (Simorangkir, 1986: 203). 
      In the discussion of this draft of the Law, the involvement of foreign capital 
became an important issue.  The debate started when discussing the issues of the “press 
enterprise” and the “news station”, which Usamah Hisyam warned not to be monopolized 
by certain group of enterprises.  Hisyam said that the group of press enterprises had 
grown to 20 and was under one enterprise group, and if the collective bodies also founded 
the news station, there would be information monopoly even monopoly in the press itself 
(The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August1999: 97). 
FPP did not expect the foreign capital in a national press enterprise with the reason that 
this press Regulations had provide freedom to the Foreign Press to be distributed in 
Indonesia, even through distant printing system.  With the foreign capital, the capital 
owners had the opportunity to influence the government even the portion was small, for 
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example 25% or 49% but it was still worried that it had implications to the issues related 
to the moral of the nation, which is more important than demands of globalization.  In 
addition to involving information issue, the rejection was also based on the fact that 
Indonesia is a developing country, which had not been able to position in parallel with 
developed countries (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 
August1999: 101).  
      Government through the Minister of Information asked for opinions of two 
communication experts namely Atmakusumah and Budiatna. Atmakusumah expressed 
his astonishment why we had to worry (be afraid of) the foreign capital.  He explained, 
no countries even with 100% involvement of foreign capital would dominate the media. 
Some countries he mentioned were Thailand and India. Bangkok Post accepted the 
capital from England but it could not control media; it even inspired the spirit of domestic 
capital and domestic journalists by publishing its rival namely The Nation.  The foreign 
capital entering India never gave birth to Indian media dominating (the mass media).  The 
fear of the foreign capital was unreasonable because everyday the foreign culture enters 
Indonesia through translated articles.  It never happens in the history that Indonesia never 
gets foreign culture from Middle East, Europe, Japan, and China. That is something 
rational about the foreign capital, so what things we are afraid of about the foreign 
capital. The rise and fall of mass media in a country are determined by the readers.  If the 
readers or listeners do not like the foreign culture, they will reject and the media will go 
bankrupt.  The foreign capital might introduce better management and other things, give 
better attention to the employees, so that the welfare of the employees will be better 
because the foreign capital tries to make profits (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Second Meeting, 27 August1999: 102). In a shorter way, Budiatna added: 
”Principally, I do not object to the foreign capital, because we are in a 
market.  Thus, the local publication must be appropriate with the needs 
of local readers.  A conglomerate from Germany, Bartlesmann, for 
example, has the famous magazine Time with its headquarter in New 
York; it is managed by Americans but the capital is from Germany.  The 
principle of the entrepreneurs is gaining big profits, thus it does not 
influence the contents” (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the 
Second Meeting, 27 August1999: 103).  
 
      In addition to the two inputs, the government also expressed its agreement to the 
entering of foreign capital with the reason that Indonesia had entered WTO (world trade 
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organization), for example the control of banking up to 100%.36  The fear of the entering 
of the foreign culture can be prevented with legal warnings. Yunus Yosfiah even said that 
in relatively short a time the press quality would be very different.  However, since there 
is Regulations on the Foreign Capital stating that mass media is one of the enterprises 
closed for foreign capital, there will be proposal of the arrangement, for example the 
maximum of foreign capital is 25%. 
       Bambang Sadono (FKP) expressed no problem but the formulation did not have 
to be present in these Regulations but it had to refer to the present regulations or the 
future regulations. Meanwhile, FPP still rejected the entering of foreign capital in 
Indonesian press enterprises in accordance with the instruction of the Leader of the 
Faction of United Development Party (PPP) (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, 
the Second Meeting, 27 August1999: 105-106).  In the discussion in the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Third Meeting on 30 August 1999, the topic of foreign capital still existed. 
KH. Amin Bunyamin who was also from the FPP suggested that actually the FPP did not 
object to the investment of the foreign capital itself, but due to unstable national political 
situation and strong influence of the press in forming the opinion, the FPP considers this 
issue very sensitive. Meanwhile, the Army Faction agreed to the foreign capital but the 
maximum value was 49% (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Third 
Meeting, 27 August1999: 5-6). Finally, the Minister of Information reconfirmed that the 
government had the interest that media industry could develop well.  This is the 
consequence of globalization and the joining of Indonesia into WTO. This condition is 
not in line with the prohibition of the entering of the foreign capital (The Minute of the 
First Workshop Meeting, the Third Meeting, 27 August 1999: 8). 
  
Table 6.15: Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
The Issue of the ”Foreign Capital” 
Institution Speaker The Reason for 
Supporting or Rejecting 
                                                
36 Indonesia ratified WTO through Regulations No 7 year 1994 then implemented the agenda of trade and 
economy liberalization in such a way that it got appraisal as one of the most advanced developing countries 
in opening its market. However, Indonesia has a number of weaknesses such as the absence of 
comprehensive, national policy and coordination.  And after economy crisis in 1997, the debt of Indonesia 
increased to US$ 137.6 billion in 2001 or higher than its Gross Domestic Product (Walsh and Wibowo, 
Masih Adakah Alternatif Di Ujung Krisis, Jakarta, INFID, 2003, pp.308-312) 
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Government: The 
Minister of Information  
 
 
Mohammad Yunus 
Yosfiah  
 
Supporting: the 
consequence of 
globalization and the 
membership in WTO and 
to improve the press 
quality  
 
 
Government: the Invited 
Media Experts  
 
Atmakusumah dan 
Budiatna 
 
Supporting: foreign 
capital does not dominate 
media  
 
 
The House: the 
Development Functional 
Faction  
 
 
Bambang Sadono 
 
Supporting: no problem  
 
The House: the Army 
Faction 
 
Aryasa 
 
Supporting: maximum 
value 49% 
 
 
The House: the United 
Development Faction  
 
Usamah Hisyam 
 
Rejecting: because of 
cultural threat and Party 
instruction  
 
 
    What interesting from the discussion was that media experts gave their opinion 
that we should not have worried about the foreign capital since it would not monopolize 
mass media. The fear of the foreign culture was not reasonable since everyday the culture 
enters Indonesia through translated foreign articles. Out of four factions in parliament, 
only the FPP still expressed its rejection. (table 6.15).  The opinion of the experts seemed 
to smoothen the way to the government “commitment” to agree the entering of the 
foreign capital into the press industry in Indonesia with the reason to improve its quality.  
 
6.2.7.7 An Independent Press Council  
      By the middle of 1990s, when President Soeharto was eagerly implementing the 
political openness that was inspired by glasnost and perestroika models from Russia, he 
suddenly made a surprise by agreeing the closing of three magazines namely Tempo, 
Editor and Detik.  It was not surprising anymore if the Indonesian Journalist Association 
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(PWI) even agreed to the bridle.  Those three magazines were considered “guilty” of 
reporting the sinking of ex East Germany ship bought by Indonesian government.  This 
report finally revealed the disorder of the Minister of Research and Technology, BJ 
Habibie, who took care of the purchase of the ship and it involved President Soeharto 
who agreed the purchase.37  In this situation, the Press Council or the Newspaper 
Publication Association should have appeared to protect but what appeared was protest 
from 370 journalists on 5 July 1994.  
      One of the materials in the draft of the Press Law, the Press Council institution 
was a hot topic to discuss.  The first discussion involved the number of persons, while the 
second discussion was concerning with its independence.  The chairman of the meeting, 
Aisyiah Amini, started this discussion by referring to the list of the problem inventory 70 
about the Press Council consisting of 15 persons including the Chairman and the Vice 
Chairman. The number consists of 5 journalists selected by the journalist organization, 5 
persons from the owners or the press company managers selected by the press enterprise 
organization, and 5 experts in the press and other fields selected by the journalist 
organization and the press enterprise organization (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Third Meeting, 30 August1999: 29).  The Army Faction that was given the 
first opportunity to talk directly proposed the addition of the representatives from the 
Government and the representatives from the society without minding the number, while 
the FKP agreed to the elements existing in the Press Council but rejected the arrangement 
of the number in this chapter. The United Development Faction even asked the number 
was determined, either 15 or 25 (The Minute of the First Workshop Meeting, the Third 
Meeting, 30 August 1999: 29).  The Minister of Information, M.Yunus Yosfiah, said:  
”If the number was 25 including those from the government, I suppose 
that it less now, namely 15.  The Press Council also received fund from 
the government such as Komnasham (The National Committee for 
Human Rights).  Let’s implement this seriously in order for this Press 
                                                
37 What was strange and ridiculous was that no one of the letters annulling the SIUPP (bridling) to the three 
magazines stated that the reason for the closure was the article about the sinking of the ex East Germany 
ship.  The letters issued by the Minister of Information on 21 June 1994 stated that the reasons for the 
closure of those three magazine were administrative ones.  Tempo magazine was said to have been warned 
to keep political stability but several articles in Tempo were considered not to reflect independent and 
responsible press life anymore. Detik tabloid had deviated from its original mission of being informative, 
detective, criminal to general and political mission, while Editor magazine was accused of handing over 
ownership (see Utami et al, Bredel 1994. Jakarta, Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, pp.98-119). 
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Council to be fully independent” (The Minute of the First Workshop 
Meeting, the Third Meeting, 30 August 1999: 29-30).  
 
      This government explanation directly brought the discussion of this draft of 
Regulations to talk about the Press Council independence. The Army Faction (Int. 
Aryasa) in his response still suggested the presence of the Government representative 
even only one person.38  It was also suggested to eliminate the fund from the government, 
because with the fund, there would not be Press Council independence because the 
government could even control the Press Council.  Meanwhile, the FKP (Bambang 
Sadono) explained why the number should not be stated in this chapter with the reason 
for the continuation of this Regulation, including the changes in the society, in the long 
term.  To his opinion, the number could limit the dynamics in the society, but it was 
related to the fund, then it was suggested that there was no fund from the government.  If 
fund were needed, it was taken from the Budget of the National Income and Expenditure 
(APBN).  The other member of the FKP, Bahtiar Ali, even highlighted the number issue, 
which he considered not sufficient with only 15 persons.  Besides, he suggested that the 
discussion was returned to the Press Council in the sense of universal namely the press 
council, an organization established and founded by the press society so that there was no 
representative from the government. Next, it was said: 
”This is actually what we want to correct for the world (the information) 
that we actually have the understanding of the press council as the Press 
Honored Council of PWI (whereas) the press council is interpreted 
universally as self-arranging press organization.  Thus, our arrangement 
is correct, no need to enter government elements.  We need to hear (the 
government elements), we invite them as informants”  (The Minute of 
the First Workshop Meeting, the Third Meeting, 30 August 1999: 30-
31).  
 
      The Minister of Information immediately responded by telling how the press 
figures as part of the pillars enacting the democracy should be able to democratize.  The 
fact that the number of the press representatives in the Press Council was considered 
insufficient, the Minister of Information did not see this as a problem and the number 
                                                
38 In Article 6 and 7, Chapter III of Press Regulations No 11 Year 1966 on Press Council it was clearly 
stated that representativeness of Press Council was dominated by the government.  Chapter 7 article (3), for 
example, says: ”Further stipulations concerning the tasks of Press Council, its working procedures, the 
method of replacing vacancies in Press Council and so on are determined by the government and Press 
Council.   
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could be added but with financial risk. The government had the right to express its 
opinions concerning the financing because by far the Press Council received the fund 
from the Government.  He even feared if the Press Council when later the Press Council 
did not get fund from the government, where they would get the fund from.  As for the 
independence, the Minister of Information again gave an example of Komnasham 
(National Commission on Human Rights) that also received the fund from the 
government but its credibility was creditable. Finally, Yunus Yosfiah asked the FKP for 
clarification, where the fund would be sourced if not from the government (Minute of the 
First Workshop Meeting, the Third Meeting, 30 August1999: 31-32).  
      In his clarification, Bambang Sadono said that if the big number of the members 
of the Press Council were burdensome for the government, then the Press Council had to 
be consequent to finance itself like other press organizations.  In order to get the fund, the 
fund was not from the government but it was via the Budget of the National Income and 
Expenditure (APBN). However, this opinion from the FKP had not halted debate about 
Press Council. Usamah Hisyam suggested that the FPP could not agree to this issue and 
proposed the words “at least” the Press Council consisted of 15 persons.  As for the fund 
and the independence, the FPP intended to serve as intermediary by saying that even 
though the fund originated from the APBN, it would not be able to be given directly to 
the Press Council but it had to go through the Department of Information.  For the reason, 
it was also suggested that in the discussion of the draft of the Press Regulations the Press 
Council was determined but the fund was not existent so that it would create a new 
problem. This problem of fund would be better discussed with the journalist 
organizations of which number reached 26. The FPP supported the opinion of Bahtiar Ali 
(FKP) to pay attention to the independence of the Press Council (The Minute of the First 
Workshop Meeting, the Third Meeting, 30 August1999: 33-44).  From this discussion, 
however, we can see that the Army Faction was the only faction that wanted two 
representatives from the Government in the Press Council (look at table 6.16). 
      
Table 6.16: Dynamics of the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
The Issue of the ” Independence Press Council ” 
Institution Speaker The Reason for 
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Supporting or Rejecting  
 
Government: The Minister 
of Information  
 
 
Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah 
 
Supporting: the fund from 
the government and remains 
independent like 
Komnasham 
 
 
Government: the Invited 
Media Experts  
 
Budiatna 
 
Supporting: no government 
elements  
 
 
The House: The 
Development Functional 
Faction  
 
Bambang Sadono; 
Bachtiar Ali 
 
Supporting: self financed or 
from the APBN; 
No representatives from the 
government  
 
 
The House: The Army 
Faction 
 
Aryasa 
 
Rejecting: the presence of 
government representatives 
and the absence of the fund 
from the government  
 
 
The United Development 
Faction  
 
Usamah Hisyam 
 
Supporting: the fund is 
needed but it must be 
independent  
 
 
 
 
6.2.7.8 From the Press Freedom to the Press Council  
      It was discussed above the debate or discussion of important issues in the 
Workshop Meeting of the People’s Representative Council concerning the Draft of the 
Press Law. Out of a number of issues that had been discussed, this research found seven 
issues obtaining quite big numbers of discussion namely about the Press Independence, 
Publication Registration, Publication Prohibition, Trial by the Press, Protection for 
Journalists, Foreign Capital, and Press Council.  The attention given by the meeting 
participants seemed to be influenced by political context of that time, namely various 
political changes, media independence, and the efforts of politicians to appear as pro-
reform figures.  The discussion of the issues, we can also see the existence of a number of 
  
224
actors representing the political parties and the factions in the People’s Representative 
Council.  From the United Development Faction, Usamah Hisyam talked the most often 
and comprehended the topic of the discussion.  From the Army Faction, Int Aryasa, the 
figure from the FKP who appeared the most was Bambang Sadono. The Faction of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party only appeared in early periods due to limitedness of the 
members so that YB Wiyanjono had to be present in other meetings in the People’s 
Representative Council.  The Government was always represented by Yunus Yosfiah as 
the Minister of Information but sometimes he asked for opinions from Atmakusumah and 
Budiatna as the experts. Aisyiah Amini from the United Development Faction also often 
appeared using her rights to talk even though she was the chairperson of the meeting.  
The media people who were present and expressed their opinions were Parni Hadi (The 
Antara news agency) and RH Siregar (The PWI).  
 
Table 6.17: The Attitude Tendency of Political Actors from the Government,  
DPR, and Media in the Discussion of the Draft of the Press Law 
Issue Government F-ABRI F-PDI F-KP F-PP Media 
The term 
“Press 
Independence” 
Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting Supporting - 
The 
Publication 
Prohibition 
Rejecting 
 
Supporting Rejecting Rejecting Rejecting - 
The Press 
Enterprise 
Registration 
Supporting Supporting - Rejecting Supporting Rejecting
The Protection 
for Journalists 
Supporting Rejecting - Supporting 
 
Rejecting Rejecting
The Trial by 
the Press 
Rejecting Supporting - Rejecting Rejecting - 
The Foreign 
Capital 
Supporting Supporting - Supporting Rejecting - 
The 
Independent 
Press Council 
Supporting Rejecting - Supporting Supporting - 
 
      Summary of the dynamics of the discussion of the draft of the Press Law can be 
described in table 6.17. We can see from the table that the Army Faction more often 
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objected to various important issues in the Press Law than other parties, including the 
government, FKP, FPP, FPDI and media.  This tendency can be interpreted as the 
rejection of the Army Faction to the reform in press.  The agreement on the clause of the 
publication prohibition, the objection to the legal protection for journalists, the enclosure 
of the prohibition to make a judgment (the trial by the press), or the involvement of the 
government elements in the Press Council, strengthens this conclusion. 
      What interesting is that this attitude of the Army Faction sometimes got support 
or was in line with the chairperson of the meeting, Aisyiah Amini.  Meanwhile, the 
government support to various issues around the press freedom was strengthened by the 
opinion or advice from media experts like Atmakusumah and Budiatna. 
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Chapter 7 
The Press Freedom in the “Gus Dur” and “Mega” Periods 
 
In this chapter, the results of the field research and the literature describing the 
press freedom in two presidential periods, Abdurrahman Wahid or ”Gus Dur” and 
Megawati Soekarnoputri or ”Mega” is reported. It is started with the contemporary 
democracy development in Indonesia, and then followed by the condition of the press 
freedom in those two government periods.  The relationship between media and the 
government was the theme that was always introduced as part of the political 
communication.  In this section, how each government had certain characteristics 
marking the practice of its press freedom is explained.  
 
7.1 The General Development: The Approaches to the Contemporary Indonesian 
Democracy 
        Since the independence from the Japanese colony in August 1945, Indonesia had 
implemented the democratic government twice.  First, in the period of President 
Soekarno government, namely when the parliamentary democracy system was 
implemented (1950-1959) and second, the use of the current democracy government 
system (1998-2004). The main characteristic in the second system was the presence of 
more than two parties (the multi party system) followed by the second main competitive, 
fair and open characteristic of general elections. In 1950, the 1950 the temporary 
Constitution was put in effect where the parliamentary democracy system was 
determined; the government answers for the People’s Consultative Assembly. 
Consequently, the multi party system was embraced and it gave freedom for the society 
to establish political parties in accordance with their aspiration (Thoha, 2003:136).  
However, the parliamentary democracy system of the period of 1950-1959 was 
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considered to fail due to the occurrence of political instability in the form of government 
shift several times so that it had to be returned to the stable system namely the directed 
democracy system.  
      Actually, after Soeharto stepped down in May 1998 Indonesia also experienced 
the shift of government several times.  The first government was led by BJ Habibie; it 
lasted for 16 months (21 May 1998-20 October 1999).  The second government was led 
by President Abdurrahman Wahid and it ran for 21 months (20 October 1999-23 July 
2001), and the third government was led by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, which 
lasted for 27 months (23 July 2001-20 October 2004).  Nonetheless, there was difference 
between the liberal parliamentary government system and the democracy system of 1998-
2004.  In the latter system, which still lasted until the year 2007, the bench mark of the 
democracy system still lasted, namely the free, fair, competitive general election in 1999 
during the governance of BJ Habibie and consecutively in 2004 during the Megawati 
Soekarnoputri government.  This period was the transition period namely the shift period 
from the authoritarian to the democratic system even though the democracy was not 
established, stable nor consolidated.  There were still some unfulfilled requirements for a 
country to be said to have the established or advanced democracy system since there was 
no strong political consensus. The relative level of the government decentralization, the 
government agreeing to the law for media, the private media, the citizens with the access 
to various source of information on different media, and the journalist association were 
needed (Price et al., 2002: 60).  Some other requirements were needed in the three 
approaches as Larry Diamond suggested (see Chapter 2). 
      In the first approach, the actor and the elite approach and the mutual commitment 
were needed through the coordination mechanism of the constitution, political institutions 
and the elite agreement to enact the state authority limits. The second approach, the 
strengthening of such political institutions as the administrative officials (the 
bureaucracy), the parliament, the general election system, and the court system that could 
accommodate the community aspiration independently. The third approach, the politics 
culture, namely the perception, the attitude, the action and the trust about democracy 
legitimacy. The culture of cooperation, the accommodation, the bargaining among the 
elites and the society politics participation are also required.  Fourth, an approach 
directed to the society, which was enabled by the revived civil society (Dwipayana et al., 
  
228
2003: xxx).  All of these were present almost along the transition period but they were 
limited superficially.  
      The condition that Price expected was relatively fulfilled since the liquidation of 
the old stipulations on the press censorship by the BJ Habibie government was 
strengthened by the birth of the liberal Press Regulations, which prohibited any pressures, 
obstacles, censor to the press, the formation of the independent journalist association, and 
the independent press council.  In the period of the President Megawati Soekarnoputri 
government, the Broadcast Regulations of 2002 was ratified to replace the undemocratic 
Broadcast Regulations year 1997.  The new Regulations stipulated the network television 
system (Article 31), meaning that there was no national television model anymore; it also 
determined an independent Indonesian Broadcast Commission (Article 7, 8, 9) as a 
regulatory body.  However, the important article was even rejected by the private 
television industry so that the struggle to enact it was still going.  The problem in 
question was how strong the government and the civil society faced the capital investors.  
The fact told, after the ratification of this Broadcast Regulations (also before), the 
Indonesian television industry was occupied by the investors who did not submit to the 
new stipulations so that the television programs was still dominated by the entertainments 
that were not of good quality, unhealthy and not educative.  Besides, the growing 
infotainment journalism in the private televisions contained a number of mistakes. 
Gossips become news; they search for mistakes. They are forcing and dramatizing. There 
is unclearness of the media use that uncovered the privacy, threatened and blurred the 
profession (Iswandi Syahputra, 2006: 169-193).  In the current media industry, the public 
interest has small opportunity to be raised and defined by media.  The issues of prosperity 
of the labors, farmers, homeless people will have the “news value” only if they start 
doing demonstration, doing chaotic demonstration, disturbing the comfort of the middle 
class as the main customers of the media industry (Hidayat  in Gazali, 2002: 14-15).  A 
number of threats related to the information freedom had also been present in some 
Constitution Plans.  For example, the draft of the Penal Code (KUHP), the draft of the 
Intelligent Law, the draft of the State Secrets Law and the draft of the Freedom to Access 
Public Information that had not been agreed.  
 
Four Approaches  
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      Embracing the first approach, the government coordination through the 
constitution was done by amending the 1945 Constitution that had been in sacredness for 
54 years.  In the amendment in the year 1999, for example, the Article 7 says,”The 
President and the Vice President hold the offices for five years and they can be 
reappointed for the same position only for once more office period”.  This change was 
meant to prevent the appearance of such a president as Soeharto who held the position for 
more that five periods consecutively because the Constitution at that time did not state the 
words ”only for one period of office”.     
      In the Article 22 about the House of  People’s Representative  there was an 
addendum that appeared in Article 22B stating, “The members of the House can be 
dismissed from their office.”   This change was intended not to let the members of the 
House to do wrongs and violations without being able to be replaced or dismissed.  The 
change in the year 2000 added the Chapter on Human Rights (Chapter XA), for example 
in article 28A stating that ”Everyone has the right to live and to defend his life and 
living” while Chapter 28B article (2) ”Everyone has the rights of his life, the rights to 
grow and develop and the rights for protection from violence and discrimination”.  These 
chapters give a number of basic rights to citizens that were not given during the previous 
government; even it was never explained in a number of constitutions.  The poor 
assurance of human rights in the constitution was worsened by various human rights 
violations during the authoritarian New Order government.  Then, such human rights 
violations began to decrease in line with political changes in the new, democratic 
government.  
      Still based on the second change in the year 2000, there was phenomenal Chapter 
28F stating that ”Everyone has the rights to communicate and to get information to 
develop personality in his social environment and the rights to find, get, own, keep, 
process and convey information by using any existing channels”39.  Not to mention the 
determination of the Constitution no. 26 year 2000 on Human Rights, especially the 
articles 69 and 70 and then the limitations in the Human Rights Court Regulations articles 
                                                
39 Leo Sabam Batubara suggested that the idea of the communication and information freedom was given 
by the Indonesian Broadcast and Press Community (MPPI) after various findings since its foundation under 
the name of Indonesian Press Society (MPI) on 14 October 1998 (Interview, 11 February 2005). 
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8 and 9.40 However, some big cases were not settled until the end of the President 
Megawati Soekarnoputri period office. Take examples of the various Human Rights 
violations in Aceh during the Soeharto era, the violations in East Timor, the riot on 27 
July 1996, the shooting of the students in May 1998, the killing of Human Rights 
activists in Papua, the assassination of Munir, and a number of the society culture, 
economy and social negligence in the transition era.  
      The second approach looked at the parliament strengthening, the court system, the 
general election, and the bureaucracy officials. Although it was still attached to the 
practice of money politics, the parliament members were voted by a democratic system 
from the candidates provided by tens of political party.  During the transition time, the 
parliament seemed to be more vicious than the executive was.  They dared to criticize the 
government. The weakness was that the political party as the basis of the parliament did 
not discuss the program to solve poverty and unemployment except in the campaign time 
(Mudayat, in Mandatory, Edition 1/Year I/2004: 69-99).  Whereas, the parliament as the 
product of the general election of 1999 and 2004 are always from such big political 
parties as Golkar, PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan-The Struggle of 
Indonesian Democratic Party), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-United Development 
Party), then PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional-National Mandate Party), PKB (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa-Nation Awakening Party), and the Democrat Party.  The people of 
those parties enjoyed the position in the parliament.  Another weakness, the political 
parties were not the cadre parties and what they did was not clear because they were not 
based on the party political functions such as the political education and the political 
                                                
40 For example, in Chapter 69 article (1) of Human Rights Regulations ”everyone is 
obliged to honour the rights of others, moral, ethics, and the rules of the society, nation 
and country, article (2) ”Human rights of someone entail fundamental obligation and 
responsibility to honour others’ rights reciprocally and it is the government’s responsibility 
to honour, protect, enact, and develop it.  Also, in General Explanation paragraph 7 of 
Human Rights Judgement Regulations:”  Regulations on Human Rights Judgement are 
expected to be able to protect human rights, both individually and socially, and it 
becomes the basis for the enactment, legal assurance, fairness, and secure feeling for 
individuals and the society of serious violations against human rights” 
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socialization.  If they did the political recruitment, what they recruited were the former 
officials, the former military high rank officials, the people who were supposed to have 
fund to finance the parties or were expected to collect the fund for the survival of the 
parties.  Meanwhile, the young people who actually were potential, creative and critical 
were not touched at all because they did not have the capital.  In fact, there appeared new 
generation of intellectuals and activists who developed the alternative critical thinking 
and who actively struggle to encourage the renewal of Indonesia, but the idea and the 
action of the thinking only worked in society domain and did not enter the domain of the 
leaders, politicians or authorities.  The group of authorities only run the government 
bureaucratically with the orientation of searching, competing, and defending authority 
(Eko in Mandatory Edition 1 Year I/2004: 31-67) 
     What prideful was the performance of the general election in 1999 and 2004.  The 
process and the performance ran smoothly, orderly, fairly and competitively including the 
election at the local level (the election of local leaders).  The event of the election did not 
result in vertical or horizontal conflicts such as riots or turmoil. It means that the political 
awareness of the citizens to acknowledge differences and superiorities of other people 
started to grow.  This was the treasure of democratic values to be fostered, developed and 
maintained for the continuation in the future.  
      High number of legal issues in Indonesia focused more on the problems at the 
central government level whereas the political structure at the local level was worse.  The 
first solution was straightening up the officials, and out of those three importing elements 
from the legal side, namely structure, substance and legal culture, it was the third of them 
that had to be straightened up (Arinanto in Stanley, 2000: 93-94).  Until entering the 
period of the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government, a number of 
legal cases involving the former New Order military officials including Soeharto 
remained unsettled.  The solution to take was judging those doing wrongs fairly in an 
independent and autonomous court, and the groups being harmed were compensated and 
their rights were restored.  Thus, there were two advantages; first it became the precedent 
encouraging the law enforcement and the political regularity because politics would get 
the clue that any violations by anybody could not be exempted from the law and the 
court.  Second, it was shown to the public the appreciation of the government to the rights 
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of the society that by far were respected through words and promises only (Kleden, 2001: 
138). 
      The condition of the bureaucracy was one of the big problems in the transition 
period in Indonesia.  The noblemen mentality, the mentality to be served not to serve, the 
unprofessionalism, and the corrupt mentality were still conspicuous.  For example, 
although it had been done for years, the performance of the civil servants recruitment test 
had always been unfair with the questions of the test being known by some participants.  
The same thing happened in the performance of the school test; the revelation of the 
answer to the test in advance was reported each year. Unprofessional actions of the 
government officials were also seen when there were disasters like tsunami, earthquake, 
flood, landslide, and forest fire.   No significant treatment progress was seen, and the 
donation was even embezzled.  In the National Education Department, the disorders still 
occurred and resulted in the collusion, corruption, nepotism (KKN).  The National 
Education Department was not just the place where “the robbers” gathered because in 
addition to leak of fund there was affluence of fund as well.   The bureaucracy 
complexity in this department actually reflected the bureaucracy in all lines of the 
Indonesian government, where many rules were intentionally made in favor of the 
interest of the ruling parties (Long Passage-Annual Final Report Kompas 2001, 2002: 
153-154).  
      The third approach focused on the political culture.  From those three political 
culture types as explained by Almond and Verba (see Chapter III), the participant 
political culture started to grow when there was brevity to criticize in all levels of the 
society.  Especially the ideas channeled through mass media, in addition to a number of 
the protest actions by the society in the street.  In the village level, the society also 
expressed openly any disappointment, the feeling of being pressured, discriminative and 
unfairly experiences. Still prominent, the paternalistic culture began to be criticized.  In 
the cities, the urban poor groups often voiced their concerns over the incapability and the 
unfairness of the government and the business sector. They expected the enactment of 
fairness by the political leaders. Various political behaviors of attitudes of the elites such 
as competing for the power or committing a corruption were not in line with the political 
propriety and the political correctness.  For the reason, the political system renewal was 
able to be done only if there was a real shift of the political aesthetics to the political 
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ethics, which was supported by the real shift from the thinking based on the political 
culture to the consideration based on the political morality.  Thus, a set of values was 
accepted not only being considered as the common values but was accepted as the shared 
values due to the reasons or the realms that could get the acceptance right (Kleden, 2001: 
34) 
      In the fourth approach, there could be seen how the legal renewal through the 
constitution amendment renewal and some other constitutions leading to the responsive 
legal type was a strong capital to strengthen the civil society.  The responsive legal type 
had the commitment to the “consumers-perspective law” that: gave attention to human 
targets, touched total human needs (physical, psychological and ownership), fulfilled the 
demands of the society at large, and responded to the individual cases (Fadjar, 2003: 19). 
Next, in the responsive legal type with the consumer perspective, the function of the law 
as the social engineering instrument had to be followed by its function as the human and 
social empowering instrument, so that the human and the social independence could be 
realized.  In this perspective, the alternative search was an essential way out or the social 
problems by familiarizing dialogue, negotiation, discussion and compromise (consensus).  
Human beings and the society had to be encouraged to be self-help. 
      Nonetheless, the development of the civil society in Indonesia after Soeharto was 
still far from the expectation.  A number of the social actions driven by the Non-
Government Organizations did not have good coordination with other Non-Government 
Organizations so that they did not serve as the strong power like those in the Philippines.  
The NGOs in Indonesia were criticized as the actors and the organizations that were often 
involved in international issues such as weak accountability, shallow democracy, and 
unstable legitimacy (Suharko, in Mandatory Edition 1/Year I/2004: 171-187).  Moreover, 
the government elites often disturbed, for example by provoking the female political 
activeness, denying their ability to give political consideration and even attacking such 
organizations as the Indonesian Women Coalition (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia-KPI).  
The establishment of KPI was strongly controlled by the government especially by the 
Women Affairs Ministry, since it was suspected to be related with the communism 
(Manning and Diermen, 2000: 320). 
      The Indonesian contemporary democracy showed the absence of stability, or 
settled ness, firmness. During the Soeharto government era, Pancasila was paralleled with 
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the word Democracy so that as if the Indonesian political system was Pancasila 
Democracy.  Now in the transition time, the liberal democracy principle seemed like to 
be embraced but there was no clear understanding and moreover its practice was found. 
The current Indonesian Democracy was a fake democracy namely the democracy that 
merely worked procedurally but that did not touch the essentials covering changes of the 
value and the behavior in various elements of the society and the government.  Some 
important government officials did not show professional performance to run the 
government by this time.   
 
7.2 Press Freeedom in the Period of President Abdurrahman Wahid  
(20 October 1999-23 July 2001) 
      Before being proposed by the center axis as a candidate of a president in the 
People’s Consultantive Assembly after the general election in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(Gus Dur) was known as a democratic figure, in addition to a Moslem leader from 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).  His name raised during the crisis period 1982-1984 by 
intermediating conflict between a number of factions in NU before finally was elected as 
the General Leader of Tanfidziyah and finally reelected in 1989.  His relationship with 
cycles outside NU, such as followers of faith, Christians, Chinese and foreigners, was the 
asset for NU but at the same time it was felt as threat for the values he was struggling for 
(Bruinessen, 1994: 185).  When President Soeharto government was still very powerful, 
he and his friends part of whom were non-Moslem founded Democracy Forum (Fordem) 
that was considered an alternative of the foundation of Indonesian Moslem Scientists 
Association (ICMI) sponsored by Soeharto and was led by BJ Habibie.41  For the reason, 
the election Gus Dur gave expectations for future democracy in Indonesia. 
      Not long after his inauguration as the fourth President of the Republic of 
Indonesia after Soekarno, Soeharto, and Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid immediately 
made a surprise by liquidating the Department of Information.  It was a Department in the 
New Order taking big role in filtering various information and disseminate it top-down to 
the society (see Chapter III).  This policy by Gus Dur smoothened the path for press 
                                                
41 To a certain extent, ICMI played its role in the process of bureucracy Islamisation and a number of ”pro-
Islam” government actions and on the other side it represented people organizing by the state (Martin van 
Bruinessen, NU Tradisi Relasi-relasi Kuasa Pencarian Wacana Baru, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 1999, p.259) 
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independence pioneered by BJ Habibie with the confirmation of Regulations No. 40 year 
1999 on Press in September 1999.  By Presidential Decree no.153/1999 Gus Dur 
established National Information and Communication Office (Badan Informasi dan 
Komunikasi Nasional-BIKN) with a number of functions, namely: establishment of 
policies in the field of national information and communication services in accordance 
with general policy determined by the president; information and communication services 
for the society; confirmation for government and civil institutions in the sector of national 
information and communication services; coordination of activities in National 
Information and Communication Office cycles; management of sources for fruitful and 
valuable operation of the National Information and Communication Office. BIKN was a 
non-department institution that was directly under and was responsible to the president 
who coordinated with the Coordinator State Minister of Politics and Security Sector 
(Nurudin, 2003: 98). 
      Looking at the tasks to be done by the BIKN, it was clear that President Wahid 
really wanted to minimize or even eliminate the entire authority of the Information 
Department as the practice of the New Order.  In the past, the Information Department 
through the Minister of Information and all of its subordinates such as the Directorate 
General of Press Publication and Graphics (PPG), could directly annulled the SIUPP or 
just warned the press that they are considered violating the criteria of the government 
because their reports were categorized as containing sensitive things related to the tribe, 
the religion, the race or group (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar golongan-SARA) or 
“disturbing” the national stability.  In the Press Law no. 11 year 1966, the Law no.4 year 
1967, and the Press Law no.21 year 1982 there were always mentioned that the 
government was the Minister of Information, but the most lethal regulations for the press 
independence was the Regulations of the Indonesian Information Minister 
no.01/Per/Menpen/1984 on the Press Publication Enterprise Permit Letter (SIUPP) and 
the Decree of the Indonesian Minister of Information No. 214A/Kep/Menpen/1984 on the 
Procedures and Requirements to get the SIUPP (Simorangkir, 1986).  When all estates 
controlling the instruments are not present, the pressure against media does not turn to 
end.  In the time of the Wahid government, the pressure against media still occurred 
either done by himself or by his proponents who felt to be harmed by the media reports.  
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      In other perspective, the practice of the press freedom cannot be isolated.  
President Wahid suggested that the press must have the values for the society.  Adhi 
M.Massardi, one of his spokespersons told: 
”The press freedom is present when the press has the values for the 
society.  The press as the fourth estate will not be valuable if the other 
three estates: legislative, executive, judicative, are not present. Thus, the 
press cannot be isolated. For example, in the example of the corruption 
in the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum-KPU), 
the press had been shouting for these three years but there was no result 
because the other estates did not move.  It also applied in the case of the 
Akbar Tanjung corruption, the press also shouted but when the judicial 
institution kept silent; it did not put any effect.  There was 
misunderstanding that the press as the fourth estate may work without 
the other three estates. As long as the society does not treat the existing 
media information, it did not give effects to the press.”(Interview, 3 
August 2005) 
 
      During the governance of President Wahid, the cabinet often changed the 
personnel, while the legislative institution was much in the conflict with it.  This people’s 
representative even stepped him down later.  
 
7.2.1 The Government-Media-Relations 
      Although Gus Dur cleared the path for the press independence by liquidating the 
Department of Information, he was a man of controversy, and fanaticism of the NU mass 
support caused the disharmonious relationship between the Gus Dur government and the 
media and they tended to be in hostile. In an interview, Adhi M. Massardi as one of 
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s spokespersons said: 
”In the Gus Dur period, the press was not in favor of him but Gus Dur 
remained a president. Thus, Gus Dur became a president not because the 
press but the political system. The proof was that after falling down Gus 
Dur was still honored, unlike the others, Soeharto for example.  I 
remember Jose Rizal’s writing, ’the task of the press is to lift the sufferer 
to the altar of the monastery and to wait if people care for the poor’” 
(Interview, 3 August 2005). 
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       To the attitude of the press, Massardi said, President Wahid told not to care about 
it. He continued:  
”The Press reported slantingly about Gus Dur, but he said, do not care 
about it, because the press cares only those who are educated, middle 
class, and rational.  Prove that what the press writes is wrong.  
Unfortunately, we had no time to prove it, but the lower class was not 
influenced by the press because they did not believe what the press 
wrote, for example about the agriculture products.  The proof was that 
the harvest was good, the agriculture products were also good” 
(Interview, 3 August 2005)  
 
In the Gus Dur era, especially by the time of his Accountability Report as the 
President in the People’s Consultancy Assembly in July 2001, the difference of point of 
view and the conflict between the President and the media was sharpening.  At that time, 
media was in the political fever, meaning that media gave the big portion to the political 
news, including various talk shows in the television.  In the talk show, the informants 
often expressed strong opinions that resulted in the conflict in the society.  The war of 
statements between the party leaders in DPR/MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly)  
and President Wahid was also reported by media. 
 
7.2.2 The pressure against Media 
        Realizing the condition, President Wahid had warned the press on 27 January 
2001, commenting the unqualified press performance.  Some of the press were said to 
emphasize the sensation rather than the facts, the objectivity and the accuracy of reports 
and then he suggested that press cool the mind, rather than fire the public emotion 
(Kompas, 13 March 2001). April 2001, Gus Dur summoned the Director of TVRI Chairul 
Zen and asked him to immediately censor the programs that he said to be overacting, full 
of blasphemy and opposed to the presidential institution (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002:259).  
Moreover, President Wahid also cast an idea to form a Media Controlling Team led by 
Luhut Pangaribuan and Harun Al Rasyid that resulted in the objection from various 
parties, including Atmakusumah, the Chairperson of the Press Council 2000-2003. 
Atmakusumah commented that the establishment of the team would threaten the press 
independence since the team was meant as an institution that would determine the 
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standards of reporting and to prepare the legal prosecution to the mass media that are 
considered to harm the government (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002: 260).  On the other hand, 
Gus Dur held an informal meeting on 30 June 2001 in Utan Kayu, the complex of arts 
and journalism.  This meeting was attended by a number of important media figures such 
as Jakob Oetama (Kompas), Bambang Harymurti (Tempo), Bondan Winarno (Suara 
Pembaruan), Don Bosco Salamun (SCTV), A.Muis (Hasanudin University), Dhimam 
Abror (Jawa Pos), Sasongko Tedjo (Suara Merdeka), Moh Sobary (Antara), Reva Deddy 
(Anteve), Susanto Pudjomartono (The Jakarta Post), Uni Z.Lubis (Panji), Andy F.Noya 
(Metro TV), Widi Yarmanto (Gatra), Yuzirwan Uyun (TVRI). That off-the-record 
meeting tossed cast, among others, criticism about twisting and the character 
assassination that Gus Dur often cited (Pantau, Agustus 2001: 9). 
      According to the record of the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI), in the 
period from 3 May 2000 to 3 May 2001, there were 99 cases of disturbances to the 
journalists and its media. Out of 99 cases, 41 cases were the pressures done by the 
government officials in various media in Indonesia.  The most government officials were 
the policemen, then the court officials, the army, the presidential secretariat, the 
parliament members, Faisal Tanjung (Army General), the officers of the attorney offices 
(Solahudin et al., 2001:35-73).  Several examples were, first, the State Secretary blocked 
the access of information from the source of the news namely the ministers. Responding 
to the issue, the journalists who usually covered in Bina Graha as the presidential office 
boycotted the news coverage in the State Court on 17 May 2000.  Second, the officer of 
the Police Head Quarter, Saleh Saaf, planned to investigate the editors of the Gatra 
magazine after this magazine wrote the suspected scandal of Gus Dur and Aryanti.  Saaf 
said that the Gatra article was categorized as violating against the law and the moral 
ethics that tendentiously attacked the president in person. Third, a number of journalists 
with official ID card were not allowed to cover the informal meeting between President 
Wahid and delegations of Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) in the building of the People’s 
Representative Council. The president security force (Pasukan pengaman presiden-
Paspampres) explained that journalists allowed to cover the event were those with the ID 
card with the signature from DPR (the House) press report section, Iskandar Basri.  
Fourth, photographer of Media Indonesia, Sayuti, was hit on the stomach by Faisal 
Tanjung, a military general.  Tanjung was going to be investigated by the Connectivity 
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Team against the violence case of 27 July 1996 and Sayuti was going to take his picture 
when the general just arrived.  
      Some parts of this case showed incomprehensiveness of the government officers 
about the tasks of journalists completed with the arrogant attitude and the prestige of 
power.  In fact, this was a serious threat for the press independence.  
 
7.2.3 The Professional and Unprofessional Media 
      In the eyes of the media, Gus Dur was categorized as having no sense of crisis, 
playing the law, authoritarian and inconsistent (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002:229-238).  The 
media itself did not sufficiently fulfill the journalistic standard basis while reporting 
about Gus Dur, for example the Pos Kota used 4 contra Gus Dur news sources and 1 pro 
Gus Dur source of information. The Rakyat Merdeka presented 2 pro informants and 12 
anti Gus Dur informants, the Media Indonesia took 7 contra sources and only 1 pro Gus 
Dur source, while  Kompas only presented the perspective balance by giving the 
relatively balanced space between the pro and the contra Gus Dur sources of information 
(Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002: 252-255).   
      In spite of the unprofessional media, there were still media that seriously placed 
themselves as the controllers of the government authority, which wrote sharply.  Kompas 
actually had changed the methods of writing its editorial from the two models that were 
often used namely the Middle Path Model (Model Jalan Tengah-MJT), the Heaven Wind 
Model (Model Angin Surga-MAS), then started to use the Watch Dog Model (Model 
Anjing Penjaga-MAP) (Mallarangeng in Sularto, 2001: 67).  This last model was used in 
the editorial entitled ”Nekat Dibalas Nekat, Hasilnya Tentu Saja Semakin Tidak Karuan / 
Thoughtless Action contra Thoughtless Actions Result in Chaos” written in Kompas of 9 
June 2001. Mallarangeng told that this editorial did not discuss an official personally, but 
his behavior in the public space.  The readers would understand easily that for Kompas, 
Gus Dur’s attitude was ”not wise”, ”arbitrarily”, ”aimless” and endangered the 
democracy system.  With such an editorial, tens thousand of the Kompas editorial readers 
would enjoy the presentation of the sharp opinion and stimulated them to think and 
formulate their own opinion with regards to the attitude of a figure occupying the highest 
executive authority in Indonesia (Sularto, 2002: 72).  Actually, here lies the potential of 
the media democracy especially in creating the public space as described by Habermas 
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namely an arena where the entire members of the society could interact, exchange ideas 
and debate about public issues, without worrying the intervention of the economy or 
politics authority (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002: 242).  The concept of the public space required 
the same treatment in reporting the public issues without looking at who was talking or 
who was in the report.  
      As Muis expressed, there were two things in the political communication of the 
Wahid government.  The first was the communication authority variable and the second 
was the paternalistic variable. The communication authority that the president and some 
of the MPR/DPR members had gave birth to the statement reciprocal political 
communication.  The tendency of the politics elites in this communication resulted in bad 
results in lower cycles namely the provoking lower cycles to give the strong feedback to 
the parties considered as the political opponents of their leaders. Meanwhile, the 
paternalistic variables made use of the hypodermic needle model with the objective that 
the public opinion would change fast in accordance with the expectation of the political 
elites.  As a consequence, the grass root, the mass, became wild due to the provocation of 
the statement from the upper level (Kompas, 13 March 2001). 
 
7.2.4 A Controversial Figure  
      In fact, Gus Dur was an idol figure for the democracy activators in both the 
religious community and the activists of the Non-Government Organization (LSM).  
However, the controversial character attached to Gus Dur personality finally exploded 
uncontrollably when he seated in the presidency.  Even though he had liquidated the 
Department of Information so that the control of the state to media and information was 
hardly present, Gus Dur’s attitude toward the press and his controversial statements, 
including his accusation to the press to have twisted the fact, were getting worrisome.  
Some examples of Gus Dur controversies were his labeling of “kids” to the members of 
the People’s Representative Council, the annulment proposal of the MPR Decree number 
XXV/1966 relating to the prohibition to disseminate Marxism-Leninism-Communism, 
the cessation of several ministers, namely Hamzah Has, Jusuf Kalla, Laksamana Sukardi 
and Suroyo Bimantoro. The cessation of the Head of the Indonesian Police, General 
Police Suroyo Bimantoro triggered the acceleration of an Extraordinary Meeting of the 
People Consultancy Assembly and the Army/Police Faction with 38 chairs in the MPR 
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made a surprise by stating that the plenary meeting on 23 July 2001 was an Extraordinary 
Meeting of the MPR (Zada, 2002:213).  
      On the other hand, apart from the Gus Dur personality, the media performance 
contributed to making the worse relation between the President Wahid government and 
the media.  An example was the Gebyar BCA program in Indosiar television station on 23 
October 1999 that presented Bagito as a comedian group.  In order to make the audience 
in the studio and the spectators laugh, Bagito expressed the physical deficiency of Gus 
Dur.42   It was not laughter they obtained but the outrage of the mass of Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU), and they requested Bagito and Indosiar to apologize.  Although the humorist Gus 
Dur exerted his popular statement ”Gitu aja kok repot”(“why bothers?”) in responding 
Bagito’s humor, the NU mass occupied Indosiar and considered Bagito’s humor as 
humiliating their leader (Nurudin, 2003: 103).  
        Another factor making the relationship between the government of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid and the media was the behavior of his followers that often did 
anarchic actions by occupying the media offices considered to have “humiliated” Gus 
Dur.  An example, in addition to the case of Indosiar, was the raid of the activists of 
Surabaya Ansor Youth Movement to the Jawa Pos office on 15 April 1999 due to their 
being irritated by an article entitled ”Gus Dur was seized by PBNU – Considered to be of 
two minds, Not Allowed to Talk about PKB”.  Then, the occupation of the Jawa Pos 
office on 6 April 2000 as a protest against an article entitled ”PKB was Restless, PBNU 
Made a Clarification Team”.  This article wrote the name of Hasyim Muzadi, the NU 
leader as one of the KKN doers.  The article that quoted the Tempo edition of 1-7 May 
2000 as the source of the news mistyped the name; it should have been Hasyim Wahid 
not Hasyim Muzadi.43  And the occupation of the Jawa Pos office by the Multi Purpose 
Force (Bantuan Serba Guna-Banser) on 18 January 2001 (Solahudin et al., 2001: 8-11). 
                                                
42 Gus Dur had lost his sight for long so that he had to get remedy abroad.  The disturbance did not improve 
so practically it made him ”blind” so that someone had to hold his hand while walking.  Consequently, he 
could not do several presidential activities like reading the speech.  
43 Atmakusumah suggested that the mistake originated from Tempo namely mistype or often called slip of 
the fingers. “I believe this is not misinformation.  It is rare that Indonesian media make misinformation.  If 
any, it is done by inexperienced media, newly published or adventure tabloid” (Stanley, ed.,  Indonesia di 
Tengah Transisi, Jakarta, Propatria, 2000, p.141) 
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        Being unprofessional was one of the obstacles in the press independence as it was 
stated by Hallin and Mancini, but the attack en masse of a media office might be a 
specific phenomenon in the transition time in Indonesia. 
      By far, we can draw temporary conclusion that the press independence had been 
ratified with the Pres Law year 1999 and the liquidation of the Information Department 
gave more assurance to the media to report the news sharply, to criticize the government.  
The conflict between the government and the media was not merely resulted from the 
reporting method of the media, but also from the attitudes of the officials and the former 
officials, the society behavior, in addition to the attitude and the character of the president 
in leading the state management.  
 
7.3  The Press Freedom in the Time of President Megawati Soekarnoputri  (23 July 
2001-20 October 2004) 
      In terms of the political policy, the difference between President BJ Habibie, 
Wahid and Megawati was that the latest even revitalized an institution with a nuance of 
the Department of Information, namely the Ministry of Communication and Information 
(Komunikasi dan Informasi-Kominfo).  Actually, this marked the settlement of the New 
Order elements that remains living in the bureaucracy of the government departments.  
The bureaucracy of the Department of Information, which was changed into Kominfo, 
was still occupied by some figures that had the idea to control the press independence, for 
example by proposing the revision of the Press Law 1999.  The difference between the 
first two and the third was that this third did not like to talk directly to the media.  If BJ 
Habibie could be hours joking with the media, Gus Dur could express various spoken 
statements. Megawati was economical in words and tended to keep silent.  Moreover, if 
President BJ Habibie had Dewi Fortuna Anwar, President Wahid had several 
spokespersons including Adhi M.Massardi. President Soekarnoputri did not have anyone 
to function as a spokesperson although there are several political advisors such as 
Cornelis Lay. 
      In such a condition, it was difficult to predict Megawati’s attitude toward media 
and the press independence.  According to the chief editor of Media Indonesia newspaper 
Saur Hutabarat, Gus Dur had been familiar with criticizing the culture while 
Soekarnoputri was not accustomed to criticism.  Thus, when we are going to criticize her, 
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we had to do it in a different way, not directly frontal as before (Wardhana in Zada, 2002: 
277). 
      President Megawati Soekarnoputri turned not to take criticism easily, although 
protests aimed at her had different character because of some demonstrations with the 
action of stepping on the face of the poster of Megawati (President) and Hamzah Haz 
(Vice President).  The protest done by the Civil Youth Movement on 24 June 2002 was 
responded by summon of them by the police (Sinar Harapan, 2 July 2002).  Meanwhile, 
the violence toward the journalists was getting more and more during the governance of 
Soekarnoputri.  The Anti Violence Coalition against Journalist recorded that from 3 May 
2001 to 3 May 2002 there were 118 cases hurting the press independence with 58 cases 
of physical violence (Sinar Harapan, 5 July 2002).  The coalition visiting the 
Commission of Human Rights protested the violence done by the police and questioned 
the public right to know and guarantee the press independence as the rights of the 
citizens.  
     Once the president cited a comment resulting in many responses, for example she 
stated that the government was like “a litter bin” (Sinar Harapan, 14 February 2002). 
When media confirmed the statement, she stated that the press was “slipped”.  The State 
Secretary who was also the Secretary to the Cabinet, Bambang Kesowo, said: 
”I read the news of the press, everything was really twisted.  I did not 
say “to twist”, but everyone had been “twisted”.  The context of the 
current government heirs the problems of the past, it’s like a litter bin” 
(Sinar Harapan, 14 February 2002)   
 
      On the anniversary of the Press in the year 2002, President in her speech said that 
the Indonesian press could only criticize but it did not give solutions. This statement was 
considered untrue by the journalist cycles such as the Independent Journalists Association 
(AJI) and the Indonesian Television Journalists Association when they saw the 
Commission I of the People’s Representative Council on 21 March 2002 (Sinar Harapan, 
22 March 2002). 
”AJI looks at the statement as showing the incomprehensiveness of 
President Megawati about the functions of the press.  The substantial 
function of the press is a watchdog. Its task is controlling the 
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environment and barking if there are things going wrong.  This metaphor 
needs to be understood well, that press has clear vision, hearing, and 
instinct of dangerous things in the environment.  In fact, the press should 
not give solutions.” (Sinar Harapan, 22 March 2002) 
 
       Other journalist organization, the Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI), 
considered the statement of the President as an advice.  The PWI assessed, the press 
freedom and the independence, if it is counted with numbers, only fifty percents had been 
achieved, some information accesses are still blocked. The PWI pushed the Commission I 
of the DPR together with the government to finish the Regulations on the Freedom to Get 
the Information and the Broadcast Regulations. (Sinar Harapan, 22 March 2002).       
       During the period of President Soekarnoputri, one of the important tests for the 
press independence was at the time of constructing the new Broadcast Regulations to 
replace the Broadcasting Law year 1997.  In this process, the conflict of interest was not 
merely between the politicians and the government, the civil society and the media like in 
the period of the construction of the Press Law 1999, but it was colored more by the 
competition for influence between the capital owners behind the television stations and 
the politicians and the civil society and the government.  
      There were two principal objections of the television media cycles represented by 
the Indonesian Private Televisions Association (Asosiasi Televisi Swasta Indonesia-
ATVSI) to the new Broadcasting Law: First, the obligation of the national private 
television to cooperate with the local, private television because it was considered 
burdensome after billions of investment to establish the transmissions in the local areas.  
Second, they oppose to the authority of the KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia-Indonesian 
Broadcasting Commsission) that was too powerful, including in annulling the broadcast 
permit and composing the code of conduct (Sudibyo, 2004: 75).  Their objection was 
shown by demonstrating against the ratification of the Draft of the Broadcasting Law, on 
25 and 28 November 2002. A number of private television stations like TPI, ANteve, 
RCTI presented TV-Poll entitled ”Private Radio and TV was in the Mourning”.  Metro 
TV, Indosiar and other TVs also reported the demonstration periodically at 10.00a.m. – 
11.00 a.m.  The campaign of objecting the Broadcast Regulations was done by television 
practitioners by using each television station to mobilize the artists, politicians, 
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academicians, and the public who all opposed to it. There were hardly informants 
supporting or at least being neutral to the new Broadcasting Law (Sudibyo, 2004: 76). 
       The event, Agus Sudibyo told, resulted two important notes.  First, the dominant 
perspective of the independent press still considered the government the first “enemy” of 
the media.  The question was whether the media was also critical against the capital 
owners who could take part in the political games that the media was highlighting. 
Second, the public group that does not have the high social political status and the 
capacity to construct the public opinion would not get the access to the media. Media 
tended to report political issues, which was hot, controversial, full of sensation and did 
not give sufficient space for populace issues such as poverty, unemployment, health, and 
bad influence of the advertisement (Sudibyo, 2004: 77-78).  
      In the period of the Megawati Soekarnoputri governance, the practice and the 
competition of the press freedom concept still happened between the government, the 
civil society and the capital owner of the media industry.  
 
7.3.1 The Government-Media-Relations 
      Similar to the periods of Habibie and Gus Dur, the relationship between the 
government and the media tended to be contrary one to each other.  The government 
represented by the President and her staff and the political party cycles in the parliament, 
the media was represented by the printed press and the television press.  However, in this 
period the role of the Press Council was taking part in mediating the conflict between the 
government and various parties that felt to be harmed by the media reports.  Various 
complaints and protests to the performance of the media could be settled through the 
meeting of those two parties with the Press Council as the mediator. 
 
7.3.2 The Roles of the Press Council and the Ombudsman 
      The Press Council Institution stipulated in Chapter V Article 15 of the Press 
Regulations year 1999 started to work since its formation in the year 2000, handling 
reports cases that were not objective, unfair, containing prejudice, or inaccurate and 
according to the record there were 150 complaints in the process (Kompas, 10 February 
2003).  The first Press Council of period 2000-2003 was led by Atmakusumah 
Astraatmadja, a figure who had been very experienced in the press in both the Soekarno 
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and Soeharto era. Since April 2000 to January 2004 the Press Council had settled 449 
complaining letters in accordance with the functions it had to do.  This showed a number 
of phenomena.  First, the Press Council served as a reliable place for those who felt to be 
harmed by media.  Second, the increase of the community awareness to use the 
constructive methods to settle the problems with media.  Third, the high number of 
unprofessional media.  These phenomena also described how the Press Law had began to 
be known and understood by some people, even though it was still far from the expected 
number. For the reason, the Press Council also made this socialization to a number of 
cities, especially to see the strategic groups such as the officials of the police, the 
education, the government, and the media.  
      The Press Council could also facilitated directly and indirectly by letter, the 
considerations and the efforts to settle the complaints from the society with regards to 
cases related to the press reports concerning with the Rights to answer, to correct and 
suspects of the violation against the ethics code. Most letters (233 copies) contained 
complaints to the press media in order to write/broadcast the right to 
answer/clarify/comment/object/protest to inaccurate, incomplete, and unbalanced or bias 
reports (Panjaitan and Siregar, 2004:59).  At least, there were 4 letters asking for the 
settlement of the problem among the press media.  See table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: The Reports and Claims to the Press Council 2000-2004 
 
No Types of Claim Quantity
 
1. 
 
The requirement to the press media to publicize 
responses to inaccurate, incomplete, unbalanced, 
and bias reports.  
 
 
233 
 
2. 
 
The requirement for the legal protection for the 
journalists  
 
 
79 
 
 
3. 
 
The requirement for the Press Council to provide 
the expert witness or the mediator in the case of 
reports 
 
 
38 
  
247
 
4. 
 
The sue to the media  
 
28 
 
 
5. 
 
The Accusation of the press ethics violation  
 
23 
 
 
6. 
 
The Accusation against the press media considered 
to be pornographic or provocative  
 
 
18 
 
7. 
 
 
The reports on the journalist summon by the Police  
 
 
17 
 
8. 
 
 
The reports of the misuse of the press profession  
 
9 
 
9. 
 
The requirement to settle the problems inter the 
media 
 
 
4 
Source: Panjaitan and Siregar, 2004:59 
   
      From this table we can see that the high number of demand to report the 
comments or other forms of protests, objection, clarification showed the violation done 
by the media people against Chapter 6 on the Press Role especially point c that reads 
”developing the public opinion based on the appropriate, accurate and correct 
information”.   The inaccuracy, bias, incompleteness, unbalanced are the important 
elements influencing the media performance.  Whereas, the accuracy, completeness, 
neutrality are parts of the objectivity (McQuail, 1992: 205).  The accuracy, for example, 
determines the reputation and the credibility of the news media in the eyes of the public, 
and if the media reports are considered inaccurate, people will not trust the media 
anymore (McQuail, 1999: 207). 
       According to Press Council record, the demand of legal protection for the 
journalists showed the accusation or the pressure in any forms including the violence to 
the journalists done by state officials or the society.  This record confirmed the 
persistence of the use of the violent ways to deal with the mistakes or dissatisfaction 
toward the press that also happened during the periods of the BJ Habibie and the 
Abdurrahman Wahid governments.  If the media showed its unprofessional inaccuracy, 
  
248
then any pressures outside the media also showed the bad understanding and the 
immaturity of the society or the officials.  Both were threats for the press independence.  
      Some of the cases had been settled by the Press Council in its capacity as a 
mediator between the litigant and the media.  In a number of cases, the role of 
ombudsman of the related media was so important that the settlement was easier and 
faster.  One of the reports of the Press Council was the role of the ombudsman in the 
Jawa Pos, the Rakyat Merdeka, the Kompas dailies and the ombudsman of the 
Cenderawasih Post (Papua), the Kaltim Post (East Kalimantan), the Pontianak Post 
(West Kalimantan), the Fajar Group (South Sulawesi), the Gorontalo Post (Gorontalo) 
(Panjaitan and Siregar, 2004: 65).  It was interesting that some of the media reported by 
the society were the English media published abroad namely the Newsweek, the Reuters 
news office, the Time Magazine, and the Washington Post newspaper and a domestic 
newspaper, namely The Jakarta Post.  The Jakarta Post daily also made inaccurate report 
in the edition of 13 November 2003 where it wrote about someone close to the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP) who injected fresh money to the Republika national 
newspaper with the title ”PDIP-connected Family Acquires Media”.  In the edition 24 
November 2003, the following day, The Jakarta Post did the obligation to make a 
correction as stipulated by Chapter 5 article (3) of Press Regulations on the same page 
with the special box entitled ”Report Unsubstantiated: Editor” (Panjaitan and Siregar, 
2004: 125-126). 
      The sensational case of the Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman reported by a 
number of the Indonesian mass media related to the Bali blast was the report in the Jawa 
Pos of edition 28 October 2002 entitled ”Two Generals Were Suspected Going to Bali 
before the Blast, Back the Following Day”.  The Jawa Post ombudsman team finally sent 
a letter to General Djaja Suparman and it was stated in the letter that the Ombudsman 
Team had received a letter from the Chief Editor of the Jawa Pos concerning the 
Statement of the Assessment and the Recommendation of the Press Council.   The Press 
Council recommendation was based on the indictment of Leutenant General Djaja 
Suparman dated 28 April 2003 to The Jakarta Post, the Jawa Pos, the Radar Bali, the 
Sumatera Ekpress, the Pelita and the Rakyat Merdeka.  In addition to offering the rights 
to answer, the Team also invited Suparman to the Ombudsman office of the Jawa Pos 
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Group to hear directly Suparman’s rights to answer as recommended by the Press 
Council (Panjaitan and Siregar, 2004: 85). 
      This settlement might be the first time to occur in the press history in Indonesia. It 
was also the first time of the problem settlement process between the media and someone 
being mediated by the independent Press Council that executed its task professionally.  
The case of Djaja Suparman became a valuable experience for the press independence in 
Indonesia after having the Press Law no. 40 year 1999 that determines the independent 
Press Council and encouraged the formation of the Ombudsman in each media.44  This 
practice of the press independence also decreased the tension that tended to occur 
between the government and the media. 
 
7.3.3 The Closemouthed Mega  
      As it was mentioned before, one of the characters of President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri that differentiated her from the other two presidents after Soeharto was her 
closemouthed attitude, including her reluctance to talk to the press.  Some people 
proposed her to have a spokesperson as proposed by Ade Armando, the Chairperson of 
the Media Watch of The Habibie Center and Rizal Mallarangeng, the political researcher 
in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) who also often wrote 
speeches for President Soekarnoputri (Sinar Harapan, 11 February 2002).  The 
spokesperson would officially inform the things related to the government policies.  
     His political advisor, Cornelis Lay, in an interview with the researcher told:   
”I think Mega was traumatic with Gus Dur’s spokesperson.  That’s it.  
So, when Mega knew the presence of spokespersons, the closest 
references were people who worked on behalf of Gus Dur. And Mega 
was startled.  What a difference between what they conveyed and what 
was formulated. Thus, she did not want it to happen; so institutionally 
she made use of the Minister of Communication.  Only that when this 
Minister did not want to take it because he also had his own agenda, it 
was given to Bambang Kesowo (The Minister of the State Secretary).  
                                                
44  Upon the assignment by the leader of the Kompas, Jakob Oetama, the formation of ombudsman team of 
the Kompas was pioneered by St. Sularto in September 1999 by doing literature study and finding 
information in the embassy of Sweden, the first country developing ombudsman team. This institution is 
not primarily meant to develop self-censorship but also self regulatory with the final objective to develop 
free, independent press that hold press ethics (St.Sularto, Humanisme dan Kebebasan Pers, Jakarta, 
Kompas, 2001, pp.76-77).  
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However, Bambang Kesowo also had a serious communication problem 
so that the problem continued”. (Interview 20 August 2005) 
 
       Nonetheless, Megawati still did not want to have a spokesperson, even she still 
rejected when Cornelis Lay asked if she would clarify to the media such problem as the 
Oil price increase. Cornelis Lay whose nick name was Coni told: 
”She said, ’No. Soon, people will know...’  So, Mega’s way of thinking 
was too simple.  The good thing will automatically be known by people 
and she will remain good. She never imagined that the good thing if it 
was not communicated, wrapped in the right communication would 
become bad in the eyes of the public.  Why bothered? I did have good 
intention, didn’t I?’ she said.  That’s the problem, I spoke to myself..” 
(Interview, 20 August 2005)  
 
       Compared to the two previous governments, the Soekarnoputri government bore 
more problems. This seemed to be caused more of long period in leading the government 
than BJ Habibie (16 months) and Gus Dur (21 months).  She actually “only” continued 
the Wahid’s government that was interrupted on the one third of the way.  And we 
tracked the process of Megawati Soekarnoputri to occupy the chair of the Vice 
Presidency in the Gus Dur period and then replaced Gus Dur’s position as the president; 
there appeared a gratitude politics nuance among the politicians in Senayan.  As a leader 
of the winning party in the general election of 1999 Soekarnoputri (automatically) 
became the president.  However, the game of the center axis driven by Amien Rais even 
supported Abdurrahman Wahid even though finally with the support of the other factions 
in the Extraordinary Meeting of the People’s Consultancy Assembly, they get him down. 
To “console” the Soekarnoputri’s disappointment and especially her proponents who did 
violent actions when Soekarnoputri was not elected a president, finally she was given the 
opportunity ( Hermawan et al., 2000:269-336). 
      During the Soekarnoputri government, the relationship between the politics and 
the media, as Coni suggested, was no understanding of one to each other.  He said:  
”From Habibie, Gus Dur to Mega, the press relatively got the 
comparable freedom and practically was maximum.  We can see that 
from the absence of the intention to limit, for example.  From those high 
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levels of freedom, what unique about the relationship with the politics, 
with the political actors, with the country, with the political 
infrastructure such as the parties and the figures of the political doers at 
high levels seemed to experience, I thought, the high tension and there 
was tendency to increase.  To my opinion, the experience with Mega, 
both of them (the press and the politics) did not understand one to each 
other.  For example, Mega always imagined that it was the social 
responsibility of the press, to say, when she was a president to do 
something.   It was the responsibility of the press to educate the society, 
and so on.  The press, however, looked it as the responsibility of the 
government to assure them (the press). In fact, there was difference in 
the relationship patterns but such relation pattern difference did not 
cause the increase or the decrease the independence level of each media.  
It was so distinct at that period”. (Interview, 20 August 2005).  
  
       The closemouthed character of the president to mass media contributed to the 
tension of the relation. Cornelis Lay also told that Mega often complaint of the press that 
she felt constructing the negative image of her, hiding the positive things she had, then 
she expressed her complaint in a number of meetings.  For example, the president 
complaint of the press that was too sided.45  As for the issue, the president did not expect 
to be defended but she expected that the information was conveyed completely. Coni 
continued: 
”On the other hand, mass media also complaint of Mega who was mouth 
closed, was stingy to share information, who did not want to 
communicate and so on.  I think both of them had the truth value, and 
the bridges to establish it had been constructed, even many.  I started 
with the media, making forum with them.  Starting to meet a limited 
number of figures.  The forum was relatively permanent and every time 
                                                
45 When President’s criticism was advocated by press people, Sinansari Ecip, one lecturers of 
Communication Study of Hasanudin University, Makassar wrote in order for press cycles to be fair to 
acknowledge.  In fact, some of the press were not good yet, reports are unbalanced, ethics code that should 
have given moral sanctions did not give any effect. Even the Code Ethics of Indonesian Journalists (KEWI) 
was signed by 25 journalist organizations on 6 August 1999 and was decided by Press Council as common 
agreement and was strengthened by Chapter Article (2) the implementation of Press Regulations were 
remained questioned, like a paper tiger (Kompas, 8 February 2003).  
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she was leaving somewhere, going abroad for example, those key media 
figures were always there. The figures like Karni Ilyas, August 
Parengkuan, Tommy (Suryopratomo)- Kompas, TPI Director, then from 
Metro, thus all the key media figures even local media such as Pikiran 
Rakyat were coming.” 
 
           Coni explained that those meetings did not solve the tension of the relation and 
they complaint one to each other.  The reason was that those who were most involved and 
acted arbitrarily were the lower layers.  Thus, it appeared an opinion at that time, ”if she 
wants to be with the media, she must be with the lower levels, not with the boss”. 
         From the media, Coni found out that there were many persons who tried to 
construct a bridge to overcome the tension, for example with Uni Lubis (she was with 
TV7 at that time).  On the other hand, Mega always considered the media unfair to her in 
their reports.  On the other side, the media felt that their work was never made easy by 
the government by providing sufficient facilities to get the information, for example.  
There were permanent relationship patterns so that during the transition time there was 
reciprocal suspicion but both parties had the very high autonomy and independence.  
        Just like the previous period, during the period of President Soekarnoputri 
government, there were pressures against a number of media (table 6.4), but some of 
them were reported the Press Council because they reported inaccurately about the Bali 
Blast.  
 
Table 7.2: The Relations of the Government – the Media in Several Legal Cases  
The Period of 
Government   
The Litigant The Accused Media  The Utilized 
Law  
The 
Settlement 
Method  
 
Megawati 
Soekarnoputri 
(23 July 2001-
20 October 
2004) 
 
1. Leutenant 
General Djaja 
Suparman 
 
 
 
 
 
2. M.Said 
 
1. The Jawa Pos, 
Rakyat Merdeka, 
Pelita, Radar Bali, 
The Jakarta Pos, 
Pikiran Rakyat, 
Sumatera Ekspres 
newspapers(10/02) 
 
2. The Tempo 
 
1. Slander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Blasphemy, 
 
The Press 
Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court 
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Budairy, Staf 
Khusus Wakil 
Presiden 
Hamzah Has 
(18/3/03) 
 
3. Akbar 
Tanjung, 
Golkar Leader 
 
4. Minister of  
Domestic 
Affairs(26/9/0
3) 
 
5. Megawati   
Soekarnoputri, 
President of 
Indonesia  
 
6. Tommy  
Winata, Boss 
of a Company 
 
 
 
 
7. Laksamana 
Sukardi, the 
Minister of 
BUMN 
Newspaper 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Rakyat 
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7.3.4 The Capital Investors in the Broadcasting Law  2002 
      During the period of Megawati Soekarnoputri presidency, the practice of the press 
independence and the relations pattern between the government and the media could also 
be seen in the discussion of the Broadcasting Law 2002 replacing the Broadcast Law year 
1997.46  In that Regulations there were some crucial chapters but from its map there were 
                                                
46 The old Broadcasting Law no 24 year 1997 was the first Broadcasting Law owned by the government. 
Discussion of this Broadcast Regulations 1997 was very tough, since it involved political interest namely 
President Soeharto’s interest to be reelected as a president in the year 1997. He asked the existence of 
Broadcast Regulations because there used to be only five private televisions. For the reason, this Regulation 
is said to emphasize Soeharto’s interest, so new TV stations were permitted to operate (Interview with 
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three parties: first the industry, second the government, and third the civil society. Bimo 
Nugroho Sekundatmo, one of the members of Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
established by Broadcasting Law no. 32 year 2002 said: 
”Each of the three parties has different concepts and they were not 
matched.  The industry is different from the government; the 
government is different from the civil society; the civil society is 
different from the industry. Then, the civil society enters its ideas 
through the People’s Representative Council so that the draft of this 
Regulation becomes the initiative draft of the People’s Representative 
Council.  So, the model is the same with the construction process of the 
Press Law and it went through hard fight so that it took 4 days from the 
draft in 1999 until 2002” (Interview, 30 August 2005). 
 
        Nonetheless, Sekundatmo said, there were many points entered from the civil 
society, took more side to the civil society, for example there was regulation from the the 
representative of the society.  There was also Community Broadcasting Institution, the 
local broadcast was strengthened, but there were also pending chapters due to the inputs 
from the government such as the Common Stipulation with the Government.  In these 
Law, the industry interests were neglected so that they proposed the judicial review. 
        Different from the process of the construction of the Press Law 1999, in the 
construction of this Broadcasting Law 2002 the group of the capital investors in the 
television industry tried hard to make their interests not being harmed. Paulus Widiyanto 
said that the Broadcasting Law 2002 tried to rearrange the Broadcasting System in 
Indonesia.  Thus, in the Broadcasting Law of 2002 there was not national television; the 
only national television was TVRI.  The existing 10 television stations could not 
broadcast nationally; they had to be network televisions.  The system was adopted with 
the understanding that in the United States of America, the network television is used 
because there are only 64 networks, the newest is the Fox; all of them are in the capital 
city although they are dispersed.  In Japan, the networks are divided into provinces. What 
is appropriate for Indonesia is the network television due to the specialty of Indonesia as 
an islands country with three different time divisions. The other reason is uneven people 
                                                                                                                                              
Paulus Widiyanto, the Chairperson of the Special Committee of the Broadcast Regulations of the DPR RI, 
6 December 2005). 
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density. The target of the television broadcast is people gathered in a place, thus this 
rearrangement refers to the existing conditions in Indonesia. 
      This decision, however, was rejected by the capital owners of the private 
televisions. Through their workers, they protested via the “National TV Mourning Day”.  
Both during the discussion and after the ratification of this Broadcast Regulations, there 
were a number of problems, especially for the capital owners of the national private 
television. Some topics of the debate were, among others, the establishment of the 
Indonesian Broadcast Commission (KPI). Paulus Widiyanto told that KPI’s reference 
was the FCC (Federal Communciation Commission), an independent institution working 
as a regulator.  Another reason was to fill the absence of the Department of Information 
that had been liquidated by President Wahid.  Just like the Press Council, the Broadcast 
Commission had also be filled by society representatives as a reflection of people’s 
sovereignty. It was said further: 
 “This is a long struggle, can such institutions like Broadcast Comission, 
General Election Comission be accepted by the government  in our 
society system or not?   
When I was in a discussion with Americans, I told that our struggle was 
giving birth to such commissions, but the bureaucracy always opposed 
to it.. Bureaucratic cylces felt to be competed with the presence of the 
new institutions and they were  
 not ready”. (Interview 6 December 2005). 
 
        Widiyanto suggested that many parties played in the Broadcasting Law and they 
had much interest.  First, the government interest.  There was the central government and 
the local government with the spirit of the Local Autonomy Law.  If in the local 
autonomy there was a conflict of interests between the central and the local, it also 
happened in these Broadcasting Law. Meanwhile, the interest of the central government 
was also different; there were interests of the Transportation and Telecommunication 
Department, the interest of the Communication and Information Ministry, the interest of 
the Domestic Affairs Department. For example, in terms of permits, where did they have 
to be processed or submitted?  Is it to the Transportation Department or where?  The 
Government interests were actually a matter of authority, position and finally it was a 
matter of money.  
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      Widiyanto who was also a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party in 
Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, told that this Broadcast Regulations also 
became the interests of the party and the capital owner.47  When this Broadcast 
Regulations were discussed in the party, there was complaint and sharp conflict occurred, 
but he held his principle, although the PDIP Faction decided differently, he would 
oppose. Then he said: 
 
”The capital intervened the factions.  The civil society interests also 
intervened the factions. The government also intervened.  The 
departments did, too.  Thus, the factions are the first fronts into which 
various interests entered.  I was strong enough to be filled with various 
interests.  One day, I felt myself because the interventions were 
extraordinary. If, for example, the capital group approached Tengku 
Umar (President Megawati’s house) because it did not get in Ibu (the 
address for Megawati), then through Taufik Kemas-TK (Megawati’s 
husband), if it fails, then to TK’s subordinates, and so on. The focus was 
that they asked for the national permit.  They also objected to the 
network.  They asked for the representatives in the KPI, each with three 
persons.  Then the validity of the permit.  They asked for 70 years. They 
used the logic of the right to use the building”. (Interview, 6 December 
2005). 
 
 
Next, Widiyanto said that the TV permit was only for 10 years and 5 years, 
because 70 years was very long, until the grand child.  As for the advertisement, the 
percentage of the quantity in the television program was also determined.  When 20 
percent was given, the capital investors asked for more.  It also applied in the relay; they 
requested many things. The capital investors influenced the members of the People’s 
                                                
47 In the years 2000-2001 in Indonesia existed and operated 5 national private TV stations: Metro TV, TV7, 
Trans TV, Lativi, and Global TV each of which competed with the existing stations that had been there 
before, namely RCTI, Indosiar, SCTV, TPI and ANTV. Metro TV was established by Media Indonesia 
Group, TV7 by Kompas Group, Jawa Pos founded some local TVs such as those in Batam and Riau. Until 
July 2003 RCTI was still held by Bimantara Citra and Rajawali Corporation that formerly was owned by 
Bambang Trihatmaja, the son of Soeharto. Metro TV since June 2003 was owned by Surya Paloh (75%), 
PT Centralindo Pancasaki Cellular (25%). Paloh was a figure of Golkar Party. ANTV formerly was owned 
by Bakrie Investama (60%) and PT Capital Manager Asia (CMA) Indonesia (40%), and by the early of 
2002 became Bakrie Investindo (12%), PT CMA (5,33%), and ex creditor (77,6%). Aburizal Bakrie is the 
owner of Bakrie Group; he was also an important person in Golkar in Soeharto era.  The capital of Lativi 
was still occupied by A Latif Corporation owned by Abdul Latif, formerly the minister of workforce in 
Soeharto era. Trans TV is possessed by Chairul Tanjung, the boss of Bank Mega (see Sudibyo, Ekonomi 
Politik Media Penyiaran, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2004, p.33-38) 
  
257
Representative Council, including called him.  Even, the Secretary General of the PDIP 
summoned him because the capital investors had gathered in a place provided by TV7 
(Agust Parengkuan).  But he asked that the Local Television cycles, for example from 
Surabaya, was invited.  He was asked to listen to the aspirations of the television owners. 
Although he listened but he did not feel to agree to their suggestions.  He said: 
”One day the owners of the national TVs went to Bali.  They called me, 
but many of my colleagues were there and they called me telling that 
they were with the boss (TK) doing this and this … They thought if it 
were said by TK or Mr Sucipto (the PDIP leader), I would directly 
agree. Please accept their ideas …. Ok, ok, I said but just ok and ok …. 
Until finally I was not welcomed (that was their term) and would be 
replaced.  That was the beginnings of my position as the Chairperson of 
the Special Committee.  But I was successful.  Even when I was going to 
be removed from the membership of the Special Committee, my 
colleagues said, ’if they replace you, we all retire from the Special 
Committee’ because they did not know about broadcasting.  The essence 
was that the power of the capital was so strong; they wanted to penetrate 
… and until now”.  (Interview, 6 December 2005). 
 
      In another interview, Widiyanto explained that the new Broadcasting Law wanted 
to position the Indonesian broadcast system on a more democratic platform.  This means, 
people have the higher authority than the capital owners do so that more people are 
needed to own the television or the radio media. One of the methods is by giving an 
opportunity to the local areas to build the television or the media broadcast.  However, 
during the construction of this Broadcast Regulations 2002, the People’s Representative 
Council opened more opportunity to the presence of the broadcast institutions that were 
not present and were not accommodated in the Press Regulations year 1997 namely the 
presence of the community broadcast institution. Thus, in the new Broadcast Regulations 
there was not only Private Broadcast Institution as the continuation of the Broadcasting 
Law year 1997; there was also Community Broadcast Institution (Interview, 24 May 
2006).  
       From what Widiyanto said, it can be understood that the construction of the new 
Broadcast Regulations was a fight between the capital owners, the government, the 
parliament, and the civil society.  The capital owners were the persons behind the 
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television stations opposing to the policy of the network television and the Indonesian 
Broadcast Commission (KPI) while such factions in the parliament as the PDIP faction 
driven by Widiyanto served as the door for various interests, including his own party 
interest.  The protest done by the capital owners with the ”National TV Mourning Day” 
and various maneuvers done to Widiyanto were the efforts to object to the state 
intervention through the Regulations to be replaced by the market regulation. What 
happened in Indonesia during the governance of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, even 
before and after, was not different from the objective of Chile-model liberalization (see 
Chapter I) especially the television program orientation focusing on the entertainment 
business.  Following the model of a country with the established democracy like the 
United States of America, the broadcast industry liberalization was meant to increase the 
rate and to neglect the entertainment of a good quality (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 13-
14). 
        The significant difference between the printed media and the broadcast media is 
the use of the public space.  If the printed media distributed the messages through various 
limited channels with the printed medium, the broadcast media used the electromagnetic 
wave owned by the public (the public goods).  The public goods had to be oriented to the 
public interest and the involved public regulation.  Even though the regulation function 
was done by the state but it was in the context of the public interest to the extent that the 
state regulation emphasizes and protects the interests of the public and it involves the 
public elements (Hidayat in Gazali, 2002: 10-11). The rejection of the capital owners to 
the implementation of the network television and the Indonesian Broadcast Commission 
remained occurring during the presidency time of Megawati Soekarnoputri. The 
objection, for example, was stated by Iskandar Siahaan, the Head of Research and 
Development Department of SCTV told to the researcher: 
”The KPI was not acknowledged by the Indonesian Television 
Association (ATVSI), thus their criticism to the television station was 
always denied.  According to the Press Regulations, the KPI has not 
have that role, even though the KPI issues the Broadcast Attitude 
Guidelines, but the ATVSI considers all KPI criticisms should not be 
heard.” (Interview, 31 January 2005). 
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       Siahaan also said that even though KPI criticism should not be heard, they still 
heard the criticism from the society, for example those sent by email.  To his opinion, in 
the future the KPI would give more pressures to the television station due to the 
government support. By that time the government had not given its support because it 
still supported the capital owners. Another thing causing the KPI to be rejected was: 
”By far their way of working is not fair.  For example, they released 
criticism without sending the criticism to the television station first 
because we have the right to answer. Thus, they are one sided.  The KPI 
feels like god, findings are directly sent to the press while their findings 
are often inaccurate so that their pride decreased.  During the campaign, 
for example, they said the TPI to have violated the campaign rules 
because they broadcasted certain programs, but after being checked they 
did not broadcast the program.  It turned that the KPI did not have the 
record” (Interview, 31 January 2005). 
   
From the above explanation, it can be concluded that the press independence during 
transition period of the two presidents was colored with the hostile pattern between the 
government and the media. Although each president did not do direct repression through 
legal stipulations, although there was an effort to go that way, but pressures to the media 
done by the government always happened.  In addition to being caused by the euphoria of 
the media freedom, that relation pattern was also influenced by the characters of each 
president.  
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Chapter 8 
Summary, Conclusions and Outlook 
 
 
This is the last chapter, containing summarries, conclusions and expectations.  It is started 
with summary and conclusion of chapter 2 to 6, and then it was completed with  
summary, conclusion and expectation in chapter 7.  
 
8.1 Theories of Democracy, Press Freedom and Political Communication  
Summary 
Conceptors like Sartori (1962) and Pennock (1979) defined democracy as one 
form of government, even Diamond (Dwipayana et al., 2003) called it the best 
government.  Meanwhile, liberal democracy refers to control to the state, decisions and 
sources allocation by elected public officials.  However, in the community that was 
entering the transition process and leaving the authoritarian system that shackled them, 
the democracy was not yet stable so that it needed consolidation.  Following Larry 
Diamond’s idea, democracy consolidation had a number of approaches namely actor 
(elite) approach, institutional approach, political culture approach and civil society 
oriented approach (2003).  In an actor approach, mutual commitment among the elites is 
required through coordination mechanism of an institution, related political institutions, 
and also elite agreement development to enforce state authority limits.  In an institutional 
approach, democracy consolidation must response the challenge of strengthening three 
types of political institutions: state administrative officials (bureaucracy), representation 
institution and democratic executives (political party, parliament, and general election 
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system); and the structures supporting horizontal accountability, constitutionalism, and 
government based on constitution.  Specifically, parliament must have the capacity to 
formulate constitution, to aggregate public preference, to allocate resources, and to 
consider petitions and aspiration of the society independently.  
      Political culture is related to perception, attitude, support, action and beliefs in 
democracy legitimacy.  It is realized in the mass participation as the norm of political life 
and the tendency to participate in political affairs, based on informative interest in public 
affairs.  
       In a community-oriented approach, the government needs such a public that is 
organized, socialized in norms and values and committed to civil society.  This is a social 
life environment that is organized openly, willingly, self generating, self-financed, 
autonomous from the state, and bound to common values to express their interests, 
desires, preferences and ideas.  The community requires the state to improve the structure 
and function of the state, and to encourage the officials to act accountably.  
       Press freedom serves as the stepping stone for democracy, said Carl J.Friedrich 
(Alger, 1996:10).  This conforms to Robert Dahl’s view that at least democracy theory 
has concern about the process in which citizens use their control over their leaders. Such 
control is realized in the press freedom namely civil freedom under the law, legalized for 
special purposes, developed from objective informative democracy.   Press independence 
is the freedom of government interference; press freedom is the right to communicate 
ideas, opinions and information through written words without any obstacles from the 
government.  And, according to Weaver, three different things in press freedom are: the 
absence of government control over media, the absence of government control and other 
controls over media, and in addition to the absence of control over media was also the 
presence of the situation that is required for insemination of idea and opinion variation 
for the public such as in accessing newspapers and radio.  
        Borrowing Milton’s idea, there is positive correlation between media freedom and 
democracy practice.  Free press advances democracy by showing the function as a 
watchdog that monitor the government, preventing the government from over-use of 
authority and misuse of citizens and political process.  
      As a communication with political objectives (McNair, 1999), political 
communication has three forms.  First, all forms of communication done by politicians 
  
262
and other political actors with the objective of achieving certain targets.  Second, 
communication addressed to the actors by non politicians such as constituents and 
newspaper columnists, and third, communication on these actors and their activities, as 
reported in news report, editorial, other forms of media discussion on politics.  Thus, 
political communication here means political activities, namely dissemination of 
messages containing political load by political actors to other parties.  
        Political communicators play primary social role, especially in public opinion 
process (Nimmo, 1989).  There are three categories of political communicators, namely 
politicians, professional communicators, and part time professionals or activists.  
Politicians aim at “influencing reward allocation and changing the existing social 
structure or preventing changes.”  They communicate as representatives of a group, 
propose and or protect the objective of political interests.  Politicians acting as ideologists 
are more absorbed in determining wider policy objectives, struggling for reform, and 
even supporting revolutionary changes.  They communicate to divert to a direction not to 
represent a group (Nimmo, 1989:33). 
        Two other political communicators are professionals and activists.  The first 
communicator exist in the new situation namely the existence of mass media crossing the 
boundaries of race, ethnics, territory and class to develop national identity awareness and 
the development of the media.  They are editorial writers, columnists, commentators or 
called as journalists and the other are promoters.  These second communicators are 
people who are paid to promote the interests of certain group, such as publicity agent of 
important figures, public relations personnel of private organization and the government, 
government public information official, presidential press secretary, advertising 
personnel, campaign manager and publicity director of political candidate and other types 
of symbolic broker (Nimmo, 1989: 37). 
        
8.2. Political Communication in Transitional  and Industrial Countries 
Summary 
      There is certain tendency in political communication in industrial and transitional 
countries.  In the United States of America, the First Amendment of its Constitution is an 
important element in the political system.  This amendment gives freedom to media to 
decide how they will make reports and report a number of news.  Press freedom serves as 
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the primary esteem for media in this country.  At the same time, however, the First 
Amendment also protects paid political speech, controversial issues, as long as the 
issuing committee spending much money for the campaign of the candidate is executed 
independently (Perloff, 1998: 11).  Another tendency is seen in the monopoly of media 
ownership.  The twentieth century is the era of consolidation, chain corporation or 
ownership, and media monopoly in many regencies and cities (Quick, 2003).  
Meanwhile, communication technology advance is shown with Internet booking between 
1998 until middle of 2000 and started to decline in 2001.(Dominick, 2007: 272).  
Relationship between professional communicators and politicians is blend of conflict, 
cooperation, support and refusal.  
      In Germany, social political change in the form of Germany unification in 1989-
1990 had different atmosphere compared to France, England, or Sweden, because 
Germany is now in the process of integrating 16 million new citizens into economy, 
social, and politics (Hancock, et al., 2000).   The old regime had over with the 
establishment of Federal Republic based on the new Basic Law as its constitution.  In the 
new political system, the rights of expression and publication freedom both orally and in 
written are given without any obstacles, meanwhile press freedom, electronic media 
reports and films are also guaranteed and there was no censorship.  This guarantee is 
confirmed in the Federal Constitutional Court stating that press freedom and the absence 
of censorship from the country serves as basic foundation of a democratic country.  In a 
representative democracy, press has the function as permanent mediator and an 
instrument to monitor the community, those who are elected in parliament, and the 
government.  
      The unification encouraged publications in West Germany to move to East 
Germany and to compete with the old publications.  West magazine and tabloid enjoyed 
big profits and big publications such as BILD started to publish regional edition for East 
Germany, while many old publications died.  In such a condition, a number of new 
publications sometimes fail to survive with the ‘alternative’ concept.  Nevertheless, 
publication of communist party in the district still survived and proved to be stable.  Such 
big political parties as CDU (Christian Democratic Party) and SPD (Social Democratic 
Party) in the state (Lander) were the main actors in determining policy for press and 
broadcasting.  
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Compared to the United States and Germany, England is a smaller country both in 
terms of the width of the land and its population.  Far different from the condition of 
news paper media in the United States of America, many national newspapers in England 
openly and emphatically declared as partisan newspapers (Alger, 1996: 408). Editorial 
ownership and orientation leads to conservative party and ideology, and there is similar 
tendency with the United States of America namely towards ownership concentration.  
      At the beginning of the history, England imposed tight control to the press.  It was 
done with the argument that press freedom was threat for the state safety and stability 
(Negrine, 1994:20-21).  In the course of time, the long tradition of England with its press 
freedom did not obligate this country to have written regulation even in its constitution. 
This situation was also weakness because there was no written basic protection for press 
freedom.  Although English press is one of the most independent but the unavailability of 
written regulation opens the opportunity for government to threat media that is not in the 
same opinion with it and opens the possibility of censorship.  
      Philippines, Russia and Hungary as it is Indonesia are transitional countries.  In 
political communication, they have certain tendency.  The Philippines had entered 
political transition first after people power revolution in 1986.  At that time media played 
important role in supporting various society groups to make corrections over various 
violations done by President Ferdinand Marcos government.  One of the prominent media 
was Veritas radio, which broadcasted during critical period in February 1986.  Catholic 
leader, Cardinal Sin, General Ramos and General Enrile made use of Veritas to express 
their support to the people.  After the authoritarian regime collapsed, the liberal press 
freedom enjoyed the atmosphere even though the country leaders also tried to make some 
maneuver to disturb its independence.  The constitution of the Philippines expressed 
firmly that there was no censor for freedom of talking and press independence.  
      Another interesting tendency in the relationship between the government and 
media was the involvement of the Philippines government in media, namely in three 
television stations: RPN-9, IBC-13 and PTV-4.  Due to big loss along the last decade, 
privatization policy was given to RPN-9 and IBC-13.  
      Russia is called a partial democratic country (Robinson, 2003), because it failed to 
achieve full democracy consolidation during the last decade.  The capacity of the country 
to address public interests in presidential system was said to be potential damage for 
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democracy because, among others, it was anti-consensual; political change toward the 
realm of zero-sum game, and patronage political practice.   
      Before becoming a Commonwealth country, the Russia united nation embraced 
totalitarian political system.  With such a system, media merely served as the hearing 
trumpet of the government.  In other words, there was no press freedom, no freedom to 
get public information, no freedom to talk.  When the country was independent, 
Commonwealth was founded; all legal regulations were declared invalid, including 
provision on press (d’Haenens and Saeys, 1998: 307).  Changes in political 
communication also contributed to democratization process where since 12 December 
1993 the new Russian Constitution was agreed including in it press freedom and 
censorship prohibition (Quick, 2003: 791).  
      The relationship between the government and media seemed to be prominent by 
the presidential election on 15 February 1996, just after Yeltsin declared his candidacy 
for the second time.  He laid off RTR director, Oleg Poptsov and accused RTR of ”telling 
a lie”, by focusing himself on violence in Chechnya and exaggerated economy difficulty.  
This is the intervention of the government, even the president himself, to media that is 
owned by the government (McCormack, 1999: 208). 
      Hungary was once part of Uni Soviet since 1945.   Under the political system of 
Uni Soviet, Hungary only had a little tradition of media independence.  For 45 years, 
communist government had eliminated anything related to its press freedom (Quick, 
2003: 429).  The 1949 Constitution of Hungary was amended in 1989 when this country 
got its independence to guarantee press freedom according to the Clausal XX of Article 
61 that, among others, stated ”in the Republic of Hungary everybody has the right to 
express his opinion freely and to have an access to disseminate data to the public (part 
one).  The Republic of Hungary acknowledged and protected press independence (part 
two)”. (Quick, 2003: 432). 
 
Conclusion 
      Developed industrial countries such as England, Germany, United States of 
America embrace democratic politics system with the provision of assurance of freedom 
expression and press freedom either it is contained in the constitution or not.   This 
system influences the practice of political communication that gives the opportunity for 
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media to control the government.  Nevertheless, the tendency of media ownership 
concentration may be threatening.  
Meanwhile, transitional countries like the Philippines, Russia and Hungary still 
require consolidation to achieve stable democracy.  They amend the constitutions that 
they consider do not support democracy, including the adoption of the stipulations giving 
assurance of press freedom.  They are also threatened by ownership concentration; or 
media control by the government.  The adaptation process of the new values supporing 
democracy and freedom to talk and press freedom also influence the execution of press 
freedom including the relationship between the government and media.  
 
8.3. Politics and Media before the  Transition of Indonesia  
Summary 
      After 350 years of colonization by the Dutch colonialist, the Indonesian 
independence in the year 1945 started to change social, economy, and political condition.  
The first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, succeeded in citing nationalism spirit even to 
international level with the execution of Asia Africa Conference in 1955 in Indonesia.  
However, economy and education development has not run well before the second 
president, Soeharto, who in several period applied WW Rostow development policy 
model.  With tight political policy, Soeharto defended his power for more than three 
decades since 1967 up to 1998. The structure and political role of government actors was 
so dominant that it colored the culture of society politics.  Referring to the categorization 
of Almond and Powel, Indonesian politic culture falls into parochial politics culture, 
limited to small area or coverage, and due to differentiation limitedness there was no 
special or independent political role.  In this culture the society tends to be interested in 
political objects in general, except in a place where they are bound narrowly.  What 
prominent was the awareness of the society members on the existence of political power 
center (Kantaprawira, 1988 and Wiseman, 1967: 34).  This is political culture 
emphasizing political aesthetics so that it is so difficult to review habits and tendencies 
prevailing in political attitude (Kleden, 2001).  Borrowing the terms of Harold Crouch 
(1979), it is a tendency of neopatrimonialistic political culture where the country has 
modern and rationalistic attributes like bureaucracy, but it also shows patriomonialistic 
attribute.  Another tendency in Indonesian political culture is political culture that still 
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holds paternalism behavior and patrimonial character with the following indicators: bossy 
or as long as the boss is happy (Kantaprawira, 1988:37). 
        During Soekarno period (1945-1966) political party grew fast in line with the 
development of the spirit to fight the colonialists.  The General Election of 1955 recorded 
more than 30 parties and only four gained quite good votes, namely Partai Nasional 
Indonesia or PNI with 22.3% votes, Masyumi (20.9%), Nahdlatul Ulama or NU (18.4%), 
and Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI (16.4%).  Indonesian Socialist Party or PSI that 
brought the flag of intellectual group only gained 2% votes.   However, during Soeharto 
government (1967-1998), only three political parties were allowed, namely Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Golongan Karya, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI),  
and Golongan Karya was the ruling party that always won the general election until the 
collapse of this regime.  The government (executives), House of Representatives 
(legislatives), court (judicative) and all of its officials were also dominated by Golongan 
Karya, in both central and regional levels.  
      In addition to government institutions and other components in the society, the 
authority also imposed limitation to media, for example through Persbreidel Ordonnantie 
1931 made by the Dutch colonial.  During the governance of Japanese army, the Java-
Madura authorities regulated means of publication and communication by Regulation No 
16.  Some of the articles regulated the validation of publication permit system and 
preventive censorship.  The concept of press as the fourth pillar and the concept of press 
freedom had different meaning from the original one.  External authority tendency to 
limit or regulate media as stated by McQuail (1991) had lasted since Soekarno era and 
Soeharto era.  This confirms the tendencies of press system in developing countries 
where the press system tends to follow the press system of the former colony; press in 
developing countries is in transitional form, still finding the right form or looking for 
identity so that it is not stable yet; it is required to become ”agent of social change” that 
bears responsibility with the government for the success of the development; even though 
press freedom is  acknowledged but there are limitation in its realization; it is present in 
the dominance of developed countries and the relationship pattern between press and 
government tends to blend of libertarian, authoritarian systems and social responsibility 
(Rahmadi, 1990).   
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      Soeharto government used the renewed Regulation No 4 year 1967 and 
Regulation No 21 year 1982 to control press.  Stipulations of Press Council No 
79/XIV/1974 on Press Ideal Counseling Guideline binding the press in executing its 
duties and the government in its policies to counsel press (Gandhi, 1985).  Those all are 
“realization” of the principle of society freedom to express ideas and opinion both oral 
and written as stated in Article 28 of Constitution 1945 and Stipulation of People’s 
Consultative Assembly No IV/1973 on State Directive Guidelines and  Regulation No 11 
year 1966 on Press Principle Rules. (Gandhi, 1985: 147).  Control of television media 
was also done by the authority through some minister decrees that were more flexible 
compared to the constitution.   This proved the authoritative character of the government 
that used patrimonial political culture and structure; it was shown, for example, through 
the Decree of the Minister of Information No 190A year 1987 stating that commercial 
television was only in Jakarta area but was then revised by the Decree No 111 year 1990.  
The other control for electronic media especially radio was the obligation to relay news 
report from the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI) and at the same time it 
confirmed that commercial private radios were not allowed to produce their own news.  
      However, eventually various pressures to media, including the closing down of 
three magazines, namely Tempo, Editor and Detik in 1994 even made media circle more 
“united” to oppose and it was realized in the form of, among others, various media and 
internet reports around May 1998 with regards to so many bad things about Soeharto 
government.  
 
Conclusion 
     Patrimonial political culture and structure became the foundation of the authoritarian 
political system in both Soekarno and Soeharto government.  Even though Soekarno once 
applied “liberal democracy” system but finally he executed the ”guided democracy” that 
shackled various aspects of society life.  Both of them, Soekarno and especially Soeharto 
also emasculated press freedom through various regulations and minister decrees.  
Practically, after the independence in 1945, political institutions and media were under 
the authority control.  
 
8.4. Political Communication in the Transition of Indonesia 
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     The study of politics communication in Indonesia started to proliferate only since 
political change in 1998 followed by general election of 1999 and 2004 that was initiated 
by the publication of Press book in “May Revolution”, the Collapse of Hegemony by 
Hidayat et al (2000).  This study discussed political, economy macro context, the process 
of media production and consumption and media content by the end of the New Order. It 
was discussed, for example, how two television stations, SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi) 
and Indosiar were reporting bravely the fact of student demonstration compared to TVRI 
(Television of the Republic of  Indonesia) and TPI (Indonesian Education Television) 
that were considered the most hesitant (Hidayat et al., 2000: 193).  One of the theses 
taken in the discussion was the idea of Golding and Murdock stating that the power of the 
state and capital owners cannot always use media as their instrument.  However, press 
freedom in the context of press industry was not automatically press freedom that was 
functional for democratization process.   Press industry had been free from authority 
regime but it was getting impossible to free itself from the hold of the invisible hand of 
market mechanism (Hidayat et al., 2000: 455). 
Another review highlighted media effect in the general election of 2004, both 
printed and electronic media such as newspapers and television, and also internet, short 
message service (SMS), polling, and advertisement. From the observation of young 
media practitioners, it was found that mass media had become one of the authorities 
having the capability to influence, condition, even orientate perception and public 
opinion (Luwarso et al., 2004: ix). 
Media, culture and politics were investigated by Krishna Sen and David T.Hill 
(2001). This investigation was done by Sen and Hill and was published in 2000 by 
Oxford University Press, entitled Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia.  Actually, this 
was the result of research during the period of 1995-1996 when Soeharto government 
was still powerful.  Those two researchers said that, unlike in the West where high 
culture is over politics and pop culture is below, the government of Indonesia placed 
media as the vehicle of ”national culture”.   It means that the government applied 
authoritarian power through media (Sen and Hill, 2001: 13). 
Angela Romano (2003) who wrote the book of ”Politics and the Press in 
Indonesia, Understanding an Evolving Political Culture” discussing how the elimination 
of the state control over the press and other social, political institutions influenced the 
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work culture and media organization.  The only journalist organization in Soeharto era 
namely Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) in their meeting in Semarang in 1998 
declared their vow to care for any form of new paradigm from reform press model 
namely commitment to independence, idealism, press freedom and professionalism 
standard, and to promote non-aggressive ways for the community to solve complaints to 
press (Romano, 2003: 100).  
Such studies give a description that the study of politics communication in 
Indonesia gets good attention from academicians and media practitioners.   This seems to 
be an indicator that wider open spaces provided by the political system also opens an 
opportunity for the creation of more participative political culture where the civil society 
also contributes to the process of democracy.  
Indonesia entered the transition time when the right to communicate started to be 
enjoyed by the society after Soeharto stepped down in May 1998.  The shift of the regime 
resulted in some changes in leadership structure and political policies, including the 
policy for media.  As the part of human rights, the right to communicate is stipulated in 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Number XVII/MPR/1998 regulating that 
everyone has the right to communicate and to get information to develop his personality 
and social environment.  Everyone has the right to find, get, own, keep, process, and 
deliver information using any kinds of available channels.  Regulation Number 39 year 
1999 on Human Rights and article 28F of Constitution 1945 amended in 2000 confirmed 
it and even was used as the base of consideration in Regulation No 40 year 1999 on 
Press.  
      Some people define the so called transitional society, for example Samuel 
Huntington, Carothers, Price and colleagues. Huntington and Carothers saw that 
transition from non-democratic to democratic country is called transition.  Indonesia 
together with Nigeria, Croatia, and Serbia fall into transitional countries even though 
their journey direction is not clear yet (Carothers, 2002). 
      Price, Rozumilowicz, Verhulst (2002) presented a number of political dimensions 
from democratic transition, for example that mature transition is characterized by the 
authority to govern effectively by the elected executive officials, and also effective 
authority of the elected legislative officials, judicial autonomy, expression freedom, the 
right to associate and to meet; no government control over information, and democratic 
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government for at least 10 years (Price, Rozumilowicz, Verhulst, 2002: 4).  Indonesia is 
categorized into primary transition country from sultanate regime.  
      Referring to the opinion of Giouseppe Di Palma (Sahdan, 2004) there are three 
factors causing the transition to democracy as that happened in South Europe, Asia, Latin 
America and Africa namely economy welfare and equality, modern social structure and 
diversification of the ruling middle class, and national culture that accommodates 
differences, which implied democracy.  As Huntington also stated, the reason was 
because the regime lost legitimacy due to the increase of community sensitivity, the 
effect of global economy crisis, the increase of people participation, political 
participation requirement and big demonstration.  
      Indonesia  press played a big role in facilitating the transition to democracy, in 
bringing Soeharto into his collapse from power (Pit Chen Low, 2003: 25) by 
disseminating information and giving the votes to people, helping channel pro-democracy 
movements at the last days of Soeharto regime.  For a couple of days in May 1998, 
private television and newspaper challenged openly the owners and the government that 
tried to control information through media censorship in the form of pooling, and covered 
the riots and student demonstration leading to the fall of Soeharto and the birth of free 
press (Pit Chen Low, 2003: 26).  In the new government media kept on executing critical 
function against the government in the era of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
      According to Sahdan (2004), replacement is the right transition type for Indonesia 
because Soeharto was not able to overcome economy crisis, to recover legitimacy and to 
minimize the big democratization wave of the oppositions (Sahdan, 2004: 94-95). Some 
of the characteristics are, among others, the opposing groups against Soeharto were in a 
very strong position and were able to organize themselves freely; dominant element in 
Soeharto government was conservative group that refused changes; the opposing groups 
against Soeharto did not take over the power, because the initiative of handing over the 
authority came from Soeharto himself in order to keep political stability and mass 
anarchy.  
      The existence of Habibie authority brought Indonesia to preliminary politics 
liberalization phase determining the end of pre-transition.  This phase was remarked with 
redefinition of people’s political rights, the occurrence of ungovernability or government 
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disorganization, instability, and uncertainty.  This phase is often called freedom euphoria 
and politics participation explosion at it happened during Habibie government (Fatah, 
2000: 431).  Referring to Guilermo O’Donnel and Philippe Schmitter (1993), this is the 
phase of ”the start of transition from authoritarianism to somewhere we do not know”.  
This is the ”corridor” of authoritarian regime to transition phase.  The end of this passage 
is general election in 1999 and 2004 and the birth of new regime through more 
democratic procedure and that has better legitimacy compared to the previous regime, 
including the elected new government under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid and 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
      Press freedom in Indonesia experienced very important change after Soeharto 
withrew in May 1998.  Freedom House said that in 1998 the government annulled the ban 
for press, followed by the growth of new and old publications that covered the first 
democratic general election since 45 years (www.freedomhouse.org).   More importantly 
was the approval of new Press Regulation by the government and the House of 
Representatives after marathon discussions in August-September 1999.  This new 
stipulation was legalized on 23 September 1999 in the official Gazette of the Republic of 
Indonesia Year 1999 Number 166 and Appendix of the Gazette of the Republic Indonesia 
number 3887.  Some considerations accompanied the birth of 1999 Press Regulation , for 
example: press is one of the instruments to express ideas and opinions; press is important 
to develop public welfare; press must be “free from” and “free for” executing its 
journalistic activities; press serves as keeping world peace; the old regulations of the 
press has not been appropriate and press is born as the mandate of constitution (Panjaitan 
and Siregar, 2004:2-3). 
     Some political considerations underlying the establishment of Press Regulation 
appeared in some stipulations.  First, in considerers section, which included universal 
idea about press freedom.   First, press freedom as the realization of people sovereignty 
second the freedom to express ideas and opinions according to the conscience, and third 
the right to get information and human rights.  Second, the inclusion of the right to get 
information that had never existed in any legal stipulations in Indonesia.  It also includes 
professional press, legal protection for journalists and press that is free from interference 
and pressures.  These all are consequences of political changes toward democracy that 
leaves the tendency of being closed and repressive as the characteristic of the previous 
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politics system.  With pressures from civil society motored by Indonesian Press and 
Broadcasting Society (MPPI), this Press Regulation was finally delivered.  
       The concept of press freedom in the Press Law consists of two main issues. First, 
constitution prohibits the establishment of regulation and constitution limiting press 
freedom.  First, press execution should be: a. free from government interference, no 
regulating execution from the government, b. public and press control the government, 
not the other way around, c. free from permits, censorship, bridle, d. based on self 
regulation, for example ethics codes.  Second, the state follows press decriminalization 
legal politics, not criminalizing press.  The third issue that is often mandated in various 
constitutions is the prohibition to establish regulation or constitution limiting press 
freedom is not present in this Press Law.  
 
Conclusion 
Political communication in transition time was remarked by the presence of 
political changes especially by the openness for media to influence and direct public 
perception freely.  There was also work culture changes of the journalists, which used to 
be the instruments of the authority; then they had awareness on the new paradigm that 
was committed to independence, idealism, press freedom and the expectation to improve 
professionalism.  This phenomenon followed the idea of such experts as Price, 
Rozulmilowicz and Verhults (2000) that democracy transition requires press freedom, the 
rights to organize and to meet, and no control over information.  Press Regulation that 
was established during the transition of Indonesia confirms two main issues.  First, press 
execution is free from government interference where public and press should even 
control the government, no permits is applicable, no censorship and to be based more on 
self regulation, for example in Ethics Codes.  Second, pres criminalization law is not 
applicable in democratic society.  
 
8.5 Press Freedom, Media and the Press Law in the Period of BJ Habibie 
Summary  
The government of President BJ Habibie was the first transitional government 
after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998.  During his presidency, Habibie wanted to show 
himself as a reformist president, executing political reform.  With political burden as a 
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person close to Soeharto, BJ Habibie tried to perform as an open and educated figure, by 
eliminating legal stipulations hampering press freedom in Soeharto era and ratifying new 
Press Law.  
In his government, the relations between the government and media ran more 
healthily because the elimination of press license resulted in the existence of the new 
radio and television stations and printed media.  Even though the Press Law had not been 
ratified, mass media had been able to express people’s voice, demand for political change 
and criticism to Habibie government.  Such press freedom euphoria could not be 
understood well by a number of government officials, society and media circle.  Several 
officials who felt to be harmed by press reports submitted claims to the court, using the 
Criminal Code (KUHP).   On one hand, this phenomenon showed that part of the 
government officials both civil and military still felt uncomfortable with media criticisms.  
On the other hand, media circle could not show them as professional workers, obeying 
media ethics, did not make judgment through media.  
Research using content analysis found out how Kompas as one of the most 
influencing newspapers reported on the draft of the new Press Law.  Kompas presented 
more live reports rather than features.  This could be understood because live reports 
fulfilled the rules of news values such as the significance of public interest, presenting 
prominent informants like the ministers and the members of House of Representatives, 
and the issues were in line with the political current of that time namely the draft of Press 
Law. Kompas also presented a number of certain informants that Dan Nimmo called 
them communicators and activists, namely politicians and activists of Non Government 
Organization.  It meant that Kompas placed itself as the channel for activists who pushed 
the ratification of this Press Law.  The reason was that this Law would give guarantee for 
press freedom and gave room for democratization.  
However, through the analysis on the minute or the results of the meeting of the 
Special Committee of the House of Representatives discussing this draft, it was found the 
conflict of interests between a number of elements, such as military, political parties and 
media circle.  They could be said to represent the groups of pro status quo and pro 
change. Military tended to object to the new idea that gave freedom to media; on the 
contrary, political parties and media agreed to the new stipulations supporting press 
freedom. Through analysis of the text of the meeting minute, it was found some 
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important issues being the characters of press freedom in this Law, for example the issue 
of press freedom as the main issue, followed by legal protection for journalists, the 
prohibition to publish, trial by the press, foreign capital, and independent Press Council. 
 
Conclusion  
It can be concluded that during the era of President BJ Habibie government, the 
government opened the room for press freedom as the path for democratization.  
Although bearing political burden adhering to Soeharto, President BJ Habibie wanted to 
appear as an open and pro-change figure.  Through the Minister of Information namely 
Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah who was a military general, this first transitional government 
introduced healthier political communication, opened rooms to channel information and 
various opinions.  The government tried to execute structure change and participative 
political culture in line with democracy.  
However, the change of political culture cannot automatically be done, for 
example the culture of being open to criticism.  The presence of legal claims to media by 
civil and military officials showed that criticizing had not been agreeable culture.  This 
also described that media had not had professional working culture based on media 
ethics, did not make judgment, reported objectively, let loose freedom.  
Meanwhile, the Kompas daily taken as the representative of printed media that 
reported the discussion of draft of this Law tended to give positive support to the new 
Press Law. Kompas also reported the opinions of politicians in the House of 
Representatives and in the government who expected the immediate completion of this 
Law.  Kompas even served as a kind of channel for the activists to push the ratification of 
this Law.  The argument was the same, with the new Press Law then press freedom 
would be respected, and be executed.  The involvement of Jakob Oetama, the president of 
Kompas, in pushing such demand could be said to represent the expectation of Kompas 
to be out of various oppressions during Soeharto era. 
From the discussion process of the draft of Press Law in the House of 
Representatives it could be concluded that this new stipulations for press served as an 
effort to take revenge on the trauma of press oppression during Soeharto government.   
For political parties, supporting press freedom could not be avoided in such a situation 
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full of pressures against pro status quo groups.  For media, and those joining MPPI, press 
freedom was something real.  
In political transition period in Indonesia especially in Habibie era, the 
relationship between politics, society and media was seen in the discussion process of the 
draft of Press Law.  The beginning of transition time could produce legal stipulations for 
media that took side for information openness and press freedom.  
 
 
8.6. Press Freedom under Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri 
Summary  
        After being free from colonialism, Indonesia practiced democratic government 
system in a relatively short period namely liberal parliamentary government system 
(1950-1959) in Soekarno era and democratic government system after Soeharto (1998-
now).  Multi party system and relatively fair and competitive general election were 
primarily characteristics of those two democratic systems.  
      After the Soeharto government, political transition to democratic system was done 
by four governments under President BJ Habibie (21 May 1998 - 20 October 1999), 
President Abdurrahman Wahid (20 October 1999 - 23 July 2001), President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri (23 July 2001 - 20 October 2004) and President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (2004 – now).  As it was under the government of BJ Habibie, two previous 
governments were also in unstable democratic system and no strong political, social 
consensus was present.  However, some conditions as meant by Price et al (2002: 60) had 
been realized, including the press freedom.  After the annulment of press censorship law 
by the government of BJ Habibie, it was followed by the birth of the liberal Press Law, 
which prohibited various pressures, obstacles, censorship to press, the formation of 
independent journalist association, and independent press council.  
      President Abdurrahman Wahid dismissed Department of Information that had 
become the censorship institution during the New Order period so that press enjoyed the 
freedom to execute its duties, especially in criticizing the government policy.  In the time 
of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the 2002 Broadcasting Regulation was legalized to 
replace the undemocratic Broadcasting Regulation of the year 1997.  After the 
legalization of this Broadcasting Regulation, however, Indonesian television industry was 
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increasingly controlled by the capital owners who were not willing to obey new 
stipulations.  Moreover, television programs were dominated by unqualified, unhealthy, 
non-educative entertainments.  Gossips were made reports, looking for mistakes, doing 
pressures, dramatization, opinion, unclear media use, opening privacy and blurring 
profession (Syahputra, 2006: 169-193).  
 
Press Freedom in the Era of President Abdurrahman Wahid  
      The election of Abdurrahman Wahid who is well known as Gus Dur as a 
president shocked various parties since he did not come from the winning party of the 
general election in 1999.  His presence created a number of hopes for the democratization 
process because he was already popular as a pro-democracy figure in Soeharto time.  
Short after his official legitimacy, he dismissed the Department of Information, a 
government institution that controlled media much.  This policy by Gus Dur smoothened 
the path for press pioneered by BJ Habibie with the approval of Regulation No. 40 year 
1999 on Press in September 1999.  As the “replacement” for Department of Information, 
Gus Dur established National Information and Communication Agent (BIKN) with some 
functions such as determining the policy in national information and communication 
services; information and communication services to the society; and the function of 
activities coordination.  President Gus Dur seemed to reduce and even to eliminate the 
entire rights of the Department of Information as it was practiced in the New Order.  
However, press freedom was only one of the pillars for democracy.  Without the 
performance of other political parties, such as legislative and judicative, democratic 
government would not run well.  
      Press freedom in Gus Dur era was colored by personal character of the president 
that was full of controversy and his close relationship with his proponents.  This resulted 
in the relationship between Gus Dur government and media not as harmonious as when 
he was a public figure, and it even tended to be in a hostile.   Adhi M. Massardi, one of 
the spokespersons of President Abdurrahman Wahid said that in Gus Dur era press did 
not side with him but Gus Dur defended himself as the president.  Although press 
reported negatively about Gus Dur, he did not care about it.  Anarchic action done by his 
proponents by occupying media office that was considered to have “humiliated” or 
“insulted” Gus Dur also made relational tension with media.  
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        Just before the Accountability Report as a President in the parliament in July 2001 
disharmony between the President and media worsened.  This situation was resulted not 
only from the stubborn and controversial character of Gus Dur, but also that media itself 
was joyful by giving big portion to political news, including various talkshow in 
televisions.  Media often broadcasted informants with strong voices so that it created 
conflicts in the society.  Wars of statements between party figures in parliament and 
President Wahid were often reported by media.  
        In such freedom atmosphere President Wahid often became the object of media 
criticism so that once he warned the press, for example on 27 January 2001, he said that 
the press performance was not of good quality.  Press was said to prioritize sensation than 
facts, reports objectivity and accuracy, and he asked media to cool mind, not to fire 
people’s emotions (Kompas, 13 March 2001).  Once, Gus Dur also intervened TVRI by 
calling the Chief Director, Chairul Zen, and asked him to execute censorship against 
broadcasts that were out of control, full of blasphemy and attacks against presidential 
institution (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002:259). President Wahid also had the initiative to make 
Media Controlling Team led by Luhut Pangaribuan and Harun Al Rasyid so that it caused 
concerns from various parties, including Atmakusumah, the Chairman of Press Council 
2001-2003. 
     Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI) noted, during the period of 3 May 2000 to 3 
May 2001, there were 99 disturbance cases to the journalists and their media.  Out of the 
99 cases, 41 cases were pressures done by government officials to various media in 
Indonesia.  Most of the government officials were policemen, court officials, army, 
presidential secretariats,  parliament members, army generals, and the officers of the 
attorney office (Solahudin et al., 2001:35-73). 
     The issue of media professionalism became an important factor in the press 
freedom in the era of President Wahid.  On one hand, media considered Gus Dur not to 
have the sense of crisis, playful with laws and was not consistent (Sudibyo in Zaka, 
2002:229-238).  On the other hand, media itself did not fulfill basic rules of journalism 
while reporting Gus Dur (Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002: 252-255).   Nonetheless, media 
seriously placed itself as the controller of government power, writing sharply.  For 
example, with the editorial of Watchdog Model, Kompas wrote intelligently to motivate 
the readers to think and formulate their opinions about the actions of the figure as the 
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holder of the highest executive power in Indonesia (Sularto, 2002: 72).  There was the 
democratic potential of media to create public space as described by Habermas as an 
arena where all members of the society were interacting, sharing ideas and debating on 
public affairs, without fearing the intervention of the economy or political authorities 
(Sudibyo in Zaka, 2002: 242).  
      As a President, Gus Dur’s past habit to express controversial comments was still 
done. On one side, he cleared the path for press freedom by dismissing Department of 
Information, but he also often accused the press of twisting.  The proposal to annul the 
Decree of People’s Consultative Assembly number XXV/1966 related to the prohibition 
of the dissemination of marxism-communism-leninism, the dismissal of Hamzah Has, 
Jusuf Kalla, and Laksamana Sukardi from the ministry positions and Suroyo Bimantoro 
(Head of the Indonesian Police) resulted in commotion in media and the society. The 
dismissal of General Police Suroyo Bimantoro triggered the acceleration of Special 
Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly and the Army/Police fraction with 38 
chairs in the People’s Consultative Assembly (Zada, K.ed, 2002:213).  
      On the other hand, however, in addition to Gus Dur character, media performance 
contributed to the worsening relations between President Wahid’s government and 
media.  Some examples were Gebyar BCA program in Indosiar television on 23 October 
1999 presenting the Bagito comedians.  In order to make the audience in the studio and at 
home laughed, Bagito expressed Gus Dur’s physical disability.   Instead of burst of laugh 
they received but the anger of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mass, and the requirement to both 
Bagito and Indosiar to apologize.  Although the humorist Gus Dur expressed his famous 
statement: ”Why should bother?” in responding to Bagito humor, NU mass occupied 
Indosiar and considered Bagito humor as humiliation against their leader (Nurudin, 2003: 
103).  
 
Press Freedom in the Period of President Megawati Soekarnoputri  
      Megawati Soekarnoputri, the first daughter of Soekarno, finally was chosen to 
replace Abdurrahman Wahid as the president after he was dismissed on the way.  Among 
the two presidents after Soeharto namely BJ Habibie and Wahid, Megawati 
Soekarnoputri had distinct difference, especially from the view point of her willingness to 
talk to media.  If BJ Habibie could spend hours to have a chat with media, Gus Dur could 
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express various unwritten statements, Megawati was even economical in words and 
tended to keep silent. If President BJ Habibie had Dewi Fortuna Anwar as her 
spokesperson, President Wahid had several spokespersons including Adhi M.Massardi, 
President Soekarnoputri did not appoint anyone as her spokespersons.  If BJ Habibie and 
Gus Dur were familiar with criticisms, Mega was not.  The chief editor of Media 
Indonesia, Saur Hutabarat, said that Soekarnoputri was not familiar with criticism.  So, 
criticism to Megawati must be expressed in different way, not direct frontal as before 
(Wardhana in Zada, 2002: 277). 
     Responding to protests from the society, Soekarnoputri government called the 
police department (Sinar Harapan, 2 July 2002).  In Soekarnoputri era, violence against 
journalists occurred often.  According to the record of the Coalition of Anti Violence 
against Journalists from the period of 3 May 2001 until 3 May 2002, there were 118 
violence cases took place that injured press freedom in the form of 58 physical violence 
cases (Sinar Harapan, 5 July 2002).  The President, who was represented by the State 
Secretary, accused the press of being “slipped” when their controversial comments were 
confirmed by media (Sinar Harapan, 14 February 2002).  However, Soekarnoputri dared 
to criticize the press that was only able to give criticisms but did not give solutions.   
     One of the most important tests for the press freedom in Soekarnoputri era was 
the establishment process of the new Broadcasting Regulation to replace the 
Broadcasting Regulation of the year 1997.  There was conflict of interest between the 
government, civil society and capital owners.  The television media circle that was 
represented by the Indonesian Private Television Association concerned with the 
obligation to build transmissions in the regions.  Besides, they refused the authority of the 
Indonesian Broadcasting Commission that was too big, including the authority to annul 
broadcasting permit and to establish code of conduct (Sudibyo, 2004: 75).  
     During Megawati Soekarnoputri government, the practice and struggle for press 
freedom concept especially for television media still took place between the government, 
civil society and capital owners of media industry.  
      As it was in the periods of the previous two presidents, the relations between the 
government and media in Soekarnoputri period also tended to be in a hostile. What made 
it different was the role of the Press Council.  In this period, the independent Press 
Council served as the mediator between the government and various parties that felt to be 
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harmed by media reports.  A number of complaints and protests against media 
performance could be overcome through the meeting of the two parties and the Press 
Council.  
      The Press Council Institution that was legalized by the Press Law in 1999 started 
to function since the year 2000, handling the reports that were not objective, bias, unfair, 
containing prejudice, or inaccurate (Kompas, 10 February 2003).  The first Press Council 
(2000-2003) was led by Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, which from April 2000 to January 
2004 had solved 449 of denunciation letters.  This indicated that Press Council could 
serve as the most reliable institution for those who were harmed by the media.  Besides, 
there was awareness increase of the government and the society to use constructive ways 
to solve problems with media.  This condition also showed that Press Law started to be 
known and understood by some parts of the circles.  The Press Council took various 
actions such as socialization of this Press Law to the cities, especially to meet strategic 
groups such as court, police department, education, government, and media circle itself. 
On the other hand, the requirement of legal protection for journalists showed the 
persistence of the pressures over the press done by the state officials and the society.   
      The tense relation between the president and media was proposed to be bridged 
by the presence of president spokesperson.  However, it was refused by Soekarnoputri.  
One of her politics advisor, Cornelis Lay, said the President was traumatic with the model 
of Gus Dur’s spokesperson.  It was said that Soekarnoputri was dumb founded to find the 
spokesperson of Gus Dur who stated something that was too far different from what was 
meant by Gus Dur.  Cornelis Lay evaluated that the relation between Soekarnoputri 
government and media was a relationship where there was no understanding one to each 
other.  Even, when there was an effort to meet the media leaders, understanding often 
took place.  
      The practices of press freedom and relation pattern between the government and 
media can be learned in the discussion of the Broadcasting Regulation 2002.  There were 
a number of interested parties, namely industry, government and civil society. Bimo 
Nugroho Sekundatmo, one of the members of Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
(Head Office) said that each party had different concepts that did not meet one to each 
other. (Interview 30 August 2005). 
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        A number of points from the civil society tended more to the civil society, for 
example the regulation of the society representatives was entered in this Regulation. That 
included the presence of Community Broadcasting Institution and local broadcasting 
strengthening.  The Article that was beneficial for the government was, for example the 
article on Common Stipulation with the Government.  The group of capital owners in 
television industry tried hard not to harm their interest.  One of the arrangers of this 
Regulation, Paulus Widiyanto, said that the Broadcasting Regulation 2002 tried to 
rearrange the Broadcasting System in Indonesia.  Thus, in the Broadcasting Regulation 
No 32 year 2002 there was no national television anymore, the only national television 
was TVRI.  Meanwhile, the existing 10 TV stations could be broadcast nationally; they 
had to be in a network.  This decision, however, was refused by capital owners in private 
televisions.  As what Sekundatmo did, Widiyanto also read that the establishment of this 
Broadcasting Regulation was a competition of capital owners, government, parliament, 
and civil society.  Capital owners were those behind the television stations that refused 
the policy of network television and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) 
while the fraction in the parliament such as PDIP fraction motored by Widiyanto served 
as the door for various interests, including the interest of his own party.  
 
Conclusion 
In the government periods of President Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, the condition of press freedom was colored by tension atmosphere 
between the government and media.  One of the causes of such tension was personal 
character of each president in responding various media reports and the professionalism 
of the media itself.  President Wahid who had cleared the path for press freedom 
dismissed the Department of Information turned to be fond of expressing controversial 
comments and statements.  Consequently, he often became the target of media; even 
finally he felt to be abandoned by media that he had “helped”.  The style of Gus Dur 
leadership that did not care much about political bureaucracy finally caused him to be 
sent down by his political opponents in parliament.  
Meanwhile, the closed style of President Soekarnoputri to media also made her 
relationship tended to be distant and in a hostile.  Just like the tendency of the previous 
president, Soekarnoputri also criticized the press that was only able to criticize without 
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giving solutions.  The tension between media and the government, however, could be 
bridged by the Press Council that ran its function quite well.  In her era, press freedom 
was also colored by conflict of interest between the government, capital owners and civil 
society circle.    
 
 
 
8.7. The Indonesian Press System: A Reflection and Outlook  
      With as long as 7 years of experience of transition period, has the proper press 
system for Indonesia been found?  Did Press Law no. 40 year 1999 and Broadcasting 
Law no. 32 year 2002 give the direction for the formation of new Indonesian press?  This 
is not an easy question to anwer.  First it was due to that 7 years of experience was not 
sufficient to result in a “press system”. The second reason was that for more than half a 
century in the life of Indonesian press, the embraced model was the limiting one, 
repressive style.  The third reason, the culture of Indonesian politics was not clear as well.  
Thus, what happened during these 7 years was just an experiment of press system or an 
experiment of press independence.  
      The initiators of Press Law and those who gave the idea of “communication and 
information independence” as it was accommodated in Chapter 28F of Ammended UUD 
1945 such as Leo Sabam Batubara and the other members of MPPI seemed to be eager to 
pass the liberal model in the system of Indonesian media.  However, some of the 
requirements were not fulfilled.  For example, the prohibition to make stipulations and 
regulations that limited press independence to be stated in Indonesian Constitution like 
the First Ammendment of the United States of America.  The problem was that entering 
the clause of the prohibition, changing of amending the Constitution was not an easy 
political problem compared to the early time of the transition in 1999-2000.  At that time, 
political euphoria of the elites was still so high that those who wanted to be said as 
reformists, pro-democracy, and the like “easily” agreed to new ideas.  Various political 
changes after the period seemed to experience stagnance. This was due to more 
discussion, debate, or even quarrel among the elies rather than doing real things, for 
example how to exterminate corruption.  In addition to debate and discussion, a number 
of stipulations had been produced to overcome or to prevent corruption, but corruption 
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was becoming even worse, and was even done by government officials and other 
politicians.  Press independence also experiences stagnance because it did not result in 
changes. The Indonesia media remain constrained by growing legal restrictions, as well 
as by continuing threats and violence directed at journalis (Karlekar, 2003: 92). What was 
written by media, for example about corruption, Human Rights violation, bad behavior of 
legal officer, poverty, poor education management, did not bring effects in the form of 
investigation and serious improvement by authorized parties.  It meant that the fourth 
estate that also underlined liberal model only stayed on concept.  Press or media did not 
function entirely as the fourth pilar estate of democracy because it did not bring any 
changes.  On the political estates such as executive, legislative, and judicial had not 
trusted press so that most of press findings were not considered. The government or state 
did not move.  
      The situation was made worse by strong influence of the capital in mass media 
industry.  Various efforts to manage television industry experienced quite serious 
oppositions.  Television programs such as electronic cinema or known as sinetron being 
favored show, infotainment of celebrity gossips, criminal reports, dominated television 
stations in Indonesia.  Almost all of 11 television stations broadcasted such programs 
everyday.  Essentially, such programs were so far from communication ethics or mass 
media ethics.  There was almost no benefits that the public obtained from watching 
sinetron and criminal reports that were full of mental and physical violence in addition to 
wasting time unproductively.  What benefits we should benefit from the gossip of the 
celebrities who were married and then got divorced?  The advertisements broadcasted by 
media also had inseminated consumptive attitude of the society in either the higher level, 
lower level, both old or especially the young generation.  Ironically, the Indonesian 
Broadcast Commission Institution (central) or KPI  in Jakarta and similar institution in 
the local areas did not play maximum role either.  First, it was due to rejection by media 
industry to their inputs, warnings and criticism. Second, social support at it was mandated 
by Press Law to control media was so little.  The end of this problem was the attitude and 
behavior of the citizens that did not base on democratic values.  That democratic attitude 
and culture was not easily obtained from schools.  The democratic attitude, values, and 
ideas might be taught in education institutions but they were not found in daily life 
practices.  Norms of honesty, appreciation to human beings, appreciation to differences 
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of religion, ethnics, ideology, independence and responsibility, were not taught in 
televisions.   On the other hand, most of media and press cycles did not have professional 
attitude and traditions such as attaching to ethics, keeping neutrality, being discipline to 
accuracy, averting sensation.  Sometimes, a number of parties related the low 
professionalism of media to their low prosperity.  This is similar to Lipset’s theory of 
democracy, that democracy had to be based on economy.  In Indonesian methaphor, 
democracy does not work if the stomach is hungry.  Is it true?  
      If it still based on liberal concept that was going to implemented in current 
Indonesian press system, the problems did not come from Constitution only, but also 
from the operations of the stipulations in Press Law and Broadcasting Law. In certain 
step, the implementation of certain stipulations in Press Regulations was relatively more 
real dan rational than the stipulations in Broadcast Regulations.  For example, bow 
broadcasting could develop awareness of legal obedience and national discipline in  
Chapter 4 article (2e) if examples for this were difficult to obtain from government 
cycles.  How could broadcasting prevent monopoly of ownership and support health 
competition in broadcast sector if economy consideration and entertainment business 
were more dominant that social and educational considerations for the society as it was 
stated in Chapter 4 article (2g)?  How dis broadcasting encourage the improvement of 
society economy sufficiency, realize even distribution, and strengthen nation competition 
power in globalization era (Chapter 4 article (2h)) if the government could not do that?  
Other problems actually came from media cycle itself namely how serious they built a 
professional media industry that was based on universal communication ethics? How 
human resource was recruited, trained, and its quality was improve?  In social or public 
level the problem was very basic that was related to government task namely how to 
improve their education level so that they became rational audience?  
      The way out that might be able to be offered was starting from limited group, 
people and institution who had commitment on democratic values.  Initiative was not 
only from civil society and media, but it had to be supported by the government and 
business sector. Building democratic press sytem was started from institutions or media 
industry who agreed to media ethics, appreciation to human beings, dissemination of 
enlightening information.  Even though according to Press Council the number of 
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professional press was only around 30 percent but from there the building of liberal press 
could be started and its capability was improved.  
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Appendices 
1.  Interview with Adhie M. Massardi, a spokesman of President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Jakarta, August 3, 2005 
Question (Q):  Was the formulation of Freedom of the Press during the era of Gus Dur 
changed? 
Answer (A): Nothing was changed in the formulation of Freedom of the Press. What 
really changed was the atmosphere, where the institutions that had formerly retained the 
freedom of the press were pulled out. Everything was not clear so that the freedom of the 
press could not be blocked anymore. But the danger was that the public themselves that 
have been threatening the freedom of the press, not only in the beginning of the reform 
era (1998) but up to now (August, 2005). 
In the case of Ahmadiyah (that was attacked by the group that considered Ahmadiyah as 
an Islamic heresy), all kinds of media were in favor for it. The press itself is dancing 
freely on the stage. There is no dancer, there is no musician. 
The freedom of the press exists or is meaningful when it has some meaning for the 
public. The press as the fourth estate will loose its meaning when the three other estates, 
namely the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, do not exist. So the press cannot 
stand alone. 
The example is the issue of corruption at the General Election Committee (KPU, Komisi 
Pemilihan Umum). For these last two years, has been yelling loudly but there has been no 
result (because the three other estates did not make any movement). Another example is 
the corruption case of Akbar Tanjung. The press was also yelling loudly when the 
judicial body did not pay any attention, so there was no result at all. There was a general 
misunderstanding that the press as the fourth estate can stand alone without the three 
other estates. While in fact, as long as the public do not pay attention to the information 
from the media, then there will be no influence for the press. 
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Q: What was the position of the press during the era of Gus Dur? 
A: During the era of Gus Dur, the press was not in favor for him, but Gus Dur was still 
the President. So, Gus Dur assumed the presidency not because of the system but because 
of the political system. The evidence is that after Gus Dur was out of his office, he has 
still been well respected, not like other former presidents, for example Suharto. I 
remember a writing by Jose Rizal, ‘The duty of the press is to lift up the oppressed to the 
altar of the temple and to wait to find out whether there is anybody who will pay an 
attention to the person or not.’ 
Q: What was the position of Gus Dur to the press? 
A: The press always said the bad things about him but he said, ‘Don’t think too much 
about it, because the press only pays its attention to the educated, the middle class, and 
the rational ones. The way is just prove that what the press writes is wrong’. 
Unfortunately we did not have the chance to prove it. But the lower class was not 
influenced, because they did not believe what the press said. The evidence is that at the 
time the harvest was good, and agricultural produce was good. 
Q: Was it true that Gus Dur was down because of the press? 
A: Absolutely not. Gus Dur was not down because of the press. It was because of the 
General Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). Not because of Aryati (a 
woman), not because of Bulog (financial abuse), but because of the Kapolri. Up to now, 
no one has questioned about Bulog or Aryati. 
Q: Why did Gus Dur leave the press free? 
A: To let the press to stand in favor of him, to disclose the problems of the nation, to let 
the President take an action. To act on behalf of the people, not to deny his political 
commitment. For example, when Gus Dur sacked Wiranto. So the press had to disclose 
the problems of the nation then Gus Dur would take the necessary actions. But the press 
did not understand what Gus Dur wanted. Another example. The decision of the MPR on 
the teaching of Marxism and Leninism was proposed to be revoked by Gus Dur. At the 
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time the press did not back him. The press was only following the current political flow. 
The press was busy enjoying its freedom to criticize the authority. 
Q: Why did the press treat him like that? 
A: Because Gus Dur was the president that should be criticized when in during the era of 
Suharto the press had not been possible to do it. While during the era of Gus Dur, the 
political power of Suharto was still in Senayan (the House of Representatives). ‘We are 
just enjoying the freedom of the press and the press is still learning, so it is quite 
acceptable if there are mistakes. But there will be no result if this (bad) press is 
restrained. This is a learning process’, said Gus Dur. 
Q: Was there any problem between Gus Dur and the press (media) in his era? 
A: Gus Dur was mad at Kompas and CSIS (the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies) because he (Gus Dur) had to back them but the two institutions in fact also hit 
him like other media. 
Q: What was the situation after the existence of the Press Act? 
A: There has been no progress or benefit other than that with the Press Act it is very easy 
to make a press publication because there is no more licensing and this makes the press 
industry grow. In fact, the press was really good when there was the SIUPP (the press 
business license). The Watergate Scandal in the United States, for instance, was good not 
because it made the President Nixon down, but because of its investigation findings. The 
current freedom of the press is somewhat better because there are some functioning legal 
instruments. An example of the failure of the press is in the case of Akbar Tanjung’s 
corruption. Every press institution was undressing him but when in fact the law left him 
free, then there was no result from the press. 
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 2. Amir Effendi Siregar, a member of the Press Council term of 2001-2003, Jakarta, 
January 31, 2005 
 
Question (Q): What was the changing process of the relationship between the media and 
politics by May 1998? 
Answer (A): From a political point of view, the pressure against Soeharto was too hard. 
The political pressure, then the economic pressure, all flowed into the media. Political 
dissatisfaction, economic dissatisfaction, both could not be prevented any more. The 
political pressure was so strong, and the trigger was the economic pressure. Push till 
drop, then Soeharto fell down. It was in 1998. Here the role of the media was incredible. 
Even the media of Soeharto himself. Anybody’s media. Print media, anything, all was 
pushing him (Soeharto) down in 1998. So, in fact the media at the time was very much 
free, because of the two pressures (against Soeharto). What is interesting here is the 
period of 1998 onward. Our colleagues who were concerned about this moment as the 
opportunity for a change then formed what was called the Indonesian Press Community 
(MPI, Masyarakat Pers Indonesia). This was to take the momentum of change 
particularly in the media. From a structural point of view, this aspect was changing, also 
the political aspect, the economic aspect, and any aspect. And in the process, the first 
draft was the press act. And this happened right after May 1998. Immediately. Here we 
joined together, all of us. I was there too. The figures of the MPI, if you want to name, 
included Leo (Batubara), Ridlo Eisyi, Mr. Suryana (passed away), and the Association of 
Press Publishers (SPS, Serikat Penerbit Pers) as its center. Everything was conducted at 
the SPS. The Ministry of Information (Deppen) was still there, and the role of Mr. Yunus 
Yosfiah was great. He invited press figures, and also many kinds of figures, every 
organization was involved. But in my opinion, it was only the MPI whose 
democratization concept was clear.  
Why did they want to directly prepare the draft of the Press Act? It was to make the 
democratization process guaranteed by the law. While the process itself had in fact been 
running. At the time, in the draft of the Act, to save the electronic media, in the section 
about press, it was said that the ‘press’ as a journalistic work did not only include the 
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print media but also the electronic media. This was deliberately included to guarantee the 
democratization process among journalists of the electronic media. This was deliberately 
included to provide a legal guarantee for the democratization process (Then he read the 
section 1 of the Press Act). 
Then in 1999, there was enacted the Press Act, though there had been a Mass Media Act 
that would cover everything, but the one passed was the Press Act. Because we talked 
about the Press Act, the Mass Media Act, the Broadcasting Act, our friends at the MPI 
changed the name to be the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Community (MPPI, 
Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia). Then came up the names such as Zainal 
Suryokusumo, Kukuh Sanyoto, Bahrul Alam. These people worked on the process of the 
Broadcasting Act that was passed in 2002 / 2003, though in fact it had long been 
discussed back to 1999. This is the transitional process. This is the outline of the story. 
This Press Act covers any journalistic activity, not only in the print media but also in the 
electronic media. While, the Broadcasting Act covers everything. It covers the whole 
context. For instance, electronic cinema (cinetron), film, airing time. But to help our 
colleagues in the electronic media to have the freedom in presenting journalistic news, 
the reference should also come from here (the Press Act). 
Q: There were discussions / arguments in the process of preparing the draft of the Press 
Act. Would you please tell me what do you mean with the freedom of the press? 
A: For us, the concept about it is clear. To be a democratic nation, it is a must that there 
has to be a freedom of the press. There can never be a democracy without freedom of the 
press. In an academic language, freedom of the press is one of human rights. In practice, 
freedom of the press does not only belong to the press people but also to the general 
public. There the concept is being sharpened and clarified.  
Q: Had the concept been clear right from the start or through a process? 
A: For this group (MPI), the concept had been clear right from the start.  We have to use 
this momentum to arrive at democracy. If this is not well maintained then it will be like 
the pendulum of a clock. It can swing to the left and to the right like what happened in 
1966 that looked as if it was democratic but after the consolidation of political power 
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then it swung back to the authoritarian. This is what has to be well maintained with full 
awareness.  
Q: What is the reference of freedom of the press? 
A: It is clear that our initial reference was liberal. It was an antithesis to the repressive 
press system. We had to go to the liberal one, though in the process of preparation there 
was a pull and push. Some people were not yet ready to be democratic. Our society was 
not ready for democracy. That was the case. On a philosophical level, if you want to be 
democratic then you have to trust the people. It is a fixed price. If you do not trust the 
people, never ever hope to build democracy.) 
Q: What was the position of the government at the time? 
A: In the beginning, everyone wanted to be a reformist. We could easily lobby the House 
of Representatives (DPR), because the DPR also wanted to be reformist to go to 
democracy. The more severe problem was even after the election. The easiest DPR to 
negotiate was the DPR of the 1998 era, because the DPR wanted to change its image 
instantly to be democratic. Everyone follows the wind. But then what we found was the 
new elected members of the DPR (from the 1999 general election) who thought that they 
had more legitimacy. Here came up argument that the people were not ready for 
democracy. 
Q: Can you tell me the members of the DPR who followed the wind of reformation? 
A: Everybody … even Harmoko (former Minister of Information during Soeharto 
periods). So the Press Act was not so difficult to negotiate at the time (1998–1999). 
Q: Who were included in the Special Committee (Pansus) for the Press Bill of the DPR? 
A: Here we can see the role of Mr. Yunus Yosfiah who accelerated the process. He was 
the one who received the draft. When UNESCO people came, he welcomed. We also got 
in. Even the MPPI was also a part of his team. It was really incredible. Because of the 
political psychology that everything could go on easily. Well it is interesting to analyze 
… the political psychology. The members of the Special Committee included Bambang 
Sadono, Effendi Choirie (also a member of the Broadcasting Bill), and Joko Susilo who 
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was also a member of the Broadcasting Bill). In the context of the Press Bill, we talked 
with the whole fractions of the DPR. That is why the process was so fast. But for this 
context, you should interview Mr. Leo Batubara. His role was so vital in the Press Bill. 
Also Mr. Ridlo.  
Q: Back to the discussion about the Press Act, how this Act can answer the opinion that 
our press has crossed the line? 
A: (He was reading the Press Act). Here it is written. A journalist is free to join any 
journalist organization. Journalists have and obey a journalistic code of ethics. This is the 
thing that controls everything that may cross the line. So, this Act should be read in one 
single package with the code of ethics. Even here the press reserves the answering right; 
the press reserves the correction right. The argument was about whether such an ethic 
could be included in the Act or not. When there was an item raised, there was an 
answering right. The correction right should be an ethic. It should also be included in the 
Act. Second, one has to obey a code of ethics. This is very much close with 
professionalism to make journalists in control. But the question is who made the code of 
ethics. The journalists themselves, not the Law / the DPR. After being made by the 
journalists and being endorsed by the Press Council, then the code of ethics becomes one 
with the Act. And this is binding in nature. So if you read this Act, you will find that this 
Act is very great. It is a breakthrough. You cannot read the Press Act in separation from 
the Code of Ethics of Indonesian Journalists (KEWI, Kode Etik Wartawan Indonesia), 
because the KEWI is a part of the Act. What is interesting here is that the KEWI did not 
come from the DPR but from the journalists themselves.  
Q: Well that is the great spirit in preparing the Press Act. In the course of time during the 
transition period, how have the freedom of the press and the Press Act been going? 
A: That is why some people say that the press has crossed the line or has been wrong. We 
are not ready for democracy. It is in the course of time, and some people want to revise it. 
Even they want to change much in the revision. While in fact this is a blessing in 
disguise. Why? Because this can control those unprofessional things, by referring that the 
journalists have to comply with the code of ethics. The difference is that in other 
democratic nations, there are some of those nations that do not have a press act. But their 
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legal system has guaranteed the democracy and the freedom of the press, including in the 
United States in its First Amendment. Here, there are a lot of acts that have not come 
from a democratic philosophy. That is why for the case of Indonesia, a Press Act is 
needed to guarantee the freedom of the press. If there is no such an act, we are in trouble. 
All of those acts, the criminal laws, all are still used by the authority. That is why we 
have to continue fighting. This is not over yet.  
Back to the liberal concept. It follows that every root of democracy comes to the liberal. 
This is always being improved and everything will be seen in the Broadcasting Act. Then 
there will be a public domain where the liberal is in the orthodox notion. That is why we 
learn from Europe with everything in it. Democracy started from liberalism but it is 
continuously being dug. The extreme side from the liberal is the authoritarian. Our 
broadcasting Act is the result of our thinking process to find a democracy with justice.  
Q: How was the position of the government during the transition period, including Gus 
Dur (Aburrahman Wahid) and Megawati who was tough enough to the media? Did it 
prove that they had not understood the Press Act or was it because of the character of 
power? 
A: We have to put the transition period this way. We have to classify the period into the 
era of Gus Dur, the era of Mega, the era of SBY, or we can start from the era of Habibie. 
Every period has its own distinct character. In the era of Habibie, as I told you, almost 
everyone wanted to have an instant democracy, starting from the executive to the 
legislative. When Gus Dur was in power, he liquidated the Ministry of Information 
(Deppen). He still followed the stream. The era of Mega, it started being controlled. 
There were debates about the Press Act, and the revision came out in the era of Mega. 
The Broadcasting Act is in fact different from the Press Act because there is a public 
domain there, so a control is needed no to create unnecessary problems. And the era of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is also very much different. Without the media, SBY 
would be in trouble. So the character is very much different. SBY and Jusuf Kalla (JK) -
vice president- were elected by the popular vote not by political parties. That is why they 
had to be assisted by the media. That is why the character is very much different. SBY 
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does not have a strong political base. Only JK now has Golkar. Just imagine when there 
is no Golkar.  
Q: Does the Press Council see any big issues in the transition period where the 
relationship between the media and the government was in trouble? 
A: What we see now, our latest phenomenon is that a lot of people use the criminal law 
(KUHP). If the question is addressed to the Press Council, the Press Council is still 
committed to use the Press Act to solve any problem to let the democratic process go on. 
In the last months, the Press Council has solved a lot of cases. There are the cases of 
Laksamana Sukardi, PT Toba Pulp Lestari, and Jamsostek. All has been solved by using 
the Press Act. 
Q: So, there are some elements of the authority that use the Press Act to solve cases, but 
here we find the cases of Tommy Winata (TW) and Radar Jogja versus Kedaulatan 
Rakyat (KR) where the criminal law is used. What do you say about that? 
A:  For the case of TW, it is a learning process. He did no trust the Press Council. The 
Press Council would be in the favor of the press. Because he did not have a trust to the 
Press Council, then he used the criminal law because the target was to hit the press, in 
particular Tempo. If he had known that the Press Council could be objective, he would 
probably not use the criminal law (KUHP). For the case of KR versus Radar Jogja, KR 
has long had a heart feeling.  
The problem is in the dissemination of the Press Act and its notions. A lot of people have 
not understood. Not only the government officials, even the press themselves have only 
given little for their answering right. That is not right either. But now, for the case of 
Sofyan Djalil (the Minister of Information of SBY), he was very glad that he could use 
the answering right in Kompas. He said that this was very effective. This was a 
masterpiece for the case of Kompas and Rakyat Merdeka. They were aware that this (the 
Press Act) can be used. It is effective and efficient. You can later ask to the Press Council 
about the example of cases that has been solved. So those cases can be mediated and 
solved by the Press Council. In addition to solving cases, the Press Council also conducts 
a dissemination program and some researches. The Press Council has been conducting a 
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research on 28 media in Java to determine which one is professional which one is not. 
We have to be completely open, to provide materials for the media to improve their 
professionalism.  
Q:  Then? 
A:  The interest of the public should be maintained. Do not let any anarchism and chaos 
for the sake of the uncontrolled interest of the media. So when there is a case of 
defamation, it should be solved, and we have proved it. This can be solved to maintain 
the democracy and the freedom of the press. What people have often misinterpreted is the 
concept of defamation that is considered parallel with the freedom of the press. This is 
wrong. There should be a principle of freedom of the press. And the solution on the 
dispute should be based on a legal framework of the freedom of the press. What has often 
been wrongly misinterpreted is when people say that in the name of the solution of 
defamation dispute the freedom of the press has to be silenced. Or the other way around, 
for the sake of the freedom of the press then defamation is OK. That is wrong too. There 
should be established a system, a democratic legal framework to solve the case of 
defamation. And I do believe that the Press Act can do that. But some people do not 
believe it.  
Q:  What about the special thing of the Press Act (lex specialis) that has still been treated 
not in unison by the people? 
A:  There are still discussions about it, special or not special. I do believe that this one 
(this Act) is special in nature. It is called special because it can solve its own problems. It 
has its own mechanism. When there is a problem it can solve it. And it can be proved. 
Say for instance the case of defamation. Can it be solved by the Press Act? Yes it can. 
While some other people may say that it cannot. This discussion is still going on, but the 
ultimate question is which law is the most appropriate one to be used in a democratic 
system to solve the problems? Of course this (act) one. Now if I ask you, can the criminal 
law solve the problem? Can it guarantee the democracy? The answer must be no. If it is 
so, then do not use the Press Act. It is that simple, isn’t? Without debating whether this is 
special or not, the right choice is this if one wants to choose the democratic option. 
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Q: What about the opinion saying that this act contains some weaknesses and even it 
cannot guarantee the freedom of the press? 
A:  Some legal experts say that this act is a special one as long as its ruling is special in 
nature, implicitly, and it is already sufficient to prove that it is special in nature because it 
only rules in the domain of journalism. Journalism is not regulated in the criminal law. A 
legal expert should be smart, creative, and progressive in translating this. And the rest I 
would call them orthodox. The ultimate question is that, if you agree with democracy, 
which one would be the best to be used? Isn’t that? 
Q:  If there are ideas about revision, to where should it go? 
A:  If you want to seek for things, for instance the case of defamation, you have found the 
proof. It works. Very clear.  
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3.   Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, Chairman of the Press Council term of 2001-2003, 
Yogyakarta, October 29 and 31; Jakarta, November 1, 2004 
 
Question (Q): Since when do we have the freedom of the press? 
Answer (A): If we look at our press history, at least I can say that in fact Indonesia has 
never had a freedom of the press for a long period of time. So, in fact we have never had 
a real freedom of the press that is constitutionally guaranteed, at least like in the United 
States that is at least is guaranteed particularly by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. We have never had such a legal assurance, moreover a constitutional 
assurance, until the reformation era with the coming of the sections 28e and f of the 
Second Amendment of the 1945 Constitution though in fact the constitutional assurance 
of the section 28 is not as strong as and not clear as the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution. The First Amendment of the US Constitution is very clear. Though we are 
not so sure that it can give an assurance for the freedom of the press to express and to 
have an opinion, but the coming of the sections 28e and f can be interpreted as a 
constitutional assurance for the freedom of the press in addition to the freedom to have an 
opinion and to express and the freedom of accessing as much as information as possible. 
In the Dutch colonial era, the first newspaper in Batavia was Batavia nouvelle. It is very 
clear that during the colonial era there was never any freedom of the press because there 
were always regulations to prevent the freedom of the press. There was the article 
Persbreidel Ordonantie, there were a lot of censorship pressures, so in fact there was 
never any real freedom of the press. In the Japanese colonial era, everything was much 
worse, because there were military assistants who were assigned in the offices of mass 
media and in fact they functioned as the censor officers. In the Japanese colonial era, 
there was introduced a license system, a kind of publishing license. Things were much 
worse for our press during the Japanese military occupation in the Second World War. 
After that, everything was abolished. No more censorship after the independence of 
Indonesia. But in reality we have seen a lot of bridles against the press. Even very close 
to the proclamation of the independence, such a bridle also happened. It happened 
everywhere, even in Yogya that was the capital of the country at the time. In Jakarta, the 
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situation was of course very limited because of the power of the Dutch military. Where 
the Dutch military was in power since the beginning of the independence, there was al 
ways a limitation to the freedom of the press. Even in the areas of the Republic of 
Indonesia, there were also bridles by our emergency government in Yogya. Then in the 
areas occupied by the communist, there were takeovers on the media that might be non 
communist in nature. So there has never been any real freedom of the press at all. 
Officially there has never been any freedom of the press. On October 1, 1958, for the first 
time there was issued a licensing system just like the licensing system in the Japanese 
colonial era, the SIT (Surat Ijin Terbit-press permit), by the military, first to the Jakarta 
area. So the press of the print media had to beg a publishing license to the military. If I 
am not mistaken the name was Peperda Djaja (the War Commandant of the Jakarta 
Area). Then in 1960, such a system was enacted to all areas in Indonesia by the Supreme 
Commandant, Soekarno. The system was officially in place until it was replaced by the 
License for Press Publishing Company (SIUPP, Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers), by the 
amendment of the Press Act. The licensing system was only stopped since the 
replacement of the old Press Act with the new one in 1999. Wow.. If anybody would say 
that there was a freedom of the pres in the era between the independence and 1958 that is 
not true, though there was no official rule to limit the freedom of the press but in practice 
you can see a lot of bridles based on various laws, whether they were the Emergency 
State Act, this Act, that Act, and so on. Perhaps we can only say that it seems we are 
going to have a freedom of the press since the enactment of the Press Act no. 40 of the 
year 1999, if it can be put into practice. Up to now, it has only been five years from the 
year of 1999, and it is still a very short time to say that we do have a freedom of the 
press. A five year period is still too short. There should be dozens of years or even 
hundreds of years. The United States has been established for 250 years and they need 
those 250 years. So I can say that we have never had any tradition of the freedom of the 
press until the reformation era. That is why I can absolutely understand that it is really 
very difficult now to enforce the freedom of the press. My most apparent concern was 
probably the one that was published by the Jakarta Post yesterday (October 28, 2004). It 
was a clear contradiction with my hopes since 5 years ago. I was really very upset with 
the disturbances in the last 1 – 2 years to the freedom of the press by the 5 and 6 month 
punishment to the editors of Rakyat Merdeka, though it might be only a probation 
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punishment, where one of them was punished 5 months of imprisonment and 10 months 
of probation and the other was punished with 6 months of imprisonment and 12 months 
of probation. Then Mr. Bambang Harymurti was punished with 1 year of imprisonment 
though he is still seeking an appeal, and two other cases have been given a verdict by the 
lower court and it has been changed by the higher court. In the two cases, Mr. Bambang 
Harymurti or Tempo was initially beaten by Mr. Tommy Winata, but the higher court has 
changed it to be in favor of Tempo. But there is still a criminal case about the verdict of 
the lower court of Central Jakarta to imprison Mr. Harymurti for one year. An 
imprisonment on journalists and imprisonment on demonstrator for their opinions and 
expressions, or imprisonment for speakers for their opinions, all should never be let exist 
in a democratic country. In my opinion, a journalistic work, an expression of 
demonstrators, an opinion of a faculty member – perhaps like you, an opinion of someone 
giving a speech, if it is considered as crossing the line of law should be in maximum be 
charged with civil law and the sanction should only be a fine, and it should never be a 
large fine. There should never be a fine that is so huge to make a press company 
bankrupt. If the fine is so huge, then a demonstrator or a speaker could be in financial or 
economic troubles, and it would be a pressure to raise a fear for these people, and we will 
loose a lot of freedom. A lot more people would be afraid to express their aspirations, 
also to convey information and to express their opinions. In my opinion it is the same 
with the absence of freedom. 
Q:  Do you know about the Yogya case, between Radar Jogja and KR where there is a 
petition for one year of imprisonment for the journalist of Radar Jogja? 
A:  Yes, I do. I follow the case. In my opinion, the sanction for journalistic work should 
only be limited to a fine. I agree with the current opinions, that imprisonment should not 
make the press or speakers change their opinions. Imprisonment for such an activity will 
not be more effective than a fine. Because a fine, though small it may be, but it will 
usually be very effective. It is enough to make them think to first make them introspect 
and when they feel guilty they will change their attitude. But if they don’t feel anything 
wrong, they will do the similar things in their journalistic works or in their expression 
rights or in their way of expressing opinions. But it should be maintained that people 
should always be encouraged to express their aspirations in all times. That is what will 
  
313
make us progress as human beings. I can say that to some extent we can have this 
freedom of the press because in the last few years, people have been brave enough to give 
a pressure, for instance through the mass pressure. There are still pressures on the 
freedom of the press from political powers, social organizations, or from individuals who 
have certain powers. I can also see that demonstrations with violence have been 
decreasing than in the first years of reformation. I think the massive pressures at the 
beginning of the reformation era were not only directed to the press but also to the police. 
There was a governor’s office that was burnt by the mob, an office of the Local House of 
Representatives (DPRD) that was damaged, and there were police stations that were 
damaged and burnt, and also there were some mass media offices that were ‘invaded’ 
(between quotation marks). I think all of them just euphoria, because we have been to 
long without freedom, and when there is an opportunity to express our freedom, there are 
some people who have not mastered hot to express themselves in an appropriate way and 
this has led to such a violence. For instance the office of the paper Waspada in Medan 
was a little damaged. The office of the paper Radar Cirebon also suffered a little damage. 
The offices of Pikiran Rakyat in Bandung and Rakyat Merdeka in Jakarta were also 
invaded by demonstrators and were given a pressure because the people did not agree 
with the caricatures published in the papers. 
 
Brother Lukas, I think we have to fight changing the toughest law to amend, particularly 
the Criminal Law (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana). According to a faculty 
member of UNPAD (University of Padjajaran, Bandung), led by Mrs. Qomariah (if you 
are interested you can contact Dr. Qomariah E. Saparjaya, she still teaches at UNPAD, 
and she was a member of the Commission on Law and Act of the Press Act), she studied 
the prevailing Criminal Law along with her colleagues. And they found there were at 
least 35 sections that could be used against journalists for their journalistic work, also to 
be used against demonstrators, or against anybody expressing his / her opinion with a 
punishment up to 7 years of imprisonment (there were some with a maximum of 6 years 
of imprisonment, but also some with a maximum of 7 years of imprisonment). After that 
they also studied the revised draft of the Criminal Law made by the regime of Soeharto 
and the latest one the revised version by the ministry of Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the 
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Ministry of Law and Human Rights. And they found that the 35 sections have even 
increased. The revision during the era of Soeharto was for around 45 sections, but the 
revision of Yusril is for 48 sections, some people calculated 49 sections, but I think they 
are 48 sections. Why there is a difference? In one section, it is ruled that a civil servant or 
a public official or whatever is not allowed to leak the secret of the state. It is section 
number 49. I don’t count it in the relationship with the press because it is in the 
relationship between civil servants and the institution. But for the press, if the press also 
distributes the secret, there is a section for that. That is why I only calculate 48. So, it is 
very clear that our political leaders, our legislators, and the members of the House of 
Representatives (DPR), they have not already had a sense of belonging to the freedom of 
the press, the freedom to express, and the freedom to utter opinions. I can say it is a kind 
of sense of belonging. So they seem to be unaware about it. If they are aware, how can 
they do like that. The number of sections did not decrease but on the contrary it has 
increased. So we have become more and more old fashioned, more conservative, though 
all or some parts of the sections – I don’t know, because I am not a legal expert --  have 
been changed from a formal charge to be a material charge. Indeed there are some 
changes there. Formerly it solely depended on the interpretation of the judge whether 
writing could be considered as raising unrest or a chaos or not. If it could then you might 
be punished with imprisonment. But now there should be evidence, a material charge. 
OK, so it becomes more difficult for a judge to punish it has been changed to be a 
material charge. But in fact, the number of sections has been increased. I cannot 
understand. That is why I am still very pessimistic. That is why I was very upset when I 
was asked by the Jakarta Post about that. And last time, at the beginning of the 
reformation, I thought our law enforcers, our politicians, would not use the law though 
the sections were there. But after seeing people punished with imprisonment, moreover 
for Rakyat Merdeka, with 5 months of imprisonment and 10 months of probation because 
they were sued by Mr. Akbar Tanjung of making just ordinary caricatures, showing Mr. 
Tanjung without a shirt, where the head was the head of Mr. Tanjung and the body was 
taken from the internet .. The second case when an imprisonment for 6 months just 
because of sensational headlines about Megawati saying that Megawati was only of a 
Bupati level, that Megawati was more severe than Sumanto, that her mouth smelt like 
diesel fuel ..  OK, from a social ethical point of view perhaps the language was not yet in 
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the time to be used in Indonesia, but it was in the domain of ethics. I cannot understand 
why in the domain of law a news item about Megawati or a caricature about Akbar 
Tanjung could make a journalist go to jail. And also about Mr. Bambang Harymurti. Why 
just because of publishing a denial by the governor that Tommy Winata did not buy a 
piece of land for a gambling center in Sulawesi a person like Bambang Harymurti, and 
Koran Tempo, can be punished with a fine as much as one million dollar. Though the 
punishment has been changed by the higher court to be in favor of Bambang, but the in 
the last news Bambang was still punished with one year of imprisonment. Though my 
heart may say that there is still a chance that the higher court would change this.  
OK. From those experiences, it seem that the law enforcer have not forgotten the colonial 
articles that have been more 100 hundred years old. That is why I was so mad with the 
last 1 – 2 year situation. I thought at the beginning of the reformation era that we were 
much closer to the real freedom of the press that might last forever but in fact it has been 
much farther away, except that we have at least been successful in changing / revising a 
tiny bit of the Criminal Law (KUHP) not to be like that. I was told by some colleagues 
that it was very difficult to do that. It all has come from the mindset of our political 
leaders, our legislators, and from their own awareness.  
Let me go back to Akbar Tanjung, just for the sake of an illustration. When Akbar 
Tanjung sued Rakyat Merdeka to the Police, the Police had just studied the case and then 
they sent a letter to the Press Council asking of an expert witness. At the time I was the 
chairman of the Press Council and we decided that I, as the chairman, would not be an 
expert witness, because we in the Press Council were often placed in a dilemmatic 
position. Sometimes we were asked to be an expert witness by the party who filed the suit 
or by the party who was filed the suit. In this case, we were asked by the Police to send 
an expert witness while Mr. R.H. Siregar, the vice chairman of the Press Council had 
stated his agreement to be an expert witness for the behalf of Rakyat Merdeka. But I also 
studied that in other countries normally members of the Press Council would not agree to 
be involved in a legal process, because according to the consideration of the Press 
Council in making the decision about the violation of a journalistic work we had to use 
the Journalistic Code of Ethics. When we received the letter from the Police, we wrote a 
letter that we could not meet the request, without saying the reason behind. But we also 
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said that later we would change the policy, and we were glad to hold a dialog. In our 
opinion, we cannot solve such a problem as a black and white case. This needs a process 
of education so we would let the Police know about our opinion. But it seemed that the 
Police were not interested, so the case was taken over to the Higher Attorney. And the 
Higher Attorney saw that the case was not complete because the Press Council would not 
send any person. Eventually the Higher Attorney invited us to hold a dialog because they 
had probably read our letter. Then we discussed for some hours. We explained that at a 
glance this caricature looked like a photograph, but it could not be easily caught as a 
caricature, and it was placed in the midst of the news item in the front page. It was a 
minor violation in the sense that a media was not allowed to put an engineered 
photograph. At a glace a reader would think that it was a news photograph. But in fact it 
was an engineered one, and the purpose was just to make it a caricature. But to humiliate? 
We said that there was not element of humiliation from any journalistic ethic, so we did 
not agree that such a case was taken into court. After that was a long period without any 
process by the Attorney or perhaps the case was in the queue in the court and then it was 
processed by the court. When we saw that the case had been long let unprocessed we 
thought that the Higher Attorney or the law enforcers understood that such a case was not 
eligible to be processed in court. But in fact the case was eventually processed. That is 
our disagreement with the legal process on such cases. It is not quite appropriate to 
process such a case through the court. It would be much better if Akbar Tanjung sent a 
harsh protest demanding Rakyat Merdeka to publish it. Let the readers know which one 
was right and which one was wrong, or let them be more rational in their consideration 
on whether it was only a caricature or not and compared with the argumentation of Akbar 
Tanjung. Also when the Press Council (at the time the new chairman of the Press Council 
was Mr. Ichlasul Amal) met with Megawati, he reminded her no to file a suit against 
Rakyat Merdeka. In my term as the chairman of the Press Council, I also told Megawati 
because she expressed her objection on the publication of the Indonesian press on the 
conflicts in Aceh. Normally I am not willing to tell this to the public; I will tell you why. 
She said that our press was not patriotic, not nationalistic. You know the meaning that 
was why our press also published the statement of the rebels. Then I told her that the 
press often also published the news that she might not like it but it was not a matter of 
like and dislike on the material of the news, but it was their duty to publish that. No 
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matter whether they liked or not, because this information was also important for the 
readers, for the listeners, for the viewers, but it might also be important for the 
government officials, including the president herself. It was important for the 
government, in order that the government could get enough information and could make 
a more appropriate policy based on the more complete information. I told that not long 
after she had been formally established in office, when we introduced ourselves. The 
decision for us (the Press Council) had been signed by Gus Dur (Aburrahman Wahid) , 
but even before we had the opportunity to meet him, he had been replaced from the 
presidency. For these experiences, some time ago Prof. Ichlasul Amal (the chairman of 
the Press Council, replacing Mr. Atmakusumah) and his colleagues from the Press 
Council reminded Mrs. Megawati about her case with Rakyat Merdeka. It was very 
obvious that it was a kind of education about the freedom of expression and freedom of 
opinion for the public, but it looked that it was still far away. Moreover, if you look at 
what happened on the sides of the Higher Attorney, the Police, the judges, the President, 
and the members of the Parliament. At the beginning of the reformation era I told you 
two stories. First, at least the fraction of the Armed Forces / Police (TNI / Polri) of the 
House of Representatives said that there had been a trial by the press against Soeharto 
because there had been a lot of negative news items about Soeharto. Well, well, of course 
I did not agree with that. The point is not about positive or negative. Whenever there is a 
news material that is good to be informed to the public, then inform it to the public. 
While in fact there was a lot negative news items about Soeharto it was merely because 
of the transitional political atmosphere that might not be in favor of Soeharto. Well, 
initially the article about trial by the press would be included in the Press Act (of the year 
1999), but we were against that; all of us including myself, Leo Batubara, and some 
colleagues who were involved in the preparation of the Press Act in the Commission I of 
the House of Representatives. We were successful. Some articles that we were against of 
could be abandoned (not to be included in the Press Act). But you can imagine how some 
members of the House of Representatives, at least from the fraction of the Armed Forces 
/ Police, perhaps also from other fractions, still considered it as a trial by the press, 
because the news was negative about Soeharto. Second, the subject why we extended our 
notions about the press. As a matter of fact, the Press Act is only about the print media. 
But when it was being prepared in the Ministry of Information (Deppen), and when it was 
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being discussed in the Commission I of the House of Representatives, there were a lot of 
pressures by law enforcers against our colleagues in the TV. If  I am not mistaken, the 
people who were given the pressure were those from the ANTV, it was very clear, and 
another one was Riza Primadi (SCTV). Riza Primadi and Azkarmin Zaini were called by 
the Police along with their cameramen because the two television stations had aired an 
interview with Abdullah Syafei. While in fact you can also see that in some papers such 
an interview could also be found. As far as I can remember, you can find it in Republika. 
I think it was an interview by a group of journalists. But the fact was that the law 
enforcers were not accustomed yet with seeing the head of the rebels (GAM, Free Aceh 
Movement) in person, moreover in TV with pictures. Wow that would be much more 
obvious. These colleagues from the TV expressed their complaint to us who were 
fighting for the freedom of the press in the House of Representatives. They were also 
actively involved; Azkarmin Zaini and Riza Primadi were also actively involved in the 
activities to fight for the freedom of the press. Then we demanded, since it was still being 
prepared in the Ministry of Information and the Commission I of the House of 
Representatives, that the notion and the meaning of the press should be extended not only 
to include the print media but also to include broadcasting media, both radio and 
television and any other things that were still related with journalistic work. I would 
admit that this is a bit unique, and I said that in the United Stated the notion of the press 
had been extended since 47 years ago. I read about it once, but I don’t remember it where 
did I read it, but I do remember that it was 47 years ago. That is what I said to the House 
of Representatives. It is okay to extend the meaning of the press to include broadcasting. 
Q:  This is very important Sir, moreover when we talk later about the Press Act … 
A: That is right. And in fact that (broadcasting media, radio, television; all was included 
in the press) was also being discussed. What was the journalistic work of television and 
radio? We have to admit there are some articles in the Press Act that are not finished yet 
and they are let unfinished. I will tell you later about them. The unfinished ones are for 
instance when Wimar Witoelar was on TV in a talk show. Is it a journalistic work or not? 
We have to check about it first. When he is talking about current issues that were still hot 
in the headlines, then it can be called a journalistic work. But when he suddenly moves 
and talks about how to take a good health care, about something that is not related with 
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news at all, that it is not a journalistic work. What about a film? What about a film review 
on TV? According the Act on film censorship, or whatever it is, a film should be 
censored. But since this one is a part of a review, then it can be considered as a 
journalistic work. Do these clips have to be censored or not? Just things like that. Just 
leave them. Whether they are journalistic work on TV, radio, and in practice, or not, just 
let them unfinished. The point is that we are the proponents of the freedom of the press 
and we demand that there should be an Act that guarantees the freedom of the press. Just 
leave it if there will be some difficulties in interpreting it, we don’t have the time for that. 
Another thing about the answering right. I absolutely don’t agree if the answering right is 
included in the Act because such a right is the prerogative right of the editors to publish it 
or not. But by including the answering right into the Act, if the editor does not serve the 
answering right the editor can be fined as much as 500 million rupiahs and it will not be a 
prerogative right of the editor anymore. It has been an obligation, because if you don’t 
published it you will be fined as much as 500 million rupiahs. Well there were finally 
some changes in the wording but I am not sure whether the law enforcers or the judges 
would later interpret like what was being talked in the discussion (about the Act). Let put 
this way. Formerly, the sentence was ‘the press is obliged to publish’ the answering right.  
I said no, because in the code of ethics, this is included in the prerogative rights of the 
editor to publish it or not. We cannot press the editor to publish it or not because there 
would not be a distracting answering right with a bad language that may be accusing 
other people to make the press later be sued by other persons. Then the editor should 
reserve the right to publish it or not or to improve or to give it back. Then it was later 
changed, you can read, that the press was obliged to serve the answering right. Said a 
member of the House of Representatives, to serve was in the meaning that if someone 
came to deliver an answering right, then serve it … whether the editor would publish it or 
not, it should follow the common practice in the press. Then I accepted it. I am not a legal 
expert. But since the day up to now, I am not so sure that people would interpret that 
way. I can be a witness, because I was there, and it could also be found in the minutes of 
the meeting. Thank God for that. 
Q:  Can we go on, Sir? 
A:  Yes we can. We still have 20 minutes … ha, ha, ha 
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Q:  So, what is the true essence of the freedom of the press?  
A:  In understanding what is called news the formulation may not be only one. It can be a 
long story. Even there is a notion that news is formulated by someone who has been very 
much upset as information that is according to the editor considered good to be 
published. Ha, ha, ha. But the fact is often like that. But we can also add that it should be 
an experienced editor. An inexperienced editor would be wrong. In my experiences, it is 
not the scientific or the theoretical definition in academic circles that I do not know. The 
freedom of the press is the freedom for the press to convey any information, to exchange 
any opinion, as large as possible as only limited by the code of ethics, by the social 
ethics, and by the law. For the social ethics, in my opinion, what I mean with the 
journalistic code of ethics, the social ethics, and the law are all the liberal ones. I am not 
happy if what are meant by the social ethics and laws are the old conservative ones, are 
those that are not rational, are those that are based on a narrow way of thinking. For the 
journalistic code of ethics, I see that I am happy enough. And I am not going to give any 
more requirements except for the conservative interpretation because they are not in use 
anymore; and in most parts of the world now the practice is the same. I never see any 
code of journalistic ethics that could be considered conservative or old. Everything is 
now the same. And I can now simplify by saying that a writing that deserves a 
publication should first be factual and accurate, but not necessary be meant with an 
absolute truth. Factual means like what the journalist sees or hears. Whether it contains 
an absolute truth or not is not the point, because what is seen and what is heard by a 
journalist can also be wrong. Witnesses from different people can also be different. They 
are my requirements. They should be factual and accurate. What is seen or heard by a 
journalist should be presented as accurately as possible. Whether it is true or not is 
another thing. That is what I usually tell the court. Then the second one, the writing / 
news should be objective. It should be in balance, it should involve give a chance for all 
parties included in the news, the accused one and the accuser, to speak. And it should not 
be biased. If it is positive then let it be positive, and if it is negative then let it negative. 
Then it should not be discriminative in nature, it should be prejudiced, it should not treat 
the sources on the basis of different religions, races, genders, or languages. I think it is all 
about that. But, it should be presented by fulfilling these requirements. Of course, it 
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should be fair, not discriminative, not with prejudice, not biased, factual, and accurate. If 
the press meets these requirements, then the freedom of the press is already met. I don’t 
have any definition about the application of the freedom of the press and also the freedom 
of expressions and the freedom of opinions. The requirements are still the same. That is 
all the code of journalistic ethics that I have learned anywhere. All is very alike. Then 
about the social ethics. It should be the one that is not conservative in nature; that is 
liberal; that is not irrational; that is not narrow minded; and that is egalitarian in nature. 
That is all. If the law is already just in nature, the social ethics is already good enough. If, 
for instance, the press does something wrong according the law, it should be processed by 
the law. But I don’t agree if the press is processed by using the Criminal Law that is so 
anachronistic in nature and that is already very obsolete. I did say that the press should be 
responsible to the law but I had already changed my mind when I was asked by a teacher 
when I studied in Britain about what if the law had been made by Hitler. Recently, there 
are many people who demand that the press should be responsible to the law. What if the 
law was made by Soeharto? Or by Hitler? That is not the law we want to have, we want 
the just one.  
Q:  The development of the press should be viewed from the development of the society. 
Some people say that we are not ready yet with the freedom of the press. What do you 
think about that?  
A:  No way. I cannot agree with such an opinion. No. The press should be the same with 
the political leader. It should walk through along its natural development. Perhaps they 
should walk in front of the society. It cannot be accepted that the press should walk 
behind the society. If the press is not yet so much sophisticated as what is reflected in our 
press … well, it is another story. I have just replied an email from an UNISBA (Bandung 
Islamic University) student who said that he was doubt that our society had been ready 
for the freedom of the press. Then I told him again my explanation before the 
Commission I of the House of Representatives long before our Parliament talked about 
the Press Act. So it must be right in the beginning of the reformation era. I was 
representing the Press Institute of Dr. Soetomo, where I was the executive director. I was 
there along with other NGOs such as ISAI (Institute for Information Flow Studies) and 
others. I don’t remember whether we were invited or we wanted to meet the leader of the 
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Commission I of the House of Representatives. In fact we had a meeting. -- Ah, you have 
an email address. Yes I know, we have often sent emails one another. I will forward you 
the mail I sent to the UNISBA student to give you a more structured explanation. -- The 
point is like this. Mrs. Aisyiah Amini, who was always in conflict with me when we met, 
also when we talked about the Press Bill, considered me as being too liberal but I also 
considered her as being too conservative. So in the meeting she said that we were on the 
right time yet to provide the freedom we wanted because the education level of our 
society was still very low. Wow, Mr. Lukas, it was hard to answer such an obsolete 
opinion. And at the time I forgot about the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Then I said to Mrs. Amini that 250 years ago the United States had already 
been successful in formulating an Amendment that the Congress was not allowed to pass 
an Act that limited the freedom of worship, the freedom of conducting ritual activities, 
the freedom of assembly and the freedom to submit a petition to the government, then 
also the freedom to express opinions, and the freedom of the press. That was 250 years 
ago and at the time the level of civilization in the United States had been much lower 
than Indonesia now. The evidence is that at the time the people of the United States still 
treated Negro people as slaves, that they still killed Indians, and that their education level 
was very much lower than Indonesia now. I read -- but I don’t remember where it is -- 
that some members of the Congress were illiterate. Some of them were blacksmiths 
repairing horseshoes like in the cowboy movies. Some of them were cattle breeders, and 
some were farmers. That is why I can say that the civilization of Indonesian people now 
is much higher than the civilization of United States people 250 years ago. The only 
difference of the Americans is only the courage! The question (of Mrs. Aisyiah Amini) 
could not be answered. But I was not so stupid. I don’t know how to answer such a 
question. But who has the statistics of the intelligence of Indonesian people? My belief 
that makes me believe is not about whether the education level is high or low. I don’t 
believe that a person that is not schooled is not smart. I am a son of a service servant. 
When I was a child (since I was in the first grade of the elementary school), I was often 
taken by my father to go around the villages in the early years of our independence. We 
had to go on foot for around 11 km to reach a kecamatan (district), where I saw the 
election of a lurah (leader of a village). Such a democratic election for a lurah could be 
held. I never saw any violence in a lurah election. At the time my father was a Wedana 
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(formerly a Camat), did not interfere at all in this election. When we were on the way 
home, my father complained that the elected lurah was not the one he preferred. My 
father preferred an older lurah, with longer experience, with higher education level. But it 
was OK, that was what the people wanted. It was in the 40s – 50s. So I don’t believe that 
the people in villages are not smart. They had their own choice. Even the choice was not 
in line with the preference of my father who was a civil servant officer with a higher 
education than their education. Such an experience makes me believe that the press 
should not follow but should be in front of the society, because even when the press is in 
front of the society, the society itself is not always left behind. Who knows that the 
society has been much more in front of us, if I recall my own experience … That is what 
I said in front of the Commission I of the Parliament, because I didn’t see any other 
answer. Up to now I still have the same belief. This freedom must not be blocked. Give 
as much as freedom as possible. That is what I see about the importance of the freedom 
of the press. About the freedom of expression and the freedom of opinions. I am also 
upset when there are demonstrators who scratch the photographs of Megawati and 
Hamzah Haz, who step on their photos and then they are imprisoned because the have 
been considered as humiliating them. In my opinion it is not a humiliation. It is an 
expression. In my opinion, they don’t want to humiliate but they want to express their 
anger. Another opinion is about some Aceh female activists who campaign the 
referendum. They were now imprisoned. I think it is quite inappropriate. Let them 
express their opinions. It would be much better than if later they express through 
violence. Let them talk. If they cross the lines, then they can be sanctioned but not with 
imprisonment. A sanction with a fine would be OK. But even the fine should be 
educating in nature, not the repressive one to make the people dare not to speak up 
anymore. So is the press. I have been for months taking notes which countries have 
replaced the criminal articles with the civil articles for the freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press. Some other groups of countries have reduced the amount of the 
fines, including some African countries. Even some countries, not many perhaps only one 
or two, have completely abolished the articles for humiliation, defamation, rumors, and 
calumnies. They have completely abolished them in the criminal law and the civil law. In 
relation with the press, with journalism, this is the correct attitude. Because the case of 
defamation, calumny, humiliation and so on can be corrected. Just say, for example, that 
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today we have been sent a false news item. But for the press it is usually not a false news 
item but an inaccurate news item. If someone deliberately publishes a false news item 
then in my opinion he / she is not a journalist, not also the press media who does this. 
Inaccurate means that it is not on purpose. If it is on purpose, then it is for a political 
purpose or a certain purpose outside the press media. It is OK if there is an inaccurate 
news item. If today there is a negative news item, tomorrow it can be corrected. Case 
closed. Not just that. After giving a correction we can give a better sympathy from the 
public. Just let us take a look back. Syahril Sabirin was once reported negatively when he 
was investigated because he was considered as being involved in something. I don’t 
know, perhaps about the BNI case. And finally he was released by the Supreme Court. 
That what I remember most clearly is about Prabowo. He was once accused by Habibie, 
also by Abdurrahman Wahid, that he was involved in a coup. When such an accusation 
was launched, Prabowo was not in Jakarta, so the report seemed very imbalanced. But 
when he showed up in Jakarta and he held a press conference telling his own version, the 
sympathy of the public went to him. He could tell that the rumor was not correct. Perhaps 
he has not only been rehabilitated but he has become a hero. That is the process. That is 
why when I was in the Press Council and when we conducted a series of road show or 
discussions, the most frequently asked questions addressed to us were about that it was 
not fair if the press only provide the right to answer only in the column of letters from the 
readers or in much smaller amount than the original one. Even some people say that it is 
no use to clarify or to give an answering right because our names have already been 
defamed when we were reported negatively. My first answer is that I do agree if the 
readers only read the early news where your name may have been defamed, without 
reading your answering right or your clarification. I do agree that such a possibility may 
happen. But there is also another possibility that a reader only reads your answering right 
or your clarification without reading the initial news. And there are also readers who read 
both. There are readers who don’t read both. So it is a matter of feeling for every person 
who was reported negatively as if he / she was treated unfairly. The person doesn’t think 
in a wider perspective, in a more comprehensive way. I don’t know whether you agree or 
not with me but that is what I have been telling people for years in discussions, seminars, 
and workshops. When I was with the Press Council, I was involved in 57 discussions, 
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workshops, seminars, from Medan to Ambon. Over and over I always told the same 
thing. It never ended. That is all.  
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4.  Bimo Nugroho Sekundatmo, Board of Indonesia Broadcasting Commission (Central), 
Jakarta, August 30, 2005 
 
Question (Q): What are differences between the old Broadcasting Regulation (1997) and 
the new Broadcasting Regulation (2002)? 
Answer (A): First, on the part of who controlled.  For the past regulation, it was 
Department of Information of which regulator is called KPI.  However, the authority of 
KPI is not absolute either because there are (things) decided together with the 
government. Second, its broadcasting system. The broadcasting system of the first (the 
old one) was from Jakarta covering the entire Indonesia.  In this Broadcasting Regulation 
year 2002, the system is Network Local Broadcasting System.  
Q: Wasn’t 1997 Broadcasting Regulation once prevailed?  
A: Not yet.  Even with the current regulation, broadcasting institutions have not executed 
what are stated in the 2002 Broadcasting Regulation.  There is no implementation of it 
because the year 1997 was just the birth of the Regulation, then there was turmoil in kan 
1998, it was not finished yet, then when Gus Dur took the lead in 1999 the Department of 
Information as the implementor was dimissed.  
Q:  How was the process of the birt of this 2002 Regulation and what kind of debate 
occurred and between which political powers?  Which articles were crucial?  
A:  Almost all articles were curcial but we look at the map, there were three parties, first 
was industry, second the government and third civil society.  Each of them had different 
concepts and they were not matched.  Industry was different from the government, the 
government was different from civil society, civil society was different from industry. 
Then, civil society entered their ideas through the House of Representatives so that the 
draft of this Regulation became the initiative draft of the House of Representatives.  
Thus, the model was the same with the prosess of setting Press Regulation and 
experienced so tough fight that it took 4 years from the draft in 1999 until 2002. Months 
of November-December 2002.  In fact, finally there were many points coming from the 
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civil society, tended more to the civil society; there was regulation from the representing 
society, then Community Broadcasting Institution existed, and Local Broadcasting was 
more strengthened.  However, there were suspended articles due to inputs from the 
government, for example Common Stipulations with the Government.  In the meantime, 
industry interests were neglected.  For the reason, they proposed judicial review of this 
Regulation.  When this Regulation was legalized in 2002, judicial review was proposed.   
Q: Among the civil society, which one was it?  In composing the draft of Press 
Regulation, there was Indonesian Broadcasting and Press Society (MPPI-Ind) that was 
strong, wasn’t it?  
A: That’s right. The most powerful was still MPPI. MPPI supported IMLTC where there 
were Hinca Panjaitan, SET Foundation owned by Garin Nugroho, Medan, Semarang, 
Surabaya, Makasar, each with its media watch.  
Q: Who was from government element?  
A: Kominfo (Communication and Information).  The ministry of communication and 
information, but there was another side that Directorate General of Post and 
Telecommunication did give have any ide at all.  It was part of the government as well, 
wasn’t it?  Actually, there were two governments by that time, namely Kominfo group 
and the group of Directorate General of Post and Telecommunication that relatively was 
not involved much.  Meanwhile, almost all associations of the industry opposed.  
Q: Why was the industry group left behind and then they proposed judicial review?  
A: The judicial review had been decided by Constitution Court though.  What had not 
been decided was the judicial review by KPI to this government stipulation, on public.  
Q: Thus, before the 2002 Broadcasting Regulation was legalized, was the regulation 
implemented the 1997 Broadcasting Regulation?   
A: The old Regulation.  Although its implementation did not work, several broadcasting 
permits had been issued, for example Lativi, TransTV; they existed in 1998-1999, didn’t 
they?  With those permits, they prepared themselves an in 2000s they began 
broadcasting.  
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Q: So, how was press freedom actually before the birth of 2002 Broadcasting 
Regulation?   
A: Relatively limited because that time was lawless and what prevailed was Press 
Regulation that relatively was liberal as well.  They used Press Regulation, what 
differentiated printed media and electronic media was that this electronic media used 
limited frequency zone.  Therefore, they could not operate freely; they had to have 
frequency allocation.  
Q: It seemed that broadcasting institutions remained concerned with the birt of this 2002 
Broadcasting Regulation.  It is known from the discussion, directly or indirectly that they 
still concerned with KPI and one of their statements, wheter it is true or not, was that 
sometimes KPI judgement was released without discussion with them.  They told so.  
A: It’s no problem… Idea difference is common, isn’t it?  But, we will just start from the 
prevailing law.  To my opinion, it’s just simple.  In fact, it was KPI duty to give notes, 
warnings, etc.  The cases that KPI settled such as Lativi case, SCTV case, Direct Vision 
relatively went well.   This means, we cannot see it isolately, to be generalized, no … 
there were layers of problems in it that could be settled on by one.  
Q: Then, who settled the cases, if any, before the existence of 2002 Broadcasting 
Regulation?  
A: No one, lawless. 
Q: Did KPI record that the issues that the society at that time (before the existence of 
KPI)questioned recurred ?  
A:  Actually, the big case was that these frequencies were controlled by the cronies. 
Television and radio.  Now, there are inert frequencies, some are leased, some are sold; 
that still becomes a problem.  
Q: Was relationship between the government and politics at that time uncertain as well or 
how was it?  
A: Uncertain in the sense that the owners of the current media were relatively stronger 
than the government, it is different from the past.  In the past, the government controlled 
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the owners of the capital in broadcasting.  Now, it’s not.  In the past, civil society did not 
have representatives to have at least a little stronger voice; it was nothing.  Now, KPI is 
present and civil society enters, their people are there. That’s the change of the 
competition taking place.  
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5. Cornelis Lay, Advisor to the President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Yogyakarta, August 
20, 2005 
 
Question (Q): What was the relationship between politics and the media in the era of 
Megawati? 
Answer (A): Starting from the era of Gus Dur to the era of Mega, even I think starting 
from the era of Habibie, the press has gained its freedom, relatively maximum. And it can 
be seen from the fact that there has been no intent to restrain. But the unique thing is the 
high level of freedom was closely related with the politics. While on the other hand, the 
tension between political actors, the state, political infrastructures such as political 
parties, and high level political figures tended to be very high and to be increasing. In my 
opinion, from my experience with Mega, both parties (the press and politics) did not 
understand one another. For instance, when she was the president, Mega always thought 
that it was the responsibility of the press to educate the people, and so on. But our press 
colleagues always thought that it was the duty of the government to convince them. In 
fact there were some differences in the relationship patterns, but these did not result in the 
increasing or decreasing level of freedom of the media. It was clearly felt like that.  
What I did feel was that some owners of the media, not the media itself, who voluntarily 
wanted to surrender to the authorities, perhaps because of the high level of freedom. So, 
this is my experience. Just disguise the names. There was a campaign interview 
(presidential election of the year 2004) by some television stations. They tried very hard 
to interview the president. We could finally make it. What surprised me most was that 
after the interview, the media owners came to me and offered me to edit the tapes, to drop 
those things that had to be dropped, to let me see the tapes first before they were finally 
aired. I was really surprised by him. I had been tens of years trying hard to get the 
freedom for you, media people, but suddenly you offer me the authority to apply 
censorship. So, my point is that it looked that the media were very scared or something 
like that, but from a psychological point of view, the situation was like that. 
So, while there was a tense relationship and intent to surrender on one hand, but 
on the other hand there was a tendency to complain one another. Mega often complained 
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about the press. Mega thought that the press had always been building a negative image 
about here by concealing her positive images, and she uttered this in some events. For 
instance, she complained that the media were very imbalanced. She did not ask to be 
defended but she asked that the information should be delivered completely. On the other 
hand, the media also complained about her for her silence, her reluctance to release 
information, and for her incommunicativeness, and so on. In my opinion, both had their 
points. I tried to bridge the gaps between the two parties. I started from the media, from a 
forum with them. First with only limited figures. The forum was relatively permanent. 
Anytime the president would go to a place, for instance to go overseas, the key media 
persons would be there. The people like Karni Ilyas, August Parengkuan, Mr. Tomy 
(Suryopratomo – Kompas), the director of TPI, the people from Metro, almost all key 
media. Even some local media like Pikiran Rakyat (West Java) also joined the group 
once. They were all to build communication. We dined together, of course as persons. 
But such a thing could soothe the tension of relationship and the atmosphere of 
complaints among them. They were the most involved people. There were also other 
layers. So there was an opinion, if you would deal with the media, please not only with 
the bosses but also with the lower layers. Not only with the Editors’ Club. There were 
also some efforts from the media to build the bridges. For instance, Miss Uni (Uni Lubis 
– TV7) tried hard to facilitate such communication. But there was always dissatisfaction. 
On one side, Mega always thought that the media were never fair to her in the reporting. 
On the other side, the media always thought that their jobs were never made easier with a 
provision of sufficient information, and so on. So, I think that was the permanent 
relationship pattern. During the transition phase, there was always a mutual suspicion, but 
each of them had its own autonomy and high level of freedom. So, if I have to say 
something, there was a maximum degree of freedom achievement in such a very tense 
relationship pattern, and it was almost marked with incomprehension of each other’s 
functions and with a low level of toleration between the two sides. That is the first point. 
But the one’s perception, like the perception of Mega, is not determined by the 
person him/herself, but by the next layer persons around her. For instance, I see it in the 
people of PDIP. It is very rare that the people would see the press as their friends. The 
people like Roy (BB Janis) always treat the media in a hostile mode, and then they 
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facilitate the atmosphere of continuous mutual suspicion. At the state level, the people 
like Bambang Kesowo (the Minister of the State) could be a certain factor to make hostile 
the media. But for instance, we can make another arrangement. I changed the 
arrangement. And this made a lot of people angry. At the time, the media would follow 
Mega to go overseas. When Mega stepped down, other people also stepped down, and 
then followed the media to stop down; the media people were in the last cars. They tried 
hard to catch her. When they tried to take her interviewed, they were blocked. But I 
changed the formation of the groups, starting from the presidents, the security people, the 
medical people, and then followed directly by the media. Then other people. So the 
protocol system itself did not put the media as an important aspect. And this had been a 
standard, since long-long time ago. It was hard to change. It took a lot of time, and it 
needed to argue with people. There were not any facilities for them either. There was no 
press conference. Then I asked that there should be a press conference. While at a certain 
extent, there was also a respect to the press from the Mega’s side. She would not be 
interviewed in the plane. It was not human at all, because the plane was often trembling. 
There were also such dimensions. 
But it was also weird with Mega. She had personal relationship with media 
people, most of them reporters. Some of them had a really good relationship with her. 
They hugged one another, they talked in the room. For instance a reporter of the Jakarta 
post, a print media. But this person seemed to be ethical too, not to abuse the opportunity 
to interview her, or to steal information for the media, when they just wanted to chat. I 
think this is more about a personal relationship. In general, they had had a long historical 
relationship since when she was still in an unfavorable situation. What I want to say is 
this. The gap between Mega and the media was the result of the exaggerating autonomy 
of both parties; but at the same time it was also facilitated by the protocol system and the 
psychology of Mega herself. That is why she could not be so open. It was not possible for 
her to be open for everything, with everyone, and she did not feel the need to tell 
everything. There should be a public officer to tell.  
Q: What about her interview with SCTV? 
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A: We urged her to talk with television stations, also with Metro TV. But this is a special 
case. I think the president of the United States would not like that either. The interview 
was suddenly stopped (without prior notice) for a commercial break. This is for the first 
time I saw an interview with the president was stopped by a commercial break. What 
kind of ethics was that? I was somewhat surprised with this fact when I talked with them 
(television stations). Then there are others, like RCTI. There were also people who were 
close to us, like Derek Maningka. Karni was also close to us. There were also media 
people she liked most, the professional media people. She was very happy to be 
interviewed by Peter Gontha. Well it was very rare. She was also very happy when she 
was interviewed by Jayasuprana. I don’t know why. Perhaps they did not judge her. 
Perhaps because of their age. What is clear is that those people did not attack her during 
the interview. They did not act smart; they respected her, and so on. Though in fact the 
questions were very sharp. Well, one of the worst interviews was with Bayu from SCTV. 
Well, Bayu should not ask the questions that way. Or perhaps Bayu was also a bit 
nervous, or stressed, or else. I don’t know. It was quite different from the usual Bayu we 
knew. But there were also reporters who would not interview here. And Mega would not 
be interviewed either. For instance Rosiana Silalahi. In fact Rosiana was a good person. 
And she would certainly be able to interview Mega. But when I asked Rosie to do so, 
Mega denied, and she respected her, because they were good friends. So there was a 
mixture of a lot of factors. So I can see that personality is the key for any relationship. In 
my opinion, perhaps a bit different from Soeharto or other leaders, those very personal 
relationships never led Mega to conclude and to use her power to minimize or to repress 
the freedom enjoyed by the press. She was mature in that... So when there was an urge to 
revise the Press Act, she did not respond at all. She was personally disappointed of being 
treated unfairly, but she never mentioned. And in fact she knew that was the price to pay 
and she did not have the moral and political rights to repress. You can check our media 
colleagues during the campaign. There were people who take actions on behalf of Mega, 
for instance by calling newspapers to cancel some certain news, and so on. She did not 
take any action to whatever the television or the press said. And it was really her policy to 
the media. Let them mature themselves. That is quite unique. Try check later what is 
going on with the interview with SBY. I met Mr. Edy Prasetyo from CSIS. He once 
interviewed him, special for the case of July 27th. He had been heavily reminded not to 
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ask this not to ask that. Then suddenly he refused to do so. We had to take a trick. There 
was nothing in the answers. This is related with SBY. When this came up, a signal was 
given, and he had to stop for a commercial break. So there was a scrutiny against the 
media. No such a thing during the era of Mega. She did not have anybody with a duty to 
scrutinize the media. There was no special team. But she was also upset with the media. 
While SBY has a special team to handle the media, because that is his way to respond. 
That is why many people say that Mega did not a media strategy, or a communication 
strategy. But in my opinion that was not the case. She did have. But she was urged by the 
reluctance to scrutinize the media. Well, sometimes it was very funny. After SCTV talked 
bad about her, then came Karni (Ilyas) to chat friendly. I was very confused.  
The only thing we used was only in the context to raise issues, to compile issues, 
but not to see the politics of the media. Though in fact some of the issues were raised in a 
sharp manner, for instance by Metro and Media Indonesia. Only when she was too much 
cornered, then she uttered her complaints.  
Q: Were you ever unhappy with Kompas, or SCTV? 
A: Almost never. Once she was unhappy, but never with Kompas. Even the negative 
news about her was a proof that she would not control the media. August Parengkuan 
(TV7) was informally in charge of controlling the media during the presidential election. 
But then some negative news about Mega came from TV7, and she was also confused 
about the fact. But this was only to show that there was no policy or political control on 
information. As long as about the political process, Mega valued Kompas as the most 
because of its incredible neutrality.   
Q: Any special relationship with media people, in Kompas for instance? 
A: She chatted and complained about the media to Jakob (Jakob Utama, Kompas). She 
complained. They met several times, just had a chat.  
Q: What about the professionalism of the media at the time? 
A: That was exactly the question of Mega at the time. Was it the meaning of freedom of 
the press when there was no responsibility at all? Was there anything what the media had 
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been fighting for anymore? According to Mega after having a chat with Jakob, people 
like Jakob were also unhappy with the same thing. I did not know whether it was right or 
wrong, but it was something like that.  
So I don’t see any effort for improvement from her side. At least she started a 
tradition of press conference when she was going overseas about where we were going 
to, about what we should do, and so on; while in fact she had not had the tradition of 
making a press statement. Sometimes she only responded to one or two things about the 
interior, period. So, she started to be a source of information.  
The third one in the next development that in my opinion is very fundamental is 
the introduction of the thing called the embedded media. Wherever she went, the media 
were there too. It was a bit disappointing that the media were taken anywhere to the 
regions but there was no report about it. Then I reviewed it, and it was the fault of Mega’s 
team that followed her visits to the regions. Because, anywhere I talked with the media 
about the problem why there was no report, and they said that wherever we went the 
substance was still the same. So Mega herself was not aware that she took people with a 
duty to deliver what she wanted to say but in fact she always talked the same things. She 
imagined of being in front of different audiences and the same theme would not be 
irritating. Well, the failure was in the people around Mega. But this reflected the 
awareness that she had a problem in political communication and she tried to manage 
through several chains. But there were other things that were more personal that never 
happened but that was agreed. OK. Let’s now have breakfast / lunch with media people 
to enhance or to increase the frequency of meetings designed by big media editors, and 
we can do it with the next layers. We started with the closest friends. When all of this 
design was complete then the presidential term was over.  
Among the media, she was also respected as a person who never tried to limit the 
media but the media also complained that Mega often was very fond of complaining.  
So that was the relationship. Some sort like that. A relationship that was not fully 
in tune and sometimes was marked with suspicion and misunderstanding, but it never 
ended with sacrificing the freedom of the press.  
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Q: Was there any spokesperson? 
A: That was the thing she would not. Mega was a bit traumatic with the spokespersons of 
Gus Dur. So when Mega found that there were spokespersons that referred to the people 
who acted on behalf of Gus Dur, she was quite shocked. There was a very great 
discrepancy between what had been formulated and what was delivered. She did not want 
that such a thing happened again. That is why, she institutionally functioned the Ministry 
of Information. When the Minister did not function either, because he had his own 
agenda, then the duty was given to Bambang Kesowo (the Minister of the State). But 
because of the fact that Bambang Kesowo had a serious communication problem, then 
the problems were like in a series of chains.  
Q: Were there people like Pramono Anung (the Vice Secretary General of PDIP) who 
could be called the spokespersons? 
A: Not at all. He only delivered the result of PDIP meeting. But for the state, no one 
could be called the spokesperson of Mega. No use for that. I said to her to make 
clarification about some problems such as the fuel price hike to the media... but she said: 
No. Soon people would know. So the way of her thinking was too simple. Anything good 
would soon be known by the people and would still be good. She could never imagine 
that a good thing if it was not communicated in a good package could also be bad in the 
eyes of the public. She said that why we bothered if we had a good intention. In my heart 
I said that it was exactly the problem.  
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6. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, former spokeperson of the President B.J.Habibie, Jakarta, 
Augustus 30, 2005 
 
Question (Q): What were your duties as the spokesperson of the president?  
Answer (A): A spokesperson is like Andi Malarangeng.  In fact, structurally I was 
assigned as Assistant to the Vice President for Globalization affairs when Habibie was 
the Vice President.  That’s echelon one office.  Only for a short time Habibie took hold of 
vice presidency when Mr. Harto stepped down and Mr. Habibie became a president.  I 
was still in the vice president office for the Globalization affairs.  Before entering the vice 
president office I had had good relationship with many domestic and foreign mass media 
people, because in my capacity as a researcher they often asked for my opinion; I got 
acquainted with both domestic and foreign journalists.  So, when Mr. Habibie was 
assigned a president, I got so many telephone calls, requests from journalists, that knew 
me personally, whether it was possible for me to open an access to the president, so that 
president would be willing to be intervewed, etc.  Hence, I took an initiative to write a 
letter to Mr. Habibie; the State Secretary was Mr. Akbar Tanjung.  I wrote to Mr. Habibie 
the importance for the government (president) to explain to the public various things 
related to public interests, directly to the public, and also to international world so that 
they understand the measurements that the president was going to take.  
With that letter, Mr. Habibie then ordered Mr. Akbar Tanjung to ask me to 
arrange his relations with mass media.  So, this had nothing to do with my job because 
there had been mass media department, the press bureau, in the president’s residence.  It 
had been there since Mr. Harto era.  So, it was personal initiative.  Then, Mr. Habibie 
invited me, accompanied by Mr. Akbar Tanjung, although I knew Mr. Habibie very well 
and was quite close to him, but structurally I was Mr. Akbar Tanjung’s subordinate.  He 
told me, “Dewi, you arrange”… Then, I was asked to arrange the relations with media 
that intended to hold direct interview with Mr. Habibie (not media in general), so the 
requests from media to interview Mr. Habibie got to my desk.  Therefore, I arranged his 
schedule, such an interface between the president office and journalists who intended to 
interview directly.  The protocols of when to interview, etc., of course involved the press 
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bureau of the president office; they arranged the protocols, but usually I would ask the 
president adjutant of the president’s available time for interviews, etc. so that Mr. Habibie 
started to open for direct interviews with journalists.  At the beginning, it was hard to 
convince Mr. Habibie about this matter.  We know that Mr. Habibie was so open to 
journalists when he was the Minister of Research and Technology and he was open as 
well when he was the vice president but he initially was influenced by Mr. Harto 
managed such an issue.  Mr. Harto was not fond of making direct contact with journalists 
and even he told to be carefull to talk to journalists because they like twisting.  During the 
new order, president palace had such eerie image, didn’t it? It was not open at all to 
journalists and Mr. Harto would talk directly to the public through the so called 
Klompencapir groups namely the groups of listeners, readers and viewers.  Thus, his way 
of communicating was one way.  It was the Minister of Information or the State Secretary 
who talked to public.  Journalists could not approach the president.   Once I was involved 
in a debate with Mr. Habibie; he said the Mr. Harto told to be careful talking to 
journalists… it’s better not to talk directly to them.  I told him… “Mr, Habibie, during 
Mr. Harto time, everyone visiting the palace became president’s spokesperson.  They 
interpreted by themselves what they talked to the president.  Thus, a leader of a mass 
organization who just saw Mr. Harto got out and gave press conference, saying that Mr. 
Harto said so and so, whether it was true or not… we just couldn’t verify.  Now, that 
there are much misunderstanding and quite radical exchanges in our state matters, the 
leadership style in this democratic era… you are your own best spokesman… no ther 
spokesman better than the president himself.”   So, finally I succeeded in convincing him 
and such an arrangement was made.  He was pleased with that and even made long hours 
of interviews.  It was one.  
However, there was then another more fundamental policy that we know it was 
more appropriate with the philosophy of transitional government itself namely the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. President Habibie realized the importance 
of freedom of speech, the freedom of information, as the main pillar of a democratic 
nation. Since the beginning, as we know, the government embraced such a polich as 
giving freedom to press: no more telephoning culture, no more SIUPP, the Department of 
Information did not do such activities that did not give information but instead controlled 
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information.  When Mr. Yunus Yosfiah (the Minister of Information in Habibie era) gave 
the press freedom, it was the policy of the president, the policy of the cabinet.  Thus, 
since that time, we saw the efforts to catch up our falling behind in the field of press 
freedom. In fact, it was done quite systematically through Department of Information that 
finally released the control over the culture that emasculated press feedom and second, 
the president held direct communications with media.  In fact, there was an effort to do 
such transformation in the relations between the government and the society.  
Q: At that time (Habibie era) I saw it distinctively when Mr. Habibie talked to 
international press in English; something that was never done for tens of years. That 
looked like Mr. Habibie character but were there any other factors influencing such a 
thing, in addition to the initiative of Mrs. Dewi to be his own spokesman?  
A:  It was his character.  Mr. Habibie is a kind of person who likes talking, isn’t he?  
Even we found it difficult to limit his time when he was talking.  We convinced him that 
whether he talked directly or indirectly the information would flow out.  When there was 
no information, media would even create or search for the information informally, and it 
might not be verified.  Thus, when we convinced him that direct communication was 
valuable for the interest of his governance, and it was his obligation to tell public about 
his policies, the right of the society and international world to know what happens in 
Indonesia in order not to inflict misunderstanding, he was even very enthusiastic.  
Initially, it was my initiative but then Mr. Akbar Tanjung who in the old system 
(Soeharto) functioned as a spokesman, was elected as Golkar leader, he became so busy 
because the State Secretary had to manage Golkar at the same time, Mr. Akbar Tanjung 
issued his State Secretarial decree promoting me a spokesperson not to replace Mr. Akbar 
but to help him. And finally I was given an authority to talk in the name of the 
government.  Initially, from March to July 1998 I was the assistant to the vice president 
for globalization affairs.  From July 1998 to November 1999 I was the assistant to the 
State Secretary for foreign affairs.  I did many things related to the relations between 
Indonesia and the world outside through media.  I also coordinated with Department of 
Foreign Affairs, etc.  So, actually I did not have much time to become the spokesperson 
of the president but we knew it as well that requests for interviews were bountiful. Not 
many people are willing to fulfill the requests for direct interviews in English from media 
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in Indonesia because it is not easy to hold such an interview in CNN, BBC, ABC, 
moreover when it is done live… Many parties who have particular authority and capacity 
can answer such questions about what was happening.  I often had to sit for a debate with 
panelists, instead of the Minister of Foreign affairs who was more official doing it.  
Q: One of the greatest works of Mr. Habibie was Press Regulation.  How did the 
Regulation exit? Did Mr. Habibie have special team or committee, something like that?  
A: He did.  Under Mr. Habibie there were many councils, politcs and safety council, 
economy council, and there were many teams that he formed in an adhoc way.  There 
was even one team of civil society that always gave inputs. We knew it that Mr. Habibie 
is a type of hyperactive person and he was open to any parties.  In fact, the time was so 
limited that it was rather forced to make many regulations.  It was just like to chase after 
payment.  Fortunately, Mr. Muladi was there as a Minister of Justice as the right hand of 
the president to process legislations.  He was certainly played the most important role in 
addition to the State Secretary.  He was lucky enough to have people who had good 
capacities and were dedicated and understood the condition at that time that we were in 
transition time and the time was so short to prepare different regulations, to prepare 
transition, leading to a stable political system.  In terms of quality, there were so many 
regulations that need criticizing.  In fact, there were weaknesses but the spirit at that time 
was laying the foundation for a democratic country, which protects human rights, so the 
spirit was there.  And there was fear that if it was completed in such a short time, if there 
was new government, for example, and it turned to have quite strong political legitimacy, 
and quite strong authority, and did not turn out to be reformative, our fear was that we 
would step back.  So, this was a kind of window of opportunity that actually was narrow, 
reformative aspirations that was buried for 30 years, would be finished in relatively short 
time.  There was fear of the new president or the House of Representatives with complex 
reform commitment so that it would be difficult for them to make decisions so that they 
found it problematic to pass one regulation only, for example.  There was fear the reform 
would step back or be stagnant.  These difficult regulations were released immediately 
with so much imperfectness.  Repairing is easier than making the one ones.  The fear was 
logical because since 1999 until today there are only few regulations passed.  
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Q: How was the role of Mr. Yunus Yosfiah?  
A: Mr. Yunus Yosfiah was so reformative although he was a soldier.  He said it that 
although he was the minister of information, he would change fundamental paradigm of 
the government that used to be centralistic to become decentralistic, from an authoritarian 
government to a democratic one; from a government that considered the people had the 
obligation and the government had the rights, from the ever-right country to a pluralistic 
one.  Even we would like to develop a stronger community, but not a weaker country.  
Centers of policy making must be distributed.  This reform spirit was present and this was 
that people sometimes were not sure, did not believe, that the old people, the old stock, 
would be able to do it.  So, there were cynicism and other things.  That’s no problem 
because the history will see who are serious and who are not.  Why did the same person 
who did not take any actions in the authoritarian system suddenly was willing to 
(change)?  Didn’t he just intend to keep the power?  If he only intended to keep Mr. 
Habibie’s government or Mr. Habibie himself, he did not have to hold this total reform. 
He could do it through Golkar, through army, through the prevailing regulations and it 
was enough to stifle those turmoils but he did not do it.  He opened the press freedom and 
with the freedom he was striken by very free press everyday, but it did not matter for Mr. 
Habibie because he acknowledged it as his product.  He considered the freedom his own 
child so that it was legal to criticize him.  
Q: Was was the practice of press freedom after the regulation was released?  
A: On one hand, we saw that it had to be like that, on the other hand, we were sad and felt 
disappointed that our friends in NGO or mass media did not want or were not capable of 
judging not just the skin.  Thus, they kept looking Mr. Habibie and his government as the 
extension of the new order.  They did not see the efforts as genuine efforts, which really 
would do reform.  They just saw this as cosmetic changes, as merely a tactic to maintain 
power.  Whereas, if when think it logically, opening press (freedom) was the beginning 
of tight control of the government so that the government had to be self conscious.  We 
also felt sorry that press took its clear sidedness.  We can say the press enjoyed freedom 
in that there was no control from the government but the press was not free from 
primordial interest, sectoral interests.  Thus, we knew it that Kompas, for example, would 
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always report it this way and whatever good things the president did would be reported as 
something like the half-empty glass, instead of half-full glass because and would step on 
the government to raise other figures because it did not like Habibie.  Kompas was pro 
Megawati, you know it.  So were other newspapers.  Meanwhile, Republika, for example, 
was Mr. Habibie’s newspaper.  Therefore, the things that actually we had to criticize 
were not criticized because they felt to have to show sidedness.  There were plus and 
minus aspects and it was possibly difficult to avoid in a pluralistic, independent society 
and even though the newspapers were said to be free, they were not free from economic 
interest, not free from political interest, not free from social cultural interests of the 
readers, especially capital owners of each one.  In this case, therefore, we questioned: 
what was the press free from, because we also know it that in global scale the ones 
determining the editorials were the owners of the capital, economy interest, ideology of 
the owners determines so much.  To my opinion, that was better than the government 
determined what deserved reported and what did not.  If there were freedom and 
sufficient space for a competition, the society would be more critical.  And if the society 
could read the same information but interprete it differently, their critical power would be 
higher.  Which are acceptable and which are not.  I knew it well that Mr. Habibie was not 
disturbed with the reports in mass media, more of which were not amiable with him.  
Q: Did it show professionalism (level) of the media at that time?  
A: To my opinion, there were two problems.  First, being released from 30 years under 
control, there had to be euphoria and there was an expectation of not just free coverage 
but many of them wanted to make newspapers, tabloid, etc. while we know that tight 
control to media results in limited availability of profession journalists.  There was no 
opportunity to become professional journalists in Indonesia; they had to get it abroad.  
Those, who were in Indonesia, had to do tight self cencorship.  Thus, when the freedom 
existed, they suddenly felt free.  The limits between what was reasonable what what was 
not, therefore, sometimes was missing, tak an example about covering bot sides, check 
and recheck, trying to present as complete information as possible and not only basing on 
opinions, or reporting something unverified; that was not so good at that time because 
professionalism was not there yet.  By that time, government always controlled.  Second, 
when the number of the existing media was suddenly abundant, while the Human 
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Resource was limited, we saw so many amateur journalists, even the adventurers were 
involved in media either as owners or employees in media so that the quality of the media 
itself was not spread evenly; some were good as they were old players but some were so 
bad.  The third, quite high partisanship; the involvement of these parties either as capital 
owners or journalists had their own sidedness to certain figures.  It was even incomplete. 
Political orientation in a newspaper, for example, could be different between the editor’s 
and the journalists’ so that there was a competition in it.  It was not surprising, therefore, 
when we read certain news of which title was terrifying that seemed to blasphemy but 
actually the content was not.  It was possible that the journalists just wanted to report the 
news as it was but the editor who had different angle chose something (the title) different, 
whether it was pro or anti.  We often saw, for example, that most part of the analysis was 
rightist while the editor was leftist…. or vice versa, and it showed an ideology fight in the 
media itself or at least conflict of interest.   
Q: Was there any certain issue considered unfair in mass media reports?  
A: Yes, there was.  For example, the case of tapping the conversation between Mr. 
Habibie and Mr. Andi Ghalib… Such a case sometimes became media scandal. I do not 
recall the others but there were such scandals where the privacy limits were contravened. 
Q: What about electronic media, such as SCTV? 
A: I don’t’ think so.  SCTV was enjoying its popularity.  Different from printed media, 
television cannot create news because it bases on broadcast, based on quotations so that 
someone had to be responsible for what he broadcasted.  In printed media, there can be 
opinions from sources that can be trusted… We do not know clearly who the sources are. 
Of course, there are preferences, sidedness to the broadcasted news on television, but 
whatever the news they broadcast must be real, either based on interview, based on 
events they record, interview with the president, or interviews with famous figures.  
Thus, the freedom of the television to create just opinions is somewhat difficult because it 
had to be based on facts.  Meanwhile, in newspapers there are many analyses and also 
titles made by the persons; it is personal responsibility.  We often find contents that are 
different from the title, don’t we?  Or people who mad accusations but did not tell the 
sources.  We don’t find too many such a things on television although there are 
  
344
preferences, for example, but not in Indonesia. Take an example CNN.  CNN is fond of 
(Gulf) war the most.  So, the news on the conflict was reported repeatedly with the same 
pictures although the news has been out of date.  The news about Indonesia, for example; 
any news about Indonesia was accompanied with the pictures of the riots while the news 
was not about the riots.  It created opinions, didn’t it?  Was it done on purpose or because 
they didn’t have other pictures?  Or if you watch Fox News; when they talked about 
terrorists, they always broadcasted people who were praying in the mosque.  Then, what 
was the relationship between terrorists and the people who were praying.  Besides, that 
created an opinion that those people praying in the mosque were terrorists.  Thus, tv 
media play its role to create an image, but reports do not.  I saw it that SCTV was quite 
skillful to cover strategic and brave events; they got their place to compete RCTI with its 
Liputan 6.   Anyway, I do not recall the problems with SCTV. 
Q: So, was the relationship between the government (Mr. Habibie) and media relatively 
good?  
A: Yes, it was relatively good.  Eventhough they were so critical to Mr. Habibie’s 
government, they appricated government openness.  And you saw it that Mr. Yunus 
Yosfiah became a very popular figure with mass media.  
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7.  Erdy Taufik, a News Producer of SCTV, Jakarta, December 21, 2004 
 
Question (Q): How long have you been with SCTV? 
Answer (A): I joined with SCTV in October, 1994. After exactly for four years, I resigned 
on November 1, 1997, then I joined again in February 2004. So I have been for six years 
not with SCTV. At first I was a reporter (weekly) for the program Wakil Kita (Our 
Representatives), then my last position was as a producer. When I joined the TV again in 
2004, I became a producer again. 
Q: Did you spot any changes in the atmosphere between 1994 and 2004? What had been 
changing in SCTV? 
A: For sure the people had. Particularly for the period of 1994 – 1997, based on certain 
considerations, everyone had to be very cautious. In 1998, there was a courage to try a 
change but had to keep in the framework not cross the line to touch the Cendana 
(Soeharto)  family. This was directly dictated by the head of the editorial board based on 
an instruction given by the owner who was also a member of the Cendana family. The 
plant should not eat the fence. Isn’t that so? But what was interesting, was that we were 
challenged to be creative. It is just like an art that if you want to say something you 
cannot utter it to the point; you should take the long route and let the people (viewers) 
interpret it. But now if you want to talk about Miss Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, the 
eldest daughter of Soeharto) who was involved in the sales of Scorpion tanks, you can 
directly mention the name. If you spot the Armed Forces are involved, you can just 
mention it. No problem. But we had to seek for an advice to the chief editor. There was a 
censorship that was common at the time. 
Q: While in fact the Cendana family still holds some ownership, doesn’t it? 
A: Well, it is now hard to say. To say no, there are still games played, but not on the 
person’s name (a member of the Cendana family). But everyone knows that the person 
comes from the Cendana family. There was Sudwikatmono, now there is Henry Pribadi, a 
businessman linked to the same circle. 
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Q: Well, is there exactly any difference in the freedom of the press for the present time 
and the past? 
A: Now doubt about it. Very much different. To tell you the truth, if I have to self – 
introspect, the freedom is now too much that there is no more control. This is what I want 
to say, this is what I feel. The people feel too elevated to raise a case / an issue that they 
do not conduct any more check and balance. They directly write down everything, 
without any prior confirmation, without any checking whether it is true or not. When one 
gets some information from a source, then without the need for checking to other sources, 
the person just writes it down. While in fact the responsibility of a journalist is huge. 
Anything that is already presented / aired will be very difficult to make a correction. My 
own experience and also my friends’ shows that there has been no problem in anything 
we have aired for these 8 – 10 months since February 2004.   
Q: So it means that there has been some control from the inside though there is no….? 
A: I don’t see any control from the authority. The most only comes from the owner, but it 
is not also very severe. Just for instance, yesterday one of the commissioners joined the 
launching of a book about the Armed Forces (TNI) and the he requested that it be aired. I 
think if it is considered as crossing the line, it can still be acceptable. The person was 
happened to be there, and he just asked to be shot with the camera and aired in the TV … 
We did not mention his name. He just asked to be included in the news because he was 
invited to join the launching of the book by the Army School of Command (SESKOAD). 
Q: Does the person have any relationship with the owners / the military? 
A: He is just an ordinary person, but perhaps he is close with the owners. In the past, 
when the military was in a very great power, one would feel very proud if his / her event 
was joined by a general and he / she was there. I think there must be some bias. I don’t 
know the deeper relationship that may exist, but a businessperson may think that it is 
much safer if he / she is close with a soldier of the general ranks. If anything happens, 
one would feel much safer, because no one would dare to annoy him / her. Such notion 
may never vanish. In the past, one was very proud when there was a photograph of a 
soldier, though only a corporal, but the person was still proud about it. But he / she could 
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still be robbed, couldn’t he? It is something that is very personal in nature. I don’t know 
how deep the relationship is. But I see it can be found everywhere. You can also find 
such a thing in the station. If one just seeks for praise, it is OK. The problem is when 
there is an instruction not to air this. Well, it is a real problem. 
Q: So, is self – censorship still there or not? 
A: I would see it this way. I happen to be a producer. I have to see the news written down 
by a reporter until it is worked on by the editor. A producer is responsible for the 
broadcasting. When there is something I consider not so convincing, I would check the 
matter first to the editor. For instance the case of Bank Global. The issue is perhaps very 
racial in nature (Chinese ethnicity). If we mention the ethnicity, we can be accused of 
being influencing something. I have to check it first to the editor whether this is true or 
not, who the source is, whether it came from the Bank of Indonesia or some source else. 
It would be really dangerous if we are not accurate. This is not because of self – 
censorship. But perhaps, for some colleagues the reason behind is self – censorship, 
because they are the products of the New Order. They became journalists when the New 
Order was still in power, and they have been accustomed with such a system. And it does 
influence. But it will be too bad if you are too cautious or if such a self – censorship is 
too much. I have a friend, named Totok Suryanto. He was with a newspaper named 
Surabaya Post; then he moved to the paper Sinar that was closed with the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, now TNI, Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia). At the time, a journalist who was often assigned to work in the 
headquarters of the Armed Forces would feel that he / she was the great one, because he / 
she could see everything. Now, after the era of the New Order, he is takes a too much self 
– censorship, perhaps much more than the Armed Forces themselves. So the person was 
shaped and trapped in such a system. Another example is the case of Scorpion tanks. We 
don’t want to take a biased position what it was made an issue in the Dot.Com and 
Tempo. At the time we held a discussion in the editorial meeting. We saw that they did 
not haphazardly write down that way. Then suddenly we seemed to be in their favor. In 
my opinion, we have to check the matter first. We should not judge first whether this is 
right or wrong. So we have to check it, because the source is perhaps some certain figure. 
Such an attitude would be much better then if we immediately say ‘you have to be careful 
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…’ You can find such an attitude, that is why I say that we have to have a certain position 
… because we have been accustomed with what happened in the past system.  
Q: Well, what do you mean with freedom of the press then? 
A:  In my opinion, perhaps also because of my experience with NGOs, if I see a fact, then 
what I do is how to make the fact known by the public. But I am also responsible whether 
it is a real fact or not. A fact according to my own version. If I present a fact, then what I 
mean with the freedom of the press is the freedom for me to get information then I study 
the information and if feel some doubt in it I would check the matter first. Then what I 
mean with the freedom of the press is whether this fact is true or not. That is what I will 
write down, that is what I will present to the audience. So, if I say that Tutut is involved 
in the case of Scorpion tanks, I cannot say take it for granted, though in fact there can be 
some bias when what I quote is not right. So, in simple, it means how I can write it down 
and make it as accurate as possible. There should be nobody that is sacrificed and there 
should be the one who is responsible for it. In my opinion, that is the most appropriate 
attitude. So, people would not think that I have to write like this or like that haphazardly 
without any consideration about the possibility of anybody who would be in an 
unfavorable position because of it, while the fact is not really like that and that I never 
pay any attention to it. The consideration is not self – censorship but what will happen 
then when it is found that she (Tutut) is not involved in the case while in fact we have 
broadcasted that way. 
If I routinely follow the atmosphere after the New Order, I can say that in the past there 
was something like ‘not to be aired’ or ‘not to be broadcasted’, and then now everything 
is possible. Then we have to find the meaning of the freedom. Does it only mean that we 
can say that Mr. or Mrs. A is a corruptor but we cannot point out in what case the 
corruption is? Now we can see a lot in the media that say that Mr. or Mrs. A is a 
corruptor but the media cannot say in what case the corruption is. I don’t see that what 
have been happening in the station (SCTV), but what I can see here is that a news item is 
discussed first in an editorial meeting to see how far this item can be made a news item, 
then we have to process it to make it just a news item according to someone but it can be 
considered a good one after checking whether the fact is really accurate or not. But in fact 
  
349
the information can be anything in the field. But when that piece of information comes to 
the office (SCTV) and it is discussed in an editorial meeting, it is often that … So if we 
turn back to the case of the involvement of Mrs. Tutut in the Scorpion tank case, someone 
has to check about it first to find out who is really involved. If someone from the Armed 
Forces is involved then we have to check it first to the Armed Forces. If there is no such a 
fact then we can say, ‘put it off for a while’, because it is about the reputation of 
somebody. We need an explanation from the authorized person whatever the person 
would say; we have to really cover both sides. We cannot just accept something as a fact.  
Q: So, do you mean that in this organization there are efforts at any level of the media 
workers to be professional? 
A: The chief editor in an editorial meeting often takes such an attitude. So one should not 
just accept some piece of news and just protect somebody. If you raise an issue, are you 
completely sure that the person in the issue does the thing? If you are not so sure, then 
check about it first until you are sure. If you yourself are not sure then how can the public 
be sure about it? This not a debate, but the discussion often goes that way. And the 
guidelines are like that. Never ever write down anything if you are not yet sure about it 
…  
Q: Is there any a kind of code of ethics? 
A: Please check to Mr. Iskandar (the Research and Development Department of SCTV). 
We have an ISO, I don’t remember from what year it is, but I have never seen it, because 
perhaps I am often assigned a job at night, but I am sure that Mr. Iskandar has the stuff. 
There are some rules applied here at SCTV. But too bad the I have never had; I think 
there should be some guideline book; well… something like the blueprint of Liputan 6. 
Perhaps most of my job is at night, and I never ask about it then I don’t have it. 
Q: If it is, then it should be given. If is not, then how to take a control, say about that one 
has to cover both sides. Is it left to the persons themselves? 
A: It depends on the attitude of the person who is involved in the journalistic world. If I 
can see, whether you are aware or not, there must be some norms, some morality, a kind 
of integrity in the profession. Though I may in fact never have it, but such a thing has 
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become a standard for a journalist, a true professional journalist. When there is something 
unfair, unjust, we don’t want to force to sell something, to present it to the audience. 
Q: In the recruitment interview, are there any standard questions about what should be 
met by a journalist? 
A: When I joined for the first time in 1994, there was not, but when I joined again, I 
didn’t know because I knew the interviewer. Mr. Iskandar (the Research and 
Development Department) also knew me. Mr. Don Bosco Salamun also knew me. The 
new person was on Mr. Karni Ilyas … But let me put it this way, at least I learn from the 
media that can be considered good in how a news item can be considered as fulfilling 
journalistic requirements. But this is an interesting question, whether or not there is a 
media organization that applies such a standard or all standards. 
Q: The question is how to build such professionalism. Are there guidelines, even are 
there the vision and mission? 
A: Well that what happened when I re –joined in 2004. I learned a lot more about what 
school is followed. If I observe during the meetings, when news budgeting is being 
discussed, then there are often arguments about cases that require a high level of 
accuracy. That way we go through the process.  
Q: Is there anyone with a dominant role such a meeting? 
A: I think it is quite normal if there is someone who is more dominant than the rest 
because the person is considered as the one who knows better and there is no argument to 
say that it is wrong. Except when there is some controversial news, then it is debatable, I 
can have my own opinion, and I can express what I think. So a news item is not always 
like what the owner wants, or the boss wants. It is already our joint responsibility, that is 
why we discuss it in the meeting.  
Q: I think it is quite normal if there is someone who is more dominant than the rest 
because the person is considered as the one who knows better and there is no argument to 
say that it is wrong. Except when there is some controversial news, then it is debatable, I 
can have my own opinion, and I can express what I think. So a news item is not always 
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like what the owner wants, or the boss wants. It is already our joint responsibility, that is 
why we discuss it in the meeting.  
A: Yes, because then the news item is no more a personal responsibility.  
Q: Can you tell me the atmosphere of such a meeting? What about the process? 
A: We start with a list of some news items; say we talk about the evening news. The 
evening news item number one is this, number two is that, and so on. Then it is 
questioned what kind of content is there. Then the editor whose his / her persons were 
sent to the field will speak up. If I have an opinion, then I can also speak up that this 
should be changed like this or that because I read in dot.com or in other sources not like 
that. There must be something that is not solid yet. For instance, the case of Bank Global 
gets a rating as A minus. The question is there must be something wrong about our bank 
rating system. A bank that has come into bankruptcy and has been shut down in its 
operation can still get an A minus rating. When we want to raise this issue, are we going 
to present the news item like this? Of course we have to make it clear whether there is 
any information from the Bank of Indonesia or not. If there is, then why such a bank can 
still get an A minus rating? Then I say, it would be better if there is an official statement 
from the Bank of Indonesia or the Bapepam (the stock market supervising body), because 
they are the authority to provide information to the rating institution. Then if the rating 
institution gives an explanation why Bank Global still gets an A minus, this is already an 
interesting news item. 
Q: Are there any problems concerning accuracy, imbalance? 
A: To tell you the truth, I have to admit that in the case of Buyat (an environment 
pollution case that is suspected to be conducted by a big American company, PT 
Newmont), the issue was getting down in the midst of other issues, such as there was 
suddenly a demonstration against the fuel price increase, about the congress of NU, about 
the congress of Golkar, about the arrest of Sujono Timan, and so on. This is a business 
that is related with the coverage of other stations. In fact the Buyat case is decreasing in 
its rating. Then a case that should be solved is often put aside. Somehow or other, we 
have to also see what our competitors are doing, what issues are they raising, and what 
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issues get the good rating. We cannot only just show our empathy to Buyat people who 
are suffering from the waste materials. Moreover when the information does not come 
from the main source, for instance when the Police headquarter explains about its 
investigation on the board of directors of PT Newmont. If there is no issue about Bank 
Global, perhaps we can raise again the case of Buyat, because the case of Bank Global is 
the one that is being on the main stage. That is the way things are going. Another 
problem is for example the inaccuracy of names. Though in fact this case is very 
technical but this is not less important. For instance, the title of the source. There can 
happen that we mention a Brigadier General while in fact a Lieutenant General. Other 
inaccuracies about names can also happen, and such a thing should in fact need not to 
happen. This can be the mistake of the reporter. So, when there is a news item from the 
person, we always ask to be rechecked again. We have to be very careful in editing news; 
we have to avoid making mistakes. 
Q: Back to the past, was there any close relationship with the government or even the 
other way around? 
A: In the past, we seemed to just accept anything. There was an attitude to be risk 
aversion. In the past, if you made mistakes then you were dead.  So when there was 
something dangerous threatening us, moreover the threat of loosing our jobs, then we had 
to play safe. Because, we all knew to where everything was going. Everything was going 
to Cendana. Whether it was about agriculture, mining, or even about education. Then 
eventually we had to take the attitude to just let it go. The most we could reach was if 
there were some colleagues who took a critical attitude, then we only wrote down the 
peripheral things, for instance about the system of education, about mandatory schooling, 
etc; without mentioning something that was wrong. For instance, about the mandatory 
schooling, we wrote that there were people who found difficulties to get enrolled in 
elementary schools. That is the most we can do. Just let other people take their own 
interpretation. So we gave more emphasis on the interpretation not the real fact that we 
raised up. 
Q: Was there any unfriendly relationship with the government? 
A: Well, we had to have a good relationship with the government.  
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Q: So it is quite different from now, isn’t it? 
A: For instance, the case about Sarwono Kusumaatmadja in 1998. That was our trick to 
get through, just to make us not afraid with everything. It was only people like Sarwono 
who were still willing to talk. At the time it was even the owner who was in fact making 
us afraid.  And at the time the owner was so powerful. There was a discussion before the 
program was being aired. The owner would never think about Liputan 6 in comparison 
with his huge business. At the time the owner was really powerful. So, if Liputan 6 
should be drowned, just let it. The pressure was so heavy because there were other 
businesses, because there were those people (Mr. Sudwikatmono, Peter F. Gontha, Henry 
Pribadi, and other guys). They had a really strong pressure to Liputan 6. They did not 
want to take a risk to jeopardize their businesses, just only because of Liputan 6. 
Q: But no more problems recently … for instance with the military? 
A: No, even with the military, even for the fatal issue. As far as I can remember, nothing. 
I don’t know if the problem only reach the editor in chief or the vice editor in chief. But 
so far there has been none in the editorial meetings, even the mistakes or the things that 
the military don’t like. That’s why we often accommodate them. For example when they 
have a parade, then we air the news item, but even so only from the interesting visual 
perspective. Well, this is the character of television, its visual. A military parade is 
interesting for most people though from the news perspective it is not. The most is just 
like that and please broadcast it. That is more or less like the launching of the book. Not 
something very special, it is only just because a commissioner of the company was there. 
Well, it is something like seeking a face. Then we say: why we don’t want to give just 
one minute for a 30 minute program? We have to tolerate something, don’t we? But there 
is no more restriction about the things that should not be aired. 
Q: So the government has not been taking any measure, both in the eras of Gus Dur 
(Aburrahman Wahid) and Megawati, including the interview with Megawati where she 
looked very emotional?  
A: There has been nothing happening, even when we aired about the business of Gus 
Dur, about the business of the son in law of Megawati. The interesting one about the 
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interview was the protest from the viewers: Why did you ask such a question that a 
president got mad? There have often been things like that. There was also an experience 
of Rossi (Rosiana Silalahi) who made Gus Dur a close friend by addressing, ‘Hi Gus, 
how are you doing?’ We were protested by a viewer. While according to my context, a 
presenter / an anchor can make a source more familiar. Because, from a theoretical point 
of view, if we can be close with the source, then we can dig all of the information. But 
after that a lot of protests … why did you make a Gus Dur a friend for a person like you? 
Such a thing often happens. Also when a Rossi was bombarding Amien Rais with 
questions that made him in a bad position, there were people who got mad. Such a thing 
may have never happened before. But the respected institution of MPR (the General 
Assembly where Amien Rais was the chairman) did not show any objection about it.  
Q: Are there still any invitation from the government, from the military headquarter, that 
often used to summon the chief editors? 
A: I don’t know. If there is, the most is that a reporter who will come. Then the reporter 
would report to the editorial meeting, but there is no restriction from the military. 
Q: What about the cases of Aceh (special treatment for journalists reporting Aceh that is 
in a military / civilian emergency status)? 
A: I read about it, but I have not met with the person (Dhandy Laksono). I read that 
Liputan 6 was considered wrong and the person was sacrificed. What I heard is that 
Dhandy interviewed a figure of GAM (Aceh Liberation Movement) and the military was 
upset. They felt embarrassed by SCTV, why the station could meet a figure of GAM, 
while in fact the military could not. That is what I heard. The military was upset, that is 
true. But I don’t know whether the reporter has been ‘worked on’ by the Local Military 
Command (Pangdam) or not. But as far as I know, there has been no problem so far. For 
instance when we aired about the military soldiers shot by the GAM. Also about the 
quarrel between the Special Police Task Force (Brimob) with the military. There was no 
problem when we aired about it. Back to the case of Dhandy, it seemed that the military 
felt embarrassed and then Dhandy was sacrificed.  
Q: Do you have any experience with the KPI? 
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A: Well, this is my personal opinion. The concern is that KPI would replace the existence 
of Deppen (the former Ministry of Information). I hope that the KPI is like the Press 
Council, not to judge but to help, to open itself, because the KPI consists of independent 
people who are not involved in the stations as commissioners. I think if the KPI is like the 
Press Council, it will be good. It should first take a control first whether what is aired has 
an impact or not. It would be much better than if it suddenly says that this program is not 
good without any prior discussion. For instance for the news about murder. The KPI said 
that the visual was showing blood everywhere. For us, when we air a news item on 
murder but without a dead body, then there is no murder. For instance, when the news 
item is about a murder, but the visual is just showing people gathering. Well, it would be 
wrong from an audiovisual point of view. When we are talking about a murder, then there 
should be a dead body. But we have to improve the way we present the dead body, not 
that we must not present the visual of a dead body. As long as we can make a trick with 
mosaic, for instance, we can still present the visual. But the infotainment programs that 
have no relationship at all with Liputan 6, just show gossips. 
Q: To conclude this conversation, in your opinion what kind of press system that would 
be appropriate for the present time while in fact we also have the former one? Which one 
would be the most appropriate? 
A: Appropriate in this way. Let the press go but there should be a KPI. Let us air a news 
item that meets the journalistic standards but never let any body to say ‘stop’ because we 
are wrong. Because, no one is perfect. If there is some carelessness, we cannot just stop 
it. Because when we recruit someone to be a reporter, we cannot know whether the 
person has a conscience or not, whether the person is a terrorist or not. We cannot guess. 
So, it would be better if the KPI discuss first with the chief editor. It is much easier for 
KPI to talk with the chief editor. It is the job of a chief editor, more to the outside than to 
the inside. There they can discuss about what is said by the KPI that though the programs 
of SCTV are vulgar though in fact the programs won the awards of Panasonic. Well, that 
will be much better, because we given the room to talk; because there can be arguments. 
Then there can be some measures saying the minimum when showing blood everywhere 
is not ethical. This can be better accepted then if the KPI tried to replace the position of 
Deppen. Because, one becomes a reporter not because of that the person could not get a 
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job in other places. There are also some people who only work for some years then they 
resign because they cannot follow the way of the job. 
Q: So what is the  system of the press now?  
A: Well, perhaps it is because of the influence of my background, that I dare to say that 
the system of the press is starting to give room for the public. A press with concern. 
When there are news items about protest against the fuel price increase, about the cheap 
labor wage, about a garbage dumping site that is not welcomed by the nearby people, I 
think now it can raise the issue, that perhaps in the pas was not that easy now. There is a 
meaning of concern and it depends on the press itself whether it just wants to sell visuals 
or there is another vision to give room for those people who have been deprived from 
their own rights whom we are now helping by channeling their protest. There are Buyat 
people who have been cornered and who utter their problems and now we raise the issue 
without too much concern about what the Minister is going to say that if we condemn the 
Newmont people then this will bother the investment. I think there is now some room, 
there is no more feeling that if do like that an investor would take back their interest. No 
more thought like that. I am happy with the press system. Never let happen anything that 
makes the public space narrower. We have a live broadcasting of the Golkar congress, 
but we also have a live broadcasting of the quarrels of Gus Dur. Any level of the society 
has the same portion, and it deserves being published to the public. 
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8. Iskandar Siahaan, a Journalist and  Head of the Research and Development 
Department of SCTV, Jakarta, January 31, 2005 
Q: Is there any research in this department (R & D) on the profile or polling to show the 
position of SCTV in the eyes of the public? In other words, how to detect the opinions of 
the people? 
A: In fact we subscribe weekly data on the audience from AC Nielsen. Every Wednesday 
he sends us the data on the number of audience for every program and it reflects the 
rating of each program per week. Such an example like this (showing the data from AC 
Nielsen) is available every Wednesday. This is the rating, and this is the share that shows 
the number of audience. One point means that the rating is around 330,000. While the 
share is taken from the real number of audience at the spot. For example, at 9:13 – 9:45 
on Monday, the real audience of Derap Hukum on the particular day was 12.3% of the 
real number of people who were watching the television. While the rating comes from the 
projected population of TV owners who do not in fact watch the TV. For example, say 
the total population is 220 million people and there are 100 million TV viewers, but that’s 
not the real number of people who turn on the TV; while share comes from the real TV 
viewers. The number of real TV viewers changes every week in line with their tastes and 
in line with the current issues. For example if you read the newspapers today or 
yesterday, or if you watch the TV today (the news on Aceh), the number of audience 
shows an increase just like when the Iraqi war broke. This is to find out the perception of 
the people on us / SCTV. The perception is in the sense that whether they watch us or 
not. In addition, we regularly conduct a survey in the cities used by AC Nielsen as the 
rating city samples. The survey is much deeper on their watching habits, their 
expectations, their tastes, and so on. Such a survey was conducted in 2001 or 2002, I 
don’t remember exactly. 
Q: What kind of result did you get? 
A: (Showing the survey by AC Nielsen), we place an order to them but what we want to 
see depends on our request. For instance, whether the people like the Dialog program 
during the daily news or not. Which presenter do they like best? Which segments do they 
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like most? Then it shows that sport news is much preferred, and criminal news shows this 
result. That’s the way to find out their tastes. 
Q: In general, what do you find out? Which one is at the first rank? 
A: In 2001, we (SCTV) were number one for news. This can also be compared with the 
Panasonic Awards. Though in fact, it was a combination between the active audience 
sending their choices and the surveys by certain institutions. For three consecutive years, 
i.e. in 2004, 2003, and 2002, Liputan 6 has been in the first rank. They were in 
cooperation with the Tabloid Citra. You can see their methodology. 
Q: That’s for news, isn’t it? What issues are there? For instance political issues? 
A: The image on us has been more to a political TV station. The political content of news 
is much higher than the economic ones. So, in the eyes of the audience, when they want 
to see political news, they turn to SCTV. So we have been more inclined to that side. This 
has been the case since the start of Liputan 6 up to now; and we do not dare to change 
from political to economic news, or to give a larger portion to international news. So 
when there are important political issues, for example replacement of a minister, 
replacement of the  president, certain political policies, and so on, people tend to prefer 
SCTV. 
Q: Are there any particular segments in political issues, the government for instance? 
A: We do not cut it into segments but we distribute. For instance, the total program is 30 
minutes, and it means there are 4 segments / durations. The political issues may exist in 
segments one, two, three, and four. So in average there are six minutes per segment.  The 
first six minutes may all be filled with political issues, but it may also be filled with 
economic news when it is considered important, for instance the issue on fuel price 
increase. But political issues are the more dominant ones. And those political issues can 
be anything. It can be about politics in the Parliament, the government, NGO, political 
parties, and so on. Then in segment two, it is possible to find such an issue again. But 
when there is no important political news in segment two, we can also fill the segment 
with only one political news item, and the rest is divided into economic, international, 
and other issues. There is no strict formula.  
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Q: In the book, ‘Revolusi Mei’, it was shown how SCTV at the time was the only media 
institution that was bold to put forward the ideas that perhaps had never been put to the 
surface such as the increase of fuel price.  So how did such a political character come into 
existence? Was it based on the vision or mission, for instance? 
A: Based on experience, I have been with SCTV right from the start, the daily news – 
even there was only weekly news, prior to the daily news --  has  come into existence not 
by design, but more as the result of the development in the society. Early in 96, we were 
still searching from scratch. In the beginning, the character or the identity was not yet 
reflected. So the May Event (98) up to now (99 and so on) has been asserting that we 
have to give a priority to political issues, more dominantly than other issues. So it is not 
quite appropriate if it is connected to vision and mission. The vision and mission of the 
corporate is general in nature, for instance to be the number one TV station, the vision to 
educate the people which is then translated to the news division as to be the number one 
in news. So how do you call it? By accident or what? It has been the struggle of the 
people inside. You may call it by process. 
Q: Then has it been captured and maintained as a kind of identity to be kept? 
A: Yes, but it has not become a written precept, but it has been in the mind of the media 
practitioners here, both the reporters and the people at all levels when they are discussing 
the preferred topics in the editorial meeting. The discussion on political issues is more 
dominant than other issues, such as cultural issues, economic issues, and so on. It is a 
kind of culture, perhaps, or a kind corporate culture in news.  
Q: But it has never been written, specialized, and specified? 
A: No. Now it even becomes very strange if one puts an economic news item at the first 
headline. No. It would be uncommon. The first one must be political news. It has been 
the character. It has not been written down but it has become the way of thinking and 
doing of the people at SCTV. It can be seen from the editorial meeting.  
Q: What about at the corporate level? 
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A: There has been no comment about it. For them as long as we are still the number one, 
whatever we choose they will agree, because they seem to be apolitical in nature. I don’t 
know why. There was no intervention by the owner, even before May 98, to direct or to 
ask to take news as the priority. Perhaps they do not know that it can be made the 
bargaining power. There has been not much discussion on that matter among the owners. 
Q: Then who directs (the option to political news)? 
A: Like what I said, it is has been by process. In fact there have been some changes in the 
editorial board. Since we were established there have been three chief editors. The first 
one was Sumita Tobing who also wrote the book ‘Revolusi Mei’. Then followed Jeffry 
Naldi. And now it is Karni Ilyas. The one who has been directing may not be the editor in 
chief, because it is the medium level and the producers and the editorial board who direct.  
Q: At the medium level, which one is more dominant? 
A: It has always been changing over time. I would suggest that you join an editorial 
meeting to see the real situation, because everyone is dominant. So no one can say that I 
am the one who gives the color. The producers have also been changing over time, don’t 
they? At a time one is the producer for a daily program then he / she moves to a special 
program. Then moves again. So the producers can not be considered as the dominant 
ones, because they also keep changing. 
Q: But it should still be elaborated whether there are other variables that have made 
SCTV have a political character in the midst of other issues such as economic issues, 
entertainment, and so on. 
A: But it is very clear that the momentum of May 98 has a significant influence on the 
next following steps. We are the one who took the momentum, so I would call it very 
weird if want to change the character and to put aside political issues. So the atmosphere 
has been like that. But to tell you the truth, before May 98 we were still searching from 
scratch. Because we did take the momentum and we have been thinking to be the number 
one in news, then people would tend to think that way.  
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Q: Back to professionalism, would it be a kind standard to measure and to find out the 
performance of the people in SCTV? What are they? What values should be owned and 
followed by the people here? 
A: In fact there are two questions. There are technical standards to be followed. For 
instance, for a program to be aired at 10 P.M, the program should have been completed 
some hours earlier. For instance at what time it should have come into the editing room. 
Then the other question is about the standard values. Since this is about news, then facts 
should be made sacred. Honesty must not distort the obtained facts. There should be a 
balance and neutrality. This has been available in the code of ethical conduct but it is 
partially regulated in the standards. How to treat a source of news can be read in the code 
of ethical conduct. But as I said, we cannot do precisely by the book but because it has 
become a part of us, only then we write it down. We do not have to refer to it, but if often 
that the procedures themselves have been incorporated to us. We honestly need an ISO 
for the purpose of the company to sell its stocks to foreign investors. Such a standard is a 
kind of corporate label, an international standard. So here in my name card you can find 
the label. Then the parties who want to buy the products of SCTV have already known 
that the products of SCTV, particularly news products, all have been made following the 
standards. With such a standard we do not need to worry about the deviation of the 
quality. Even when people change, but the quality is still the same because it has been 
done following a certain procedure or standard. 
Q: Well, that’s the detailed part. What about a general code of ethical and to whom it is 
educated? 
A: Normally when someone joins the company, he / she is trained for three weeks here. 
This is training about code of journalistic ethical conduct. That is what we educate here. I 
happen to be one of the trainers. Then when the person is already at work, we educate the 
ISO. Later, if there is any problem we can discuss. For instance, why is the news we see 
not well balanced? How come such news is released? For instance, when the visual is 
exaggerating. Why do we still air the visual of rotten dead bodies in Aceh on the fourth or 
fifth day as if we do not have a sense of humanity, without considering the effect to the 
families of the victims? For one or two days, the viewers may still be able to tolerate… 
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but for the next days, for what purpose do we still air such a picture? Do we want to 
exploit those dead bodies just like dead fishes in the river? So, this is still in process, but 
in principle, the code ethic is about how we respect the humanity of human beings. Do 
not treat human bodies like animals. A cow or lamb that is stripped into pieces and 
hanged in the market is OK, but we should treat differently to human beings, though if 
seen just as a corpse they are all alike but how important it is to respect the humanity 
side. Just another example, the news about housewives whose houses are bulldozed in 
Jakarta. Then comes up in the news an impression that we are with those weak people but 
at the same time we justify the bulldozing by thinking in the sense that they in fact live on 
an illegal piece of land. That is the problem we have to discuss. The reporters may think 
that those people are legally wrong, but are not they just the victims of urban 
development that is never in their favor? Why do they live on the illegal land? If the fact 
is like that, how do we present the report? There should be found another perspective not 
to treat them as outlaws. Some of them are just the victims of public policies taken by the 
government. And we are now planning to write down such a thing in what we call it a 
Code of Conduct. We are still in the process of doing it and we have not completed it yet. 
This CC will later be more detailed than the Code of Ethics. This is the Code of Ethics 
(attached). We find here the Code of Ethics from the Association of Indonesian Private 
Television Stations (ATVSI, Asosiasi Televisi Swasta Indonesia). Here is the Code of 
Ethics of Indonesian Journalist. This is the code ethics issued by the television company 
for all programs while that is for news program. This is given to those who have been 
recruited here. 
Q: Have you ever got a complaint from the audience? 
A: Yes, we have. A lot in fact. We provide an email address for the audience, and there 
are a lot of complaints from the audience saying that we have not been in balance for 
political news, for instance when we are too tended to a certain candidate. Also about 
criminal news that may incite the impression that we (SCTV) tend to corner the suspect 
and do not trust the police that much. We should be in balance, we should cover both 
sides. Well, a lot, aren’t they? 
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Q: Also from the Indonesian Commission on Broadcasting (KPI, Komisi Penyiaran 
Indonesia)? 
A: From KPI only some criticism on entertainment programs, but not news. They trust 
news more because news programs are worked on by those people with a code of ethics. 
They only question about the programs that are much related with ghosts, superstition, 
and some violence, but such a criticism is directed to all TV stations. So it gives an 
impression that it is only about entertainment not news program that they are questioning 
and such a criticism is directly pointed to the producer of the programs. The second point 
is that the KPI has not yet been acknowledged by the Association (ATVSI); that is why 
their criticism has always been put aside. According to the law, the KPI has not yet the 
authority to do that. The KPI has also issued a Guideline of Conduct that has been 
effective since last month, but the Association (ATVSI) still considers that any criticism 
from the KPI does not deserve an attention. It is themselves (the TV itself) that should be 
paid an attention. But any input from the public through email is always discussed in the 
editorial meeting. I don’t know in other stations. But I think in the next periods to come, 
this KPI will be much more pushy because of the support by the government. Now the 
government has not yet given the support. The government looks to be on the investors’ 
side. The way of doing things by KPI has not been fair so far. For instance, they release 
criticisms but without first send the criticisms to the television stations and only after the 
television stations give their answering right that they release the criticisms. So, KPI has 
been only one sided. The KPI thinks that it has become a god. Anything they find is 
directly released to the press while in fact they are often inaccurate about things. That is 
why they are loosing their authoritativeness. The KPI does not work professionally. Just 
for instance during the campaign, they said that the Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI) 
had violated the campaign rule because the station had aired a certain program … but it 
was found that after a check to the TPI, in fact the TPI had never aired the program. It 
seems that the KPI does not have any record. That is why the KPI starts doing weird 
things. That is why the television stations do not respect the KPI. So there is no enough 
support for them. The guidelines they issued are in fact good enough, very detailed for 
television stations, but just right from the start the television stations have not been 
positive to it and the KPI does not look like to build a communication. Most of them are 
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activists, campus people, more or less like those in the early reformation age when 
Soeharto was dropped down. They consider themselves as road activists and they do not 
want to sit to talk. Then up to now the communication is still blocked. They are still in 
the euphoria, while the power of capital is much stronger than the power of the state. 
When an investor or a capital owner talks, the state can be influenced. So it is much 
better for them to lobby to the House of Representatives to bribe the authorities, to bribe 
the government. For the government, this KPI is only a money consuming organization. 
The KPI should be first low profiled, should build a communication first, should talk 
together about things … and should never accuse the televisions in the first place. 
Formulate together. Do not think that they are the only right one. Who knows that the 
television stations can donate some funds for the operations of the KPI. If they do not 
have any record, what can they see? Who knows that they would call the television 
stations to borrow a record. 
Q: Do we really need an institution to monitor the television? 
A: Yes we do. Such an institution is very important, because we ourselves may be caught 
in the influence of a routine. If there is no input from outside that can tell us whether 
what we have done is right or wrong, it can be a problem. We often do not think about it. 
While in fact they may be just little things but they can also little by little jeopardize the 
development of thoughts among the public. Such a thing is very important for us, but it 
should be communicated not like the police do. They think that the television people do 
not have values to follow. Such an impression we get about them (the KPI), who think 
that they are the only right ones, while on the other hand we know how they do. 
Q: Perhaps they have not established their credibility? 
A: I can admit the credibility of the people. But what about the credibility of the 
institution? They have good education. But too bad, the way they do is very bad, perhaps 
because there is no facility for them. And such a gargantuan work cannot be treated just 
as a side job in addition to their campus works. With a decent salary they can work full 
time there with good monitoring facilities and supporting staff. Only then they can be 
good, can be authoritative in talking like the Television Commissions in France, Canada, 
or England. They are even authorized to repeal the license for stations.  
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9.  Leo Sabam Batubara, an activist of Indonesian Broadcasting and Press Society, 
secretary of Press Worker Association,   member of  Press Council term 2001-2003, 
Jakarta, February 11, 2005 
 
Q: What was your involvement in the preparation process of the draft of Press Act no. 40 
of the year 1999? 
A: To tell you the truth, I am now writing a 300 page book. It is almost finished. One of 
the chapters has it title ‘Fighting for the Freedom of the Press’. It is between pages 4 and 
17 (attachment of this interview). You can find the detailed answer, but more or less is 
like the following. Some months after Soeharto was forced to step down and replaced by 
Habibie, we gathered at the Hotel Media Sheraton on October 14 – 15 on the initiative of 
the Association of Press Publishers (SPS) where I (I was the secretary general of the 
Trade Union of the Association of Press Publishers) and the late Suryana held a National 
Expert Discussion. The theme of the discussion was the Vision and Mission of 
Indonesian Press, where the keynote speakers included Mr. Jakob Oetama, Mr. Fikri 
Jufri, Mr. Satrio Arismunandar, Mr. Parni hadi, Mr. Ridho Eisyi, and me, Leo Batubara, 
as the moderator. The topic was about the Discussion on the Press Act and the 
Broadcasting Act and other Acts on Press, with Prof. A. Muis, Mr. R. H. Siregar, Prof. 
Loebby Loqman, Mr. Hinca Panjaitan, Mr. Didin S. Maulani as the main speakers and 
Mr. Amir Effendi Siregar as the moderator.  
The formulating committee consisted of Mr. Tribuana Said, Mr. Atmakusumah, Mr. 
Bambang Sadono, Mr. Didin S. Maolani, Mr. Dedy Djamaluddin Maluk, Dr. E. 
Komariah, Mr. Suryana, Mr. Hinca Panjaitan, and Mr. Ridlo. So, I was involved because 
I was a member of the SPS, and at the time the SPS was reformist, because previously the 
only trade union of the press had been the SPS. The Indonesian Association of Journalists 
(PWI, the only Indonesian Journalist Organization at the time) was too much co-opted. 
They would agree with anything the government said. For instance, they supported the 
bridle on Tempo. We were not like that. We did regret about the bridle and we demanded 
the revival of Tempo. So, when Habibie rose to presidency, and when we launched this 
movement, a lot of people welcomed it. The Chairman of the SPS at the time was Brig 
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Gen Suryawijaya, now he has passed away, then came in his successor, Marshall 
Handjojo, also a progressive person just like us, but at the time he was sick, so I became 
the motor of the activities. And we asked for the support from Mr. Surya Paloh and Mr. 
Jakob Oetama. That was my involvement. I organized the movement with the help of our 
colleagues from the SPS like Mr. Suryana, the Executive Director and Mr. Ridlo Eisy. 
Then on October 14, there was born the Indonesian Press Community (MPI) with the 
goal to have a Constitutional law that protects the freedom of the press. (On December 15 
– 16, 1998, the MPI was changed to be MPPI – the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting 
Community, with a strong will not to let the Indonesian Press be restrained again). A 
month later, in November 1998, there would be a special assembly of the MPR, then 12 
activists of the MPPI held a meeting at the villa of Kompas, Pacet, Cianjur. There they 
prepared the bill of freedom of information that would be taken into the General 
Assembly of the MPR. We also prepared the bill of the Press Act to be submitted to the 
House of the Representatives. We also prepared another bill to accommodate the demand 
that there should never be any law that restricted the freedom of the press. Then the bill 
of Freedom of Information was only accepted after it was included in the decision of the 
MPR no. XVII. There we contributed some ideas on the freedom of communication and 
information which was included in the article 28 f. The article came from the MPPI. It 
was then the starting point for the Press Act. Then on December 15 – 16, 1998, at Hotel 
Santika, we met again. There were hundreds of experts who attended the talk on (the 
topic) ‘Building an Information Society of Indonesia in the lights of a Global Vision and 
a Review on the Bill of Broadcasting’. There was agreed that the MPI was changed to be 
MPPI. It happened that my involvement was because the SPS felt the vocation to reform. 
Moreover, the SPS was relatively more progressive than the PWI (Indonesian Journalist 
Association). And I happened to be the Secretary General of the SPS. That was my 
involvement. The press community knew exactly the reason why the PWI was broken. 
There were 60 – 70 journalist associations, but there was nobody who wanted to establish 
a press association. And up to now there has been only one SPS. In the past, the decision 
of the Minister of Information said that there was only one SPS, and now there is only 
one SPS. The SPS has still been in a good performance. 
Q: What do you really mean with the freedom of the press? 
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A: By chance, the Minister of Communication and Information, Syamsul Maarif, was 
established in to office by the end of July, 2001. And afterwards he spoke before the 
House of Representatives saying that there were 5 diseases of the press, namely 
pornography, journalists without newspapers (WTS, wartawan tanpa suratkabar), and so 
on, and so on. Then he said that we had to revise the Press Act. We declined that idea. 
But in fact he always wanted to revise in order to accommodate the control from the 
government. The reason was that the Press Council was not able to control pornography 
in the press that had crossed the line. Then he asked for a help from three universities, 
namely the University of Surabaya, the University of Lambung Mangkurat, and the 
University of Indonesia. Then the University of Indonesia prepared a study with the title 
‘Study on the Implementation of the Press Act no. 40 of the year 1999 for the 
Development of the Press of Indonesia’ that was conducted by the Institute of Legal and 
Technological Studies of the Faculty of Law, the University of Indonesia, in cooperation 
with the Communication and Information Media Capacity Improvement Project of the 
Ministry of Communication and Information for the fiscal year of 2004. Then we invited 
them to expose it at a hotel. I was one of the speakers. I said that I was really sad that 
most of university people, whether they came from the law, communication, and political 
studies, almost ninety percent of them did not know about the meaning of the freedom of 
the press. I was really very sad. One some of them who did. Sometimes we were against 
Mr. Abdul Muis. If he saw me, he would not dare to speak about the freedom of the 
press. That is why sometimes he says, ‘Leo is my teacher’; while in fact he is our teacher. 
We just often find difficulties in accepting his black teachings. In my reply, that was 
written in my understanding about the freedom of the press. This is the concept of the 
freedom of the press in democratic countries. First, the constitution should forbid any law 
and regulation that limits the freedom of the press. This is not forbidden in Indonesia. 
Second, the running of the press should be: a) free from any interference by the 
government and there should be no application regulation by the government; b) it is the 
public and the press that should control the government not the contrary, because the 
government is chosen by the public to manage the money. That is why the government 
should be controlled by the public, and not the public controlled by the government. c) It 
should be free from any license, censorship, and bridle. d) It should be based on a self 
regulation, namely the right to manage it by and for its own people. For instance, the 
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code of ethics should be prepared by the association of the journalists itself. After they 
code ethics is prepared then the Press Council can use it as a reference to enforce its 
application. Third, the state should follow a legal politics that decriminalizes the press. 
There are a lot of laws that criminalize the press here. A journalistic work can be 
considered as a crime when: a) for the case of criminal defamation when the journalistic 
work is (1) not used for the interest of the public but to, for instance, blackmail people. 
So if a news item is used to blackmail someone that the act can be punished with 
imprisonment. But if a news item is to control the gambling banks or to control Mega for 
instance when Mega was said as only of the same level with a bupati, then such a news 
item does not need any prison punishment. (2) If the news item is the result of a 
fabrication where the sources, the confirmation / checks and rechecks have all been 
engineered. Some months ago the New York Times and the magazine Stern from 
Germany reported that such a crime could be punished with imprisonment. (3) If the 
news item is motivated by an intense malice. A journalist who declines to reveal the 
sources of information, while in fact the court has ruled that the sources should be 
revealed for the sake of the state, could be punished with imprisonment. A professional 
journalist may sometimes prefer to be jailed than revealing the source. For instance, Mr. 
HB Jassin, the editor who was responsible for the magazine Horison that published an 
articled entitled ‘Langit Makin Mendung’ (The Sky Is More Cloudy) written by Panji 
Kusmin that was considered as a humiliation to Islam. Then Mr. Jassin was forced to 
reveal his source, but he declined, and he was put into jail. The reason is once we reveal 
the source, then no one is willing to be our source. b) For the case of civil defamation: the 
solution of the case of defamation as the result of a publication of a journalistic work 
should only be charged with a fine that is not too much to create bankruptcy. A 
journalistic work should not be criminalized. Fourth, because (1) the constitution has 
already protected the freedom of the press with such a formulation and because (2) the 
state follows a legal politics that does not criminalize the press based on a self regulation 
(code of ethics, standard of wages, and son on), then the running of the press does not 
need any Press Act. Fifth, some countries do have an independent Press Council. The 
Press Council has the duty to listen the complaints from any party; the Press Council 
should issue a statement of its judgment and a recommendation concerning the not 
binding sanction that is obediently followed by the professional press. If this press 
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violates the code of ethics, then it should ask for an apology and should serve a two page 
answering right. That is the recommendation of the Press Council, but it is the media 
itself that has the right force the decision of the Press Council. If the media declines, that 
is okay, but in the developed countries almost all comply with the decision of the Press 
Council. The reason is not about the worry of being jailed, but because of that is the 
essence of professionalism, just like if someone wants to play professional football. If 
someone is given a red card, he would just get out the football field. No need to beat 
anymore. So, that is the concept of freedom of the press that I follow. That is all. When 
we launched our road show program in 18 cities, including Yogya, the event was also 
attended by the police and the attorneys. They said that they had their own culture. I said, 
‘Gentlemen, there is no our own culture. Because if there is our own culture, then the 
president should be the king because according to the culture there is no election. But we 
have elected the president. That is a western culture. Well, that is not a western culture 
either. It follows Roman and Greek cultures. According to our culture, we are not 
allowed to criticize our parents and our superiors. But what do we have to pay? We may 
loose the country. Then this is the universal culture, democracy, the people’s power. 
Please read the book written by Dr. Ong Hok Ham. He says that our exchange of power 
is full of blood, from the father to the mother, from the father to the kids, from the kids to 
the kids. That is our culture. Is that what we want?  
The same also applies to the running of broadcasting in a democratic country. First it 
should be free from any interference by the government. An independent regulatory body 
should be a legal authority by the parliament to play the legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions in broadcasting regulation. Such an independent regulatory body will 
function as the policy maker, regulator, supervisor, and controller of broadcasting 
activities. This body has the authority to a) issue, extend, or stop the licenses; b) annul the 
license of broadcasting after it is ruled by the court. Second, it should be free from 
censorship, except for self censorship. When the MPPI prepared the draft of the 
Broadcasting Bill, the content was like this. But then the House Representatives decided 
the different things, because the Minister of Communication and Information said that 
broadcasting should obey the government. Then Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
along with the government … But on the way, the government prepared the RPP, the 
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draft of the government’s regulation. Then they filed a suit to the Constitutional Court. 
But the Constitutional Court ruled that the KPI was not allowed to join, that it was only 
for the government. When I met Jimly (the chairman of the Constitutional Court), we 
shook hands. ‘Hi Leo, it has been long that we do not meet’, said Jimly. ‘Yes Sir’, I 
replied, ‘I want to see you Sir, there are a lot of violations on your side’. He was still very 
authoritarian in nature. That is my understanding about the freedom of the press. So, 
there is no my particularity. There is no Asian democracy. There are no Asian values. 
There are no Indonesian values. But there are fact and truth values. Then I stressed that 
our Constitution did not protect the freedom of the press. 
Q: Well, but is it the same concept like in the Press Act no. 40 of the year 1999?  
A: Yes it is. That is what we have been fighting for. Because the Act no. 40 of the year 
1999 is a subsystem of the constitution, this act will be the basis of the national 
communication and information system that should be democratic in nature. Not like in 
the past where in the article 28 of the 1945 Constitution was said that there was a 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, but the Press Act said that the press 
company business license (SIUPP) could be revoked. When Surya Paloh and Gunawan 
Mohamad filed a suit to the Supreme Court, the State Administration Court (PTUN) of 
the first degree revoked the decision of the Minister of information on the cancellation of 
the license. The license (SIUPP) is not allowed to be revoked. The State Administration 
Court also forbade that. But then the Supreme Court ruled that based on the regulation of 
the Minister of Information no. 21 of the year 1984 of the article 33h the license could be 
revoked. What a great story!  The lower court referred to the Constitution, but the higher 
court referred to the regulation issued by the Minister of Information. That is what we 
regret that we do not have the culture of compliance with the constitution. You do any 
thing at your will … Then in the law it is written …. Anybody who applies any 
censorship, bridle, or ban on broadcasting (section 2 article 2) and anybody who prevents 
the press to search, to find, and to distribute ideas and information (section 4 article 3) 
can be charged with a maximum 2 years of imprisonment or a fine not more than Rp. 500 
million (section 18 article 1). In this law, it is deliberately written that the press is not to 
be imprisoned. The one who can be imprisoned is the one who prevents the freedom of 
the press. So this is the concept of the freedom of the press that we have been fighting 
  
371
for. Then, a free press would respect human rights, and information is in the public 
domain. In this way we agree with Gus Dur. That is why there is no need for a ministry 
of information. You can see that in this law it has been designed that there is no need for 
a ministry of information, and Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah agreed with it. We, three of us 
namely Mr. Atmakusumah, Mr. Azkarmin Zaini the chief editor of ANTV, and I myself, 
were authorized by Mr. Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah, the current Minister of Information. 
This law has a public character, and the press should control the government. This 
arrangement is based on self-regulatory, standards of profession for the media, and there 
is no regulation and control from the government, and there is no need for a ministry of 
information. And there is no SIUPP (license), and it means that there is no need for 
registration to the government. Now the government of SBY wants to revise the Press 
Act so that there will be a mandatory registration. If this revision is accepted, then 
someday the registration can be cancelled. If Tempo is considered as against the national 
interest, perhaps it will not be registered anymore, and that means that the media will no 
longer exist. In this matter we are different from the PWI (Indonesian Journalist 
Association) that still agrees with the proposal for revision of the law as long as it is only 
about the registration. But in fact the registration is just the next step to dangers. So, if the 
question is what concept of freedom of the press as it is meant in the law, then that is the 
answer. So the Press Act no. 40 of the year 1999 is the medium target, because our goal 
is that there should be no Press Act anymore, because the Constitution should have 
accommodated that any regulation and law that prevents the freedom of the press should 
be banned and because our legal politics should not put journalists in prison anymore. In 
the developed countries, no Press Act is necessary. That is our ultimate goal. If the goal is 
reached, then there is no Press Act is necessary. But our Constitution is still like a gay, 
and our legal politics still likes putting journalists in prison, then we need such an act 
now. That is the real spirit of this act as a lex specialis. We need this to maintain the 
freedom of the press because our Constitution and our legal politics have not provided a 
protection for the press. So if the Constitution is amended with a new formulation saying 
that any law and regulation that is against the freedom of the press should be banned, 
then there is no need for a Press Act anymore. This also applies to the legal politics, 
because our legal politics still criminalizes the press. In the Criminal Law there are 37 
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articles and in the Criminal Bill there will be 49 articles, and in the new Broadcasting Act 
there are 9 articles that can put a journalist in prison.  
Q: How was the debate on the concept of the freedom of the press in the MPI / MPPI and 
in the meetings with the House of Representatives? 
A: When the Press Act was only a discourse, the current Minister of Information, 
Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah, in the first week of March, 1999, held a dialog with the 
Commission I of the House of Representatives. Almost all of them rejected the design of 
the freedom of the press that had been prepared by the Ministry of Information. If there 
was no need for a license, then there was no need for the Ministry of Information. At the 
time there was a Tempo journalist, and he wrote it down in an article of its March 11 – 
17, 1999 edition saying ‘A general of war proved to defend the freedom of the press. 
While civilians in the parliament proved to attack the freedom. The General, Muhamad 
Yunus Yosfiah, the current Minister of Information, quoted Thomas Jefferson saying, 
that he would prefer a press without a government than a government without a press. 
After being drowned for more than 40 years, now the Minister Yunus Yosfiah would 
bring back the ideal of the 1945 constitution that is full of the idealism about the freedom 
of the press, while on the other hand the members of the House of Representatives are 
still in the spirit of ‘Harmokoisme’ and they only want to make a law that is against the 
freedom or they still think like Lenin that the freedom of the press is a setback.’ A former 
member of the House of Representatives from the FKP faction, Dr. Bachtiar Ali (now the 
ambassador to Egypt) then told that the breakthrough by the Minister of Information, 
Yunus Yosfiah, was successful in injecting a spirit to most of the members of the 
Commission I of the House of Representatives. In the talk in the House of 
Representatives, from August 26 – September 13, 1999, where we, three of us, were 
mandated by the Minister of Information to attend, they showed that they did not want to 
look less reformist than the Minister of Information Muhamad Yunus Yosfiah. Then 
there was born the Press Act no. 40 of the year 1999 that was enacted on September 23, 
1999, the first law that has ever liberated the press. This was the first clash of opinions. 
Formerly, almost all wanted to reject the law, but after it had been written in Tempo 
saying that they were only the followers of Lenin, then eventually everything went 
smoothly.  
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But now the House of Representatives has returned to the spirit of ‘Harmokoisme’. Why? 
Because it is the press that has revealed that the top corruption has been in the House of 
Representatives itself. So the motif is to revenge. So the first debate was between the 
Minister of Information with the Commission I. And the second debate with the Armed 
Forces (TNI / Polri). In the draft of the Press Act (according to the version of the MPI) it 
was written that in conducting the duty and task, a journalist is entitled for a protection 
from the state to make it free from any prevention, disturbance, and threat. But this draft 
was rejected by the fraction of the Armed Forces (now TNI / Polri), while the 
representatives of the government (three of us), Drs. H. Usamah Hisyam from the United 
Development Fraction (FPP), YB Wiyanjono SH from the FPDI, were in favor of this 
additional article. The draft of the MPPI was proposed by the Development Work 
Fraction (Karya Pembangunan). The fraction of the Armed Forces considered that there 
was no need for such an article. We thought that journalists should be treated like the Red 
Cross. If a journalist goes into a conflict area, the person should not be beaten or be 
thrown out, like in Aceh. The person should be welcomed. The consideration on the 
importance of this article is based on the international convention of Geneva saying that 
in a war situation, a journalist has to be protected by the conflicting parties. This article 
provides that the conflicting parties should treat a journalist doing his / her journalistic 
job in a conflict equals to the personnel of the Red Cross. The fraction of the Armed 
Forces assertively rejected the article and its representatives, Aryasa and F. Ismawan, 
said that even without the additional article, the Armed Forces would protect the safety of 
journalists. In responding the conflict following the Referendum of East Timor, for 
instance, the Armed Forces provided some Hercules aircrafts and evacuated some 
journalists not to be trapped in possible violence in the area. But I said, for the press the 
protection from the state only existed if the press was free to cover the East Timor and if 
the press is protected from the Armed Forces and possible threats by rioters. The act of 
the Armed Forces to evacuate the journalists from East Timor was in fact (1) a 
annihilation of the access of the press to cover the conflicts, and (2) an effort to prevent 
the press to know which party had violated human rights by (3) annihilating the public’s 
right to know. But the fraction of the Armed Forces insisted to reject the concept of the 
state protection. Then the compromised formulation to be included in the section 8 of the 
Press Act is as the following, ‘in conducting his / her profession, a journalist is protected 
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by the law’. Third, the Development Work Fraction (Karya Pembangunan) through the 
Problem Identification List no. 68 suggested that the formulation of the journalistic 
professional standards to be ruled in the Act as the duty of the Press Council. (Even now 
the PWI still wants to revise the Press Act to include this professional standard, while in 
fact it is very dangerous). The opinion of the Minister of Information, Mohamad Yunus 
Yosfiah was in line with the opinion of the experts of MPPI, that if the suggestion of the 
FKP was accepted, then there would be opened a room for the state or the government to 
interfere the qualification of journalists. According to the Minister of Information, the 
standard of profession is in the realm of authority of the respective press media. This 
explanation was soon supported by Dr. Bachtiar Ali from the FKP then all fractions 
agreed with this proposal, and the chairman of the Special Committee of this Bill, Mrs. 
Aisyiah Amini, without delay knocked the hammer signaling that the article was taken 
out from the draft.  
Fourth, the MPPI against the PPG (Association of Press and Graphical Companies). 
These staff of the Ministry of Information, around ten people, including Mr. Sembiring, 
Mr. Saifuddin, some directors, and some expert staff, they kept their mouth shut. But in 
fact they struggled very hard, through their whispers to the fractions of the Armed Forces 
(FABRI), the FPP and FKP, to pass the mandatory registration if the license would be 
revoked. Since early the beginning the Press Bill prepared by the Ministry of Information 
had not included any article about licenses (SIUPP) for a press publishing company, but 
required a mandatory registration to the Ministry, and a violation to this regulation was 
charged with possible punishment not less than Rp. 10 million and not more than Rp. 100 
million. In the debate between the FKP and the representatives of the MPPI whose 
presence was based on the mandate of the Government as experts, the MPPI assertively 
rejected the requirement. The consideration was if the House of Representatives still 
provided a legal authority to the Ministry of Information to require a mandatory 
registration for a press publishing company, then requirement would be the control tool 
for the Government to intervene the press. During the first three days of the working 
meeting between the Special Committee of the Press Bill, the Minister of Information, 
Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah, as the representative of the government, was actively involved 
in the debates. What is interesting here is that he put forward the public interest and he 
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did not think that he should win the articles exactly like the Press Bill prepared by the 
Ministry of Information that was the main subject of the debates. His position was that 
any idea, from wherever it was, would be supported as long as it was in line with the 
principles of democracy, supremacy of the law, justice, and freedom of the press. The 
drafters of the Press Bill according to the Ministry of Information with its spokespersons, 
Ir. B. Sembiring, and Drs. HA Saefuddin (now the head of the National Information 
Institute) still vocally defended the concept of mandatory registration. While it was going 
on, the fractions of FABRI, FPP, and FPDI change their mind. They did not support the 
position of Ir. B. Sembiring anymore. In this argumentation the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of Information, IGK Manila, who represented the Minister of Information in 
these discussions on the Working Committee level, did not show his preference, and the 
team was torn apart. Ir. B. Sembiring, Drs. HA Saefuddin and other members of the team 
of the Ministry of Information still consistently defend their position concerning the 
mandatory registration, while the experts of the Ministry of Information, Mr. 
Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, Mr. SL Batubara, and Mr. Azkarmin Zaini, the three of 
them were activists of the MPPI, held the position that the government should never be 
given any tool again to control the press. IGK Manila who perfectly functioned as the 
eyes, the ears, and the mouth of the Minister of Information in the talk about the Press 
Bill, followed the position of the Minister of Information, and he stood up to facilitate an 
agreement. Bambang Sadono, Dr. Bachtiar Ali, Sofjan Lubis, and Amir Sirait from the 
FKP said that the concept of a mandatory registration was no longer in line with the 
concept of the freedom of the press. Their authority to collect the data on press publishing 
companies could be delegated to the Press Council. But drafters of the Press Bill from the 
Ministry of Information still held their position. Then eventually there was a deadlock 
that was reported by IGK Manila to the Minister of Information, Mohamad Yunus 
Yosfiah. After days of debates, finally IGK Manila on behalf of the Minister of 
Information said the final position of the Government that the Government could accept 
the annihilation of the mandatory registration. This is a history many people don’t know. 
Up to now the PWI still agrees to revise the Press Act to include this article. And the 
current Minister of Communication and Information is heading for the goal (to revise the 
Press Act).  
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Fifth, the MPPI against Aisyiah Amini and FABRI on the article about trial by the press. 
They insisted to include this. We insisted to reject it. Because the Minister of Information 
also rejects the trial by the press, then finally Aisyiah Amini, she was also a member of 
the National Commission on Human Rights, she took the statement  letter from the 
National Commission on Human Rights written by Marzuki Darusman and the Secretary 
General Clementino saying that they agreed that trial by the press should be included in 
the Press Act. But one of her people, Mr. Usamah Hisyam, the spokesman of PPP, met 
me and showed the letter to me and asked me, ‘How can we fight against this?’ 
Moreover, it was reported that Marzuki Darusman found a incorrectness and he revoked 
the letter. But the letter was only signed by Marzuki. Though Aisyiah Amini protested the 
revised letter of the National Commission on Human Rights, but then the article was 
changed to be ‘to respect the principle of innocence before being declared guilty by the 
court.  
Q: So the government still strongly insisted to include the article, didn’t it? 
A: Yes, particularly Aisyiah Amini. The Minister of Information did not agree if the 
article on trial by the press was included in the law. Other fractions kept their mouth shut, 
but finally they agreed to reject this article. The reason was there had been an article in 
Tempo saying that they were the followers of Lenin, they wanted to prove that they were 
not the followers of Lenin. Well, they could easily change their minds. So, when there 
was an obstacle in the meeting, I said that in this room there were still some followers of 
Lenin … Now all of the members of the House of Representatives are Lenin followers 
and now they don’t care about it. The influence of the Minister of Information was still 
very strong because the mentality of the members of the House of Representatives was 
still to obey what the Minister said. Whatever the Minister said, they would agree. 
Moreover the Minister was a general of war. Because he did not know the details, then he 
asked Atmakusumah to speak up.  
Then the sixth, the fraction of the Armed Forces (FABRI) against the MPPI. The FABRI 
insisted that a news item should be balanced and accurate, and if was not then it violated 
the law. This was also one of the hottest debates in the talk about the Press Bill, 
especially when on Wednesday, September 8, 1999, there was a meeting to scan every 
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article to prevent any mistyping. When we arrived at section 5 article 1 where it was 
written, ‘The National Press is obliged to report events and opinions accurately and in a 
balanced manner and to respect the norms of religions and the decent norms of the 
society and the principle of innocence before being declared guilty by the court.’ I saw 
that Aisyiah Amini was absent from the meeting. Then I requested a permission to 
comment on this article to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Information, IGK 
Manila. He said, ‘Just stop it, because we may have to start from the scratch again’. Then 
IGK Manila asked a permission to the Chairman of the meting, Sutanto, and he was 
permitted. I said, ‘Dear Rear Marshall Aryasa and Brig. Gen. Isnawan. We want to beg 
the conscience of the FABRI to drop the words ‘accurate’ and ‘potential punishment’. 
The consideration is, as what we already mentioned before, that the Press Act protects the 
press in order to make it possible for the press to conduct the social control on any 
violation and misconduct. During the New Order era, there were a lot of collusion, 
corruption, and nepotism (KKN) practices. The press will conduct an investigative 
reporting to fight against the KKN practices. Without any deliberate purpose, the press 
can be not so accurate in its reporting. If the Press Act forces the press to be always 
accurate and if it is wrong then the punishment would be a fine as much as Rp. 500 
million, then the Press Act will not support the effort of the press to bring to a clean 
governance.’ Then Sofjan Lubis spoke up, ‘We have to support the suggestion of Leo 
Batubara to revoke the words ‘accurate and balance’ from this article. According to the 
code of journalist ethics, a journalist is already obliged to comply with this principle. But 
if the law forces it with a potential punishment for the violator, it is no longer an ethic 
anymore.’ Then everybody was shocked. The chairman of the meeting, Sutanto, asked 
the representatives of the government and the four fractions to hold a meeting at the 
leader level. And exactly at 13:30, IGK Manila came into the meeting room and he met 
me and said that the suggestion of mine and of Sofjan Lubis was accepted.  
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10.  Leo Sabam Batubara (Continued) 
Question (Q): Is it true that the government supports the concept proposed by the MPI 
and why is it so? 
Answer (A): It is already clear. It is the minister who supported the idea. He was our 
Thomas Jefferson .. But let’s start with Sembiring and Saifuddin (former staff members 
of the Ministry of Information). As a matter of fact, they did not support. 
Q: Who are the people of the government who support the Press Act? 
A: The minister, Mohamad Yunus, is our Thomas Jefferson. Well, that’s great. You must 
see him. Some months ago, the third of May was the Freedom of the Press Day of the 
world. The UNESCO and the Press Council held a celebration commemorating the 
World Press Day. He made a speech. I was in the floor. The minister directly went home 
... or perhaps he was still there .. I say. I was very proud that day to meet Mr. Mohamad 
Yunus, because he was our Thomas Jefferson, ha, ha, ha. Because he was the Secretary 
General of the PPP so he was everyday in Jakarta from Monday to Friday. So the 
minister of information, Mr. Mohamad Yunus was our Thomas Jefferson. And Maj. Gen. 
IGK Manila was the Secretary General of the Ministry of Information, and he was the ear 
and the mouth of the Minister. He made things easier. Whatever I said to him would 
certainly be forwarded to the minister, just like what it was. While in fact, if he added or 
reduced something from it, then it would be a great trouble for us. The registration case, 
for instance. If he stopped the progress of it, if he did not pass it to the minister, or if he 
lied to the minister that the registration should be maintained then it would be maintained 
(in the Press Act). Mr. Sembiring and Saifuddin still wanted that the Press Act 
accomodated the maintenance of control of the Ministry of Information through 
mandatory registration. And it was because of the mandatory registration that the 
Ministry of Information still existed. Isn’t that so? There are still other positions of the 
Ministry of Information. There are still 6 – 7 – 8 directors at the LIN (National 
Information Agency).  They were the ones who influenced Mr. Syamsul Muarif to 
behave like what he did.  
Q: What are the positions of Mr. Syamsul Muarif? 
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A: Wow, he is much more dangerous than Mr. Harmoko. I read his writings. What are the 
dangers of Mr. Syamsul Muarif? Mr. Harmoko did repress the freedom of the press based 
on the instruction from Mr. Soeharto. He was a good fellow. But for Mr. Syamsul Muarif, 
the repression of the press was his ideology. Please read the Bill of Broadcasting. I have 
written more than 13 times about broadcasting. I can have them photocopied for you 
anytime. You can see in Kompas, about the press. It was his ideology to repress the press. 
He was one of the chairmen of Golkar. For me, he was much more dangerous than 
Harmoko. Then, a former staff of the Ministry of Information still tried hard to propose 
the revision of the Press act to accomodate the control of the government. And it was the 
thinktank of Syamsul Muarif and it is the thinktank of Mr. Sofyan Jalil (Kominfo).  
Q: So, the position of Mr. Sofyan Jalis is quite the same with that of Mr. Syamsul 
Muarif? 
A: No difference at all. Listen to this. Mr. Harmoko did repress the press because of the 
instruction from Mr. Soeharto. But the ideology of Mr. Syamsul Muarif was to steer ... to 
control. Moreover he was so much religious. He was a cadre of HMI (Islamic Student 
Association), a graduate of IAIN (State Islamic Institute) where they saw pornography as 
the responsibility of the press. That was why pornography could only be tamed through 
control. Isn’t that so? While in my opinion, I have said that ... excuse me, my throat has 
been sore because of it ... pornography falls into two territories. There is sex industry in 
one hand, and there is press industry on the other hand. So the porn tabloids could not be 
included in the press because they fall into the sex industry category. But if in Kompas, 
Republika, Jawa Pos, etc., there are columns about women or sex that cross the line, they 
can be reported to the Press Council because they are press products that fall into porn 
materials. While the tabloids are only about sex, about hiring women with a sum of 
money ... all about sex. That is why the function of the press should be informing, 
entertaining, and educating; and the press should respect privacy. But there is no 
educating function in the tabloids. Then there are two requirements. First, there should be 
a publisher. Well, perhaps they don’t have the publisher. It is one of the requirements of 
the Press Act. Second, there should be the educating function of the content, and it should 
respect privacy. If not, they are not press products. But they don’t want to do it. That’s 
the misled freedom of the press. Too much freedom, says he. 
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Q: Was Mr. Syamsul Muarif close to the people like FPI (Islamic Guardian Front, that is 
very fond of conducting violence in the name of religion)? 
A: Exactly. They think that they are the holiest people in front of pornography. I have 
known him for some years. When he was the minister of information, in the first week of 
his ministry, the KADIN (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce) invited him. I was invited 
too. Then I made a speech. I did hope that Mr. Syamsul Muarif become the second 
Mohamad Yunus not the second Harmoko. On the way, in the seminar, it was proved that 
Mr. Syamsul Muarif had become the second Harmoko. I said so. Then when there was a 
seminar, he made a speech. I was there too. He said, that Leo once had said that he was 
the second Harmoko. He said that he was not the second Harmoko nor the second 
Mohamad Yunus, but he was Syamsul Muarif. Mr. Sofyan Jalil was a doctor in 
economics, he was like a tabula rasa, like a piece of white paper. It depended on who 
would paint it. Because the thinktank was full of those people (Sembiring, Saifuddin, and 
so on), then he started to change. What happened then? Did you read the latest 
publication of the SPS? This was distributed during the press anniversary in Pekanbaru 
(February, 2005). It was read a title ‘Who did poison the mind of Sofyan Jalil?’ In his 
speech, because it was Friday (February 4, 2005), he spoke here when the Press Council 
gave the awards to some media: the most professional one, the professional one, and so 
on. He also made a speech. He said that he was so happy with the Press Act. He said, 
yesterday Mr. President had been undermined in his reputation because of Rakyat 
Merdeka and Kompas and that he was asked to provide an answering right. That should 
be so. He said that he agreed if the Press Act fell into the category of lex specialis. Then 
on Friday and Saturday, the Tempo magazine came to him for the next Monday issue. 
The magazine asked him about the truth that the minister said that the Press Act fell into 
the category of lex specialis. He said, ‘Yes, but only after being revised’. Ha, ha, ha. 
Then came the SPS magazine, ‘Who did poison the mind of Mr. Sofyan Jalil?’  The 
people who poisoned him were .. perhaps the FPI or something else.. 
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11. Paulus Widiyanto, former Chairman of Special Committee on the Draft of 
Broadcasting Law year 2002 of Indonesian House of Representantive from 
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, Jakarta, December 6, 2005 
 
(Question): What were the processes involved in setting Broadcasting Law?  
(Answer): Actually, there were three Regulations.  First, it was Press Regulation, second 
Telecommunication Regulation, and third Broadcasting Regulation.  These three 
Regulations were proposed to the House of Representatives to replace the old Regulation 
considered not to be appropriate for democratization and information processes.  Those 
three were submitted to the House of Reprsentatives of 1997-1999 period.  General 
election in 1997 produced 1997 House of Representatives.  Then, the president stepped 
down and was replaced by the vice president for two years period.  The first to replace 
was Press Regulation, with Press Regulation No 40/1999.  Telecommunication 
Regulation, formerly, was Regulation No 36/1999.  Broadcasting Regulation was not 
discussed because everthing was completed in September 1999.  Even those two 
Regulation (telecommunication and press) were worked on for 2 weeks at the longest.  
Thus, the production of Regulation was unusual but the quality still imposed problems.  
The old Broadcasting Regulation was no. 24 year 1997; there was no 
Broadcasting Regulation before.  The discussion of the Regulation was so complicated 
because it was related to politics.  Such political interest was of presidential interest to 
reelect Mr. Harto for the president of the year 1997.  He asked for the existence of 
Broadcasting Regulation since previously there were only five private televisions. The 
Regulation was considered to benefit Mr. Harto / president, therefore new stations were 
permitted to exist.  First was RCTI, then SCTV, followed by TPI, Indosiar and ANTV.  
RCTI was a subscriber (pay TV using decoder), RCTI comprised of RCTI Jakarta and 
RCTI Bandung.  SCTV were in Surabaya and Denpasar. It means that they were local 
TVs. When RCTI was owned by the family of Mr. Harto (Indra Rukmana) then SCTV 
was owned by Mr. Sudwikadmono.  The permit was in Surabaya because it was designed 
as a local TV.  TPI was owned by Tutut and in order to be different, she was in Jakarta, 
she rode on TVRI vans.  In the past, TVRI broadcasted at night, so TPI broadcasted at 
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daytime. Thus, TPI made use of TVRI’s daytime. She used sate facilities for her (Tutut) 
interest.  As for Indosiar, the permit was in Semarang, owned by the family of Liem Soie 
Liong.  When TPI became a national television, an Education TV, RCTI and SCTV were 
furious, how could TPI become national, while we could not.  It showed a kind of area 
division, SCTV in Surabaya and Denpasar, Indosiar in Semarang, RCTI in Jakarta and 
Bandung.  Hence, ANTV planned to be born in Lampung and Pelembang.  Initially, tv 
was design locally, however since TPI made use of state facilities namely those of 
TVRI’s nationally, it caused jealousy.  There was also an obligation for private 
televisions to give 20 percent of commercial revenue to TVRI, since TVRI was not 
allowed to broadcase commercials.  They asked national TV and the others to be in 
Jakarta.  The objective was related to political interest, namely to pronounce Mr. Harto 
the winner for the presidency.  Therefore, around March, those private televisions, 
including the learning ANTV, became national televisions.  Our colleagues commented 
that they were permitted to operate even with bamboo antenna …due to unpreparedness 
of any infrastructures.  Because of such political interest, national televisions were born 
in 1997.  Actually, there was no national television at that time.  The Regulation had been 
submitted to Mr. Harto but was returned to the House of Representatives.   Tutut 
intervened that there had to be national televisions.  Otherwise, TPI that had TVRI would 
become local again.  That’s what I mean by the political interest.  
It was stated in the Regulation the permit to operate new televion stations, thus 5 
new televisions existed based on this Regulation.  Actually, there were 17 on the list. 
Metro was actually on 17 (or 12) rank.  Number 10 was Jawa Pos TV.  Due to political 
interests, however, Metro TV won the place.  Because we did not pay to the Minister of 
Information, then Metro, which was not legile, was selected since Surya Paloh was close 
to Yoseano Barak, whose sister – Yosiani Barak – is Surya Paloh’ wife.  He is such a 
hoodlum.  Using any efforts, he finally got the opportunity and Jawa Pos TV loose. 
Actually the permit was temporary because it was almost the last minute of Mr. Yunus 
(Yosfiah).  Thus, it was around September-October when they were not ministers 
anymore, the permit was issued.  Hence, the permit was actually invalid, because 
constructing Broadcasting Regulation had to conform to Regulation No 36 on 
Telecommunication and Broadcasting Regulation No 24 year 1997.  One was frequency 
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permit and the other was broadcasting permit.  In order to get this broadcasting permit, 
trial test had to be undergone for a couple of years.  In fact, the permit was not complete 
by that time.   Our colleagues always asked about the permit and they could not clarify. 
When they could not give clarification, they said … where do we have to go because the 
Department of Information had dismissed. Vacuum. This Regulation was existing but it 
was not practicable because it was mentioned that … was the Department of Information. 
This was the map of the problem at that time, how political interventions gave brith to 
this Broadcasting Regulation. Therefore, the anatomy was that this TV7 was actually Mr. 
Sukoyo and then he sold 80 percent of the shares.  Then, step by step, the capital was 
inflated, Mr. Sukoyo failed to make payment, became zero point something.  MetroTV 
was Surya Paloh, then they broadcasted without complete permit.  That’s what I said 
Regulation No 24 year 1997 was barren since there was no Minister of Information… and 
what present was the Minister of Transportation and Telecommunication, even the 
Directorate was then put here (Department of Transportation and Telecommunication) to 
have legal foundation.  It was the Broadcasting Regulation when we tried to improve it. 
In 1997, this Regulation was proposed to be amended.  But the government, House of 
Representatives and People’s Assembly Council stopped in September-October (1998) 
and this Regulation remained.  I took it; we processed the draft to become Regulation No 
32 year 2002. 
Q: Is this Regulation not democratic?  
A: No.  It was not democratic because there were many chapters stipulating about… only 
two broadcasting institutions were admitted.  Governmental and private institutions.  
Hence, this Regulation only adopted two kinds of broadcasting institutions.  But this 
Regulation stipulated public, private, community and pay broadcasting institutions.  Its 
being not democratic because it did not give opportunity to other institutions.  Whereas, 
the needs of the community would not be covered by those two institutions only.  What 
important was that the government had broadcasting institution whereas the permit was 
given by the government, to itself.  This Regulation also obligated all to relay to 
governmental broadcasting.  Then this Regulation did not allow news broadcast.  Thus, 
all the programs were entertainment, no news. RRI and TVRI became the center of the 
relay from private broadcasting institutions, all became the nozzle of the government. It 
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was called relay obligation.  So, this governmental broadcasting institution was a working 
unit (Regulation was named so).  
Q: So, was it true that the Regulation had never got a chance to be implemented?  
A: This Regulation only served as the legal base for the birth of the new five televisions.  
Although, in fact it was defective.  
Q:  Thus, the permit was given by the Minister of Information whose office is over.  
A:  The permit tender was closed.  Basically, it was limited radio frequency and wave. 
So, it had to be stipulated by Telecommunication Regulation, its spectrum was divided 
into how much it was for broadcasting and how much was for telephone.  Being limited, 
actually there was a map.  There was frequency map in Indonesia referring to ITO.  Thus, 
the frequency was divided into cities with predetermined maximum.  But the system was 
still analog, whil the current system is digital.  Map was then made, most of them were in 
the capital city, 14 frequencies, actually there were only 12. 
Because there had been five, plus five, there were ten, one TVRI (11), but there were 
local and national TVRI, so they made 12.  So, with this Regulation, there was no 
possibility for local TV because the frequencies were all used.  Thus, the (new) 
Regulation tried to rearrange the Broadcasting System in Indonesia that was not national. 
So, in the Regulation No 32 year 2002 there was no National TV anymore.  The only 
national was TVRI.  Those ten televisions could not be national anymore.  But network 
TV.  Thus, rearranging the Indonesian broadcasting issue by making the Indonesian 
broadcasting system Network System.  Hence, we adopted the system because we have 
an understanding that network TV was in America only, because the networks were only 
64… The latest was FOX, all of them are in the city capital but are scattered.  In Japan, it 
is divided into prefectures, the system is network.  Then we adopted, and the proper 
broadcasting system was network.  The television station that is proper with network tv 
was TVRI.  The characteristic of Indonesia is a country of islands and we have three time 
parts.  The third, is uneven distribution of population.  The targetsof TV are people, 
gathering in a certain place, and this is not good.  So, this rearrangement refers to the 
prevailing condition in Indonesia.  
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Our colleagues in National TV protested this Broadcasting Regulation, because 
the omission of one word “national” that cut them off.  Then they made “National TV 
Mourning Day” protest. Their reason was related to business. The Broadcasting 
Regulation had been available but the Government Stipulation was contrary to the 
Regulation. The new Government Stipulation even legalized the current condition.  The 
term limited ment 40 percent only.  In America, it was only 30 percent then it was raised 
to 40 percent.  We, 90 percent (in Government Stipulation) meant the same with 
returning to the old Regulation.  Basically, the opposition was just due to business.  
Q: What were the interests of the state with the new Government Stipulation (2005)? 
A: It was on permit.  There were 7 crucial points in the Broadcasting Regulation.  
Network system, KPI (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission), permit…etc.   With 
regards to KPI, it still becomes a problem until today because this Regulation created a 
new institution called KPI.  Since we learnt from those countries having democratic 
broadcasting institution, we had to have an independent institution. KPI was an 
independent institution that we designed as a regulator.  There were many references; 
there was FCC, and others.  The government did not agree.  We proposed KPI because it 
had strong justification.  Because, during Gus Dur era, there was no Department of 
Information, no Minister of Communication and Information; what present was National 
Information Institution. Thus, we needed KPI.  However, the government still had 
Department of Transportation and Telecommunication of which base was 
Telecommunication Regulation.  The Government said that it was not the right time for 
KPI to exist.  Telecommunication Regulation, the permit was from the government, but 
the struggle of our colleagues to enter reform and democratization elements into this 
Regulatioan was unsuccessful.  But they succeeded in infiltrate an idea, the name was 
Independent Regulation Office Body, not included in the body but in the explanation. 
This Body was similar to a regulator for telecommunication, but because of lack of time 
for a discussion, it was only infiltrated in the explanation.  Some time, BRTI 
(Independent Telecommunication Regulation Body) would be born.  When Broadcasting 
Regulation was born, and KPI had been proposed, the government hurriedly made BRTI. 
The chairman, however, was the government itself.  Thus, in this Telecommunication 
Regulation there had been seed of reform, in the explanation.  (Press Regulation, on the 
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other hand, gave birth to Press Council…).   However, this was not strong.   So, in the 
Broadcasting Regulation there was KPI.  It was the Councils or Commission that the 
society had to fill as the reflection of people’s sovereignty.  
Democratization process occurred when public opinion was given to independent 
institution, not government.  This was in accordance with the birth of KPU (General 
Election Commission), namely a state institution, but it could be called governmental 
institution because the term was LPND (Non-Department Governmental Institution). 
Nevertheless, it was not that (LPND) but independent institution.  The process, however, 
was still like that because civil society was not strong.  Why, first, because we found it 
difficult as well to get human resource... KPI, for instance, was used to be considered as 
NGO representative.  Why? Because our government was a new government that was not 
prepared with concept.  But bureaucracy had the concept, namely, whatever benefited 
their position.  Who was government and who was bureaucracy?  Government may 
change at anytime but bureaucracy is permanent. And these all were designers from 
bureaucracy.  For example KPU, but the bureaucracy was just the same, they were the 
corruptors.   It was such a long struggle, whether such institutions would be acceptable by 
the government in our state system or not. When I was in a discussion with American 
people, I said that our struggle was to give birth to commissions, but it was always 
opposed by bureaucracy.  Because they felt to be competed by new institutions and they 
could not stand that.  
In fact, there were much interests involved.  So much interests. One, for example, 
government interest; there were central government and local government. The spirit was 
Local Autonomy Regulation.  Sometimes, there was conflict of interest between the 
central government and the local government. When we discussed this Broadcasting 
Regulation, there was conflict of interest as well.  In central government itself, however, 
there was much interests as well.  The interests of the Department of Information and the 
interest of the Transportation and Telecommunication (Kominfo) and Department of 
Domestic Affairs.   For instance, if it was the permit interest from the government, where 
the emphasis was, to Transportation or where?  The spirit of Broadcasting Regulation 
was there was only “one permit”.  Since in the Telecommunication Regulation, there had 
been government authority, for example to give frequency permit for TV Jogja that was 
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36 UHF.  The current Kominfo should not issue broadcasting permit.  The permit was 
just one, not two.  Because only one permit is required for one office.  In order for them 
not to quarrel, KPI was formed.  With regards to Local Autonomy Regulation when there 
was frequency (arrangement) in (local) cities, for example in Surabaya, the frequency 
was owned by local Surabaya.  Then, the interests were authority, power, position, and 
eventually was money.  When this Regulation was born, the institutions under 
Department of Telecommunication in those areas got confussed.  
There was also interests and conflict in Parties (PDIP).  When it was discussed, 
there was complaint and it was critical. And I held the principle, even when the fraction 
decided A, I opposed to it.  Why? Because the above interests had infiltrated the 
individuals.  Since I had sufficient arsenal, when Mr. Dimyati Hartono resigned as the 
member of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of Special Committee was 
vacant, I was assigned the PDIP Fraction the Chairman of the Special Committee 
(showing the assignment letter as the Chairman of Special Committee from PDIP 
Fraction).  However, I had been a member of Special Committee since 11 March (year..). 
The capital intervened fractions.  Even civil society also intervened fractions. The 
government also intervened. Department did the same thing.   
Thus, fraction was the front liner to be infiltrated different interests. I was strong (person) 
not to be infiltrated by various interests.  At a certain time, I felt lonely because of 
extraordinary interventions. For instance, the capital group approached Tengku Umar (the 
house of President Megawati), and because they failed to infiltrated Megawati, they went 
to Taufik Kiemas, and failed with TK then to his subordinates, and so on.  The focus was 
that they asked for national permit.  They also concerned with network. They asked for 
representations in KPI, each three persons.  Then validity of the permit.  They asked for 
70 years.  They used argument/logic of the right of building use… Then we allowed TV 
only 10 years and 5 years. If 70 years, it means until long generations…  
Then commercials how much percent.  We gave 20 percent only; they asked for more.  
Then relay, basically, it was so complicated.  So, they influenced the members of House 
of Representatives, including called me by phone.  Even at an occasion the Party 
Secretary General asked me to come, because capitalists had gathered.  And the venue 
  
388
was provided by TV7 (Agust Parengkuan). Okey, but I asked the representatives from  
Locals were invited as well, I came.  And from Surabaya came..  I was asked to listen to 
the aspiration from those TVs, basically it was that.  I listened but I did not feel to 
agree… Some time national TV went to Bali.  They called me, but it turned that my 
supporters were many and they called me, too.  Brother, they were with the boss doing 
this and that … They thought that when it was said by TK or Mr. Sucipto (PDIP leader), I 
immediately agreed…. Please accept their ideas… yes yes yes I told so.  But just yes yes 
yes…. Until finally, they term it, I was not welcomed, and was going to be replaced.  It 
was the beginning of my being Chairman of the Special Committee. But I was successful.  
Even I was going to be replaced/removed from being the member of the Special 
Committee.  But my colleagues said if I was replaced, they all resigned from Special 
Committee. Because they did not comprehend, did not know about this.  Thus, the capital 
power powerfully wanted to enter… and until today.  
Q: Was there any of their requirements that “succeeded” to be accepted?  
A: As a matter of fact… Oh yes, about the commercial, it was cigarette commercial.  
Originally it would be total ban but finallyi it was not total ban.  So, the matter of 
commercial was crucial. I was different from Commission V with regards to Trading.  I 
was different from Rini Suwandi (Minister of Trading).  It was in Malang (?). Rini 
Suwandi asked for guarantee that cigarette commercials were permitted, because it 
related to national cigarette industry.  Contribution from the tax was so high.  I was also 
contacted by the Minister of Manpower, Yacob Nuwawea, how is the cigarette 
commercials, they could go on strike… Due to finance interest, the tax was on 
Commission V, Manpower Commission and Health Commission.  Thus, the 
commissions also brought the interest of their partners.  I was in Surbaya to hold 
dialogues in Unair, then Sampurna… believe it or not I was picked up by helicopter, from 
Unair I was brought to Sampurna office and landed on the helipad on the roof, I was flied 
by the pilot to a location … just to talk to Rini Suwandi.  So much interests.  The 
businesses were intersectors.  Health Department, Industry, Finance, Manpower, 
Domestic Affairs Department, Law, Transportation.  Complicated.  Thus, it can be said 
there was political interest behind economy interest (money), thus intertwined.  That 
excluded the international.  Then I tried to listen to them. Okey, you have your own 
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interests, let’s see what our common interest.  Then I said, I was in Semarang, I wanted to 
see it from the Five Junctions.  If it was only crossroad there would be crash accident, 
then I would turn around.  Therefore, no one of you (businessmen) would loose.  Thus, it 
would take long to process this Regulation. (I was also the Chairman of Special 
Committee of the Regulation of the Freedom to Get Information).  It was prolonged.  
Finally completed on 28 November.  Then valid on 28 December. 
The Head of the Sate, President did not sign the Regulation.  The reasons varied.  
When this Regulation was finished, they (capital owners) still intervened, too.  However, 
in accordance with the Constitution, in three months time, this Regulation was still valid.  
So, there were several unsigned Regulations, including the Regulation on the Formation 
of Riau Province.  
On 28 November I was in Jogja.  I was on air at RRI. Then went to Bali. 
December 31 was TK’s birthday, he held an event in Bali. 
Q: Can we say that President objected to this Broadcasting Regulation?  
A: Madam said go ahead! And the Minister of Communication and Information gave his 
speech at the closing of the assembly and ratification by the Government.  The 
government responsed it well.  However, as the head of the state, Madam did not sign.  
That it is, the intervention came to the presupposition that without signature, it would be 
valid.  That was capital intervention, to the extent to change KPI.  In short, the process of 
this Broadcasting Regulation formation was extraordinary, and I was supposed to know. 
Therefore, my colleagues from local tv appreciated me and they appointed me their 
“senior member”.  
Q:  How was the implementation of this Regulation?  
A: This Regualtion was not convenient for television business benefit in the past. 
Because they tried to abort this Regulation. However, they made a two sided approach, 
on  one side they refuse, and their refusal was directed to juridical review, then they tried 
to influence their friends as the members of the House of Representatives to encourage a 
revision, on the other side also tried toget into the Regulation by trying to enter KPI 
institution as an institution that would control the broadcasting world and enter their 
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people so that they would make beneficial decisions.  From the beginning, however, they 
preferred the permit was on the government.  Because from the beginning the permit was 
from the Department of Information.  Thus, they were comfortable to return there.  There 
was even a teasing allusion, it would be one envelope only to go to the government, but it 
took nine envelopes to go to KPI.  So, they did not want to change; they refuse reform or 
rearrangement. And for the reason, they tried to enter their people to KPI.  They even 
intended to help KPI financing.  Because the government tried to stunt the role of KPI; it 
was done by the formation of KPI secretariate of which level was lowered.  There was 
requirement, if it was a state institution, the secretariate of these areas had to be echelon 
one or echelon two.  When KPI was assigned by Department of Communication and 
Information to follow up the formation of KPI, then the concepts proposed by the 
government, Minister of Communication and Information, to the State Minister of State 
Appratus Control, the formation of echelonization at KPI secretariate general was also 
lowered, only echelon two.  Second was on budget politics.  The budget was given little 
by little.  They only rented a building in Trunojoyo (Kebayoran), and actually it was not 
…. even the first meeting was at the house of KPI members.  Thus, institutionally they 
were underestimated.  The budget had to be proposed to Kominfo, even when I asked 
KPI budget and was approved 10 billion, which was cleas in National Expenditure and 
Revenue Budget, it was given 5 billion only.  Thus, budget politics depended so much on 
the government that notabene was…. In fact, the comments to KPI were not welcome. Its 
existence was really not expected by bureaucracy.  Next, when they had to follow up with 
the formation of Government Regulation.  It was a conflict interest between the 
government.  Sentences that stated, in … was determined by KP and the Government.  In 
the past, it was only KPI.  The phrase “and the Government” followed… Why?  Because, 
did the decisions of the independent commissions or state instititon have legal power or 
not?  It was the problem.  The discussion on that was so.  The decisions of KPPU often or 
almost all lose in the court.  Therefore, due to such fear we thougt twice.  When we are 
on the discussion to set this Regulation, there was legal hierarchy.  First was the 
Constitution, second the Regulation, third the Government Stipulation, then Local 
Regulation, etc., etc.  Where were decisions of the institutions located?  The 
sophistication laid here.  Did KPI have legal power or not?  Then, compromised way out 
was sought.  All containing KPI sentences were grouped into one chapter.  Then, some 
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Government Stipulations were born, including the new Government Stipulation signed by 
President SBY by the end of 2005. It was this tough Government Stipulation No 50 that 
was protested.  This Government Stipulation was not in line with the spirit of 
Broadcasting Regulation.  The spirit varied. There was local autonomy, monopolist, 
diversity, rearrangement, limited area, and limited broadcast.  These private institutions 
tried hard to remove them all.  Network matter, for example.  It was wrong. The network 
system concept was unproperly implemented, formulated, because (the Regulation 
regulated network system and local system) the system was network, meaning that you 
had to build network stations in local areas, but they did not agree; they only agreed to 
relay.  Thus, there was no local content that could enter there.  This really returned to the 
old Broadcasting Regulation.  I want to say that the government did not comprehend the 
spirit of this Broadcasting Regulation.  That was the time, if I may compare, when Bob 
Hassan was a minister, or before that, when he was still a businessman (not yet a 
minister), then when the Minister of Forest made Government Regulation, it was Bob 
Hasan who implemented.  And this (Broadcasting Government Regulation) compared to 
it.  Another example, with regards to network station matter, not all were centered in 
Jakarta; that could be centered in Medan, Surabaya, Bali, Makasar, anywhere.  Please 
anyone who was willing to build network TV.  TV that got the permit as a network had to 
build local station TVs in different areas.  The comparison of the old Broadcasting 
Regulation in West, Central and East part of Indonesian Areas was available.  So, when 
they made a relay, one in Jakarta, two in Central, and one in the East. That was the 
concept in the past.  For instance TV7; it was present in Jakarta, in Bandung, and in 
Jogja, in Surabaya, and there was one in UjungPandang, Irian one. This was meant to 
cover all areas. But with this Regulation, it was not so because it was seen by all 
provinces. “Private broadcasting institution may hold broadcasting through network 
station system with limited area coverage”; this sentence is correct (as it is written in 
Broadcasting Regulation 2002), but when once “It was controlled as followed...”:… 
everything was wrong.  “Network station base is a private institution located in the 
capital of the province”.  It was greedy. It was unacceptable. Our spirit was not there. It 
means that as a concept, network tv has been faulty.” The members of network station are 
private tv located in the capital of province, governor and or city.”  ”For common 
broadcast program, the network station can be broadcasted through relay stations to all 
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areas in one province.” “Specifically for Capital Special Territory and Yogyakarta 
Special Territory, building relay station was not allowed”.   Thus, if there was a tv in 
Jogja, relay from Bantul could not be done, in Wonosari it could not be made, because 
they were still in the same province.  Because it did not see topography. “The area 
coverage of a network system is limited to at most 75% of the total province in 
Indonesia”. Imagine.  The most liberal country is 35% (America).  To get to 45% is a 
hard struggle. This (75%) is just the same as accommodating the existing station. Those 
big TVs had occupied any places. The value of 75% out of the number of the provinces in 
Indonesia was the existing ones.  Papua, for example, it is not a problem either to have it 
or not.  If there was no one in East South-East Nusa it was no problem. Due to 
percentage.  In the past, the spirit was divided into West, Central and East Indonesia due 
to time difference. Such a spirit did not exist here (the new Government Stipulation).  
Number F. “Exception to the stipulation meant in letter E enables the coverage of 
broadcast area to become at most 9% out of the number of provinces in Indonesia.  Only 
for network station system that had been operating a number of its relay stations so that it 
covered 5% of the total number of provinces in Indonesia.  What does it mean?  The 75% 
could become 90%.  This is called minus “national”.  Whose interest is it? The minister 
was Agum Gumelar (transportation and telecommunication), now Agum Gumelar is the 
commissioner president of the owners of the shares of RCTI, Global TV, and TPI.  Thus, 
the person who used to give frequency permit, now he is gratituted a Commissioner 
President of the television conglomerates.  The Commissioner of SCTV is Leutenant 
General Suyono (former Chief of Army General Staff).  The current TPI Director is 
Mayjen Suwisma.  The tv capitalists kept their capital, their business by placing such 
persons.  And people who set this, bureaucratic people who were Agum’s subordinates, 
just wrote.  This returned to the old Broadcasting Regulation, which stated national.  This 
Government Stipulation was called minus national.  How to operate this Broadcasting 
Regulation of which spirit was different.  For the reason, our colleagues made judicial 
review anew, to cut these all.  
With regards to other stipulations (in Government Stipulation).  This was 
ridiculous again. Chapter 71 verse 2.  Private broadcasting institutions that already had 
radio station permit from Directorate General Post and Telecommunication and or 
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national broadcast permit for television from Department of Information before the 
issuance of this Government Stipulation, its presence was acknowledged. Written report 
on its existence was submitted to the Minister to adapt its permit to become permit of 
running broadcasting in accordance with the new Regulation.  So, you had got national 
permit and it was still valid.  This was meant by returning to Department of Information.  
The House of Representatives refused this Government Stipulation and it was delayed for 
2 months.  At least, there were some colleagues in the House of Representatives who still 
concerned about this matter but many of them did not understand.  
By whom was its implementation?  It was going to be implemented but it was 
contrary to Broadcasting Regulation.  Thus, it was not multi interpretation,  I interpreted 
in singularly.  I am not a member of the House of Representative but I still give ideas to 
my colleagues. But they never involve me in a discussion.  Our colleagues in KPI got 
disappointed.  How was KPID if the permit came from the central.  What about people 
who planned to build a radio in Nabire, in Natuna.  This became centralistic again. 
Whereas, we were going to decentralize, to empower locals, locals had to be given local 
wisdom, nothing… Then, which one was going to be implemented when it had been 
contrary to the Broadcast Regulation?  
Q: How do you see the implementation of Broadcasting Regulation since 2002 until 
todate?  
A: I said earlier it was double. What was advantageous for them (media industry) was 
followed, what was disadvantegous he tried to interprete.  Find breakthroughs, legal 
possibilities. For example handover, it was cleas impossible but now it has been handed 
over.  Our past spirit was that the tv could not broadcast anymore, the frequency was 
returned to the government.  Now, it is not.  Return the frequency first, later the KPI 
(government representatives) will take control.  Lativi ruined, now it is broadcasting 
aimlessly.  It had been targeted.  
Q: How was their performance related to press freedom?  
A: Press freedom is different from enterprise freedom, press businesss. The last press 
freedom became the cover of business interest.  So, people held demonstration in the 
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name of press freedom but it served as the cover of media business.  I say, this 
Regulation enabled the growth of broadcasting institutions in various places, either 
private broadcasting institution, community, or others.  It means the society gets closer or 
is on proximity foundation.  There is tv jogja… (close to Jogja society), etc. People from 
South Sumatera had to pay 100 million Rupiah to be able to take part in Siapa Berani 
competition to buy the airplane tickets to broadcast in Jakarta.  If there were local TV as 
the affiliation of Siapa Berani, it means local money economy...  Thus, if private tv could 
exist there, that prevents concentration of money.  Bu next was they gave opportunity 
with freedom, for people to appear on television. So, there are more local programs and 
news in 100 tv, not just 10 tv.  There are produced 100 broadcast hours on the same day 
at the same time all over Indonesia.  It means there are 100 people who can appear or 100 
times 10 people appear and give opinions.  That means distribution, spread of media 
freedom. Decentralization opens tv or radio to open all of this.  This is an extension of 
press freedom in local areas.  Giving opportunities, not an opinion monopoly, but multi 
opinion, diversity of opinion.  This is the freedom that we developed using Broadcasting 
Regulation, more people were involved, more people would appear, even more 
production houses.  There are talents that could appear.  But with national system, local 
areas were considered viewers. In the past, it was only tower that broadcasted.  Making 
new station needs 100 billions but making tower is only 1 billion.  So, they see people as 
rating, consumers. Jogja people are just consumers. So the implementation of this 
Broadcasting Regulation should be like that.  Actually, there are so much opinions, but 
the main points are as I stated.  
Q: But there was Broadcasting Guideline from KPI, how was that?  
A: Society awareness had to be improved through literacy (media awareness).  Namely 
by opening the complaints. It is better that your broadcast is admonished by KPI rather 
than being closed by FPI.  But they preferred to be admonished by FPI rather than KPI.  
It means KPI tried to educate society to be more civilized in stating something but using 
such a power (FPI) became uncivilized. KPI defended your interest (television enterprise) 
as well.  Not just society interest but it defended broadcasting institution interest when 
you are facing society that is going to do anarchistic actions.  I, for example, met Mr. 
Nurhadi, major general the former Head of Army Information Center, now the report 
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director of Indosiar, they were terrored by such organizations.  Why didn’t you tell KPI, I 
asked.  He overcame it with this (money). Finished.  Give them some hundreds millions, 
cancelled (the protest). It means that broadcasting institutions used the old fashion of 
solving such a problem.  It was not institutionalized. There was channel, canal.  They 
remained to take a short cut ended with money.  Such character existed.  The owners of 
these are by chance Chinese.  Soeharto family had reduced but Chinese remained. SCTV 
Chinese. Hari Tanu Chinese.  Furthermore, most of them are Christian and Catholic.  
When I met the bishop I said, the bible is the same, I have bible, but when we fight it was 
not faith (religion?) that unites us.  I am egalitarian, but their chapter is maximum profit. 
How to influence me with such approaches.  TV7 Agus Parengkuan met, Catholic. 
Handoko (Indosiar) Catholic.  They treated the bishops going to Rome. The religion 
broadcast is Indosiar. SCTV Christian, Fofo Suryaatmadja (an Australian). Yes Antv is 
Ical or Agung.  That’s it.  Why one faith …. How is it?… I have ownership anatomy, but 
it changes, doesn’t it?  That’s the innards. So, to see whose interests…  oh my! TV7 are 
friends.  Indosiar are friends. SCTV, RCTI are friends. Lativi was with Chris Kelana 
(Catholic).  So, the issue was that private television was controlled by Christian Catholic. 
Frankly speaking, with regards to this Broadcasting Regulation I, energy, time, tears…  
but not bleeding.  
Q: Do you see any changes of private tv (for example SCTV) after the existence of 
Broadcasting Regulation?  
A: No measurement. SCTV is not independent. It tends to SBY. From the past.  Some 
people say TV7 is pro PDIP.  Is that right?  Therefore when we set the criteria of the 
candidates of KPI members there were requirements such as non-particant, no 
relationship with capital owners, for that reasons I have mentioned.  If only KPI consisted 
of three elements, government, industry, and society.  Who are the government elements? 
Who are called the government?  To my opinion, the government is the president and 
ministers. Bureaucracy is not government. Government is changeable but bureaucracy is 
not. I do not agree to that and I do not adopt America. US, the members of FCC are five. 
There are two political parties. Republic and Democrate.  When Republic Party wins, the 
leader of FCC must be from the same party with the president, that’s the stipulation.  The 
composition is three parties win, two parties lose.  I refuse the concept for KPI.  I am 
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independent.  Free from government interest, from from political party interest, free from 
industry interest.  How can you make KPI, KPI was made by the House of 
Representatives not to become politic.  That is politic interest as well.  The people of the 
United States embassy told so. Debate in my room was with Americans.  
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12. Paulus Widiyanto, Jakarta, May 24,  2006 (Continued)  
 
Q: What shifts happened in media politic economy during and post Soeharto? 
A: TVRI was not permitted to broadcast commercials, only private tv were allowed.  At 
that time because tvri is national, it was worried (with commercials) it would cause 
consumptive culture, since Ali Murtopo there had been signal of the existence of private 
tv.  The signal was then responded by the entrepreneurs at that time, would build tv, pay 
tv.  The entrepreneurs at that time were those close to power, at leat the crony of 
Soeharto, his children.  It means that privet v was new and was related to 
telecommunication, usually those who had been in telecommunication field who were 
interested, including Bambang Trihatmojo, then his son in law, Indra Rukmana, some 
other persons like Piter Gontha, all of them made RCTI.  It started in 1990s.  
That means that the prive tv was intended to accommodate commercials that had existed 
in TVRI.  Then, it was decided that TVRI should not broadcast commercials but the 
revenue would be taken/shared from privates with proportion as stated in the agreement.  
Fearing of consumerism, it was decided that TVRI did not broadcast commercials and it 
was transferred to private television (RCTI).  Those people involved in such a world were 
those close to power (Soeharto). At that time, RCTI was still pay-tv, so that people who 
subscribed to the decoder were those who were able to watch television. Thus, it was 
limited to those having decoder. From marketing point of view, however, it was not 
interesting because it should have been open sky; anyone was capable because it was 
beyond terrestrial.  The subscription tv was then replaced with common tv.  
In Surabaya, there also existed SCTV, owned by Surabaya people but there were still 
Soeharto’s people in it, such as Suwikadmono who cooperated with local entrepreneurs, 
among others was the governor of East Java, Mohamad Nur.  Most of the people in it 
originated from Surabaya, one of them was the director, Agus Mulyanto, from Petra 
University (?).  So, the technical people were from Surabaya. 
Thus, those TVs actually were born as local tv.  SCTV in Surabaya, but then there 
was SCTV in Denpasar.  RCTI in Jakarta and RCTI in Bandung.   After the partnership 
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between TVRI-private televisions bore good fruits, Cendana family had an idea to use 
TVRE as an “education television” because the broadcasting hours of TVRI were from 
evening until night time.  Then, it was formulated a concept that television was an 
educational televison for Tutut to serve as an education instrument. And because it was 
an education television considered to be meaningful, which we could make of use of it as 
if we attended lectures, we could do this and that, Professor Wijoyo gave studium 
generale, as a father of economics. Then, the image was that it was a real education 
television.  What “tricky” was that TPI utilized state instrument, state infrastructure 
namely TVRI, because TVRI was not on air from morning to evening, for the interests of 
TPI as a private television. But she said, the content was her (TPI) but the infrastructure 
was of the state.  And actually there were commercials.  Most of the directors were 
Arabians, Fahmi Alatas if I am not mistaken, and some other directors such as Ahmad 
Bahasoan (marketing director), my friend in LP3ES.  So, TPI was not run using business 
laws but power laws.  For instance, the commercials were obtained from threatening 
instead of playing in the market, and many commercials/companies went to TPI because 
its network was national, while TVRI was not permitted to broadcast commercials.  I 
knew many cases.  The mony from sponsors of an event went to individual directors 
instead of the company.  Then the directors of TPI established a new company (Company 
Limited) and served as an agent for commercials placement in TPI.  It was a business 
method using power, wasn’t it?  This resulted in many commercials for TPI, and causes 
jealousy of other prive televisions.  Consequently, we (other private televisions) required 
to be national.  TPI was born in the third order on 23 January 1993 at the same birthday 
of Tutut, and it was written on the inscription that was signed by President Soeharto, his 
father.  Then, it was urged that private televisions became national televisions, while the 
private televisions were born as local televisions.  Historically, they were even pay-tv, 
subscription, limited.  This is the history of our national television.  
From capital ownership point of view it was, of course, the entrepreneurs there, but from 
its birth point of view as broadcasting institution in communication terminology, it wa 
born from local television with limited area coverage.  
The fourth private television, Indosiar, is owned by a company with the front 
name Indo and it must be Liem Swie Liong (Indocement, indomobil, indofood), so 
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Indosiar is in cooperation with Hongkong.  They made use of such business situation.  
Since it belongs to Indo group, its group like BCA supports it.  As a broadcasting 
institution, its function is just accommodating money from the right pouch coming into 
the left pouch.  There are 50 companies in this group, then they put commercials there, 
got into the pouch there, and so on.  It was just shift of spread sheet. Therefore, Indosiar 
persisted, more as a business instrument.  
The fifth TV, ANTV.  Its birth, by design was in Lampung, Andalas, by Aburizal 
Bakri in cooperation with Hasmuna group, owned by some friends who I know 
personally, owned by Agung Laksono. Since it was born in 1990s and Mr. Harto still 
wanted to be the president, the birth of ANTV was forced to approach and to be directed 
fro political interest of president election in March 1993.  My friends who started it told 
that even bamboo towers would do.  To fulfill the target of national coverage.  In their 
first broadcast in the People’s Assembly Council, they were still awkward while 
shooting, etc.  That’s the way political interests used communication channels and all of 
those by design were controlled by those who benefited. Based on the experience, 
therefore, such power considered that broadcasting media television served the most 
powerful instrument to reach deeper public and to create opinions and to get supports, 
and they had unlimited fund.  
Those five early private televisions were so close to power environment.  They 
were born based on Minister Decree instead of constitution; 1997 Broadcasting 
Regulation was not available yet.  Broadcasting business had run, broadcasting 
technology had run, public interest had been created, legality was not present.  Such 
legality was then made by adapting the pre-existed one.  Thus, law legality was just an 
instrument.  In the past, broadcasting institutions were only two, governmental and 
private broadcasting institutions (LPP, LPS, compare Broadcasting Regulation year 
1997).  There used to be an obligation to relay, too.  However, when those private 
televisions were not in Jakarta, they said: how can we survive?  We have to be in 
national. Because the requirement was national, all were drawn to Jakarta and it became 
very centralistic and the local TVs became national TVs centering in Jakarta, so that they 
were easily controlled by the central power. 
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This was the preliminary map of authorities’ political interest on broadcasting 
institution for economy, politic, and social interests and it was not easy for people to get 
into the world. RCTI was owned by his son, SCTV his brother, TPI for her daughter, 
Indosiar for his close friend in Semarang, Antv for his friend in Golkar.  So, when 
Broadcasting Regulation was delivered the problem occurred because actually the request 
for national TV was refused.  The Regulation was not signed by the president and was 
returned to the House of Representatives, because Tutut did not like the Regulation, 
because she asked for national.  And only entered the word”national”.  Hence, the 
Broadcasting Regulation year 1997 was still controlled by Cendana interests, because of 
their interest to get national television network.  Thus, Indonesia was just seen from 
Jakarta.  
There was Government Stipulation in the Regulation; there was possibility of the 
birth of new TVs. And there was an order for that.  Five new TVs, number six Transtv, 
number seven TV7, number eight Global, number nine Metro.  There was ranking based 
on new ”registrants”, and the number was many, had to be tested, whether they fulfilled 
the requirements, etc.  In that ranking, actually MetroTV did not get the permit, number 
ten was actually JTV (Jawa Pos TV).  Metro was number 12 or 13.  Dahlan Iskan told 
me: Metro played this (money), and Surya Paloh was close to Cendana, married to the 
elder or younger sister of Yosiano Barak, he is the business friend of Bambang Tri.  
Dahlan told that Metro did not fulfill the requirements but it played bla bla, might be with  
Barak/Bambang.  There were interesting words, ”getting permits is like getting hot 
plates”.  Hot plates for frying fish or so. Dahlan refused, then Metro got it and he got 
number so and so.  Actually, there was Muhammadiyah TV, I don’t recall the rank.  
There were 17-18 ranking. 
Trans TV, Chairul Tanjung, TV 7 owned by Mr. Sukoyo, an airforce colonel.  
Then, because he did not have much capital, he sold it to Kompas Group, and was capital 
injected by Kompas (80%), the rest was his (20%).  In the long run, he could not pay and 
now his share is so small.  
Lativi, Abdul Latif.  He took Cris Kelana from RCTI.  He was one of the pioneers 
in RCTI but then moved to Lativi.  
  
401
That’s the description.  Permits were given to them having relationship with the 
cronies.  And it occurred during the cabinet under Mr.Yunus Yosfiah, 1999. 
The new Broadcasting Regulation was going to place our broadcasting system on 
more democratic platform. It means that people or society had higher power than capital, 
so there had to be more people having such television or radio media.  An example is 
giving the opportunity to the local areas to establish that television or broadcasting media. 
However, the House of Representatives at that time was going to set the Draft of the 
Regulation more open to the existence of broadcasting institutions that were not present 
in the past but now are present, namely the existence of community broadcasting 
institutions, which were not accommodated in the past Broadcasting Regulation.  Thus, in 
the new Regulation, there was not just Private Broadcasting Institution as the follow up 
of the Broadcasting Regulation no. 27 year 1997, but in that Broadcasting Regulation 32 
we give the life right for Community Broadcasting Institution.  
So, the pattern was withdrawn because in the past Suharto was the new order 
leader and his children were entrepreneurs while his cronies were also there, when their 
ownership collapsed and was sold, it was sold to other young entrepreneurs, Chinese, 
who were still new.  Being new, they could find new patrons. Those new patrons were 
still on authority. When Habibie became the president to replace Suharto, tv ownership 
was on Habibie circle. Yunus Yosfiah  is a person from South Sulawesi... then the permit 
for Global TV got to Habibie’s crony since Globaltv permit was a religion tv.  It was 
given to an ICMI person named Nasir Tamara, a journalist.   In it, there was Jimmly 
Ashidiqie.  PT Iftiqar, its office was in BPPT, commissioner Nasir Tamara. It was Duta 
Visual Wisata, IDVNTV, then became TV7 (number order seven), Mr. Sukoyo.  
Previously, Indosiar was Handoko, Swastomo Supartin is my friend.  Mr. Nurhadi had 
not joined yet. Mediatv, Metro, Surya Paloh. Pasar Raya Media Karya is Lativi.  There 
were Abdul Latif and Chris Kelana.The shift of ownership must be related to 
Broadcasting Regulation because permit cannot be handed over.  This falls into this 
handover category...  Previously, 20 percent of Metrotv shares were owned by Haritanoe, 
through Indovision if I am not mistaken.  Then Haritaone was able to be expelled, the 20 
percent were taken by Surya Paloh, amounted to 100 percent. 
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Back to the new patrons, the owners of media companies would still seek safety 
to the new patrons of which people may change but the pattern will be the same 
(authority).  This is still observable until now, old owners, the persons who gave the 
lisence in the new order, still bear children and grandchildren until today, everlasting. 
Surya Paloh is still vice chairman of Golkar senior members.  The TVs owners still has 
relationship with party politics.  
Q: What about other cases, other than GlobalTV? 
A: It’s different now. Three old powers: RCTI, SCTV and Indosiar, compete tightly and 
the fight tends to devour each other because…. and sometimes the fight is brutal, for 
example, two parties cooperate to beat the other one. By way of, for example, because 
each event is done outdoors, they usually use large places for certain shows and will 
cut/omit/cancel the possibilities of other TVs to enter into those stages.  Take an example 
that a hotel would beused for a certain tv program and as much as IDR100 million has 
been paid, but because the paymet has not been completed, other TV comes and says, I 
will will pay IDR 200 million so that the TV can be beaten.  Such a method is used today 
in their competition.  Finaly, those at bottom level cannot compete and will lose and the 
loosers will possibly be absorbed by big TVs, it’s possible.  This will converge to a new 
immature Indonesian point.  Thus, the kings of tv/media, and these will be very 
dangerous, because all of them have converged.  Those who have tv have 
telecommunication, have production house, all in one, no diversity.  The ideal of 
Broadcasting Regulation is giving the message of diversity of ownership and diversity of 
content. With such centralization, it would prevent such diversity, it becomes uniform. 
And this is distinctive. And we will become part of content homogeneity of the worl tv. 
The world TV is one.  
It has been part of global marketing, global broadcasting industry, because Broadcasting 
Regulation prohibits this much percent of foreign content and it was protested by 
international community as I experienced.  It means that we/House of Representatives 
prevents the tv content from being such international extension.  Thus, the danger is 
there, if the ownership is only on some persons, and some of the Indonesian people 
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become part of that global broadcasting system, finally the ideal of content and 
ownership diversity is never reached.  
Q: What about Murdock’s joining Anteve? 
A: Because they get the permit (foreign ownership) 20 percent (in Broadcasting 
Regulation).  We expect that the ownership was through capital market.  Mechanism with 
capital market.  Please play stocks.  Only SCTV and Indosiar that have been go public 
out of 11 stations. Only those two can be bought. Unfortunately, SCTV that used to be 
owned by some people, owned by Henry Pribadi, the pioneer, was bought by new 
persons namely Fofo and Edi Suryaatmadja.  They are new players from Australia.  They 
have their capital from their business in Australia, now they occupy majority of the 
shares. Henry Pribadi’s shares were sold as much as IDR 549 billion.   
Lativi is going to be sold as well. The purchaser will be a big TV again.  TPI has been 
taken over by Haritanoe, so he has RCTI, Global and TPI. TV7 will be sold, too.  Lativi 
is targeted by SCTV.  Thus, they will be centered to …. 
What interesting is that, in the past, there was tendency that the pioneers begin 
with printed media, radio, then television.  Now, it is television, radio, then printen 
media. Haritanoe, for example, began with telecommunication… This is what we 
discussed toughtly in the Broadcasting Regulation namely cross ownership.  This became 
a problem because we considered it important to prevent monopoly. And Todung Mulya 
Lubis unceasingly opposed to it.  The first sentence in the Draft of the Regulation was, 
”cross ownership is prohibited..”  We discussed it, then ”cross ownership is limited”… 
then ”cross ownership is regulated”.  That is how we prevented cross ownership.  The 
legal sentences we composed related closely to such interests. And the opposition was so 
strong.  What is meant by cross ownership. It became a problem. Per definition, its 
application, they are three: radio, television, printed.  What is meant by cross ownership 
is like that.  It has not entered into telecommunication yet.  This is present in the 
Government Stipulation.  It becomes sophisticated.  Frankly, they are not the measures. 
...Legitimizing the existing.  Thus, the debate was on how we treat the existing. 
Restructure, I told so.  But they disagreed.  No way, they said.  If I wanted it to be 
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rearranged, those big TVs pressed us through the minister.  They asked the existing to be 
preserved.  Then existed compromise chapters that were visible in the last chapters.  
With this Government Stipulation, the existing was approved to be everlasting.  
So, how many frequency channels do RCTI, Global, TPI, for example, occupy? Please 
count!  Those all belong to Haritanoe.  Not to mention radio, and the printed media such 
as Genie, Sindo, and its telecommunication infrastructure.  He already has Indovision.  
The other is like SCTV whose new owners are Fofo and Mr. Sudwikadmono.  He 
also targeted Lativi.  Another is newslink, where every handphone owner would get 
newlink information.  News sms, for example.  Thus, news enter the handphone through 
telecommunication network.  Convergence will occur, between telecommunication 
infrastructure and the content.  It should not be monopolized.  This means that those who 
already have infrastructure will keep on winning.  Network has been monopolized.  
Aburizal Bakri has had telecommunication network.  In addition, he gets into internet and 
others.  And those are owned by several people only.  This is our fear because whoever 
holds them will hold authority.  
Q: Why was TV7 sold (merger), was it not saleable?  
A: No.  The name TV7 was not selling at that time.  If they wanted, TV Kompas would 
be selling.  Anyway, the news in TV7 must be present in Kompas, on page so and so... 
So, what is the difference of reading newaspaper and watching television (TV7).  Then, 
newspaper sells TV’s leaflet.  Whereas, that’s not the point.  Sindo newspaper, for 
example, that is just the leaflet of the television. In terms of ethics, it is not allowed since 
it falls into cross ownership.  Because the reader, listener, and spectators are directed to 
one point.  No diversity.  One person can work for three stations (media).  For example, I 
write news on beard fire in Merapi, that will be reported in newspapers tomorrow, 
including radio and television.   The cost is relatively small, much profit.  That’s what I 
call the information as recycle.  And it becomes instant.  Not deep.  The news is, 
therefore, not interesting anymore.  
So, there is the shift, but the explanation of its theoretical frame, to find new 
patrons or  to continue the past patronage, with its decsendants.  And that will happen 
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later in the general election.  It will be visible there.  Imagine if I have tv and I nominate 
myself candidate of president.  How is that arrangement for me as the candidate of a 
president? Okey, everyone has the same right but what about impartiality, giving the 
same opportunity, will not be achieved.  The proof was when ISAI did a research, Metro 
TV is Surya Paloh, ANTV is Aburizal Bakri.  
Q: Dedy N Hidayat said, the news tends to be commodity only?  
A: Yes, I agree to it.   Thus, the commodity is not in order for the society to know, but the 
society is stuff to eat for its needs. It is forced. And that is what I repeatedly say, whoever 
holds television media (electronic), he controls someone’s time ownership.  Thus, my 
time is owned by other people, not by me.  For example, I am forced to watch television, 
thus my time is controlled by it.  If people say time is money then it takes my money... 
And television changes someone’s behavior, not as productive person but consumptive. 
Since the time is allocated to enjoy, not to produce, and it decreases national productivity.  
Q: Do electronic cinemas (sinetron) fall into commodity?  
A: Yes, broadcasting regulation prohibits the birth of production houses, both at national 
level and local level.  With the presence of local tv, local production houses were 
expected to be productive.  It related to the content or the commodity, imaging or trend 
setting took place.  Trend setting took place, tv formed new trend. Look at that story, A’s 
love to B became C.  But tomorrow, it would be made complicated to make people got 
absorbed and controlled someone’s time.  The story was characterization of 15 or 20 
characters.  The same person played different characters. And we watch characters. And 
it was only recycled.  Whatever the face is, either religion or others.   When there was 
love, flateredness, then they were criticized, shifted to mysticism, criticized again then 
moved to religious, divine.  They were just rotated.  And those production houses; they 
have special writers.  If they were ordered to write divine stories, they can do it.   
Entertainment is commodity.  But depthness, life endurance is not important.  
Then comedy show, and everyone follows.  Another trend setter.  Look at Warkop films 
that were broadcasted several times; it’s just time consuming.  It’s so cheap because its 
humorous film. TV commercials interrupt.  So, what benefits does society get?  
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The capital owners have controlled the time of Indonesian people. And time is 
money. And it is calculated as rating.  And becomes consumptive (not productive) and 
inefficient. Electronic media control has occupied realm, way of talking, way of 
behaving, and of the utmost important is that it occupied our time.  
It’s about film.  Since television becomes a theater in our room, the movie 
theaters outside die. What I mean is the movie theaters in villages in the outskirts; it 
already replaces the role because it used to utilize the time to see movies outside, it is not 
done anymore, it is replaced with watching films at home. Cheap.  Whereas in fact the 
presence of the movie theaters the owners will get income.  Creation of employment 
takes place. And there are peanut sellers outside. Not, it does not happen; all die.  In my 
hometown, the movie theater functions as swallow nest.  Movie theaters in big cities, 
however, 21 (Sudwikadmono) is international.  It belongs to Cendana family, doesn’t it? 
Thus, all the small theaters die.  In the past, we requested that tv was not allowed to 
broadcast this and that film… there was the rule. Film regulation has not been improved.  
National films die as well.  Local movie theaters are absorded, because tv is just like a 
trawl.  This is a culture industry: televisi, radio, film. But what about the other art 
performance? Teater is dead. Dance? All die. Wheas these are all part of the culture. 
Ngesti Pandowo, Barata Traditional Human Puppet Show at Senin, all die.   So, the old 
traditional arts disappear, vanished.  Luckily, there is still campur sari...  That’s the death 
of some elements of culture industry.  
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13.  RH Siregar, member of Board of Advisory of Indonesian Journalists Union (PWI), 
Solo,  December 8, 2005 
 
Question (Q): What was your role in the establishment of the Press Regulation no 
40/1999? 
Answer (A):  In the process of the Press Regulation establishment that was discussed 
through the Draft of the Regulation, actually I had been involved quite long in the frame 
of completing the prevailing Ress Regulation UU No 21/1982 where there was 
introduced an institution called the Press Publication Enterprise Permit (SIUPP).  With 
regards to this SIUPP, there had been protest from press community to annul it because it 
was contrary to the press regulation as the source of the stipulations of Minister of 
Information regulating the SIUPP.  Why was it contradictive? It is mentioned in Article 4 
of Regulation No 11 year 1966 on the Press Basic Stipulations that “cencorship is not 
applicable to national press”.   If we look at the substance of the Information Minister 
Regulation, known as Government Stipulation No 1 Year 1984 on SIUPP, there ia one 
article there giving possibility for the government to “close” press enterprise that is 
suspected or judged to be contrary or is not in line with Pancasila Press. This had been 
our problem since the year 1982.  I was from Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI); I 
was also the member of Technical Commission of Local Press at that time.  It was the 
commission that reviewed the efforts of completing Regulation No 21/1982.  Particulary 
the efforts to eliminate SIUPP that was not in accordance with its main Regulation 
(Article 4 Regulation No 11/1966).  At that period (since 1982) I was also involved in the 
the formulation of the Stipulation of Information Minister No 1/1984 and in the 
discussion of the Draft of Information Minister Regulation, we had warned no further 
spelling out of the stipulation on SIUPP should be applicable.  At that time the 
government said that it was the Regulation that made possible.  Since in Regulation No 
21/1982 on SIUPP it was confirmed “will be arranged further by the Minister of 
Information...”  This was the legal basis of the Minister of Information to issue the 
Stipulation of the Minister of Information No 1/1984.  I said, even if there would be 
SIUPP, it should have been mandated entirely to the Minister of Information, but it would 
  
408
be regulated further by the Government Stipulation in order to make inter-department 
dialoge/communication happen.  However, since it was the regulation of the Minister of 
Information, thus the Minister of Information did not have to hold inter department 
discussion with regards to the execution of the stipulation of Regulation No 21/1982.  
That was the problem.  I was one of the persons who asked for delay of the discussion but 
due to political situation of that time the Stipulation of the Minister of Information No 
1/1984 was issued.   Then, closing down of some newspapers took place, including the 
newspaper that I was involved, which was the first victim of the Minister Stipulation, in 
October 1986, the SIUPP of Sinar Harapan was annulled.  Afterwards, we continually 
reviewed to complet the regulation and tried to eliminate such SIUPP.  Departement of 
Information together with Press Council held series of meetings, discussions, etc., trying 
to make Press Regulation not to be colored by the stipulations of this SIUP.  I was one of 
the persons in the team, with Prof Dr Muis from Makasar, to be asked to discuss it but the 
concept that we had agreed, when it was submitted to the House of Representatives in   
1999, was different from what we had discussed, so if we looked at the spiritual 
atmosphere in the discussion of the Draft of Press Regulation that it becomes Regulation 
now, was spiritual atmosphere of transition time from authoritarian government to 
democratic government.  Even, to my opinion, there was a kind of opinion and even some 
kind of “revenge” in that everything made by the New Order had to be turned upside 
down, to be eliminated, etc.  
If we examined the formula of this Press Regulation No 40, for example, “no 
permit”, then “no requirements to recommend a chief editor or to recommend 
requirements for press enterprises to have capital” ect., were not present anymore.  
Whereas our thinking concept, for example article 2, which now becomes the 
article stating “press freedom is one forms of people sovereignty.”   Our original concept 
from MPPI and PWI, at that time, the article 2 said “press freedom is source of people 
sovereignty”.   We did not agree either that normative stipulations were entered into 
positive law stipulations.  Why? Because if normative stipulations were entered into 
positive law stipulations, the moral (normative) sanctions became positive law and the 
sanctions were legal sanctions.  And, according to Press Regulation, the sanctions were 
penal sanctions, even if fine, not physical punishment.  That was the consequence of 
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raising normative stipulations to positive law.   Actually we didn’t agree with that.  It was 
first.  Second, anything related to journalistic technical characteristic should not be 
arranged in Regulation.  Take an example that journalists should broadcast ideas and 
opinions accurately, correctly and precisely.  Did such things need Regulation?  The 
same thing was applicable to the conformity with journalistic ethics codes.   It is 
mentioned in Article 2 point 2 of the Regulation that journalists have and conform to 
journalistic ethics codes.  The word ‘conformity’ had violated press independence 
because the ethics codes were made by journalists who then committed to execute them.  
Actually, the conformity to the ethics codes dependes on journalists’ conscience, but the 
ethics codes were made by journalists, but the Regulation said “to conform” that means 
anybody can say the journalist of “bla bla bla ” had violated the ethics codes.  Whereas, 
the one determined and decided violation against the law was the related profession 
organization.  Those two things should have been separated (not in the Regulation).   It 
was normative stipulation, positive law stipulation.  This caused conflict of one to each 
other.  
That was our efforts in the discussion process of the Draft of Regulation in the 
House of Representatives, and the other problems was whether the Press Council that was 
formed at that time would be financed by National Income and Expenditure Budget 
(APBN) or not.  Some people said that it was financed by APBN some people from press 
saind “no” because of the fear that press would be controlled by bureaucracy.   I was one 
of those suggesting that Press Council was financed by APBN.  Those who thought that 
if Press Council was financed it would be controlled can be seen from other example that 
the House of Representatives was financed through Cabinet Secretary/State Secretary.  
Even National Human Rights Commission was only based on Presidential Decree but 
they were independent, weren’t they?  I said that APBN was the money of the sate, not 
the government.  Whereas, some part of the government came from the state.  For the 
reason, if that was the money of the state, then the people could (get), enjoy or use the 
money, couldn’t they?  Thus, the Press Council that was formed by the state as an 
institution through the Regulation could be financed by the APBN.  I did not see any 
problem with the independence issue.  Because it was the money of the people, not the 
government.  In terms of being controlled, what about National Human Rights 
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Commission, also the House of Representatives, they were just independent.  They still 
executed control function.  That was our debate.  Eventually, this is what happens, we, 
the Press Council, are so limited in our activities due to lack of fund.  Thus, if it was 
mentioned there was fund from the state it was what we struggled for.  In order that the 
fund from the state was elaborated or in other words there was some budget allocated by 
the state to finance the activities of Press Council.  Since 2000 up to 2005 the fund from 
the state for the Press Council was eventually elaborated; I was one of those who 
struggled for it, so that in last June there had been Minister Decree to position the Press 
Council Secretariate as the officals of Communication and Information in order to help 
Press Council to do its activities.  Thus, it served as a supporting facility.  Now, we get a 
kind of budget and we use it to execute the programs.  
Q: What institutions that didn’t agree to the Draft of the Regulation?  
A: In general, press community did not agree some articles of the Draft of the Regulation 
at that time, for example with regards to “trial by the press”.  We gave strong oppositive 
reaction because the issue should not be stipulated in the Regulation.  In the concept of 
the Draft of the Regulation, the proposal about this issue existed, especially the House of 
Representatives, Mrs. Aisyiah Amini in particular, suggested that media did not create 
such reports that seemed to judge the person who is undergoing legal process.   All press 
communities protested that the issue was entered into the Regulation, including the 
technical issues, but eventually it was entered as we can see in the current Regulation.  
Q: What was the opinion of the Army fraction?  
A: The Army fraction also wanted that the “trial by the press” was entered, so that there 
was a kind of control to press freedom that had been opened widely; no more permit, no 
more profession recommendation, etc.  Because the openness had to be balanced in order 
that there was no uncontrolled execution of press freedom; there had to be such warnings 
that enabled the execution of the press independence responsibly.  
Q:  In general, was the draft arrangement doen smoothly?  
A:  As I told you before, it was a transitional time, shifting period from an authoritarian 
government to a democratic government.  There was something like a “revenge”, a kind 
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of “hate” to the rules made by the New Order through Press Regulation or the SIUPP 
stipulations had to be turned upside down, to be eliminated; there was some hate that 
resulted in a kind of euphoria.  This was that smoothened the formulation of the 
stipulations of Press Regulation. It was first.  Second, to my opinion and based on my 
observation at that time, this Press Regulation was actually one of the efforts of President 
Habibie government to prepare General Meeting of People’s Advisory Assembly that 
would ask him for his accountability, before the general election of 1999, in order to be 
reelected.  In other words, the arrangement of Press Regulation carried political interest, 
because the House of Representatives resulted from the 1999 General Election expected 
to be said reformists, whereas they were people resulted from General Election in the 
New Order.  It was because reform had been done at that time, they were afraid of being 
accused as non-reformists.  Thus, there was some euphoria so that the discussion of the 
Draft of the Regulation ran smoothly.  Furthermore, Mohamad Yunus as the Minister of 
Information was so reformative; press did not need any permits, etc.  There was a 
comment from (our) press at that time, what would happen if there was media that was 
not led by someone without press background?  That would be natural selection.  Ok, but 
before the natural selection tookp lace, the society had been fed up with misleading, 
fooling, reports due to unprofessionalism.  We could do nothing because it was natural 
selection.  When media went bankrupt, how were the employees? It was our debate with 
Moh Yunus/Menpen. 
Q:  Why did Mr. Yunus do that? 
A:  You know, he carried a political message from President Habibie.  The Draft of the 
Regulation was actually discussed for only 21 working days, before the Special 
Assembly.  Thus, it was legalized on 23 September 1999 whereas it was proposed to the 
House of Representative only in August.  That was the spiritual atmosphere at that time 
so that when we wanted to implement the Press Regulation, we face some obstacles. 
Press Council, for example, was not law enforcer, according to this Regulation, whereas 
the society/public required Press Council to do more.   It needs strengthening but it was 
impossible.   According to this Regulation, Press Council was only mediator and 
facilitator and thus it had moral force only because it was not the past Press Council that 
had the power to make regulations binding other people.  Then, some principles in the 
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Press Regulation could not be enforced, for example there were five roles (Article 6) of 
national press, namely fulfilling the rights of the society to know, doing social control, 
struggling for justice and truth, disseminating news…  When there were violations 
against them, who (would take action)?   It was mentioned there that, for example, 
journalists were under law protection (article 8) while they were doing their profession. 
What happened when there were people preventing the journalists from getting law 
protection that was guaranteed by the Regulation?  No body solved such a problem, 
brought into legal action, etc.  In the case of foreign capital investment, for example, it 
was said to have to be through capital market.  Who made an observation that the 
addition of the foreign capital did not dominate the entire capital as it was written in the 
Regulation but there was no mention in the explanation, in order that the foreign capital 
did not dominate related perss enterprise?  Who? Press Council? It’s impossible.  If Press 
Council was a self regulatory body, it should have been able to address the issue.   
Q: So, how was actually the concept of press freedom in the Regulation?  
A: It was so idealistic, but it was difficult for us to implement it… Such examples, for 
example, got legal protection; press freedom was guaranteed as the right of citizens.   In a 
concrete realization, when there was an obstacle, who solve the problem?  One more 
thing, the main function of Press Council was protecting press freedom from interference 
of other parties.  It was multi interpretation.  Then how did Press Council try to protect it? 
What authority did it have?  Who were the “other parties”?  Were the owners of press 
enterprises considered as other parties? Was press, too?  What happened when it was the 
capital owners that interfered?  How was it if press enterprise also sold pornography? 
Might this be the only Regulation with no executing rules?  Why was there nothing? We 
were traumatic of the past.  Because the existing Press Regulation did not give the 
possibility for muzzling and cencorship but in the execution Regulation (Stipulations of 
the Minister of Information) 1984, muzzling turned out to be possible even though the 
terms was not “muzzling” but SIUPP “annulment”; basically it was the same as closing 
down.   Press community called this situation “blank check” (Stipulation of the Minister 
of Information 1984).  Then, if it was written “further stipulation will be arranged …” 
that was the blank check.  The Regulation had prohibited but through the execution 
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stipulation it was possible to break through the stipulation of the main Regulation.  This 
caused this Regulation not to have its execution stipulations.  
Q: How was the conflict?  
A: It was not only during the discussion of the Draft of Regulation that euphoria took 
place, but it also existed in the society after getting free from press restraint and shackling 
in the past.  Thus, basically everyone supported; we were aware only when we were 
going to execute this and there were some obstacles.  We acknowledged the existence of 
some kind of euphoria.  
Q: We get into the implementation of this Regulation.  After it was legalized, how did 
you see press professionalism, its performance, etc.?  
A: Put it this way, when the corridor of press freedom was opened widely in the middle 
of 1998 by BJ Habibie’s government, press community and the society were nervous. 
Since suddenly it was opened widely, press was also somewhat nervous in living the 
sudden freedom, compared to 32 years under shackle.  So was the society.  They were 
nervous to see the development of the press that was so free, vulgar, making such 
bombastic titles that made them puzzled of where those all were going?  The 
consequence was that they judged everything themselves.   For the reason, related to 
press freedom that had been guaranteed entirely by Press Regulation, also by Amendment 
of 1945, article 28f, this press freedom had to have been executed responsibly.  There 
was also rather inappropriate understanding of this “accountability” issue.  In the past, 
accountable press was considered as being responsible to the government, which was 
wrong.  It had to be accountable to the people as the sovereignty holder.  Thus, in a series 
of the discussion of this Draft of Regulation I said that press freedom orginiated from the 
people because the people as the holder of the sovereignty have some public rights.   One 
of them is the right to get required information and knowledge.  In order to achieve this, 
independent press is needed.  Without independent press, the public rights cannot be 
executed.  For the reason, press must be responsible to the people as the holder of the 
sovereignt, not to the government.  Thus, although Constitution and Press (Regulation) 
had guarantee press independence but press was not abosolutely free; there were 
warnings and limits.  
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Q: So, the concept was like “social responsibility”, wasn’t it?   
A: Yes.  Hence, the present press independence must be executed professionally and 
responsibly. However, we see the lack of the responsibility.  There is also an image, 
which the community also complains, saying that press independence only searches for 
its rights, neglecting its obligations.  Whereas, actually the function of press in the Press 
Regulation was entertainment, information and social control, in addition to educational 
principle.   This educational principle was lack of attention; priority was given to social 
control, information and entertainment principles so that infotainment grew as at does 
now.  It even enters privacy now. This is the consequence of euphoria.  Thus, if we talk 
about current press independence, it must be executed civilly, professionally.  Otherwise, 
our press independence will lead to anarchy.  
Q:  So, how do you see media development during the period of 1999 to 2004?  Was the 
problem on journalist professionalism or capital owners?  
A: That’s what we see now.  Press practitioners and journalists are not fanatic in 
executing the journalistic ethics codes.  We have to acknowledge it.  If we compare to 
press figures in the past, they were so fanatic to their ethics codes.  If there was protest 
against the reports they made, they were so shocked. But now, protests and arguments do 
not give any effects. Fanaticism to the execution of the ethics codes is less visible.  That’s 
first.  Second, actually, press enterprise has developed into capitalized industry, 
especially television media that needs huge capital.  So, we see in the development of this 
press, compared to the past, that the capital investors are not merely those with press 
background, but entrepreneurs, businessmen, who see profit opportunities in press 
industry.  What happened was increasing conflict of interests, between ideal press interest 
and press business interest.  In fact, this press business interest was prioritized and ideal 
press interest was somewhat neglected.  That was what actually happened.  For the 
reason, we expected that even if the capital owners are with business background, they 
could make press ideal interest and press business interest balanced.  How to make this 
harmonious is another art.  It is impossible now to prioritize ideal press only as it was in 
the years 40s, independence war time or the years 50s.   Without healthy press business, 
good press ideal interest will not be able to be done.  This is our concern, how to make 
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both balanced so that the independence of the editor and journalists will be not neglected 
for the sake of the interests of capital owners who expect return from the capital they 
have invested in current press industry.  
Q: What factors caused less fanaticism of journalists for ethics codes?  
A:  Listen.  There is an illustration; in 1989 we were on a discussion in Jakarta to 
complete journalistic Ethics Codes when someone said that ethics codes were not 
important.  The reason was that ethics codes limit the movement space of journalists. 
Why?  Because ethics codes tell that this one is not allowed, that one is prohibited, this 
cannot be done, and that is actually the essence of ethics codes.  It was accused as well 
that those ethics codes were produced by the old people who should have withdrawn 
themselves but they did not want to; thus, these journalistic ethics codes were made in 
order to make them still existed on the stage. Frankly speaking, there was an impact after 
that, because at that time press was shackled and this opinion considered it proper.  Press 
was cooptated, wasn’t it? PWI, for example, had become the propaganda of the 
government, so when there was such an idea, people showed empathy.  Thus, it gave 
impact, primarily among young generation.  
When Habibie government executed regulation in 1998 and opened the corridor 
of press freedom widely, it seemed to legitimate the idea that had been developed 10 
years before. If there was an opinion that ethics codes were not important, plus such 
nervousness, what happened was like what we are facing today.  The reason is that in the 
past, violation against ethics codes coule be reasonable foundation to close down, to anull 
SIUPP.  Now, there is no sanction for that.  Moreover, there are tens of profession 
organization members.   If someone is a member of PWI he will be suspended from PWI 
membership.  
Q: Was there educational factor? 
A: …Ideally, those who become journalists should have communication other related 
study background, but now in reality new journalists recruitment might come from exact 
sciences, from ITB and others.  Thus, such factor (education) was not, but the 
  
416
environment made them in such a way that fanaticism of executing the ethics codes 
decreased.  
Q: What about journalism (training) educational background, not merely formal 
education?  
A:  That is our foundation, the Press Council, to improve education and trainings of 
journalists in the future.  By far, we cannot do it due to short of fund.  In the budget of the 
year 2006 most share of the fund would be allocated for education and training all over 
Indonesia because there had been an allocated fund for Press Council.  Such education 
and training was intended primarily for journalists falling into unhealthy category. SPS 
indicated that only 30 percent fell into health category, the mainstream, the rest of 70 
percent was not healthy yet.  We prioritized this big number to get education and training 
so that they would feel proud of their profession so that fanaticism to execute ethics 
codes and law norm could develop more.  This was one of therapies that we think was 
able to penetrate community’s question that press at present time practices “prevocation 
journalism”, “anarchic journalism” and so on.  
Q: After the existence of this Press Regulation, how did the government respond to it?  
A: Actually, the problem laid on the press itself that was less fanatic for executing its 
ethics norms, and was also less respective to law norms.  They were filled with euphoria 
atmosphere so that there were such press media reports considered to be harmful, defiled 
good name, which was called character assassination.  For example, due to unbalanced 
reports, sided news, unclear news source, the analysis was only based on incredible 
sources, etc.  The result press performance as it is now.  The news was too vulgar, 
bombastic.  In the early of the year 2003-2004, for example, such titles as “Mega’s 
Mouth Smells Diesel Fuel”, “Mega is More Ferocious than Sumanto” did not exist. The 
society was taken aback as well.  There was an impression that such practices of the press 
encouraged both executives and legislatives to arrange such regulations in order to 
prevent such a thing from occurring.  Actuall it returned to the press itself.  Hence, we 
expressed in the House of Representatives when there was such an opition (making 
regulation) in 2004, where legislatives and executives agreed to complete Press 
Regulation, but there was no guarantee that the existing freedom would be defended. We 
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fear that it would even be decreased.   Thus, we expressed that unprofessional press 
practice to become the foundation, encouraging the executives and legislatives to make 
new regulation so that it decreased press independence that we have now.  That is the real 
description, thus it returned also to the press itself.  Thus, we expected that press freedom 
was executed more professionally, more civilly with the expectation of no opportunity for 
the government and legislative to make new regulation that would decrease or limit and 
functioned in such a way that there are limits as there were in the past.  
Q: Are there still any pressures to revise? 
A: Based on my personal review for 6 years, the implementation is so difficult. The 
formula is ideal, but it cannot be put in practice.  As I told you: who were the law 
enforcers of the Press Regulation?  Press Council was not.  We just prevented the 
government from interfering.  Did we let it do it?  From the beginning, I was one of those 
requiring the revision of this Press Regulation.  It had been 26 years ago that I asked this 
Press Regulation to be of lex specialist character.  Now, it cannot be categorized as lex 
specialist since it has not fulfilled the requirements.  There are three requirements.  First, 
the law principle must be the same, the same penal law regime, or the same civil law 
regime, or the same state administration law regime.  For example lex specialists of Anti 
Terrorism Regulation, Anti Corruption Regulation, they are lex specialists from Penal 
Law Book (KUHP) because Penal Law Book regulates terrorism, and regulates 
corruption.  Thus, civil law regime cannot dictate penal law regime.  The regime of this 
Press Regulation law regime is mixed.  It is neither penal nor civil.  There are civil and 
penal… there is state administration….  Thus, they cannot be lex specialized.  From that 
point, they do not fulfill the requirements.  Second, an act is regulated by two different 
regulations. For example humiliation is regulated in article 310 penal law book; is there 
any humiliation offence in Press Regulation?  Nothing.   Thus, they can be paralled.  If 
they want to be lex specialists, Press Regulation must also regulate “humiliation”.  When 
there is claim to the police, we will aske the police not to use the article 310 of KUHP, 
for example.  Just use Press Regulation.  The attorney office also still uses KUHP since it 
is positive law.  Third, the legal threat of lex specialist is heavier than lex generalis.  It 
also became a controversy, whether it will happen to lex specialist.  If it is physical 
punishment there, what kind of punishment here, for example.  Thus, we call it not lex 
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specialist yet.  In 1979 I was a team member of academic manuscript of Press Regulation 
completion in 1966.  Thus, in 1979 Prof Seno Adji formed the team to complete it.  I 
expected that the Press Regulation would be lex specialist.  I was somewhat different 
from Leo; he was not of law discipline.  If  Press Regulation is still needed, to become lex 
specialist, let’s arrange it.  We entered Press offenses existing in the KUHP but we 
modified them.  If previously it was penal, we changed it into civil, if it is possible.  We 
just arrange it.   Also, when it was physical punishment, here the punishment was fine. 
Penal punishment was also applied but in the form of fine.  That’s to mention some. But 
our colleague did not understand it.  That’s what we meant that Press Regulation became 
lex specialist.  But we cannot make it lex specialist since it has not fulfilled the 
requirements.   Thus, the current Press Regulation must be revised if we want it lex 
specialist.  This depends on the press community (if they agree the revision without 
reducing press independence principle might be able to be done).  We have to struggle for 
it.  We should not refuse. On on hand, we want to refuse revision but we want lex 
specialist.  I am afraid there is interest of the capital owners.  Since with the current 
Regulation, they are so free.  They can monopolize.  It also existed in the discussion last 
night because certain groups control everywhere.  And free.  No permits are needed.  No 
recommendation from anywhere.  
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14.  St. Sularto,Vice Chief Editor of Kompas, Jakarta, August 24, 2005 
Question (Q): Are there any differences in the relationships between the government and 
the media in each of the administrations?  How was the freedom of the press at the time? 
Answer (A): I would talk primarily about the era after Soeharto, because the freedom of 
the press was only started in the Habibie’s administration. Only in his administration that 
there was the new Press Act. We were not required to get a SIUPP (press business 
license) anymore. We were just asked to tell that we wanted to publish. That was the 
beginning. Later, there was no requirement at all to tell that we wanted to publish. In my 
opinion, the greatest freedom of the press was in the era of Gus Dur. We were able to 
criticize anything. In the era of Habibie, it was a bit strict for religious matters. Though in 
fact there was no written rule about it, but we had to be very cautious if we wanted to 
write about this matter. During the era of Gus Dur and Mega, we could freely write 
anything. And in the era of Gus Dur, we were shocked that Kong Hu Cu was made a 
religion, wasn’t it? We could criticize anything and there was no worry that we would be 
bridled or be warned about. But in this era (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – SBY), this 
president is in fact very sensitive. We are in fact very cautious though it is still much 
better than the era before Habibie. In the pre- Habibie era, there was a requirement for a 
general leadership for a newspaper. If someone was to be named as the editor in chief, he 
/ she should be approved by the Minister of Information. Now there is no such a 
requirement.  
Q: Was it true that some shares had to be given freely? 
A: No. For a new media, that could be true. It belonged to Harmoko. You had to give him 
some part of the shares. Even there were ridiculous things. Harmoko was the chairman of 
the National Basketball Association. When there was a basketball championship, Kompas 
was allowed to add some more pages for commercial ads. At the time there was a rule 
about the maximum pages for a newspaper. We were allowed to have more pages for 
commercial ads. But a half of the revenue was taken by Harmoko. Then when Mrs. Tien 
Soeharto died, all newspapers, including Kompas, were allowed to display condolences. 
Most of them were one full page ads. A lot of money. But the money had to be given to a 
foundation made by Mr. Moerdiono (the current Minister of the State) and Mr. Moersid.  
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Well it is only about the game. Now about the feeling. We feel that the freedom of 
the press is great enough, just free enough from fear to be bridled, fear from warning, by 
the state. In the midst of this reform era, one tends to be anarchistic in nature. And such a 
worry doesn’t come up. In the past, the paper was bridled and case was closed. But now it 
is not the state that is going to bridle the papers but those unsatisfied institutions, for 
example the militant groups. It obliges us to be very cautious, and our self – censorship 
should always be in place. Just for a real case, if want to write about the FPI (Islamic 
Guardian Front), we should hesitate or should be not so courageous. For instance, 
recently Gus Dur alerted a warning (about the attack to the campus of Akhmadiyah). We 
wrote the warning, but we dared not to write about the attack. These are our tricks to play 
in such a difficult situation. So the constraints are still there. Even they are more 
physically evident. For instance about the Akhmadiyah case. We dare not to get into the 
issue, because there is an attitude that ‘this is only the business between Islam and Islam. 
Mind your own business!’ We, Kompas, have been labeled as a Christian newspaper. 
There is a freedom, but how we can make use our freedom to write in complete form, 
without any pressure, is still far away. We do have the ‘freedom from …’ but not the 
‘freedom for …’ 
Q: In the initial era (Habibie), it looked that the House of Representatives was too much 
eager to pass the new Press Act. Were there any special events, or special issues, that 
showed that the freedom of the press was only in the beginning? 
A: I don’t quite remember. I just remember after the SIUPP requirement was revoked. 
There was a booming press publication. That was one impact of a freedom era. In the era 
of Soeharto it was quite difficult to get a SIUPP. I could only see the boom. But I don’t 
remember anything else. 
Q: The freedom was so great during the era of Gus Dur, wasn’t it? 
A: Particularly for the ideology. The era of Habibie was still a transition, between yes and 
no. When Gus Dur assumed the presidency, we were free. Then Mega. In fact, during the 
era of Mega we were still free. We could freely criticize the government. Now, in the era 
of SBY, there are restraints. First from the government, and second from the militant 
groups. The militant groups have even been growing after the reform era. At times they 
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are more solid, and at other times not. With new uniform, for instance the PKS (the 
Prosperity and Justice Party).  
Q: Do you see any elasticity of the relationship between the media and each of the 
administrations? 
A: Yes. And the media also played with that (the elastic strategy). So did the government. 
Q: Was it only in certain issues, such as religious issues, or in other issues such as in 
economic issues? 
A: In the era of Harmoko (former minister of information), the two issues played were 
the economic and political issues. Other issues, for instance, cultural issues, were not the 
main case. The political issues were about conflicts: conflict between the poor and the 
rich, conflict about SARA (ethnicity, race, religious, groups), the dual function of the 
Armed Forces (ABRI), and about national leadership. But these last three issues were all 
political in nature. And sometimes also about economic issues. In the past, even if the 
media knew about the plan to increase the fuel price, but they were not allowed to tell the 
public… If you did it, then you were dead! Also about the monetary plan of the 
government. For instance, during the era of Soeharto, Sinar Harapan was bridled because 
it published the opinion of Daud Yusuf. It was the right of the government to launch an 
embargo. But now there is no such an embargo. You can even write the ‘off the record’ 
issues. No problem about it. So the main concerns were about economic and political 
issues. For cultural issues, no problem. 
Q: So there was a shift between issues, wasn’t it? In the past political issues could not be 
published, now they are relatively easy to publish.  
A: Relatively publishable. It was not imaginable for us to publish news like the current 
Aceh issues. It was quite unimaginable to publish issues about the Polri (the state police) 
with 15 personal bank accounts of policemen. Though up to now such an issue is still 
very much questionable (about the resume of the Polri issues), but at least we can still 
publish the news that there is a problem. Also about the court. Though there is still no 
clear resume about the issues, at least we can raise an alert. Also about the warning from 
Mr. Jusuf Kalla (the vice president) to the press to stop criticizing the government about 
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the resume for the Aceh problems … but no media stops it. The government is not going 
to bridle, but is there any guarantee that government (that is very sensitive) will not 
bridle? That is the game. The government is elastic, so we are. No media pays an 
attention to the warning by the government … still writes the issues.  
Q: Is there any more problem in the front line in the administrations of Habibie, Gus Dur, 
and Mega? The reporters?  
A: No. The maximum was only about violence case. But there was no restrain that such a 
thing could not be published.  
Q: What about the case between Kompas and Sinivasan? 
A: The case is about the company of Sinivasan that was in an unfavorable financial 
situation where it had to pay its debts. Then Sinivasan tried to find ways to get rid of the 
obligation to pay or to make the debts eased. Then they tried to find a scapegoat 
(according to their version): Kompas and Tempo. But the legal reason he used was 
obsolete. And we have the evidence that our publication was not based on our 
investigation but from the statement of Didik (an economic observer), a statement in the 
cabinet meeting. So we were in good position, then they stepped back. So if later our 
publication will be taken into the court, we will invite the source. We were ready to go to 
the court, but they declined. Case closed, we didn’t pay anything. 
Q: Does it mean that there were other cases other from the political and economic issues? 
A: Yes, there are. In the past, every business person was backed by the government. 
When the government is no longer on their side, they have to struggle for their own. Then 
when they are in struggle, they try to find a scapegoat. For the Tempo case. Tempo was 
not in good position because it did not have a source. The failure of Tommy Winata was 
because he sent people to beat the Tempo reporters. That’s all. But from a journalistic 
point of view, Tempo was wrong because it did not make a confirmation with Tommy.  
In the past, a business person was scared by the media. Perhaps because the media 
could be bribed, or if a business person was to go to the court, the court would certainly 
be in favor for the media.  
  
423
Q: What about the pressures by the groups coming to Kompas with their protesters? 
During the administration of whom? 
A: It depends. For the East Timor case, it was during the administration of Soeharto. 
Then during the era of Gus Dur, there were Islamic groups. There was also a group of 
Gus Dur that took the wrong address. They wanted to protest to Bobo (a kid magazine) 
for its illustration, but they protested Kompas. But they were still the same groups. Just 
say them the groups of gangsters, or religious groups (Islam). The group of Habib Rizieq, 
for instance, or the group that wanted to get something (money) with this case.  
Another example. For instance, a Kompas journalist writes about the people in 
Batam who reside an illegal piece of land. Then come some people to the regional office 
of Kompas in Batam. Other medias may also have such an experience. But those groups 
of people also consider the size of the media. If the media is small, what is it for to 
protest? This also happens here in Jakarta. When there is a case with Warta Kota or 
Persda (non – Jakarta press publication, owned by Kompas), then the target would be 
Kompas itself. Just like the Monitor magazine case. The wrong one was Monitor, but 
Kompas was hit. And the motif is more economic in nature: gangsters looking for money. 
Because, after we explain them, then everything is clear. You give them a drink, you give 
them transportation, ask them to go home, they will do it. While in the room, they were 
very mad. What kind of protest is that? It is a part of an era where a protest is financed. 
Now the same still applies. The protest in 1970s was not like that. 
Q: Does Kompas also change in such a situation? In the repressive era, you need a kind 
of professionalism. Can the professionalism be more empowered? Be more utilized? 
How? 
A: Yes. Professionalism and idealism. With the motto of Kompas, ‘Amanat Penderitaan 
Rakyat’ (Voice of the People’s Suffering), we can make it real. We are very open to write 
anything. It is only about the way to write. In the past, not even about the way to write, 
with such a material we could be bridled. That is the first. The second one, a media in 
such a repressive era is just like riding a bubble. Rosihan Anwar mocked it as ‘crab 
journalism’. When you hit, you get back. But now you get back not so far. Much easier 
now. Very much different. And the burden like in the era of Orba (New Order) does not 
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exist anymore. We are not scared to be bridled now. Concern yes, but fear no. The 
problem is only about to ‘cover both sides’. In the past we had to do it with the 
government, and now we have to cover all sides. If not, they can protest. We need 
confirmation not only to one party but to various parties. We still need toleration. Only 
the fear of losing our jobs is not as big as in the past. In the past, there was always a fear 
that we could be easily jobless. Now such a feeling does not exist anymore. 
Q: Do you teach special strategies to your journalists internally to keep this 
professionalism? 
A: Yes. It is about the training and introduction when someone is recruited. When 
someone joins us, we train him / her for one year. Half a year in the class, and half a year 
in the field. Just because we have urgent needs to fulfill especially in Central Java and 
East Java, perhaps soon Bandung, it may not be six months but only three months. In the 
training period, we introduce the values of Kompas, namely the philosophy of Kompas. 
We also plant the values of idealism where a journalist should be independent, critical, 
does not easily get satisfied, be more accurate, and so on. All of these at the initial step. 
Then on the way, if there is a journalist who violates the values, we give him / her 
warning. Warning from the unit leader, then from the higher position, and in the last six 
months there has been an Honorary Council which reviews cases related to the job, and a 
suspicion of violation related to the job. For instance, a journalist writes some news by 
mentioning a source, while in fact no source has ever been interviewed. This is a big 
case. It is the business of the Honorary Council. A warning will be issued. A warning 
from the Human Resources Department, not only from the Editor. If the person gets three 
warnings, then he / she has to step out. There are a lot of cases like that.  
Q: Is there any special arrangement where a press company has to have a kind of ISO? 
A: Yes. We have a General Rules for the company that applies for all employees, 
including journalists. For instance, you cannot take a bribe.  
Q: Anything specific for a journalist? 
A: Unfortunately not yet. But we can refer to the General Rules. For instance, the 
previous case where a journalist writes an interview while in fact there is no interview at 
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all. It will certainly go to the Code of Journalistic Conduct, though it can be very simple, 
but it is more complete and it can be our reference. For instance, if a journalist writes 
some news without any confirmation, you can refer to the Code of Ethics. We can apply 
it. Nothing is written about it, but there are some rules about employees, namely the 
General Rules of the Company. 
Q: Do you see any increase or decrease in the number of colleagues who have been given 
the warning? 
A: Yes. But not so many than the previous years. In the era of Habibie, there were one or 
two people, but later the number went up. This year (2005), there have been four people. 
Previously, two people. No one in the more previous year. For instance, they use some 
other people’s materials. The term is cloning. Another instance, you didn’t come to a 
place but you said that you were there. This is a serious violation. Especially such a 
violation. But no violation about bribery in Kompas.  
Q: What are the reasons behind? 
A: The reason is that they do not work thoroughly. In the past, you had to look for 
materials as many as possible. We were fortunate to have enough ample space to write. 
Now with shorter pages (after the changes starting from July 28, 2005), it is much easier 
to be minimalist. Then because it is minimalist, then you just assume that there is an 
interview. That is a real minimalism. Also about the mentality. Now people will not work 
thoroughly. Moreover, now the spirit of minimalism is very sexy. Then the impact is like 
that, you count everything. The second one, now there are a lot of information source. 
You do not need to come to the place; you just need to read the breaking news in the 
Internet. It seems that you were there, while in fact you were never there. We were 
protested because the source knew that the Kompas journalist was not there. We only 
knew after being protested. The source protested because of Kompas. Perhaps the source 
would not give a damn with other papers. The name of Kompas is indeed a burden as 
well as an advantage. The advantage is that we are trusted as a barometer. The 
disadvantage is that our small mistakes, even more our bigger mistakes, are all recorded. 
For instance, you wrongly quote something, for instance a foreign word, a Javanese 
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word. It is very embarrassing. Is there no Javanese in Kompas? Then also about English, 
and sometimes you show off with Latin.  
Q: Now about the higher level, the Honorary Council. Is it internal or external in nature? 
A: It is internal, and its duty is to provide suggestion for this ‘ombudsman’ (we also have 
our own internal ombudsman). This ombudsman has a more binding recommendation 
and evaluation to us, the management. The Honorary Council reviews the things related 
to our works, not about the bribery it does not influence the works.  
Q: How do you see the value of this ombudsman? 
A: Very great. It was established in 2000, then two years later there was an evaluation, a 
detailed calculation, about the percentage that it was utilized and about the follow ups of 
its inputs. Their comments were about the evaluation of the whole performance of 
Kompas. In addition to criticizing they also provide recommendations including 
proposals. More than 80% of the proposed evaluation and recommendation have been 
applied by the management. The management is the Editor, the management is the 
business. Then we decided to continue the existence of the ombudsman. For instance, 
there was an issue about an investment ad where you could get some amount of money. 
Well it was a lie. We published the ads several times, but the ombudsman warned us. 
Then we don’t want to accept such an ad anymore. The ombudsman also proposed 
something to be taken care (to be covered, investigated, reported, and so on). At first, our 
colleagues did not understand about it. Then an editor answered that we had reported it, 
but we would write it again because it was high again now. Such a thing happens because 
there are economists in the ombudsman. Now the person is Faisal Basri, in the past was 
Sahrial Jalil. We would write it, but it was already leaked. Also about ‘graduate’ ads. 
When Kompas published it, the ombudsman alerted. And we do not publish such an ad 
anymore. Also when there is an ad, then suddenly someone protests why such an ad is 
published. We answer that we have been bound by a contract, and we have to wait until 
the contract is expired and we will not publish such an ad anymore. Then there was an ad 
from a health clinic offering aphrodisiacs. We had not published such an ad for a long 
time, but when it came up, it was seriously debated in the ombudsman. We decided not to 
publish such an ad anymore, but then there was an ad ‘Tarzan von Klinik’, then there was 
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a strong protest why such an ad could be published. Then the advertising department 
answered that they published because there had been a research, not only because that it 
was hot. OK. Things like that. But we make use their inputs. The ombudsman has a 
meeting every month. Then we, the unit leaders (editorial, business, research and 
development, TI, human resources), we discuss the inputs on Tuesdays. But for 
Wednesdays, if it is related with the editors, then there will be an editorial meeting like 
that has just happened at 14:00 (Wednesday). 
Q: About violation to professionalism, what is the proportion between the economic and 
political matters? What do they find most? 
A: Accuracy, not only words but accuracy of data, accuracy of issues. They are really a 
very great team. The chairman is Mr. Ashadi Siregar, previously was Mr. Atmakusumah, 
a person from the newspaper Indonesia Raya. The vice chairman has been Abdul Hakim 
Garuda Nusantara since the beginning up to now. In the economic department there were 
Sahrial Jalil, Yuska Ismail, and Sofyan Djalil. Sofyan Djalil is an economist and he does 
not know much about the press. When he was in the position of an expert staff, he was 
inactive. But he knew about the media here (the ombudsman of Kompas). Sofyan Djalil 
was replaced by Faisal Basri. For the media department, there is Luwi Iswara, a former 
Kompas journalist and he is a trainer at the training department, and he studies a lot about 
the media. He just published a book named ‘The Basics of Journalism’ (2005). It is a very 
good book. And now we have a woman there, Lies Markus. In the past we didn’t have 
one. Then there is Masdar Mas’udi. Why him? Because at the time Islam was at the hard 
line, and we wanted do be appropriate about Islam. After everything has been much 
clearer, then we didn’t need him anymore. We have become more professional.  
Q: So, its influence is very great, isn’t it? Please tell me about before and after you have 
the ombudsman. 
A: Well, perhaps it is great enough. There are a lot of direct inputs from outsiders. There 
was none in the past. These people are hired to provide us with inputs. We pay them. 
Q: How many media companies in Indonesia which have such an ombudsman? 
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A: An ombudsman like in Kompas is only here. In the past there was a similar 
ombudsman, owned by Suara Indonesia, East Java. But this team only dealt with letters 
from the readers. So they treat the letters from the readers as inputs from outsiders. In 
Kompas, that is not the way to do. The letters are just a part of the inputs. So, in principle 
we seek for a way to be more professional as a part of the development of a civil society. 
That is the grand talk, but in short is how we can be more marketable. So the order is like 
this: first professionalism, then trust, then the development of a civil society. In Indonesia 
there is only one with an ombudsman that is Kompas.  
Q: Did you have any reference when you established the ombudsman? 
A: Sweden. Once I wrote about it in Masyarakat Warga … but I forget about it. Our 
reference paper is Asahi Shimbun. Ombudsman means representative. It started in 
Sweden, a country with a relatively quick establishment of the civil society. You can find 
an ombudsman for this, an ombudsman for that … The form of an ombudsman for the 
media is relatively like that. I met the Ambassador of Sweden, then I borrowed him the 
book… then I wrote in a book … The Swedish model is about how the public can have 
an access to criticize the media. It is about how the general public can control the media, 
so that the media can be a part of the civil society. Who controls the media in Sweden? 
That can’t be the government. It is the civil society that bridles, warns the government to 
provide freedom to the media, and controls the media. There an ombudsman is a 
representative of the public to control the media. In Indonesia it is different. It is the 
media (Kompas) that invites the ombudsman to ‘control’ the media. Once I depicted in a 
film that the public was going to run a class action to the court to give an influence. The 
public provided inputs to the media.  Things like that. In my opinion, the ombudsman of 
Kompas is independent in nature, and we make use their inputs. I’m sure that they will be 
very disappointed if their inputs are not made use. They usually ask about their previous 
inputs.  
Q: Well, that’s the controlling role of the ombudsman. What about the role of the owner? 
A: The owner is Mr. Jacob. Mr. Jacob also controls, but he is also involved, he provides 
inputs and assignments. Perhaps not a direct assignment, but we can understand it. For 
instance, if he said that we should have a picture about India, China, and so on. So there 
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is always a day to day control from the owner. What Mr. Jacob likes is to directly phone 
the respective party. For instance, to the chief editor, to my place here. My department is 
about TI, management, human resources, and research and development; then often 
everything goes to me. But for coverage that is closely related to me, like education, 
religious, relationship with Islam, then he would directly go to me. He would complain to 
me. For political and economic issues, he would directly go to chief editor or to the desk 
head.  
So he gives color to almost everything; also for news coverage. Sometimes he 
asks, for instance about Akhmadiyah, to the chief editor for Islam (Suryopratomo), and 
he gets the information that it is only about Islam and Islam. And he understands that 
matter, and he wants a coverage about a tabligh akbar (great congregational meeting). We 
are very sensitive. The question is, can we have an opinion? The general public wants us 
to give our opinion, and this is also recorded by the ombudsman team. Mr. Jacob, as the 
general leader, thinks that we have to give our opinion, a kind of guidance to the readers. 
For such a thing, I myself have to write it. He will not complain to the chief editor. For 
instance, what about this? Please later try to raise this issue! Ok, I will forward this to the 
chief editor (Suryopratomo). But when I also follow the ongoing process in the field, like 
visiting the birthday party of Gus Dur, and I meet with people. Such a thing is closely 
related to coverage. Such a thing can often be used to get a confirmation. He is a thinker; 
he always challenges. So when he has not had the confirmation, he would continue 
thinking. If the country is in such a situation, he cannot sleep. What the media can do; 
what Kompas can do? He is always thinking. For us, perhaps we would just say, OK, just 
leave it. But he cannot behave like that. He cannot sleep. Well it is true. He often drops 
here, just like if he wants to go a meeting, to throw out his complaints. What does it 
mean? It means that he is fully involved. Because this is his world. And this owner 
always says that he is a journalist, not a businessman. His soul is a journalist.  
Q: What is the book of Mr. Jacob that represents Kompas most? 
A: Only ‘Pers Indonesia’. What else? Collection of Editorials (Kumpulan Tajuk), 
Humanism? Now what he is going to develop is reflected in the latest article of the 
Special Edition (August 16, 2005). Mr. Jacob wrote one full page, ‘Tiga Panggung’ 
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(Three Stages). The first stage is the political one, the second stage … I forget about it … 
the third one is the economy for democratization. Let us give the chance for the economy 
to be involved there. And he always refers to the book, ‘Culture Matters’. These things 
have not been written in those books. This is his thinking paradigm; his main ideas that 
had come up one year before he earned the doctorate degree at UGM, in April 2003. Now 
it is still going on. For instance about the oration of Mr. Sarbini. This is quite appropriate 
that capitalism is not only about economics but about the inside spirit … that comes from 
‘Culture Matters’. That is the he thinks about the media today. How the media can play a 
role in the economic stage, in the business group, to join the development of the benefits 
of the general public. What was written by the media in 1970s has already gone. This is 
the new one. Please refer to his speech at the lecture of Koentjaraningrat, published in 
Kompas, when he gave his presentation in Bali, during the world publishers’ meeting in 
2004, and also here in August 2005. They are the pillars of his ideas about the media. 
Unfortunately, there are not many media thinkers. They only think about the 
business side. How can the media develop the society? Well, it is required that the media 
should be strong first. Perhaps the others have not been strong yet. For instance, Jawa 
Pos. In fact it can do it, because it is already strong. They can perhaps think like this. 
Surya Paloh is strong, but he gives more emphasis to practical benefits; he uses the media 
for his political interest. As a matter of fact, the person like Leo (Batubara) is good, but 
he is unfortunately in charge of a media (a company). Perhaps Atmakusumah. Perhaps 
Tribuana Said. No more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
431
15.   YB. Wiyanjono, former member of the Indonesian Democratic Party Fraction of the 
House of Representatives, member of Special Committee of the Draft of the Press 
Law year 1999, Yogyakarta, July 30 and August 10, 2005 
 
(Q): What is exactly the meaning of freedom of the press? 
(A) : Freedom of the press is the manifestation of human rights to express thoughts, 
opinions, and truth on one hand and to access information on the other hand, for the sake 
of human life development. Freedom of the press is the basic requirement of a democratic 
life as the manifestation of people’s sovereignty. But, freedom of the press is also a 
freedom that is guaranteed and protected by the state to seek for, to collect, to prepare, 
and to distribute news, opinions, announcements, and thoughts through the press to 
anybody who is willing to get it.  
Q: Was this formulation different from the one of the Soeharto’s era? 
A: The formulation in the new Bill of the Press Act is short, straight forward, and general 
in nature. While the formulation of the one in the era of Soeharto was very much detailed 
in the duties and obligations (section 2, article 2 of the Press Act no. 21 of the year 1982).  
For instance, in the article on the role of the press, there was a clause about the need for a 
positive interaction between the government, the press, and the public (section 2, article 
3, of the Press Act no. 21 of the year 1982) that was then meant to be the accountability 
of freedom of the press (section 5, article 2). That is also the case for the functions of 
control, criticism, and correction that were limited up to the constructive ones in nature as 
common during the era of Soeharto; and this was only seen from the government’s point 
of view. As such, the press was very much in control because if the press dared to deviate 
from the rules as dictated by the government, then the press faced the risk of having its 
SIUPP (press business license) revoked. That’s why, the formulation of freedom of the 
press as mentioned in section 4 that was said as “no sanction and bridle would be applied 
to the press”; and also in section 5, article 1, ‘freedom of the press is in line with human 
rights of the citizens and is fully guaranteed’ was only an inconsistent lip service. 
Q: Why was there such a difference in those formulations? 
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A: Changes were needed to provide a clear and proper legal basis for freedom of the 
press. There were some supporting factors, namely a) the fall of Soeharto’s 
administration, b) consciousness and strong will from various parties to rearrange a 
democratic life as soon as possible, c) the press had been long in such a repression. The 
fraction of PDI agreed with the Bill of the Press act proposed by the government to be 
discussed and perfected to be the Press Act because it was basically already in line with 
the ideal hopes of freedom of the press. In the House of Representatives there were three 
versions of the Bill, namely the version proposed by the government (the minister of 
information), the version proposed by the House, and the version proposed by the MPI 
(the broadcasting community of Indonesia). Bambang Sadono from the Golkar fraction 
formed an ‘initiative proposal’ though its mechanism was the old one. Then the 
government proposal was taken as the material of discussion and the other two versions 
were made supporting materials.   
Q: What formulations were specifically proposed by the FPDI? 
A: Some concerns of the FPDI were: the annulment of mandatory registration for press 
publishers (Bill of the Act, section 6, article 2) and about the news office (section 7, 
article 2); freedom for the journalists to join their own professional organizations of 
choice; the provision of legal immunity (protection) for journalists in conducting their 
journalistic profession; strengthening the existence of the Press Council by minimizing 
the interference of the executive in it; annulment / minimization of implementation 
regulations that were subject to the Rules of the Government and the Decisions of the 
Ministers. 
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16. Trias Kuncahyono, Executive Chief Editor of Kompas, Yogyakarta, September 3, 
2005 
 
Question (Q): What is the practice of freedom of the press in these different 
administrations? 
Answer (A): In every administration there is a distinct practice of freedom of the press. In 
the era of the New Order, it could not be said that the press is the fourth pillar of 
democracy because the role of the government was too strong; it could even make the 
press undeveloped. There was no confirmation about what was said by the government or 
government officials. For instance, if it was said that the supply of rice was enough or the 
harvest was good, there was no confirmation at all and nobody went to the field. One just 
needed to believe what the Minister of Information or the Minister of Agriculture said. 
Anything was just taken as it was because in one hand it was impossible to have a 
recheck in the field or to make some news that was different from what was meant by the 
government. According to the theory of journalism, the emphasis of some news was not 
on ‘why’ but on ‘who’: the person said this; the person said that, and so on. It was more 
about the statement of someone (‘who’). It happened during the period.  
There was a term called ‘the Free and Responsible Indonesian Press’. The 
question is about how free it was and about to whom the responsibility was. As a matter 
of fact, the press should be responsible to the reading community. The control of the 
government was as strong as manifested, among others, through the ‘phone culture’. 
Even for the highly valued news, it still didn’t work. Just the simplest instance, a military 
aircraft fell down. Such a thing was not allowed to be reported while in fact the people 
knew that a military aircraft had fallen down. Such a thing could be a news report, 
because the fact was manipulated. A photograph about an aircraft lying down on a rice 
field (where it had fallen down) was depicted with a caption telling that the aircraft had to 
make an emergency landing. 
The political situation of the time was not conducive for papers to grow so that 
the subsequent impact was the underdeveloped reading culture. At the time, the freedom 
of opinions and freedom of expression were very poor. The existence of the only one 
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journalist organization (PWI) was also a control of the government. It was ruled that 
everyone who wanted to assume a structural position in a newspaper, for instance the 
executive chief editor and the chief editor, was obliged to be a member of the PWI. No 
PWI membership, no license to assume a structural position in a newspaper. That was the 
situation. So if there was a newspaper that was not in line with the government, it would 
be bridled, would be taken an action, or would be given a phone call. This is a story about 
paper bridling in 1978. When Kompas was bridle for tow weeks (the Malari upheaval), 
Kompas could be published again with this condition, that condition, and so on. Kompas 
was not allowed to touch the family of the president. This also applied to other papers. 
That’s why the papers could not develop. If you trace, this also applied up to the 
ownership of local papers.  
The situation changed when people said the reform era came. When the New 
Order regime fell down, there came a lot of media, just like mushrooms in the wet season 
with various visions and missions; and also tabloids. It showed that there was freedom, 
but only in the number of papers, but not in the substance. In the past, for instance, 
people were proud if they could secretly read and own a copy of magazine Detik. When 
everything was already open, then nothing was special anymore with Detik. When 
Habibie opened the door of freedom of information, then everything was out of control. 
Then I saw that a media was not purely for the sake of information but for a solid 
business interest as seen that everything could then be made. There could be a media 
without a strong foundation of vision and mission, and the primary drive was only 
business interest. But it was then conducted by neglecting professionalism. While in fact 
there should be vision in the first place, then professionalism, and then could only follow 
the business interest. There came various medias without sufficient ethical foothold. They 
grew because the number of journalists who lacked of appropriate ethics. We just saw the 
infotainment side. But from the development point of view, the press could get better 
access for information. There was freedom for information and freedom for distribution. 
It would be ridiculous if there was freedom for distribution without freedom for access.  
In the era of Gus Dur, the situation was much more open. It was really 
developing. We saw so many organizations, and also organizations of journalists. They 
were so many so that it was not important anymore. Concerning the position of the 
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government to the press, there was no problem in the era of Habibie, nor was in the era of 
Gus Dur.  
Q: Were there certain issues in the respective administrations? 
A: In the era Gus Dur, it tended to be no problem. He was so open. I said that there had 
been a control by the government. But after the reform era, the control was on the hands 
of the readers. There was a phone culture and also there was this or that restraint, but now 
there was nothing to control from the readers. When someone was not happy with a 
certain news report, the simplest way was for the person to call or to send a letter. The 
person could also send summation or even provoke the mass. That is the real change, so 
that accuracy becomes very important. It was an important one, a kind of mandatory rule, 
an iron rule nobody could violate. But now it is because of the huge responsibility to the 
readers. 
In the era of Megawati, she also gave freedom and she did not get mad easily for 
criticism. Now the president is very sensitive to criticisms. But the openness is still there. 
The development of the press in Indonesia has been very fast as compared with, for 
instance, Iraq. In the era of Saddam Hussein, the control by the government was so 
strong. Even it was only Babel owned by a son of Saddam that could be the only source 
of information of the government. A dictatorial regime is really like that. When he fell 
down, then suddenly a lot of media came up. There came a lot of print media. There 
should be regulations in such a situation. When the media played around and someone 
got mad, then a regulation was made. Pretty much the same. When the political situation 
is free, one enjoys freedom. One uses it too much. That often happens. This also happens 
here, where the press crosses the line. Just because we enjoy freedom then we often 
forget the rules of the game, the ethics in media and so on. For instance, Rakyat Merdeka. 
People say what kind of journalism is that. Headline journalism, for instance ‘The Mouth 
of Mega Smells Diesel Oil’. From an ethical point of view, it is not ethical at all. But that 
what happened. And people bought the paper. Sometimes they bought the paper because 
they thought that it was representing in their mind at the time. I dare not to say but other 
people do. That is what I say as crossing the line.  
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Q: In the era of Habibie there was an issue about Andi Ghalib and Kompas wrote about 
it. Was there any objection from the government?  
A: I am sorry, I don’t remember about it. In Kompas, the rule is clear, so we are too 
cautious about things. If we don’t really know about something, why do we have to play 
with it? We can reach these 40 years of age because we have clear rules of the game. We 
are not allowed to hurt somebody’s feeling, we are not allowed to embarrass people, we 
are not allowed to corner people, and so on. The rules are clear about those things. So we 
can have a strong foundation. What has happened since the past up to now is that there 
are a lot of issues that are not taken care by the media and they have just gone away. For 
instance about corruption. Usually it takes only the first 2 weeks for a busy tumultuous 
noise then it is gone. Why? Because there are so many issues and the media can also be 
influenced. This is very clear around the election. It was fully used. Now it is already 
clear that the media is going to be used again. There are certain medias that deliberately 
approach the government. Now there is a trend like that to approach the government, 
even for the next election in 2009. If you pay an attention, then it will be very clear. For 
instance when we read about the economic crisis yesterday. You will see how papers, 
also Kompas, said that ‘the government was not decisive’, ‘it was only about discourse’, 
and so on. While ‘Seputar Indonesia’ told the contrary, ‘this is because the decisiveness 
of Yudhoyono’. What is happening here? But because we know that ‘Seputar Indonesia’ 
is going to be used for the 2009 election, there is a mixed business and political interest 
there.  
Q: Is there any difference in journalistic professionalism between before and after the 
New Order? Where do you find difficulties in applying professionalism? 
A: As a matter of fact, the regulations were so tight in the New Order era. So we had to 
be very professional and we had to avoid the obstacles. Could we be called very 
professional? No failed harvest, no famine. But could we check what it was in the field? 
And could we say that the reality was like this? We could not do that. If we could, what 
did we have in mind? There was no critical inquiry, while on the other hand it was an 
indispensable condition for journalism. From that point of view, being professional as a 
journalist was not as much as we should. We had to take anything said by the 
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government. That’s why the news was only about ‘who leads’. The president, Soeharto, 
said this … The minister, Harmoko, said that… Now things have changed and the trend 
is to the questions of why and how, and this fact requires a high degree of 
professionalism. No one will accept anything you say without any confirmation. We 
cannot do it without check and recheck. If something is just quoted like it is, for instance 
if we just write down as it is reported to the police, it can be wrong. The police often 
write incorrectly and inaccurately. That is why the requirement for professionalism is 
very high in order to give something really balanced and really factual. We are confident 
to write about famine in Flores because there is famine in the field. This is really a very 
professional work. Because of the openness, then the requirement for professionalism is 
very high. If you don’t apply very high professionalism then the readers will say that this 
paper has to be put aside because nobody likes if the paper just writes down anything 
people say. There are changes in the way to write news, namely not only on the basis of 
what is said by people. Tomorrow morning you can already have the facts. As I 
mentioned before, it should be started from a vision, then professionalism, and only then 
you can sell it.  
Q: Is there any effort in Kompas to make the professionalism higher? 
A: Definitely yes. It is started from the education. Since early the beginning of being a 
journalist, it has been given an emphasis that education is a requirement of the era. The 
way to do things has also to be changed. We can no longer only accept opinions from one 
side. At least there should be two people. Or for instance, if we receive a statement that 
furniture producers are in trouble because of insufficient raw materials or because of the 
very unfavorable exchange rate of rupiah, then I have to ask my journalist about who said 
so. My journalist says that it is the chairman of the association. Well, then I say to him / 
her to go the field to see how the producers are. Or perhaps about the issue of famine. 
The best example is probably the case of educational subsidy that should have been given 
some months ago. The government says that the subsidy has been given. Is that correct? 
Check to the field to find out whether it has already given or not. The fact is that it has 
not been given. We have to highlight this because it is based on hard facts in the field.  
Q: Any special requirement in Kompas? 
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A: Yes, it is accuracy. If there is information that someone has conducted corruption. Is 
this correct or not? Only from that we can build credibility. If we can say, the only thing 
we have is credibility. If people trust our paper, it will also be good for business. This is 
what I mentioned before. First there should be a vision, then follows professionalism. 
And professionalism will give birth to credibility. And with credibility, our business will 
be good. If the four of them are not met, for instance if there is a vision it is not 
professionally applied, then there will be no credibility. If you are not credible, no one 
will trust you, and no one will buy. So, accuracy has become so important today. Even 
people now will question small things like mistyping. Another example, if you write in 
English, if it looks right but in fact it does not, then you have to look up in the dictionary.  
Q: The three administrations: Habibie, Gus Dur, and Mega, they said that they were 
always criticized and attacked by the media, was it because of the era or …? 
A: Perhaps the situation is like this. We are critical to things. The media says that it is 
critical to things but the government says that it is attacked. In my opinion, they are just 
not ready for that. We have seen for decades that nobody has been fond of being 
criticized. So, being criticized is in fact being given an input; and it should be accepted. 
But we know that our level of willingness to be given some inputs is very low so that, for 
instance, Mega says that the media is very unbalanced. In fact Mega put herself as the 
most powerful person and as the untouchable one. But it is already the requirement of the 
era. I would see that the government is not ready for things like thing (being criticized). 
The government is not ready to admit their incapability. If you criticize the government, 
it is translated as you condemn it. In fact criticism means to develop. But they can say 
that they are attacked. But I say, or Kompas says, that we don’t hit haphazardly. For 
instance today (September 3, 2005), Mr.Yudhoyono has been mad with Kompas. What 
does it mean? See the focus today, ‘The Indecision of the Government …’ Everybody 
knows that the government is very indecisive, but when this fact is made an editorial, 
then it becomes a big problem. So, in my opinion, the government is not yet mature in 
democracy. The readiness for criticism and for being warned is not yet mature.  
Q: Each of the three administrations has its own way in dealing with criticism, doesn’t it? 
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A: For Soeharto’s administration, it is already clear. Habibie is a western – educated 
person. The press was let free even uncontrolled. So the press touched his close friends, 
he was a bit shocked and he tried to find ways to push the media. Gus Dur is a democrat 
person and you can dialog with him. He took easy criticism. Perhaps because Mega is a 
woman, she was relatively easy to deal with the press, much better than now. She was a 
president who did not get easily mad with criticism and did not take revenge against 
criticism. If in a speech she said that the press was unbalanced, that is the most she did. 
That is quite different with today (SBY). Gus Dur is a democrat man, and he tends to be 
an easy going person. And he did realize the importance of the press for democracy and 
maturity of the nation. I am fully convinced that according to Gus Dur, the maturity of a 
nation lies in the openness of the press. So in fact the direction has been quite good. The 
door was opened by Habibie then perfected by Gus Dur, so that later the press could be 
step by step the fourth pillar of democracy. But it will only happen if every media keeps 
its vision. But most of them tend to the business side only. A new newspaper, for instance 
‘Seputar Indonesia’, is very much business oriented. Another example, ‘Media Indonesia’ 
is not clear in its direction. First it supported SBY then it is against him. Or ‘Jawa Pos’ in 
local areas is not professional at all because it sells one full page for Rp. 400 million 
rupiahs every month. The content is just like in the past. It is very much like a stage or a 
microphone for whoever buys the page. It has lost its critical capability. The function of 
the media is weak. I say that it is not professional anymore. People will go to a more 
critical paper. Starting from the reform, the intention has been to place the press as the 
fourth pillar; not to be disturbed by business or political interests of certain people and 
also the interests of the owners themselves. Being the fourth pillar means being a real 
watch dog. But I am still questioning about it.  
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17.  Zainal Suryokusomo, a member of Indonesian Broadcasting and Press Society 
(MPPI), Yogyakarta, September 28, 2006 
 
Question (Q) : How is growth of broadcasting world after Soeharto? 
Answer (A) : The broadcasting growth after Soeharto: to my opinion, there are no 
significant changes.  I might be wrong.  What interesting is that the televisions owned by 
Soeharto children also broadcasted the fall of Soeharto: RCTI, SCTV, TPI.  It was 
because of the urge from their journalists, I think.  But, significantly, are there any 
changes?  To my opinion, there are not.  No changes.  Finally, after falling, Soeharto 
handed over the authority to Habibie, finally broadcasting business ran as usual, not far 
different from the past.  That’s the point.  Of course, there was something quite valuable 
that was media had the freedom to express and the opportunity was that big.  Jokingly, 
we, in MPPI, when foreign friends asked to what extent our freedom was, told that the 
freedom in Indonesia was bigger that that in your country.  It means that there were 
public sectors that turned out to be not protected by broadcasting media, especially in the 
sector of protection for children.  To my opinion, those all return to the freedom, whether 
it is really in the name of expression freedom.  Some people said it was not the 
expression freedom as the base of the movement but it was the broadcasting media was 
the god of rating especially commercial broadcasting media.  However, the truth was that 
no other things changed but the freedom.  
Q:  There was a new Regulation, wasn’t it?  Regulation year 1997 that once prevailed.  
What was the function? Was it because made in Soeharto period?  
A: Broadcasting Regulation No 24 year 1997 never prevailed effectively. I don’t know 
why. I thought it was due to pressure from certain group of civil society but on the other 
hand, if we are frank, Habibie governance seemed to freeze Regulation No 24 year1997. 
They did it because the government was approaching general election.  Everything was 
based on such considerations.  The validation of Regulation no 32 year 2002 was 
interesting because it was so phenomenal.  The growth of commercial media became so 
extraordinary.  It was not just booming of quantity increase but the grouping got tighter. 
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”The phenomena of broadcasting media was Oligopolistic phenomena, got tighter.  ”We, 
in MPPI, always said that the number of stations would increase but the number of 
owners did not necessarily increase.   Because what happened was the grouping.  I heard 
that the permit (national) of all television stations had just been released, while for radio 
stations, there were still problems.  In radio there were also ownership changes.  I don’t 
know whether it is shift of shares ownership.  Although Kompas Gramedia Group (KKG) 
is majority in TV7, is it followed by the change of the 49 in TransTV.  The information 
said that all of the eleven televisions had got the permit (new, extension), based on 2002 
Broadcasting Regulation.  In terms of radio in Jakarta, there were 39 out of 48 got 
problems.  In West Java there were some with such problems as ownership.  Thus, the 
first problem was related to the third last problem, more tendency of media control by 
commercial media.  Domination of government media was more distinctive.  Please 
imagine.  I forget the chapters.  One of the chapters: it can make network but when 
making a network in a certain area where a booster station had been there, the booster 
station was permitted to operate.  The question was why should there be a network in that 
place.  Furthermore, there were other articles.  For radio, the allowed national content 
was 60%, meaning that local could be 40%.  For television, the permitted national 
content was 90%.  It became so absurd.  Meanwhile, in Government Stipulation no 51, 
which regulated community media, the content was decreased.  Not just the broadcasting 
power that was decreased but also the area coverage.  Thus, actually with two 
Government Stipulations, it was contrary to the Constitution, article 28 F.  In the 2002 
Broadcasting Regulation, around article 31, what were allowed for national content were 
just public broadcasting institutions, television and radio.  The other, the privates had to 
be local and were allowed to make network.  Unfortunately, when making network was 
allowed, in the Government Stipulation it was loosened.  Indonesia became a very weird 
country.  When such capitalist countries as the United States of America limited 
broadcasting (national television) tightly, Indonesia did not do it.  On the other side, there 
was frequency robbery by national television that actually was intended for local 
interests.  SCTV, for example, took around 50 and it was only SCTV.  All televisions 
must take (other frequencies), because there are only 5 or 7 at most that can be national.  
Consequently, there must be boosting in locals, repeaters.  Whose frequencies are those? 
Locals’ frequencies.  Please check in KPID DIY.  If I am not mistaken, there are only two 
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frequencies available for local need.  They were used by “national” televisions and  it was 
confirmed by the government.  
Q: Does it prove strong influence of capital owners?  
A: I suspect it does.  Due to strong industry lobby, their position is strong.  It does not 
happen in television only, but also in radio. The quantity of such network ownership can 
be ”unlimited”, although in one article it is mentioned, when we talk about radio, in the 
20th or 30th affiliation or network.  It only had 5%.  However, if the 5% is distributed 
throughout Indonesia, just imagine.  As I mentioned before, the tendency is getting more 
visible.  One day, the number of stations would increase (radio and tv) but the number of 
owners would decrease.  This is a universal phenomenon.  
Q: If television tended to be to 3 groups, what about its relation to Broadcasting 
Regulation?  
A: As I told you, tendency of broadcasting media is oligopolistic, like such grouping.  
The constitution created through Government Stipulation must have foundation: content 
diversity and ownership diversity.  So, if a certain group occupies a certain area, it will be 
impeded by constitution so that it does not occupy too much to give opportunity to others 
to enter as well.  Ownership diversity must also be protected because it will influence the 
content diversity.  It happened with ownership of parts of TV7 shares by TransTV, now 
the ramadhan programs are the same.  Whereas, TV7 should have its own characters to 
keep the diversity.  Again, the Government Stipulation as the legal foundation did not 
protect ownership and content diversity principle.  On the other hand, media 
conglomeration took place.  And when we talk about cross ownership, Jawa Pos now also 
enters Sumatera.  It seems that they use Jawa Pos (Radar) model, not in the center but in 
local areas. But it gnaws national market, doesn’t it? BaliTV seems to do the same, the 
proof is that part of JogjaTV is also owned by them.  There is such a tendency.  It also 
happen in radio.  There was also such grouping with those radios that once were 
developed.  That’s the danger with the cross ownership. Kompas group has printed 
media, radio media, and television.  Later that we talk about market control. There is no 
rule for that, in United States there is. Except in that Antimonopoli regulation.  It should 
have been regulated in the Government Stipulation but as a matter of fact it is not.  We 
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already have Regulation for Children Protection, in the program the P3SPS must refer to 
Regulation of Children Protection.  
Q: Does that situation show close coalition between entrepreneurs and authority?  
A: I think so.  If you learn Government Stipulation no 50, you will see such a suspicion. 
This really gives opportunity of control by commercial media.  Although in open 
discussion, the government always denies that.  
Q: After the Government Stipulation prevailed, was there any effect on broadcasting 
institution and practice the Government Stipulation or to Broadcasting Regulation?  
A: Finally in status quo position because there were two judicial reviews: one by KPI and 
the other by civil society.  In the case of permit, however, the government kept on 
working.  The government was more powerful than KPI because KPI was weak and was 
legible to be required for its accountability. Again, there would be consequence if the 
Government Stipulation prevailed: there wouldn’t be many changes in Indonesian 
broadcasting world.  I wan to say that if there are violations the government will close its 
eyes “like this”; it sees (violations) but doing nothing.  It will persist that way.  It will be 
waste of time talking about democratization through broadcasting media.  It’s so far 
away.  Unless the civil society give massive pressure.  
Q: The status quo showed the conflict interests between the government and CS tended to 
be to the government?  
A: Actually, without the big demonstration the government (executives) would not be 
overthrown. However, there is another government that is never overthrown although it 
has been overthrown (executive), who is that: bureaucracy.  Thus the problem is in 
bureaucracy.  For example Department of Communication and Information, its 
bureaucrats are in the old eyeglasses. It is not just in the Department of Communication 
and Information but in similar departments.  Wasn’t it interesting when Megawati as the 
president said: ”I can tweak minister’s ears but not bureaucrats’”.   I agree and executives 
can do nothing to improve.  When does Minister of State Apparatus Disciplinary exist? 
That ministry had existed since Soeharto but it’s never settled.  Now the term in use is 
State Apparatus Empowerment. That contributed to law enforcement weakening.  
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Because they also became... permit is salebale, isn’t it?  And that takes place in all 
sectors.  
Q: Which department was influencing most?  
A: This became unclear, because with the existence of Government Stipulation, the 
permit was issued by the government.  Moreover if it lose, KPI was just supernumerary 
in broadcasting issue in Indonesia.  The problem was that the permit had to be reported to 
the minister, even though the legalization was through Department of Justice but the 
process still had to be through the minister.  Back to it, who was below it? Again: 
bureaucracy.  Then, what about the fate of the permit.  It was on sale.  I am not sure there 
would be any changes with the implementation of Broadcasting Regulation. In 
conclusion, government interest was just sales or money than politics, for example (2009 
General Election).  It seems there is relationship with political powers that will compete 
in the general election.  Although some colleagues in commission I in legislative join in a 
group defending KPI.  Will they just be as they were or defend their interest.  What can 
be relied is actually CS but its movements become ineffective because the problems get 
complicated when we talk about coordination.  We don’t have to talk about 
democratization, for instance about media consumer interest.  It is so neglected because 
the tendency anywhere is that universally electronic media are carriers, supporters and 
developers of pop culture.  When we talk about it, the people of Jogja who were suffering 
from the earthquake talk about local wisdom.  That’s nonsense!   With the current 
broadcasting system, I am doubtful of talking about future social life.  Demoralization 
will take place, undefendable, although NU had released the rules.  There must be 
massive movement.  The problem is how such movement must be developed.  Not 
necessarily big, but when NU released the rule to prohibit watching electronic cinema 
(sinetron), it must be responded immediately.  Make an approach to other civil society, 
the voice of Catholic, protestant clergy, and the others must be hugged to go to the 
direction.  
Q: In an infotainment journalistic discussion, such an idea was present.  
A: KPI was invited many times but it always refused.  Moreover, now, the one in Jakarta, 
all the eight nominate themselves.  
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Q: From ownership point of view, is there any similarity in television industry?  
A: You know, the people in MNC, RCTI Group, Global, TPI, it’s Haritanoe.  It also 
entered to newspaper (Sindo) and magazine (Genie).  It planned to enter to 100 radio 
stations in Indonesia.  And it sounds so. Retjo Buntung in Jogja, started from radio now 
to televisi.  Luckily, it did it first, leter it would not get.  I think there is similarity.  This 
might be influenced by the character of money that cannot stop.  
Q: Was still there anything free or unoccupied?  
A: Indosiar was still free. Republika Group was in cooperation with Tommy Winata for 
Jakarta TV.  It also had entered to radio.  Thus, it started from newspaper, to radio and 
then tv. That’s the tendency.  Lativi was not or not yet. Neraca was dying as well but it 
was continued by Zulharmans’ son.  Latief once supplied fund, but he is a merchant, isn’t 
he?  Unfortunately, the television media fell to a merchant’s hands.  Murdock did not 
start as a merchant or information merchant if we categorize him as a merchant, but the 
background was an information person. Haritanoe is a money merchant. Latief is a 
retailer.  TV7 still, JTV, BaliTV started from information. Indosiar is a money 
conglomerate. 
Q: How was the role of legislative? 
A: They complained, related to government persistence to legalize the Government 
Stipulations.  Because they did not have such authorities as veto and embargo, they 
would act in budgetting.  Let’s see whether they will do the threat.  I am not sure.  
Q:  So, the map did not move significantly?  
A: No.  From the fall of Soeharto, it didn’t.  The change was: from Regulation No 24 
year 1997 of which characteristic was very authoritarian to Regulation No 32 year 2002 
that was more democratic but it was cut again when entering to Government Stipulations. 
History recurred.  
Q: What about stepping back to Soekarno time? 
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A: At that time, as soon as we were independent, what existed was not public 
broadcasting but Office Radio (RRI), owned by department of information. Monopolistic. 
TVRI was more ridiculous because it was only enterd lately, it was a Foundation.  
Through government stipulation or president decree or it is enough with Minister Decree 
to enter TVRI as part of Directorate of Information Department.  I lasted for long, even 
until Soeharto time, it was still under Department of Information.  In fact, it was Soeharto 
who opened Indonesia to broadcasting autonomy.  Initially, radio and television were 
owned by the governmet then during Soeharto time the dual broadcasting time prevailed. 
When there is government, there is private institution.  But, the privates of Soeharto time 
were subordinates of the government.  May be, that was the biggest change, if I may call 
it.  It means that broadcasting harvested freedom and freedom became extraordinary 
while broadcasting needed control, and this was almost uncontrolled.  Then, is it an 
improvement? I would say: no.  
Q: So, what are positive sides of freedom?  
A: The society becomes more open, braver, that’s all.  But on the other side, there are 
destroyed values that have to be developed.  About local wisdom, for example, don’t talk 
about that.  When electronic media prioritizes pop culture.  The freedom, however, leads 
the society to courage and that is positive.  The current government is relatively careful.  
Q: Is it possible that judicial review becomes form of conflict of interests?  
A: For sure, the executives will win, but we have voices.  So, I suggest that we make the 
“white book” to clarify the consequences if the Government Stipulations are executed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
